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ABSTRACT
LONERGAN ON THE HISTORICAL CAUSALITY OF CHRIST:
AN INTERPRETATION OF THE REDEMPTION:
A SUPPLEMENT TO DE VERBO INCARNATO

John Volk, B.S., MBA, M.Div.
Marquette University, 2012

In 1958, the Canadian Jesuit theologian Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)
completed a draft of a major text on redemption. He stated that the text was to be an
addition to his book De Verbo Incarnato, with the purpose of explaining the historical
causality of Christ. The Lonergan Research Institute, Toronto, has produced a
preliminary English translation titled The Redemption: A Supplement to De Verbo
Incarnato. To date, there has been no interpretation of this text. This dissertation aims at
making a contribution towards the remedy of this lacuna in Lonergan studies. The
dissertation interprets Lonergan’s understanding of the historical causality of Christ,
through an interpretation of his text.
The dissertation employs the methodology of what Lonergan named the
“hermeneutical circle:” the meaning of the whole is grasped through the parts, and the
parts through the whole. In this dissertation, each chapter is interpreted in the wider
context of the whole. Each chapter is also interpreted in the order presented in
Lonergan’s text, since that text is organized according to what Lonergan, following
Aquinas, calls the ordo disciplinae or ordo doctrinae, the order of learning and teaching,
the ideal mode of explaining systematic understanding.
Lonergan’s understanding of the historical causality of Christ follows from his
understanding of history itself, where the fundamental unit is culture and the fundamental
nature of human causality is social. Lonergan understands culture through a set of terms
and relations he names the “human good of order.” This order is an expression of
cultural meanings and values, whether for good or evil. The historical causality of Christ
involves a proper causal series in which God’s redemptive agency is mediated into
human history, through Christ and his members, to transform cultural evil into good by
transforming cultural meanings and values. The principal meaning and value is the “Law
of the Cross.” According to the divine plan, this law is the governing principle of
salvation history. Since human causality is fundamentally social, the historical causality
of Christ is mediated through others who understand this law and judge it as worthy to be
chosen.
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CHAPTER 1:

1.1

INTRODUCTION

The Purpose of the Study

The Canadian Jesuit theologian Bernard J.F. Lonergan (1904-1984) is regarded by
many as one of the greatest philosophical and theological minds of the twentieth century.
He is best known from his works Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (1957)1 and
Method in Theology (1972).2 His historical scholarship on the thought of Thomas
Aquinas is represented in two groundbreaking and perhaps definitive interpretations of
Aquinas,3 making Lonergan one of the world’s foremost Thomist scholars. His literary
output extends far beyond these works, including a handful of texts in Christology.
Among these texts is an unpublished Latin manuscript written during his years at
the Gregorian University.4 He did not give a title to this work. In early circulation it was
known from the opening pages as De bono et malo, or simply De bono.5

1

Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, vol. 3 of Collected Works of Bernard
Lonergan, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992).
Originally published in 1957 (London: Longmans, Green, & Co.). Hereafter cited as Insight.
2
Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972). Hereafter cited as
Method.
3
Robert M. Doran, S.J., “Lonergan: An Appreciation,” in The Desires of the Human Heart: An
Introduction to the Theology of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Vernon Gregson (New York: Paulist, 1988), 2.
Doran references the following works: Bernard Lonergan, Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the
Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, ed. J. Patout Burns (New York: Herder and Herder; London: Darton,
Longman and Todd, 1971); Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, ed. David B. Burrell, C.S.C. (Notre
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967). Each has subsequently been republished as part of the
Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, eds. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran , vol. 1 (2000) and
vol. 2 (1997), respectively.
4
Lonergan taught at the Gregorian University from 1953 to 1965. The autograph Latin typescript of the
manuscript is found in File 657 in the archives of the Lonergan Research Institute with the label “Bono et
Malo etc. 179 pp,” and File 674 with the label “De Opere Christi (art. 35-44).” The former contains the
first five chapters of the work. The latter contains the sixth and final chapter. The six chapters of the Latin
manuscript can also be found on www.bernardlonergan.com at 25300DTL060, 25310DTL060,
25320DTL060, 25330DTL060, 25340DTL060, and 25460DTL060, respectively.
5
Frederick E. Crowe, S.J., Christ and History: The Christology of Bernard Lonergan from 1935 to 1982
(Ottawa: Novalis, 2005), 102.

2
Lonergan handed this text over to Frederick Crowe in August 1972, stating that
the text was to be an addition to his book De Verbo Incarnato6 with the purpose of
explaining the “historical causality” of Christ.7 The work was never added to the book.
The Lonergan Research Institute, Toronto, has produced an unpublished English
translation of De bono titled The Redemption: A Supplement to De Verbo Incarnato.8
The University of Toronto Press, in collaboration with the Lonergan Research Institute,
plans to publish this text as volume 9 of the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan
(CWL), under the general editorship of Robert M. Doran and Frederick E. Crowe.
This dissertation is driven by the following question: What is Bernard Lonergan’s
understanding of the historical causality of Christ in the Supplement? My purpose is to
understand Lonergan’s understanding. As such this dissertation is an interpretation of the
Supplement.
The following question naturally arises: why a need to interpret the Supplement?
The rationale assumes that the task of interpreting Lonergan’s thought should precede the
tasks of developing and implementing his thought.9 There has been some research on
specific sections of the Supplement, but not a full interpretation.

6

Bernard Lonergan, De Verbo Incarnato, Third edition (Rome: Pontifical Gregorian University, 1964).
Hereafter cited in text as DVI. Any references to DVI will rely on Charles Hefling’s unpublished English
translation, The Incarnate Word (Toronto: Lonergan Research Institute, 2006).
7
Crowe, Christ and History, 100.
8
Bernard Lonergan, The Redemption: A Supplement to De Verbo Incarnato, unpublished English
translation of De bono, trans. Michael G. Shields, S.J. (Toronto: Lonergan Research Institute, 2000).
Hereafter cited in text as Supplement. I will rely on Shields’s translation in citations from the Supplement.
Page numbers will reference both the original Latin text and Shields’s translation. Lonergan’s original
Latin text will be referenced as De bono et malo, abbreviated DBM. Lonergan numbered the first 179
pages (Chapters 1 to 4). From page 180 on I will add an asterisk (*180, *181, etc.). Shields’s English
translation will be referenced as the Supplement.
9
Frederick Crowe, who along with Robert Doran is the general co-editor of the CWL, makes a compelling
argument for the ongoing task of interpreting Lonergan as a preliminary step in developing and
implementing Lonergan’s thought. See Frederick E. Crowe, “The Task of Interpreting Lonergan,” in
Appropriating the Lonergan Idea, ed. Michael Vertin (Washington: The Catholic University of America
Press, 1989), 145.

3
Furthermore, Lonergan’s early theological writings, including the Supplement,
were written in Latin, a barrier for many contemporary theologians. Only in recent years
have English translations been made available.10 Complicating this problem is the fact
that neither DVI nor the Supplement has been published in English, though both are
scheduled for publication in separate volumes of the CWL. Finally, the Supplement, as
with Lonergan’s theological writings in general, is less known than either Insight or
Method. Although Insight and Method have tremendous implications for developing the
categories Lonergan envisioned for a contemporary systematic theology, neither was
intended to understand explicit theological doctrines.
My motivation for interpreting the Supplement is based on a deep interest in
Lonergan’s theology of redemption. In DVI, he identifies the intrinsic intelligibility of
redemption as the “Law of the Cross.”11 In the Supplement Lonergan not only develops
the notion of the law of the cross, but he also develops an understanding of how Christ, as
historical agent, moves others through their intellect and will to embrace this law.
I stumbled across a description of Lonergan’s law of the cross accidentally. In
2005 the pastoral director at my local parish handed me a copy of an article by Joseph
Komonchak, titled “The Violence of the Cross: A Mystery, not a Punishment.”12
Komonchak argued that the mystery of the cross was not a necessity, not a punishment
from God, but a mystery: “The reign of sin and death was absorbed by his [Christ’s] love
and forgiveness, a frightful evil was transformed into a transcendent good, an execution
10

For example, Lonergan’s Latin treatise on a systematic Trinitarian theology, De Deo trino, Pars
systematica, has recently been published in English. See Bernard Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics,
vol. 12 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, eds. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour, trans.
Michael Shields (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007).
11
Lonergan, De Verbo Incarnato, 576.
12
Joseph Komonchak, “The Violence of the Cross: A Mystery, not a Punishment,” Commonweal 132 (Jan
28, 2005), 19-22.

4
became a self-sacrifice.”13 He went on to say that this understanding is what Bernard
Lonergan called “the law of the cross.” I had known Lonergan’s name in association
with Insight and Method, but until then I had no knowledge of his theological writings,
and certainly no knowledge of the “law of the cross.” I found the argument compelling,
sending me on a journey to learn more about Lonergan’s soteriology.
The reason the pastoral director of my parish handed me this article is that she
knew I was deeply interested in a particular theological question: how do we understand
the salvific significance of Christ’s passion and death? The cross is the primary visual
symbol of Christianity. Yet the literal meaning of the symbol recalls an ancient method
of torturing and executing undesirables with maximum degradation and humiliation,
meant not only to kill, but to send a political message. Crucifixion was a symbolic act
with a clear and frightening meaning.14
The sad history of crucifixion circles back to the question: how do we understand
the salvific significance of Christ’s passion and death? Like others, I was exposed to
many interpretations of the cross. Some I found problematic, particularly theories
tending to understand Christ’s passion along the lines of “satispassion” or “penal
substitution.” Since that time, through study of Lonergan’s theology of redemption, I am
hopeful that Lonergan offers the Church a systematic theology of a very difficult doctrine
while avoiding what he himself would consider problematic interpretations of Christ’s
passion. And he does so while remaining faithful to the Leonine injunction vetera novis

13

Komonchak, “The Violence of the Cross,” 22.
N.T. Wright, Jesus and the Victory of God (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996), 543. On the history of
crucifixion see Martin Hengel, Crucifixion in the Ancient World and the Folly of the Message of the Cross,
trans. John Bowden from the German “Mors turpissima crucis: Die Kreuzigung in der antiken Welt und die
‘Torheit’ des ‘Wortes vom Kreuz,” (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977).
14

5
augere et perficere – to enlarge and enrich the old with the new.15 Lonergan adopted this
injunction as a central inspiration for much of his life’s work.16 His adoption of the
injunction is exemplified in his effort to reconcile the permanence of the meaning of
dogmas affirmed in the constitution, Dei Filius,17 promulgated by the First Vatican
Council, with historicity characterizing human thought and action.
In brief, the rationale for an interpretation is a means toward an end. The end is to
develop and implement Lonergan’s thought. The mission of the Lonergan Research
Institute is to preserve, promote, develop, and implement the work of Bernard
Lonergan.18 My hope is that this interpretation contributes to this mission.

1.2

The Date, Purpose, and Structure of the Supplement

1.2.1

The Date

When Lonergan handed the text to Frederick Crowe in 1972, Lonergan stated that
the text dated to 1963-1964. However, in at least three letters from Rome during the
period 1956 to 1958, Lonergan discussed progress on the manuscript. Crowe states:
From 1956 to 1958, in at least three letters from Rome, Lonergan spoke of a major work
he was preparing. On June 12, 1956, he wrote that he was planning a work on
redemption. On November 17, 1957, he reported that he had started work on it in that
academic year. On May 25, 1958, he wrote: ‘I have got 6 chapters (45 articles) on the
redemption pretty well done. May be able to bring manuscript to Halifax’ (he was to
spend the summer in that city.)19
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Based on these letters, the dating of 1963-1964 is problematic.20 The letter of
May 25, 1958, provides convincing evidence that the Supplement was essentially
completed in 1958. Whether Lonergan brought the manuscript to Halifax is unknown.
His main work in Halifax during the summer of 1958 would have been the lectures on
Insight, subsequently published as Understanding and Being.21
We can only speculate on why Lonergan mentioned 1963-1964 for the dating of
the manuscript. He may not have fully known the contents of the folder he handed over
to Crowe. Or perhaps ca. 1963 he began to edit the work of 1958. Crowe notes that the
manuscript does show evidence of an unfinished state: for example, the lack of
numbering of pages after page 179.22
Another theory is that Lonergan completed chapter 6 of the Supplement sometime
between 1960 and 1964. The evidence is based on the fact that there is a section of the
1964 edition of DVI which is lacking in the 1960 edition. The section is titled “vita
humana et historica” (human, historical life) and according to Crowe it corresponds
closely with material found in chapter 6 of the Supplement.23 Perhaps after Lonergan
had written DVI he may have thought to incorporate material from the Supplement.
It is thus possible that Lonergan completed chapter 6 between 1960 and 1964, and
then introduced the section “vita humana et historica” into the 1964 edition of DVI. This
is only a hypothesis which tries to reconcile Lonergan’s own statement against the May
1958 letter stating that he had completed six chapters. However, for the purpose of this
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dissertation, I will assume Crowe’s hypothesis that the Supplement was substantially if
not fully completed in 1958.

1.2.2

Purpose
Lonergan’s stated purpose was to explain the “historical causality of Christ.”24

He once summarized his own lifework as follows: “All my work has been introducing
history into Catholic theology.”25 Lonergan’s desire to introduce history into theology
was part of his theological project to embrace shifts to modernity which he considered
authentic. One of these shifts was from classicism to critical history. Classicism holds
the mistaken view that culture is normative, that there is just one human culture.26
Critical history holds the view that culture must be conceived empirically, and that there
are many cultures. Critical history acknowledges the fact of historical process, and seeks
a historical perspective that attempts to understand cultural developments in investigating
how patterns of living, institutions, and common meanings develop over the course of
history. This may be called a historicist viewpoint.27 Lonergan’s concern to move from
a classicist to a historicist viewpoint influenced his entire philosophical-theological
project.
In the first chapter, Lonergan identifies the guiding question of his Supplement:
how are earthly realities of redemption to be brought together since it is our duty to work
with Christ? He quotes Ephesians 1:9-10 as the mystery prompting this question, a
24
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mystery hidden in God to gather all creation in heaven and earth under one head, Christ.
However, Lonergan’s question is more limited: his question relates to how earthly
realities are to be brought together. Lonergan’s hope was that a deeper and more fruitful
understanding of the answer to this question would underscore how important the great
gift of redemption is in addressing contemporary problems, since through God’s grace
human agents cooperate with God in bringing these earthly realities together. Therefore,
although Lonergan’s purpose in the Supplement was part of his larger project to introduce
history into Catholic theology, his desire to embrace historicity was not solely for the
purpose of advancing an understanding of the historical causality of Christ. There was
also a practical purpose. In the Supplement, a more fruitful understanding of redemption,
through an understanding of the historical causality of Christ, would hopefully lead to a
more fruitful praxis in cooperating with God to address contemporary problems. I will
return to this theme in my final chapter.

1.2.3

Structure

The Supplement includes six chapters and forty-five articles. The Supplement is a
rather large text, and the six finished chapters in the English translation come to eightythousand words. An abbreviated outline is presented below:
Chapter 1:
Chapter 2:
Chapter 3:
Chapter 4:
Chapter 5:
Chapter 6:

Good and Evil (articles 1 – 8)
The Justice of God (articles 9 – 15)
On the Death and Resurrection of Christ (articles 16 – 21)
The Cross of Christ (articles 22 – 25)
The Satisfaction Given by Christ (articles 26 – 34)
The Work of Christ (articles 35 – 45)

The Supplement does not follow the thesis format of DVI, even though Lonergan
had told Crowe that the work was to be an addition to DVI. This is a question I will take
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up in the conclusion of the dissertation. The dating of the Supplement relative to DVI
makes Lonergan’s comment an enigma. The Supplement reads as a standalone text on
redemption, not as a supplement to an existing work.
Chapter 1 on “Good and Evil” is essentially a theological anthropology, serving
as background information for latter chapters. Chapter 2 on the “Justice of God” is also
background material, but rather than an anthropology it is a theology, arguing that the
norm of divine justice is divine wisdom. The exercise of divine justice manifested in
creation is the creative act proceeding from God’s will, but an act following God’s
wisdom. The effect is the actual order of the universe in all its concrete determinations.
Chapter 3 is simply intended to collect the relevant passages of scripture in order
to establish the doctrine of redemption. Lonergan did the same thing in Thesis 15 of DVI.
The structure exemplifies Lonergan’s methodology. He establishes theological truths
(doctrines) before he attempts to understand those truths (systematics).
Chapter 4 includes an article on the “Law of the Cross,” which is essentially the
transformation of evil into good, witnessed in Christ as a fact accomplished, but also
addressed as a precept to those who wish to follow Christ. Chapter 4 is very similar in
content to Thesis 17 of DVI.
Chapter 5 includes treatment of the doctrine of Christ’s satisfaction. Lonergan
may have chosen to deal with this doctrine in chapter 5 based on a statement he makes at
the end of chapter 4. There he ends the chapter stating that in no other way does God
draw evil out of good than according to the meaning, the law, the mystery, and the justice
of the cross, and that God would not impose this law on others without imposing it on

10
himself, that is, doing first what he requires of others for the sake of his glory.28 Chapter
5 is very similar in content to Thesis 16 of DVI.
Chapter 6 in the Latin manuscript does not have a title. The file from the
Lonergan Archives simply begins with Article 35, titled “De Opere Christi.” In the
English translation the chapter title is borrowed from the title of the first article, so
chapter 6 in the English translation is titled “The Work of Christ.” Chapter 6 represents
the point where Lonergan explicitly addresses the fundamental question of the
Supplement: the historical causality of Christ.
My purpose in this section has been to provide a brief introduction to the
Supplement. As part of this introduction, it is of help to situate the Supplement in the
context of Lonergan’s other contributions on redemption. I will be referencing these
other works in my interpretation. I provide a brief review of each in the next section.

1.3

Lonergan on Redemption: A Brief Review of His Contributions

1.3.1

Pantōn Anakephalaiōsis (1935)29

Pantōn Anakephalaiōsis is an essay written in April of 1935. As required by the
Jesuits, Lonergan needed four years of theological studies. These years were done at the
Gregorian University from 1933 to 1937. The Pantōn essay was a student essay written
during this period.
The title and topic is taken from Ephesians 1:10. The term Pantōn
Anakephalaiōsis is one part of a seven-part title, which in its totality reads Pantōn
28
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Anakephalaiōsis / A Theory of Human Solidarity / A Metaphysics for the Interpretation
of St. Paul / A Theology for the Social Order, / Catholic Action, / And the Kingship of
Christ, / In incipient outline. The phrase “A Theology for...” governs grammatically the
next three lines, so the last three lines in the title refer sequentially to a “Theology for the
Social Order,” a “Theology for Catholic Action,” and a “Theology for the Kingship of
Christ.” The essay includes an introduction, followed by six parts.30
The basic purpose of the essay is to suggest that a metaphysics is the key to
understanding the Pauline conception of Christ as the pantōn anakephalaiōsis. Lonergan
states that “It is from the basis of a metaphysical conception of man, one in nature and
operation, working through a material to an intelligible plurality in a transient dynamism
in which no man is more than an instrumental cause and no causation fails to affect all
men, that we attempt to interpret St. Paul.”31 Lonergan states that since human operation
is necessarily instrumental, then there is a particular significance to leadership, “to be the
first agent in human history.”32 Adam, premoved by Eve, premoved by the serpent, set
up the reign of sin. Christ, the new Adam, set up the kingdom of God.33 In other words,
premotion, whether from Adam or Christ, results in a solidary chain of causation in
which each instrument transfers the motion received from those before to those that will
follow. Christ originates what Lonergan calls the “absolute Geist of dogma” into the
organism of humanity. The “absolute Geist of dogma” is divinely revealed truth.34
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In this essay, Lonergan understood that matter individuates human persons, but
the idea is the basis of human unity, whether economically, culturally, politically, or
religiously. When there is decline, reasonableness of the idea is not to blame, but sin,
which is the refusal to follow reason. Christ, as the new head of humanity, originates the
idea that will reunify what sin has torn asunder. “The unity of man achieved by intellect
has to be a unity in truth, if it is to be stable. Peace fundamentally is this unity in truth
and only phenomenally is it ‘order with tranquility.’”35 The only truth that can unify is
the absolute Geist of dogma, and this originates with Christ.
Lonergan’s argument depends on a metaphysics of human solidarity, and his
metaphysics of human solidarity is based on his view that human beings are one universal
nature in terms of what we are, in virtue of our form, but many in terms of material
differentiation. This is a philosophical argument. The same argument could be made
theologically, based on revelation that we are made in the image and likeness of God.
Furthermore, no human intellect is an island. What we think is governed by the
historical situation. And the historical situation, at any moment in time, is a product of
the achievements and errors of the past. The point here is that there is a solidarity to
human thought, a unity of human intellects, whether in achievement or error. This unity
of intellect results in what Lonergan calls an “effective” uniformity of wills.36 Why is the
pantōn anakephalaiōsis possible in the first place? Because humans are simply not
individuals. Humanity is an organism, where each person is an instrumental cause. The
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principle of premotion, whether from Adam or Christ, transforms these instrumental
causes into a solidary chain of causation.37
Since the essay is fundamentally concerned with the work of Christ, we can
categorize this as one of Lonergan’s contributions to a theology of redemption. In
Crowe’s commentary, he states that the body of the essay is “through and through a study
of the historical causality of Christ.”38 Thus the Supplement was not Lonergan’s first
contribution to an understanding of the historical causality of Christ. He addressed the
question as early as 1935.

1.3.2

Chapter 20 of Insight (1953)

There is a heuristic structure for anticipating the answer to a question whenever
the object of inquiry admits antecedent determinations.39 In chapter 20 of Insight,
Lonergan develops a heuristic structure for the solution to the problem of evil. His
heuristic structure includes thirty-one points.
In chapter 20, he does not explicitly use the word “redemption” but speaks of
God’s “solution to the problem of evil.” Charles Hefling argues that other writings make
it clear that redemption is what he is talking about.40 For example, in a paper of 1973,
Lonergan refers to Insight’s “rather theological analysis of human history,” conceived as
three approximations. The first is progress, resulting from intelligent and reasonable
human acts. The second is decline, resulting from unintelligent and unreasonable human
acts. The third is a redemptive process resulting from God’s gift of his grace and the
37
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manifestation of his love in Christ Jesus. “The whole idea was presented in chapter
twenty of Insight.”41 Here Lonergan’s statement confirms two points. First, what he
means by a “solution to the problem of evil” is redemption. Second, the structure of
history, as presented in chapter 20, can be understood as a triad of progress, decline, and
redemption.42 In fact, at one point in the composition of the material that would become
chapter 20 of Insight, Lonergan gave the title “The Structure of History.”43 This
structure is not to be understood in a sequential sense. The vectors of progress, decline,
and redemption are always operative in history.
For Lonergan, the foundational antecedent determinations with the greatest
influence on a heuristic structure to the solution of the problem of evil are (1) that there is
an intelligible unity of the actual world order; (2) that this intelligible unity is a product of
God’s wisdom, goodness, and power; and (3) since there are no divine afterthoughts, a
solution to the problem of evil will be in harmonious continuation with the actual,
concrete order of this universe.44 Since there are no divine afterthoughts, the existing
world order, as we currently understand it, already has the potential for the solution. To
state otherwise would be to suggest that God thinks as we do. Thus the solution will be
“within the intelligibility of the actual world order” or otherwise stated in “harmonious
continuation” of the existing order.45 Furthermore, the solution will be one, since there is
one God, one world order, and one problem that is both individual and social. This
41
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solution will be universally accessible. The problem is not restricted to any persons of a
particular class or time, and the solution has to meet this reality.46
There is not space here to cover all thirty-one points in Lonergan’s heuristic
structure. However, of central importance is what he calls “new conjugate forms”
required in the human intellect, will, and sensitivity. 47 A conjugate form is essentially a
“habit,” as understood by Aquinas. These habits will be supernatural: faith, hope, and
charity. These habits allow the human intellect and will to apprehend and cooperate with
God’s solution to the problem of evil. But what of human sensitivity? Lonergan says
that although the solution will be implemented primarily in our intellect and will through
the habits of faith, hope, and charity, the solution must also penetrate to the sensitive
level of human living, since the exercise of human intelligence presupposes “a suitable
flow of sensitive and imaginative presentations.”48 In other words, the solution must
capture our sensitivity and intersubjectivity. Lonergan names this aspect of the solution
mystery, since mystery is not only a symbol of the uncomprehended, not only a sign of
what is grasped, but a psychic force that “sweeps living human bodies, linked in charity,
to the joyful, courageous, wholehearted, yet intelligently controlled performance of the
tasks set by a world order in which the problem of evil is not suppressed but
transcended.”49
Finally, we should note the importance of Insight for its value as a heuristic which
can guide some of the questions in our interpretation of the Supplement. In the epilogue
to Insight, Lonergan stated that in regard to any individual who has embraced God’s

46

Lonergan, Insight, 718.
Lonergan, Insight, 718.
48
Lonergan, Insight, 744.
49
Lonergan, Insight, 745.
47

16
solution to the problem of evil, there is to be added the consideration of “cumulative
historical development.”50 How might one develop this historical aspect? He suggests
this aspect has a peculiar relevance to the treatise on the mystical body of Christ, and that
this treatise would be incomplete if it fails to draw upon a theory of history.51 Statements
such as this give us a clue into the thought of Lonergan on the intersection of redemption
and history, aside from what he says in the Supplement. All of Lonergan’s contributions
on redemption, and particularly Insight, can serve as a heuristic to ask the right questions
in our interpretation of the Supplement. To this end, when we come to his final chapter, I
will explicitly interpret how Lonergan understands history itself as a preliminary question
before I attempt to interpret his understanding of Christ’s historical causality presented in
that chapter.

1.3.3

De ratione convenientiae (1954)52
De ratione convenientiae was Lonergan’s first writing in Christology at the

Gregorian. As was the custom of the time, Lonergan used a manual in the courses he
taught. At the Gregorian he began using the manual of Charles Boyer.53 De ratione
convenientiae was intended as a supplement to Boyer’s manual. Eventually Lonergan
wrote his own Christology manual, DVI, first published in 1960.
50
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The text is known from the three words beginning the title: De ratione
convenientiae, translated as “The Notion of Fittingness.”54 The text is divided into six
parts: (1) The Notion of Fittingness, (2) The Root of Fittingness, (3) The Excellence of
Order, (4) The Conceptually Distinguished Formalities, (5) The Fittingness of the
Incarnation, (6) The Necessity of the Incarnation, and (7) The Purpose of the Incarnation.
De ratione convenientiae addresses the traditional scholastic question concerning
the purpose of the Incarnation. In the text, Lonergan argues that the Incarnation is the
“principle of the restoration of order,”55 first and foremost “for the sake of the order of
the universe, and indeed for the sake of this order according to all its concrete details, and
in a special way as an order disrupted by sin and needing to be repaired by the mercy of
God.”56
The notion of “fittingness” is integral to Lonergan’s argument for the purpose of
the Incarnation. This explains why he begins with the notion and root of fittingness
itself. The text, as the title indicates, is concerned with how theologians apply method to
the question of the purpose of the Incarnation. Having given a number of reasons why
the Incarnation was not “necessary,” following the tradition of Aquinas, Lonergan gives a
brief exhortation to the proper theological method for addressing the question:
From the foregoing [that is, the argument that the Incarnation was not necessary] it is
clear how important it is for a theologian to have a good grasp of the notion of fittingness.
For since fittingness implies intelligibility in the proper sense and yet an intelligibility
that is in no way necessary, a theologian can inquire into the appropriate reasons for
things and understand them without in any way infringing upon God’s freedom and the
gratuitousness of the supernatural order.57
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Section 5, on the Fittingness of the Incarnation, is the longest section of the
manuscript. In Crowe’s commentary, he notes that this relatively long section “might be
called a theology of history in the style of chapter 20 of Insight.”58 In the section
Lonergan discusses three principles which govern the entire movement of human history:
our intellectual nature, our defectable human will, and the help of a merciful God.59 The
three principles correspond to the triad of progress-decline-redemption, Lonergan’s basic
structure of history, which he elaborated in chapter 20 of Insight. Furthermore, Lonergan
lists four elements of the solution to the problem of the reign of sin: (1) a revelation
accepted through faith in God, (2) hope of a life to come, (3) charity, and (4) mystery.
These four elements were previously listed by Lonergan in his heuristic for a solution to
the problem of evil in chapter 20 of Insight. The correlation is not surprising. Lonergan
finished Insight in 1953, though it was not published until 1957. De ratione
convenientiae would have been composed only a short time later, after Lonergan finished
Insight and headed to Rome.60
In terms of chronology and thought, De ratione convenientiae may be viewed as
an intermediate work between the Pantōn essay of 1935 and the Supplement of 1958:
This opusculum [De ratione convenientiae] has some importance for the mediating role it
might play in Lonergan’s thought, namely, between 1935 and the unfinished work on
historical causality in the work I am calling de bono...The mediation found in chronology
matches that found in thought. The dialectic of history and the restoration of world order
through Christ are in continuity with the themes of the pantōn paper on one side (1935)
and with the more systematic treatment of de bono on the other (1958 – as I shall argue).
In between we have de ratione convenientiae (1954) with its three-tiered structure of
history...”61
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1.3.4

The Lecture on Redemption (1958)

On September 25, 1958, Lonergan gave a lecture on redemption as part of a
course titled “The God of Christian Teaching” at the Thomas More Institute in
Montreal.62 Assuming the Supplement was completed in May of 1958, this lecture
represents his next contribution on redemption from a chronological perspective.
The lecture outlines some general features of the intelligibility of redemption. As
with any intelligibility, the intelligibility of redemption is “some act of the mind, some
act of understanding.”63 What is grasped when one understands is named an
intelligibility.
Lonergan lists five aspects in the intelligibility of redemption: (1) while the
redemption is intelligible, it is not a necessity, since intelligibility is not the same as
necessity; (2) the intelligibility is a dynamic intelligibility, meaning that it is not a matter
of deductive thought, but rather dialectical thought: the fundamental element in the drama
of redemption is the reversal of roles described in the New Testament, where the
fundamental reversal is that death, the penalty of sin, has through Christ become the
means of redemption; (3) the intelligibility is an incarnate intelligibility, which means
that it is not abstract; (4) the intelligibility is a complex intelligibility, where “complex”
denotes that the intelligibility of redemption must take into account the category of sin,
which in itself is unintelligible; and (5) the intelligibility is a multiple intelligibility.
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The fifth point on “multiple intelligibility” needs clarification. What Lonergan
means can be clarified by understanding his appropriation of Aquinas, specifically q. 48,
articles 1 – 4, 6, in the tertia pars of the Summa Theologiae. In this series of articles,
Aquinas explains how Christ’s passion brings about our salvation. Aquinas does not
attempt to explain this in a single formula. He is satisfied to explain it under five
different aspects: 1) by way of merit, 2) by way of satisfaction, 3) by way of sacrifice, 4)
by way of redemption, and 5) by way of efficient causality.64 Charles Hefling rightly
notes that Aquinas’s five aspects are not simply disconnected sententiae, “but neither do
they have a clearly intelligible unity.”65
During this lecture in 1958, Lonergan cautioned against forcing the mystery of
redemption into a single, unified viewpoint. He acknowledged the legitimacy of
Aquinas’s approach. However, in an ironic twist, in the last section of the lecture he then
suggests how one might approach a unified view.66 In the published transcription of the
lecture, an editorial note explains that Lonergan’s caution against a unified view is not a
contradiction with his own attempt at that unified view.67 Lonergan inherited Aquinas’s
“multiple intelligibility.” But Lonergan’s own habitual orientation was always to strive
for a unified understanding of redemption.
In the lecture he states that the fundamental category for a unified view is the
category of mystery. Here mystery is not a truth that we cannot adequately understand in
this life, but mystery in the sense of the New Testament narrative: the secret counsel of
64
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God. His clue to a unified view of redemption is to notice how the New Testament
relates the “secret counsel of God” to a number of antitheses: the comparison of the first
Adam and second Adam, the transformation of death into new life and the means of
salvation, the transition from an old covenant to a new covenant. Lonergan would indeed
provide his own unified understanding of redemption, what he called the “Law of the
Cross.” He provided this in chapter 4 of the Supplement, and in Thesis 17 of DVI.

1.3.5

Theses 15-17 of De Verbo Incarnato

DVI was originally published in 1960, with new editions in 1961 and 1964.
Other than the Supplement, Lonergan’s most extensive treatment of redemption is found
in Theses 15-17 in DVI, the last section collectively titled “Redemption.”
The purpose of Thesis 15 is to establish the certitude of the doctrine of
redemption by appealing to the New Testament. Thesis 15 is not concerned with
systematic understanding. The thesis states that redemption denotes not only an end but
also a mediation on the part of Christ’s suffering, death, and resurrection. Lonergan
categorizes this mediation in terms of (1) a price that has been paid, (2) Christ the
Mediator’s vicarious suffering and death for sinners and on account of sins, (3) the
sacrifice offered by our High Priest in his own blood, (4) meritorious obedience, and (5)
the power of the risen Lord and the eternal Priest’s intercession.
In a scholion near the end of Thesis 15, Lonergan recalls that Aquinas listed five
modes or effects of how Christ’s passion brings about salvation: 1) by way of merit, 2) by
way of satisfaction, 3) by way of sacrifice, 4) by way of redemption (price paid, ransom),
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and 5) by way of efficient causality.68 Lonergan correlates each of Aquinas’s articles to
one of his own categories in Thesis 15.
At the end of the thesis, Lonergan states that the several modes and effects of
redemption are “so deeply settled in Catholic thought that it is scarcely necessary to add
to what the Angelic Doctor wrote. When it comes to satisfaction, however, opinions
differ. Accordingly we present next a separate thesis on it.”69
Thesis 16 is Lonergan’s systematic speculation on the meaning of Christ’s
satisfaction.70 Lonergan does incorporate the fact of “punishment” into his understanding
of Christ’s satisfaction, but not in the context of retributive justice. He argues that the
context is one of pardon sought and granted. In this context, Christ’s satisfaction is his
voluntary taking on of suffering and death to express his detestation and sorrow over the
sins of the human race, resulting in the forgiveness of sin and reconciliation between God
and sinners. Thus Christ’s satisfaction was vicarious, and his motivation was charity.
Since Lonergan holds that systematic understanding of the mysteries of faith is
imperfect and analogical, he seeks out the proper analogy. For Lonergan, the proper
analogy to grasp the intelligibility of Christ’s satisfaction is the sacrament of penance,
first suggested by the Council of Trent. However, Trent did not develop the analogy.
Lonergan considers that the intelligible context to understand Christ’s satisfaction has
more similarity to interpersonal relationships than commercial transactions, so he invites
the reader to see the reasonableness of using the analogy of the sacrament of penance to
understand the intelligibility of Christ’s satisfaction. This is why Lonergan understands
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Christ’s satisfaction as an expression of the interior disposition of “detestation and
sorrow.” The language is straight out of Trent’s teaching on the sacrament of penance,
specifically on the nature of contrition.71
Thesis 16 is a systematic theology, but only with respect to the doctrine of
Christ’s satisfaction. It is not yet the “unified view” of redemption Lonergan is moving
towards. That will come in the next thesis.
Thesis 17 is Lonergan’s “unified” view of the intelligibility of redemption. In the
Lonergan community, his thesis is commonly known as the “Law of the Cross” based on
the phrase at the end of the thesis. Thesis 17 formally states:
This is why the Son of God became man, suffered, died, and was resurrected: because
divine wisdom has ordained and divine goodness has willed not to do away with the evils
of the human race through power, but to convert those evils into a supreme good
according to the just and mysterious law of the cross.72

Lonergan gave the title “Understanding the Mystery” to Thesis 17. In Hefling’s
unpublished translation, the subtitle “Law of the Cross” has been added because
Lonergan often referred to his thesis in that way.73 He tended to downplay his Latin
theology, but he considered this thesis a valid achievement.74 He identified the law of the
cross as the “intrinsic intelligibility of redemption.”75 Lonergan himself, in a lecture
given to the Canon Law Society of America, identified his thesis on the lex crucis as the
strictly theological component of the dynamic structure of human history.76
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The law of the cross is a principle of transformation in which evils are
transformed into a supreme good. This supreme good is a new community. The supreme
good is the “whole Christ, head and members, in this life as well as in the life to come, in
all their concrete determinations and relations.”77 The law of the cross is a law embodied
and revealed in Christ, but it is also a precept addressed to Christian disciples. In
summary, Thesis 17 amounts to Lonergan’s systematic, unified intelligibility of
redemption. The law of the cross is without doubt the most well-known and most widely
researched aspect of Lonergan’s soteriology.

1.4

The History of Research on the Supplement

There has not yet been a complete interpretation of the Supplement. Perhaps the
closest we have is a chapter devoted to the Supplement by Frederick Crowe in Christ and
History.78 The scope of Crowe’s project in this book did not allow him to give a full
interpretation of Lonergan’s Supplement.
Bernard Arputhasamy studied the Supplement in order to explicate the
fundamental meaning of Lonergan’s notion of the “Law of the Cross.”79 Although
Arputhasamy’s principal text was the Supplement, his research focused only on the law of
the cross discussed in chapter 4.
In the most recent dissertation on Lonergan’s theology of redemption, Mark
Miller also offers an interpretation of Lonergan. 80 The goal of his dissertation was to
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interpret Lonergan’s understanding of how the passion of Jesus Christ is salvific.
However, Miller does not treat the Supplement.
Charles Hefling has interpreted a section of the Supplement, specifically an
interpretation of article 45, chapter 6, where Lonergan takes up Anselm’s question, Cur
Deus Homo? He presented the essay at the 35th annual Lonergan Workshop at Boston
College in June 2008. The essay was subsequently published in the Festschrift honoring
Robert Doran.81

1.5

Method and Outline of the Study

Methodologically, my research is an interpretation of Lonergan, where
interpretation is understood within the theological method of Bernard Lonergan himself.
For Lonergan, theological method is divided into eight functional specialties: research,
interpretation, history, dialectic, foundations, doctrines, systematics, and
communications.82 Interpretation has as its own proper end to understand what was
meant in the material one is interpreting. The task of interpretation is thus to
communicate what was meant. The intent is to grasp “meaning in its proper historical
context, in accord with its proper mode and level of thought and expression, in the light
of circumstances and intention of the writer....its product is the commentary or
monograph.”83
Within Lonergan’s functional specialties, systematics and interpretation both aim
at understanding. The purpose of systematics is to seek the imperfect and analogical
81
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understanding of the mysteries of faith already judged to be true through faith. Where
systematics seeks to understand the mysteries of faith (expressed in doctrines),
interpretation seeks to understand what others have understood. My study of the
Supplement, although it involves systematic reflection, is not aiming to develop a
systematic theology of redemption. My intent is to understand Lonergan’s
understanding. Since interpretation presupposes research, my work is primarily in the
first two functional specialties, research and interpretation.
Based on Lonergan’s description of the functional specialty interpretation,84 my
approach will seek to understand Lonergan by (1) understanding the purpose and context
in which he wrote the Supplement, (2) understanding the text itself, where the whole of
the text is understood through its parts, and the parts are understood through the whole,85
and (3) understanding the author himself, first and foremost through the Supplement, but
also by making connections to his other writings that are judged, in my opinion, as
relevant to interpreting his understanding of the historical causality of Christ. Close
consideration will be given to Lonergan’s contributions to a theology of redemption, as
well as his writings dealing with causality and/or history.
The dissertation will follow the order of the Supplement. An interpretation is a
communication of meaning to a reader. Following Lonergan’s order facilitates this
communication. Lonergan began his Supplement as he did because it followed the
pattern of what he, following Aquinas, called the ordo disciplinae or ordo doctrinae, the
order of learning and teaching. This order is a manner of presentation that postpones
solutions that presuppose knowledge of other solutions. As such, the next chapter will
84
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interpret the first chapter of the Supplement. Each subsequent chapter correlates to a
specific chapter in the Supplement, following Lonergan’s order. In the conclusion, I will
briefly summarize my interpretation of the fundamental themes in Lonergan’s
understanding of the historical causality of Christ. I will include there a hypothesis of the
Supplement’s relation to De Verbo Incarnato, as well as a brief interpretation of the
practical orientation of the Supplement and how this orientation sheds light on a
contributing factor relating to Lonergan’s motivation to write the text.
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CHAPTER 2:

2.1

GOOD AND EVIL

Introduction
Our purpose here is to interpret the first chapter of the Supplement, titled “Good

and Evil.”1 The first chapter of the Supplement is divided into eight articles: (1) On the
Good in General; (2) The Human Good of Order; (3) Communication: Signs and
Symbols; (4) The Comparison of Goods; (5) Evil; (6) From Evil, Good; (7) Human
Powerlessness; and (8) Original Sin.
Lonergan’s intent to understand the historical causality of Christ has its biblical
roots in the Pauline conception of the pantōn anakephalaiōsis (Eph. 1:9-10). Chapter 1
includes two introductory paragraphs prior to the first article.
To us has been revealed the hidden plan of God's will, ‘to gather all creation both in
heaven and on earth under one head, Christ’ (Ephesians 1.9-10). While it is hardly
surprising that we here below have little inkling about how heavenly things might be
gathered in Christ, it would seem to be a rather more serious matter if we were to neglect
the question of how earthly realities are to be brought together, especially since it is our
duty to work with ‘the one who holds the whole building together and makes it grow into
a sacred temple in the Lord’ (Ephesians 2.21).
Accordingly, we have decided that careful consideration must be given to inquiring, first,
about the nature of the good, how the human good is located especially in order, by what
law the human good of order is corrupted by sin, and finally what human resources there
are for restoring the human good of order. If we have well understood these things, we
shall have a deeper and more fruitful understanding of how important in addressing any
and all of our contemporary problems is the great gift that God our Father has bestowed
upon us in the Holy Spirit through our Lord Jesus Christ crucified and risen.2
1

“Caput Primum. DE BONO ET MALO,” DBM, 1-65 [Supplement, 1-27].
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constructa crescat in templum sanctum in Domino (Eph 2, 21).
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Lonergan’s strategy is to consider good and evil in terms of three movements:
how the human good is located especially in order, how the human good of order is
corrupted by evil, and the potential for restoring the human good of order. Readers
familiar with Lonergan’s interest in history may immediately identify this as a correlation
to his theological analysis of history, commonly articulated as a threefold approximation
of progress, decline, and redemption.3 The first approximation, progress, assumes that
human beings always do what is intelligent and reasonable. The second approximation,
decline, acknowledge the fact of sin, that human beings are biased and so do what is
unintelligent and unreasonable. The third approximation is the redemptive process from
God’s gift of his grace to individuals and from the manifestation of his love in Christ
Jesus.4 Lonergan presented this whole idea in chapter 20 of Insight where he developed
his heuristic structure of the solution to the problem of evil.
Any single approximation in Lonergan’s theological analysis of history does not
explain reality in the concrete, actual sense. Each approximation is an abstraction of a
particular aspect of reality. Reality is explained when all three are considered together.
Now Lonergan’s threefold approximation is essentially a transposition of the theological
categories of nature, sin, and grace into a historical context, resulting in an anthropology
that distinguishes, yet combines, two components of concrete human reality: a constant

3
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human nature and a variable human history. “Nature is given man at birth. Historicity is
what man makes of man.”5
The present chapter is essentially organized according to the three approximations
of progress, decline, and restoration, albeit our treatment of restoration will not
correspond to a treatment of the doctrine of redemption, for the reasons previously
stated.6 Furthermore, we include a section to interpret how this chapter functions as a
starting point for the Supplement. In that section one of our aims is to briefly interpret the
function of Lonergan’s first chapter in the wider context of the Supplement. In citations
from Lonergan’s text, I include page references to the original Latin and the English
translation. The former will be cited as De bono et malo (abbreviated DBM). The latter
will be cited as the Supplement. Lonergan numbered the first 179 pages of DBM.
References to DBM, from page 180 on, will include an asterisk.

2.2

A Brief Description of Articles 1 - 8

2.2.1

Article 1: On the Good in General7

The first article is a metaphysical consideration of the good. Lonergan makes
seven major points: (1) all good is being; (2) good denotes something concrete; (3) good
denotes all things; (4) since only God is good by essence, all other things are good by
participation; (5) since only God is good by essence, we can only understand, conceive,
and know the good imperfectly and analogically; (6) there are two ways of considering
created good: particular goods and good of order. The former refers to things desired.
5
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The latter refers to the concrete dynamic whole which includes the desire, the desirer, the
means of attainment, and enjoyment of the good obtained; (7) there are three ways of
considering the good of order: (a) abstract; (b) schematic, typical, and hypothetical; (c)
actual. The actual order is the one divine wisdom infallibly knows, divine goodness has
effectively chosen, and divine power irresistibly implements.8 Lonergan’s first three
points are all logical deductions from the metaphysical axiom that “‘Good’ and ‘being’
are convertible terms…”9 The next two are based on the doctrine that only God is good
by essence. Lonergan’s source for these first five points is likely Aquinas. 10
Lonergan concludes the article with three doctrines from Aquinas: (1) divine
wisdom orders all things, the divine decree wills all things, and divine power effects one
world order;11 (2) the purpose of the universe is the good existing in the universe, and this
good is the order of the universe itself;12 (3) the universe as a whole is a more perfect
participation and reflection of divine goodness than any individual creature.13

8

Lonergan, DBM, 2-5 [Supplement, 2-3].
“Nam ens et bonum convertuntur;” DBM, 2 [Supplement, 1]. Evidently the Latin phrase ens et bonum
convertuntur (being and good are convertible) became a standard phrase in the thirteenth century, although
various authors gave different interpretations and formulations. See Jorge J. E. Gracia, “Evil and
Transcendentality of Goodness: Suárez’s Solution to the Problem of Positive Evils,” in Being and
Goodness: The Concept of the Good in Metaphysics and Philosophical Theology, ed. Scott MacDonald
(Cornell University: Cornell University Press, 1991), 152.
10
In the epilogue to Insight, Lonergan states that he had spent “years reaching up to the mind of Aquinas...”
See Insight, 769. He was referring to the eleven years of his investigations into the thought of Thomas,
first on gratia operans (the topic of his dissertation) and second on his investigation into Thomas’s thought
on Trinitarian theory, resulting in the series of verbum articles published in Theological Studies in the
1940s, subsequently published as Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas. Aquinas’s doctrine on the
convertibleness of being and good is found in ST I, q. 5, a. 1. Being and good are really the same, differing
only in idea. Goodness presents the aspect of desirableness (rationem appetibilis) of being, whereas being
qua being does not. Thomas’s doctrine that only God is good by essence is found in ST I, q. 6, a. 3.
11
Lonergan, DBM, 6 [Supplement, 3]. ST I, q. 47, a. 3 c.
12
Lonergan, DBM, 6 [Supplement, 3]. ST I, q. 103, a. 2 ad 3m.
13
Lonergan, DBM, 6 [Supplement, 3]. ST 1, q. 47, a. 1 c.
9

32
2.2.2

Article 2: The Human Good of Order14

The second article shifts focus to the human good. The article is divided into
three subsections: (1) the good of order in human affairs, (2) how the human good of
order progresses, and (3) the meaning of “higher culture.”
The Good of Order in Human Affairs: Human beings are born into an existing
good of order, but through their reason and will they establish and improve their own
good of order through historical process.15 They do this because they desire particular
goods in a recurrent manner. Working individually, human beings cannot establish a
good of order. So they form societies. Through collaboration and cooperation they
establish a human good of order that provides particular goods in a recurrent manner.16
The human good of order includes the family, the economy, and the polity.17
How the Human Good of Order Progresses: When a critical history analyzes the
good of order in human societies, across time and across space, we discover great
diversity. This diversity reveals the fact of progress. For Lonergan the cause of progress
is not found so much in external circumstances as in intellectual development.18 The
human intellect is always critiquing the situation and imagining new possibilities. If a
situation is improved, the cycle begins anew. So there is a circular movement to
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progress. “There is no intrinsic reason why this progressive cycle should end, since the
mind by its very nature is said to be that which can make and become all things.”19
Lonergan identifies two aspects of the human good of order: (1) A general
structure independent of time and place. Always and everywhere people desire a flow of
particular goods, they collaborate to create an order to make this possible, and this
collaboration creates interpersonal relationships; (2) An intrinsic principle of change;
improvements continually take place as the result of insights and communal decisions.20
This intrinsic principle of change is Aristotle’s insight that human nature is “that
which can make and become all things.”21 If this principle is understood, factors that
distinguish primitive cultures from higher cultures can be explained genetically.22 “If
such genetic explanation is valid, we may readily grasp both the importance of an
historical understanding of reality and the nature of what is called ‘human solidarity.’”23
A historical understanding of reality, based on genetic explanation, grasps a
general theorem that the human good of order has been built up gradually through history
from the insights and communal decisions of human beings. Human solidarity reveals
that the human good of order is an immense accumulation of insights, discoveries, and
decisions of the past. Virtually everything we learn is through this good of order.24
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The Meaning of Higher Culture: In this section Lonergan distinguishes a third
aspect of the human good of order, the cultural good. The cultural good is grounded in
four innate human desires: (1) the natural desire to understand, (2) the natural desire for
rectitude and for moral consistency between reason and will, (3) the natural desire for
happiness, and (4) the natural desire for immortality. In addition to these innate desires,
human nature includes a “remarkable elevation of feeling” (mira illa sentimentorum
elevatio) and a “polymorphous sensibility” (sensibilitatis plasticitas) revealing us to be
embodied spirits more than animals who have the use of reason.25 The cultural good is
an “internal” good of order, so Lonergan qualifies that the human good of order he has
been describing thus far is the “external good of order” (bonum humanum exterius).26
Human beings are motivated to satisfy their innate desires. They can proceed via
two routes: (1) the mystical route of withdrawal, or (2) engagement with society. The
latter has two stages: primitive society and a more highly developed culture.27
Primitive cultures are not inferior to higher cultures. Both seek particular goods.
Both develop a good of order. Both exhibit a concern with spiritual realities. Both use
signs. Higher cultures, however, reflect on their signs. This reflection develops into a
technical elaboration of signs in the fields of grammar, rhetoric, logic, semantics, and
criteriology. This allows natural intellectual desire to acquire accurate knowledge of

25

Lonergan, DBM, 12 [Supplement, 6].
Lonergan, DBM, 12 [Supplement, 6]. The Latin text suggests that this could also be translated as
“external human good.”
27
Lonergan, DBM, 13 [Supplement, 6]. At times Lonergan uses the term “higher culture” (cultura
superior) to refer to more highly developed cultures. Lonergan gives no source for the term cultura
superior. A likely source is Christopher Dawson’s The Age of the Gods, which Lonergan read in 1930.
The term “higher culture” is a specific term employed by Dawson to analyze cultural development. See
Dawson, The Age of the Gods: A Study of the Origins of Culture in Prehistoric Europe and the Ancient
East (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1933), xiii, passim. First published in 1928.
26

35
natural realities, and analogical knowledge of spiritual realities.28 Without the technical
elaboration of signs, there would be little or no sharing of insights required for cultural
progress. Since the principal distinguishing factor of higher culture is the reflection on
signs, Lonergan states that higher culture resides in the intellect and will. As such, higher
culture, due to its superior power, influences all the judgments and choices through which
the external good of order develops.29 Lonergan ends the article noting that down
through the ages, cultural development is often obscured by great evils.30

2.2.3

Article 3: Communication: Signs and Symbols31

Without the power and efficacy of signs all collaborative effort, all tradition, and
all progress would disappear.32 Lonergan identifies four fundamental principles in the
nature of signs: (1) concretion, (2) conformity, (3) information, and (4) mediation.
Concretion refers to the concrete nature of signification: signs are communicated
from one person to another.33 Conformity refers to a connection in sensibilities between
persons who communicate.34 There are degrees of conformity. Some signs communicate
knowledge. Others evoke sympathy, compassion, or involvement. Information refers to
a conformity between persons in their mutual understanding, judgment, and desires.
When these three are operative, the community is said to be of “one mind and heart”
(animam et cor unum) and virtually certain to will and choose the same things.35

28

Lonergan, DBM, 14-15 [Supplement, 7].
Lonergan, DBM, 16-17 [Supplement, 8].
30
Lonergan, DBM, 17 [Supplement, 8].
31
“Articulus III. De Signis,” DBM, 18-23 [Supplement, 8-10].
32
Lonergan, DBM, 18 [Supplement, 8].
33
Lonergan, DBM, 18 [Supplement, 8].
34
Lonergan, DBM, 19 [Supplement, 8].
35
Lonergan, DBM, 20 [Supplement, 9].
29

36
Mediation refers to mediums of communication. The human body is foremost and tends
to be immediate. Verbal and written communications are mediated.36
Lonergan ends the article describing a far more perfect kind of sign: God’s Wordmade-flesh. Through his flesh Christ communicates what belongs to his human nature
and his divine person. Christ’s signs also comprise the elements of concreteness,
conformity, information, and mediation, but they differ by reason of their pre-eminent
dignity. Whatever the human spirit can do, Christ can do more effectively. Thus Christ’s
signs and all other signs are related analogically. However, both possess instrumentality
for advancing the external good of order as well as interior development of the mind and
the steadfastness of the will. But whereas human signs bring about an earthly
commonwealth, the mystery of the incarnate Word establishes, promotes and brings to
fulfillment the kingdom of God.37

2.2.4

Article 4: The Comparison of Goods38

Lonergan begins with a Thomistic doctrine that God can do absolutely everything
that does not involve an internal contradiction.39 It is the function of divine wisdom to
set things in order. As such, there are as many possible orders of reality (or worlds) as
36
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required for the ordering of all possible beings. And since the end of creation is to
manifest divine goodness, wisdom cannot fall short of attaining its end. Any possible
world is so “sagaciously ordered by divine wisdom” (sollerter per divinam sapientiam)
that it may be chosen by divine goodness as a manifestation of this goodness.40
Lonergan uses the metaphysical elements of potency, form, and act to designate
the order of created good. The potential element is in any possible being. The formal
element is the wise ordering of things. The actual element, or value, is its suitability to an
end and worthiness to be chosen. Whatever is found in created good is necessarily
present in human goods, so human goods can also be divided according to the potential,
formal, and actual elements. The potential element is particular goods. The formal
element is the external good of order. The actual element, value, is the cultural good.41
There is a hierarchy among these three levels.42 The external good of order is superior to
particular goods since it enables particular goods to be had in a continuous fashion.
Cultural good is superior to the external good of order. Cultural good aims at wisdom
and goodness, and through values directs the external good of order toward progress.
Human beings are originated goods, created by God. But since we are made in
the image and likeness of God, by virtue of our imagination, intelligence, and choice we
participate in the divine perfection to the degree that we are also originators of goods.
This corresponds to the notion of personal value in Method.43
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In so far as we strive to maintain and improve the cultural good, we desire
(a) a human imagination that can represent accurately what intelligence conceives as
good, (b) skills and knowledge to wisely order particular goods and also spiritual goods,
and (c) human wisdom and goodness that knows and wills better orders. Wisdom and
goodness are to be preferred to the others based on their intrinsic dignity and
consequences. The wiser and better we are, the more perfectly we express the image of
the triune God. Due to intrinsic excellence of wisdom and goodness, there is an interior
order in the human person where our sensitive part is subordinated to reason, and reason
subordinated to God.44 This interior order is of utmost value.45 The interior order
corresponds to the notion of religious value in Method.46 We are not left to our natural
powers to attain our end, the divine goodness itself: “in the actual state of things it is by
the infused gifts of grace and by these alone that we are set aright and in good order,
constituted adopted sons of God and temples of the Holy Spirit, with personal access to
God the Father.”47
Lonergan concludes the article emphasizing the importance of interpersonal
relationships. Interpersonal relationships have the most bearing on the collaboration and
cooperation that preserves and develops the external good of order and the cultural good.
But Lonergan makes a distinction. There are interpersonal relationships among human
beings, and then there are interpersonal relationships between human beings and God.
44
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The latter preserve and perfect the cultural good through sanctifying grace. Through
actual graces we exercise and develop within ourselves the image of the triune God.48

2.2.5

Article 5: Evil49

Lonergan begins with the metaphysical principle that evil is the opposite of the
good. Since good signifies being, then evil has no positive reality.50 Because evil is the
opposite of good, then evil is divided into originating and originated evil. Originated evil
includes particular evils, the evil of order, and cultural evil.51 The evil of order denotes a
steady series of particular evils, a breakdown in action and coordination, blocking of
coordination through crime or incompetent institutions, and breakdown in personal
relationships. Cultural evil leads people from spiritual concerns to exclusively material
concerns and undermines the unity of minds and hearts by imposing on society an
outward uniformity by force, economic deprivation, or insidious psychological means.52
Originating evil is the cause of all originated evils. Originating evil is linked to
any deficiencies in imagination, intelligence, and rational freedom.53 Among these
deficiencies, the worst is the failure of that which is best, rational consciousness.54
As with progress, there is a circular movement in the phenomenon of decline.55
The failure of rational freedom corrupts the external situation and the corrupt external
48
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situation influences the intellect. Since the corrupt situation is absurd, the intellect cannot
find intelligibility in the situation. Intelligence, finding no intelligibility, substitutes one
unintelligible situation for another. The intellect itself becomes infected and in turn
prevents rational freedom from acting on the situation.
Decline in the external good of order does not leave cultural good untainted.
Culture and life, theory and praxis, the ideal and the real, become alien to each other.
Culture adapts to life, theory to praxis, and the ideal is dismissed as a dream or a myth. 56
“Just like the external good of order, cultural good also is subject both to the law of
decline and the law of progress.”57 Worst among the damage done to the cultural good is
cultural aberration that confuses evil for good, true for false, and hides its own
corruption. Cultural evil can spread its corruption through a society, disseminating falsity
under the guise of truth.58
2.2.6

Article 6: From Evil, Good59

In the world there is a potency to bring good out of evil. This potency is
grounded in our changeable material nature.60 From a materialistic perspective, good is
brought forth from evil in that renewal occurs through the process of death and birth.61
However, there is restoration in a truer sense when our experience of particular
evils reveals to us what a better order might be and directs us to improve the external
good of order and promote the cultural good. But promoting the cultural good and
55
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transforming cultural evils are two different things. Lonergan states that cultural evils
call for a heaven-sent redeemer.62 Another way of stating this is that reflection in itself,
triggered by the individual or social experience of particular evils, cannot endow us with
wisdom and goodness.63 We recall that for Lonergan cultural good aims at wisdom and
goodness, which would explain why he judges that our own resources are not sufficient
to endow us with wisdom and goodness since this would involve the transformation of
cultural evil. In short, we are powerless to overcome cultural evil by our own resources.
This is the emphasis in which Lonergan ends the article, preparing us for the next article
on human powerlessness.

2.2.7

Article 7: Human Powerlessness64

Our experience of particular evils leads us to improve the external good of order,
and our experience of the evils of order disposes us to reflection on cultural good, while
leaving us powerless to overcome cultural evil.65 Thus Lonergan begins the seventh
article by summarizing the conclusion of the sixth article. When cultural evils are not
eradicated, the external human good of order is in constant decline, and ultimately the
human good is totally extinguished. The reign of sin leads to death (Rom 5:21).66
There are four root causes of our powerlessness: (1) darkness of intellect, (2)
weakness of will, (3) the objective difficulty of good, and (4) alienation from God.
Darkness of Intellect: Darkness of intellect is a failure of intelligence to discern
what is truly good. If the intellect does not know what is truly good, the will is not able
62
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to choose the good. This darkness hinders good and spreads evil, though it may occur
without subjective guilt. The solution is learning. However, people are not motivated to
learn unless they want to because of a perceived practical advantage. Many people are so
totally caught up in practical matters that the absurdity of corrupt situations is
rationalized. Learning that does not square with the absurdity is pushed aside. Lonergan
states it is no wonder Vatican I taught the relative necessity of divine revelation.67
Weakness of Will: There is a distinction between the will itself, and the
willingness to act. Human freedom is the essential ability to will or not to will. But
between will and act there are habits and dispositions, developed through experience,
which form the character of our will.68 The weakness of will boils down to the difficulty
in developing the character of one’s willingness. The difficulty is exacerbated because
darkness of the intellect and weakness of the will conspire to strengthen each other.69
Objective Difficulty of the Good: Over time the social proliferation of evils means
that we are going to suffer, and this suffering is not easily tolerated. We incline toward
sin because we shrink from suffering. The way leading from evil, that breaks the vicious
circle, is the way of the cross. Refusing to shrink from suffering denies that the absurd is
absurd and therefore to be endured, resulting in an increase in evils.70
Alienation from God. This is idolatrous thought and action: thinking and acting
that we ourselves are the First Cause, and correspondingly denying that we are
instruments of God to do the good intended by God.71
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2.2.8

Article 8: Original Sin72

This is the briefest article in the chapter, one page in the Latin text. The root
causes of human powerlessness all flow from original sin. What people can do and may
even want to do, they are unable to do. Human impotence reveals humanity’s need for
redemption.73

2.3

Lonergan’s Starting Point
At the beginning of the first chapter Lonergan states that the hidden plan of God’s

will has been revealed, to gather all creation both in heaven and on earth under one head,
Christ (Eph. 1:9-10). Lonergan’s question is how earthly realities are to be brought
together. The restriction of the question to earthly realties is consistent with his statement
to Fr. Crowe that the Supplement had the purpose of explaining the historical causality of
Christ. Lonergan then decides that a careful consideration must be given to how the
human good is put in order, how the human good of order is corrupted by sin, and what
human resources are available for restoring the human good of order.
It is quite evident that Lonergan considers earthly realities through the category of
the good, and that his focus is specifically the human good of order. As such, the first
chapter is essentially an anthropology. Lonergan’s view of the human good of order is
not a static view. It is a historical view. The human good of order progresses and
declines through historical process. As well, human resources can restore the human
good of order, but only to a certain extent.
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Why does Lonergan understand earthly realities through the category of the
human good of order? To answer this we begin by recalling the ending of the first article.
Lonergan cites three doctrines of Aquinas. The first is that the order of the universe is
one, ordered by divine wisdom, chosen by divine will, and effected by divine power. The
second states that the purpose of the universe is the good of the order of the universe
itself. The third states that the universe as a whole is a more perfect participation in
divine goodness than any individual creature.74
These Thomistic doctrines suggest that order plays a significant role in
Lonergan’s understanding of the historical causality of Christ. The suggestion is
confirmed when we look ahead to the sixth chapter of the Supplement to discover his
interpretation of the purpose or end of the Incarnation, and the means toward this end.
The end of the Incarnation is redemption, but Lonergan distinguishes a primary and
secondary end. The primary end is the divine goodness itself. The secondary end is
restoration of the fallen order of the universe. The secondary end is also called the
external glory of God, or the order of the universe which is the most excellent thing in
creation.75 This secondary end, according to Scripture, is also the Body of Christ, head
and members, as all things in heaven and on earth are brought together and reconciled in
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Christ (Eph 1:10; Col 1:20).76 Lonergan also understands the Body of Christ as a good of
order, but in this case a supernatural good of order.77
The means by which Christ brings about this secondary end is not an
eschatological, apocalyptic transformation of the human good of order. In the sixth
chapter Lonergan will consider the historical agency of Christ, and there Lonergan will
state that the effect of Christ’s historical action as a whole is the total human good of
order, both external and cultural, past, present, and future.78 In other words, the work of
Christ is a historical process.
The reason Christ’s work is a historical process, rather than an apocalyptic event,
is based on two fundamental principles. First, although we have been justified by Christ,
we have not yet wholly appropriated salvation.79 Redemption is an ongoing, historical
process requiring human cooperation. This is not absolutely necessary, but it is fitting.80
Lonergan holds to the same position in The Triune God: Systematics: “The end of the
divine missions is not attained without cooperation of human beings: ‘He who created
you without you will not justify you without you.’”81 His understanding of our
cooperation with God should not be interpreted merely as the cooperation to attain
individual salvation. We are called to cooperate with God not merely for our individual
salvation, but because the human good that divine wisdom has ordered and divine power
has chosen comes into existence through human beings who understand, judge, and
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agree.82 Thus there is a social aspect of salvation, a social agency if you will. But social
agency reveals historical agency:
Well now! The very fact that many are linked together so as to be able to have a
common understanding and agreement about the same thing is already a good of order.
Hence human beings need a good of order before they either actuate this same good and
so preserve it or change it for the better or for the worse. This means that a social agent
becomes an historical agent.83

What Lonergan is getting at here is that our notion of history is not merely a
hindsight that discerns transitions from one state to another. History itself is a
constitutive element of the human good of order. The human good and human history are
intimately related in Lonergan’s thought. In fact, in Topics in Education he states that his
notion of the human good is interconvertible with his notion of the structure of history.84
Lonergan’s structure of history is the threefold dialectic of progress, decline, and
redemption we discussed in the introduction. For Lonergan, the human good is a history,
“a concrete, cumulative process resulting from developing human apprehension and
human choices that may be good or evil. And that concrete, developing process is what
the human good in this life is...”85
The second principle, explained in his second chapter on the justice of God, is that
God directs the common course of things in history through secondary causality in
accordance with the nature of things and the laws of nature.86 This theological
presupposition rules out as unfitting a redemption brought about by destroying the
corrupted good and replacing it with something completely new. In God’s redemptive
82
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plan, the human good is not destroyed, but rather transformed in harmony with the world
order which actually exists. To deny this would be to suggest that God’s wisdom, which
orders the universe to every last detail, did not foresee the need for redemption. For
Lonergan, this type of thinking amounts to an anthropomorphic blunder. Divine wisdom
does not learn by experience, or by trial and error. In one immediate intuition, divine
wisdom foresees, orders, and commissions all things from the beginning of eternity.87
In brief, the function of the first chapter in the wider context of the Supplement is
to define what the problem is that the historical causality of Christ is meant to address,
and to setup a general framework to understand how the historical causality of Christ
addresses this situation. Both the problem and the solution are understood by Lonergan
in terms of their socio-historical dimensions, using the basic category of the human good
of order. The human good of order is Lonergan’s fundamental category to understand
history itself. We will interpret, in more detail, his general theory of history when we
come to his final chapter. For now, what is essential to grasp is that Lonergan’s historical
consideration of the human good is a fundamental presupposition behind his
understanding of the secondary end of redemption and the means by which Christ brings
this end about through historical process.
It is reasonable that Lonergan would begin the Supplement with this
presupposition. Following Aquinas, he holds that systematic understanding should
proceed according to the ordo disciplinae or ordo doctrinae.88 This first chapter is
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consistent with this methodology. This first chapter is essentially a historical-minded
anthropology, functioning as background material for the Christology of chapters 3-6.

2.4

The Human Good of Order and Historical Progress
The human good of order is the good in the context of human affairs. Lonergan’s

structure of the human good of order is: (1) particular goods desired by persons; (2) the
external good of order, a concrete dynamic whole that structures human life such that
particular goods can be acquired on a continuous and secure basis; and (3) the cultural
good, which is principally an internal aspect of the human good of order aiming at
wisdom and goodness, and constituted by values residing in the hearts and minds of the
members of a society.
The cultural good, through the apprehension and judgment of values, influences
the emergence and development of the external good of order. The external good of
order arranges particular goods in a systematic way. Lonergan equates the external good
of order with system, which “stands to particular goods as a dynamic artificial form to the
materials put in order by design.”89 What Lonergan means here can be understood
through an example he used during the 1957 Lectures on Mathematical Logic and
Existentialism:
What is an artificial form? Well, if you put bricks and stone and wood together in a
certain way you get a house. But a house is not bricks or wood or stone. It is the order
imposed upon bricks and wood and stone.90
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Thus a dynamic artificial form is not a natural form, but rather a form, an intelligibility,
imposed upon materials by intelligence. When Lonergan states that a “house is not
bricks or wood or stone,” he is suggesting that a random pile of these materials is not an
intelligible unity. It is merely a coincidental aggregate of materials in which there is
some unity based on spatial juxtaposition. But a house is not merely spatial juxtaposition
of materials. A house exhibits an intelligible unity due to the artificial dynamic form
arranging the materials. By analogy, the external good of order is an intelligible unity
imposed on materials by intelligence.
In the second article, Lonergan distinguished two aspects in the human good of
order: (1) a general structure which exhibits uniformity and constancy despite place and
time, and (2) historical progress. We will consider each of these separately.

2.4.1

The General Structure of the Human Good of Order

In the second article Lonergan identified an aspect of the structure of the human
good of order which he termed the “general structure” of the human good of order:
In its general structure it [the human good of order] exhibits a certain uniformity and
constancy in the fact that always and everywhere people seek a continuous and secure
flow of particular goods, that always and everywhere they pursue this series through
coordinated operations, that always and everywhere their collaboration gives rise to both
external public institutions and interior habits of mind, and that always and everywhere
the division of goods, collaborative effort, common institutions, and these interior habits
themselves give rise to interpersonal relationships.91

In describing the general structure, Lonergan’s repeated phrase “always and
everywhere” (semper et ubique) reveals an anticipation of what later in 1959 he would
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call an “invariant structure” of the human good. In her doctoral dissertation, M. Shawn
Copeland studied the genetic development of the idea of the human good in the thought
of Bernard Lonergan.92 Copeland notes that Lonergan made a first and second
articulation of the human good in the 1950s. The first was in the 1951 essay “The Role
of a Catholic University in the Modern World.”93 The second was in Topics in
Education.94
Topics in Education reveals a development in Lonergan’s thought contrasted to
the 1951 essay. In the former, Lonergan identified the human good as having an
invariant structure, a notion he had not previously identified in either Insight or the 1951
essay.95 Lonergan identified three levels of this invariant structure: (1) the particular
good, (2) the good of order, and (3) value.96 Copeland explains what Lonergan means by
invariant structure:
By “invariant structure” Lonergan means that which is true about the human good at any
place or time. It will be helpful to think of an invariant structure as an implicit definition.
Implicit definitions are relational structures, the terms are fixed by the relations. The
concrete meaning can be whatever satisfies the exigencies of the terms and their
relations; that meaning is grounded in direct insights into the objects of inquiry. As an
implicit definition of a society, the invariant structure of the human good identifies and
specifies the basic terms and relations – particular goods, the good of order, value. 97

Lonergan’s notion of the “general structure” of the human good of order is
equivalent to what he later terms an invariant structure, and it should be interpreted as an
implicit definition as Copeland describes. An implicit definition does not designate
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content. An implicit definition designates a relationship between terms, where the
relations are settled by the terms, and the terms settled by the relations.98 Thus the
general structure of the human good of order does not specify any specific particular
goods, or any specific good of order, or any specific set of values. Nevertheless, the
general structure is not merely descriptive. It is explanatory. It grasps the intelligible
relations between the three levels of the human good of order.
As an implicit definition, Lonergan’s general structure is also a heuristic
structure. There is a heuristic structure for anticipating the answer to a question
whenever the object of inquiry admits antecedent determinations.99 As such, a heuristic
structure anticipates the intelligibility of the unknown, and guides inquiry toward
knowing the unknown.100 Lonergan’s general structure of the human good of order thus
admits antecedent determinations: at any place or time, there will be persons desiring
particular goods, a good of order to secure the flow of particular goods, and a cultural
good whose values influence the emergence and development of the good of order.

2.4.2

Historical Progress in the Human Good of Order

What does Lonergan mean by historical progress? For Lonergan, progress is a
cumulative improvement in the human good of order through history. It is not just one
step forward, but the accumulation of many steps forward.101 The notion of progress
acknowledges that improvement is from one situation to another. As a result of people’s
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insights and decisions, an initial situation is improved, and a later situation takes shape.102
The later situation then becomes the initial situation for a new progressive cycle.
Progress is not improvement ex nihilo. This is consistent with Lonergan’s notion of
progress in Insight: progress is a cumulative process.103 In the following subsections we
will interpret Lonergan’s notion of progress according to two themes operative in his
thought: (a) the intrinsic principle of progress, and (b) the social dynamic of progress.

2.4.2.1

The Intrinsic Principle of Progress

Lonergan stated that the reason for the great variety and diversity across societies
is found not so much in external circumstances as in the internal factor of intellectual
development.104 The Supplement uncovers two principles of intellectual development.
One is individual, the other social. The individual principle is Aristotle’s insight that
human intellect is that which can make and become all things.105 In my interpretation of
Lonergan, this individual principle is logically prior to the social principle, and as such it
is the intrinsic principle, the ultimate ground if you will, of historical process. My
interpretation is based on Lonergan’s statement that this intrinsic principle of change is
within human nature itself.106 This intrinsic principle is the natural desire to understand
that will not be satisfied until we know God through his essence.107 Lonergan listed this
first among the four innate desires of human nature.
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This innate desire to understand, that will not be satisfied until we know God
through his essence, is what in Insight is identified as the spontaneous nature of human
inquiry, which Lonergan describes as the pure, detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire
to know.108 This desire to know is manifested in questions for intelligence (what? why?
how?) and questions for reflection (is it so?). For Lonergan, this desire is the ultimate
ground of progress in the human good of order.
The spontaneous inquiry of human nature leads to the spontaneous accumulation
of insights within the individual. Questions are followed by insights, which lead to
further questions based on the incompleteness of previous insights. Lonergan calls this
pattern the “self-correcting process of learning.”109 When given free reign, the pure
desire to know will unfold in a cascade of questions for intelligence and reflection,
leading to an accumulation of insights, which is learning. But learning is not merely an
individual affair. There is also a social dynamic to learning, in other words a social
dynamic of intellectual development.

2.4.2.2

The Social Dynamic of Progress

Lonergan explains that human beings are spontaneously motivated to collaborate
and cooperate so that they may all have a steady, secure access to particular goods. 110
The reason is that individuals, on their own, do not have the resources to create the good
of order that would satisfy their desires. So they are motivated to help satisfy the desires
of others, and collectively everyone’s desires are met. The external good of order results.
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In my interpretation, the social dynamic of progress is equivalent to the social
dynamic of intellectual development. It is the pure desire to know operative in the social
context. It is the desire of human beings to collaborate and cooperate to improve. One
improves one’s lot by helping to improve theirs. Lonergan describes this social dynamic
as a circular movement. The concrete social situation influences a person’s intellect. The
intellect, restless as it is, influences the will to devise something new. Discoveries are
made which beget new ideas. Persuasion among members of the society produces
agreement to introduce new ways of doing things and new ways of collaborative effort.
The external situation improves. Human intellect critiques the new situation, and the
cycle begins anew. There is no reason why this cycle should end.111
This circular process, over time, equates to a cumulative social acquisition of
insights. This leads to another important aspect of the social dynamic of progress, which
Lonergan names “human solidarity.”112 For Lonergan, human solidarity recognizes that
the human good of order is an immense and carefully preserved accumulation of human
discoveries. Since each of us is born into an existing good of order, we learn virtually
everything from this common fund of human discovery.113
Lonergan’s notion of human solidarity reflects the social dimension of intellectual
development, in other words the social nature of learning. Again, we have recourse to
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Insight for some helpful thoughts to interpret what Lonergan is getting at. Human beings,
through their collaboration and cooperation, are also naturally inclined to communicate
and share their insights. In other words, teaching goes hand in hand with learning.
Although Lonergan made this statement in the context of discussing common sense
knowledge, it also applies to theoretical knowledge.114 The spontaneous collaboration
and communication of knowledge is the communal development of intelligence.
In my interpretation, Lonergan’s understanding of human solidarity is an
expansion of his notion of “belief.” He has spoken of belief in a number of works, but
chapter 20 of Insight has perhaps the most comprehensive treatment of the topic.115
Belief is the reception of reliably communicated knowledge, as distinct from immanently
generated knowledge. The latter is knowledge acquired through one’s own cognitional
acts of experiencing, understanding, and judgment. However, the vast majority of any
person’s knowledge comes through belief. Lonergan said that “Ninety-eight percent of
what a genius knows, he believes.”116 Each successive generation benefits from the
knowledge of previous generations.117 Belief is a constitutive component of human
solidarity, but it is only one element. His notion of human solidarity describes a common
fund of human discovery beyond the discovery of knowledge. However, by analogy, his
notion of belief can be used to understand his broader notion of human solidarity.
Finally we need to mention the role that emergent probability plays in Lonergan’s
analysis of human development.118 It is highly probable that this notion was operative in

114

Lonergan, Insight, 197.
Lonergan, Insight, 725-740. See also “Belief: Today’s Issue,” Second Collection, 87-99; Method in
Theology, 41-47; “Natural Right and Historical Mindedness,” Third Collection, 181.
116
Bernard Lonergan, “An Interview with Fr. Bernard Lonergan, S.J.,” Second Collection, 219.
117
Lonergan, Insight, 726.
118
Emergent probability is explained in Insight, 144-161.
115

56
his thought when he wrote the Supplement, though he did not make explicit reference to
the term. Emergent probability is Lonergan’s worldview to explain the emergence and
survival of new intelligible unities, according to classical and statistical laws.119 But for
our purpose we only intend to note the role of emergent probability in human
development, since human affairs also fall under the dominion of emergent probability.120
But intelligence introduces a new factor. Human beings, depending on their intellectual
development, can take the initiative in bringing about the material and social conditions
that make schemes of recurrence not just possible, but actual. In this fashion “man
becomes for man the executor of the emergent probability in human affairs.”121 The
greater the degree that societies understand emergent probability, the greater the degree
they can direct history in the trajectory of progress.
Next we need to consider another factor in the social dynamic of progress, and
this is the cultural good. In order to interpret Lonergan’s understanding of the cultural
good, and how the cultural good directs historical progress, it is helpful if we identify a
few major aspects of Lonergan’s understanding of the cultural good.
First, the cultural good is primarily the social path of human beings striving to
satisfy their innate desires, as opposed to the mystical path of withdrawal. The interior
life is rooted in the four natural desires Lonergan described in the second article: (1) the
natural desire to understand, (2) the natural desire for rectitude and for moral consistency
between reason and will, (3) the natural desire for happiness, and (4) the natural desire
for immortality. As such, Lonergan associates the cultural good to interior
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development.122 Alternately he speaks of these innate desires as spiritual needs, and the
cultural good as the means that leads people from material to spiritual concerns.123 The
cultural good is rooted deeply in human nature.
Second, there is a distinction between primitive cultures and advanced cultures.
In the unpublished English translation there is the statement that culture has two stages:
“...that of a primitive society and that of a more highly developed culture.”124 I do not
interpret this as suggesting that primitive society lacks culture. Lonergan’s general
structure of the human good of order implies that always and everywhere there is a third
level of the human good, whether the society is primitive or more advanced. And
elsewhere he has explicitly stated that even primitive societies have culture in the true
sense of the word.125 Lonergan’s point in the Supplement is to emphasize the fact that
cultures develop, and his means of doing so is to contrast primitive and higher cultures.
The primary difference between primitive cultures and advanced cultures is that the latter
reflect on their signs. The technical elaboration of signs is itself a cultural good, and
because it needs nothing external apart from signs it can be easily preserved and
transported to other places.126
Third, the cultural good involves a relationship between values, wisdom, and
goodness. Value is the good suitable to an end and worthy to be chosen.127 Furthermore,
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Lonergan’s repeated emphasis on wisdom and goodness and the manner he relates these
to the cultural good implies that the cultural good ultimately aims at wisdom and
goodness, and wisdom and goodness are to be preferred to all other goods.128 As such,
wisdom and goodness are required to discern values, to discern what is worthy to be
chosen. Lonergan conceives wisdom in the tradition of Aquinas, which is to say that it is
the function of wisdom to set things in order.129 So human wisdom would not only
discern what is good, but would also set about ordering those goods worthy to be chosen.
Fourth, although Lonergan’s understanding of the cultural good emphasizes
interior development, he makes a distinction between two kinds of cultural good. One
kind originates from the innate desires. The other is concerned with the tasks of daily
living.130 In my interpretation these two kinds of cultural good correspond to the two
dimensions of culture distinguished by Robert Doran:
Moreover, culture is distinguished into the two dimensions of the everyday set of
meanings and values informing a given way of life, and the reflexive level arising from
scientific, scholarly, philosophic, and theological understanding of the everyday.131
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level Doran mentions, as well as the values informing a way of life. I would argue
however that the aspect of meaning is implicit in Lonergan’s understanding of culture in
the Supplement given the strong emphasis on the relationship between the cultural good
and development of the interior, spiritual life.
We can summarize these four points as follows. The cultural good enriches our
interior life, and the interior life influences all the judgments and choices by which the
external good of order develops.133 The values of a culture influence how that culture’s
external good of order is put together and progresses. The values will identify good truly
worthy of being chosen to the degree that the culture fosters the development of wisdom
and goodness in its members, for it is wisdom and goodness that discern, order, and
implement values. Furthermore, any culture, primitive or advanced, uses signs to
regulate the external good of order. But those cultures which reflect on their signs have
the ability to develop and communicate theoretical insights in pure science, psychology,
economics, political science, and history, and this capability gives rise to a superior
power to develop the external good of order.134

2.5

The Human Good of Order and Historical Decline

In the previous section we considered the human good of order, and historical
process, in the context of Lonergan’s first approximation in his structure of history. This
approximation assumes that human beings act intelligently and reasonably. On its own,
this one approximation does not account for reality. Lonergan’s second approximation
accounts for the fact of evil and the resulting historical decline of the human good.
133
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The human good of order is not apart from evil. In the fifth article we noted that
Lonergan conceived evil as having no positive reality. This basic definition of evil is
Thomas’s position: evil is the absence of the good.135 Since evil is the opposite of the
good, then there is an opposite of the human good of order, in other words a “structure”
of evil comprised of particular evils, the evil of order, and cultural evil. In the next two
subsections we will consider two aspects of this structure of evil: (1) evil as part of the
general structure of the human good of order, and (2) historical decline in the human
good of order.

2.5.1

Evil in the General Structure of the Human Good of Order

In the Supplement, Lonergan identifies a general structure of the human good,
which we considered in the previous section. Based on Lonergan’s understanding of the
human good in the 1959 Cincinnati lectures, we interpreted that this general structure is
equivalent to what Lonergan would later call an invariant structure in the 1959 lectures.
Now even though good is not apart from evil, in the Supplement Lonergan does not
explicitly state that evil is part of the “general” structure of the human good of order. In
my interpretation, this is implied and perhaps so obvious Lonergan did not need to state
it. But he does state this explicitly in the 1959 Cincinnati lectures:
We have discussed some preliminaries on the good, the invariant structure of the human
good as object, and certain general features of that structure...Now we can make what we
have said a bit clearer and more concrete if we consider evil, the negation of the good.
Just as there is a whole series of aspects to the invariant structure of the good, so there is
a whole series of opposite aspects that are evil.136
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In the 1959 Cincinnati lectures Lonergan goes on to identify these evils as
particular evils, organized evils, and negation of value.137 These correspond to what
Lonergan in the Supplement identifies as originated evil: particular evils, the evil of
order, and cultural evil.
When originated evil is interpreted as part of the general structure of the human
good of order, then originated evil can be considered as an implicit definition. In this
sense no specific particular evils, no specific evil of order, and no specific cultural evil is
identified. Even though the cause of evil is not intelligible, there is an intelligible relation
between the terms designated in originated evil. Cultural evils lead to corruptions in the
external good of order resulting in the evil of order, and the evil of order leads to
particular evils. Again, the specifics will vary with place and time. And as a heuristic,
we can anticipate that in any society there will be particular evils, evils of order, and
cultural evils. In brief, the consideration of evil, as Lonergan stated in the 1959
Cincinnati lectures, fills out the invariant structure of the human good to make it clearer
and more concrete. In effect, what this does is take into account Lonergan’s second
approximation in this theological analysis of history. As each approximation is added,
we come closer to reality.

2.5.2

Historical Decline in the Human Good of Order

As the external good of order and the cultural good are subject to the law of
progress, they are also subject to the law of decline. In the following subsections we will
interpret Lonergan’s understanding of decline according to two themes operative in
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Lonergan’s thought: (a) the intrinsic principle of decline, and (b) the social dynamic of
decline.

2.5.2.1

The Intrinsic Principle of Decline
Lonergan’s article on human powerless makes it rather clear that the root cause,

the intrinsic principle of decline in human history, is human impotence with regard to the
good.138 This impotence has four causes: (1) darkness of intellect, (2) weakness of will,
(3) the objective difficulty of good, and (4) alienation from God. Lonergan’s
understanding of human powerlessness is not so much based on acts of sin per se, but on
the inclination to sin that we cannot overcome through our own natural resources. The
inclination to sin does not imply that we are unable to do any good, but rather than we
cannot avoid sin for any sustained period of time, even though we intend the good.
Intention is one thing, but performance is another.139 Lonergan made the same point in
Topics in Education:
According to the theologians, there is proof that man in this life without divine grace
cannot long avoid grievous sin. That incapacity to avoid sin without grace is moral
impotence.140

In the last article on original sin Lonergan traces the causes of our powerlessness
to original sin. This is not surprising given Lonergan’s identification of “darkness of
intellect” and “weakness of will” as two of the four root causes of human
powerlessness.141 Thus Lonergan’s understanding of human powerlessness is a theology
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of original sin, an explanation in line with traditional Catholic doctrine. Due to original
sin, and despite baptism, there remains in human nature an inclination to sin.142
Failures of rational freedom are an unavoidable consequence of impotence. It is
true that Lonergan includes the failure of rational freedom in the larger notion of
“originating evil” which itself includes failures of imagination and intelligence.
However, based on Lonergan’s description of originating evil, as well as the effect of the
failure of rational freedom on the other two faculties, in my interpretation the failure of
rational freedom should be linked with human powerless as the intrinsic principle of
historical decline. Inclination to sin is a fact of human nature, but it is only in actual sins
that decline becomes a historical reality. For Lonergan, rational freedom is the best of
the human faculties, and he states that the worst corruption is the corruption of that which
is best.143 This failure of rational freedom has no reason. There is no “why” to explain
the failure, otherwise it would not be a failure of rational freedom. This explanation
corresponds to what later in the Supplement Lonergan will name the “evil of guilt” or
“evil of sin.”144
With regard to the conquering of evil, we must distinguish between the evil of guilt, or
sin, and the consequent evil of punishment. The evil of guilt is the lack of reasonableness
within the rational consciousness of a rational creature. The evil of punishment includes
the evil consequences of sin...145
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is the failure of free will to choose a moral obligatory course of action, or on the other
hand, a failure to reject a morally reprehensible course of action. “Moral evil” refers to
the evil consequences of basic sin. Moral evil increases the temptation to sin, in both the
person and his or her social milieu.146 This distinction in Insight, as well as in the
Supplement, can ultimately be traced to Lonergan’s appropriation of Aquinas. For
Aquinas, in voluntary matters evil is divided into fault (culpa) or pain/punishment
(poena).147 The translation of the Latin term poena as “pain” or “punishment” (or
“penalty”) can distort the Scholastic meaning, given how the English word “punishment”
is typically understood in contemporary language. The Latin poena simply means a
deprivation of some human good. But poena is always a result of culpa.148
In summary, moral impotence or human powerlessness refers to the human
inclination to sin, a result of original sin. The inclination to sin will ultimately be realized
in acts of basic sin, which in this first chapter of the Supplement are described as failures
of rational freedom. Later in the Supplement Lonergan will use the term malum culpae
(evil of sin). When we take into account failures of imagination and intelligence, we now
have Lonergan’s notion of “originating evil.” In my interpretation, “originating evil” is
best understood as a social dynamic of decline that proceeds from individual failures of
rational consciousness. We will turn to this next.

2.5.2.2

The Social Dynamic of Decline

The ideal line of intellectual development, both individually and socially, was
discussed in the section on how the human good of order progresses. This is Lonergan’s
146

Lonergan, Insight, 689.
Lonergan, DBM, 147 [Supplement, 60]. Lonergan includes a reference to ST I, q. 48, a. 5.
148
Charles Hefling, “A Perhaps Permanently Valid Achievement: Lonergan on Christ’s Satisfaction,” 57.
147

65
first approximation in his structure of history, that is, what history would look like if all
human persons acted reasonably and responsibly. But the actual world includes failures
in intellectual development, and this is what Lonergan means by “originating evils.”
Human beings are originating evils to the extent that there is a failure or deficiency of
“imagination” (imaginationem), “mind” (intelligentiam), or “rational freedom”
(rationalem libertatem).149 I interpret intelligentiam to imply what Insight would
consider the two basic cognitional operations of intelligence, namely understanding and
judgment.
It is clear that “originating evil” in this first chapter of the Supplement includes,
yet has a broader meaning than the “evil of sin” (malum culpae). I suggest the reason is
based on the manner Lonergan chooses to explain the human situation in this first
chapter. The human situation is the human good of order understood in its historical
context. Since Lonergan’s historical-minded anthropology understands human beings as
originator of goods, then if evil is the opposite of good we logically arrive at the notion of
originating evil.
Furthermore, if Lonergan were to limit originating evil to original sin or malum
culpae, he would be technically correct, but this would lack the explanatory power he is
aiming for. Lonergan’s notion of originating evil has a fuller explanatory power to
explain the social dynamic of historical decline because, like intellectual development, it
accounts for the circular movement between sin and evil. The failure of rational freedom
corrupts the external, social situation, and this in turn feeds back into the subject,
inclining the subject to further sin. So Lonergan’s notion of originating evil includes a
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social dynamic, just as his understanding of intellectual development includes a social
dynamic.
It may help us to understand this social dynamic if we consider Lonergan’s
notions of bias developed in Insight. In Insight, Lonergan states that the principle of
decline is bias.150 His notion of bias is well-known among scholars who have
appropriated his thought to develop a contemporary theology of sin, particularly social
sin.151 Let us briefly review Lonergan’s four notions of bias.
Dramatic bias is primarily an unconscious flight from understanding which
inhibits insights from emerging into consciousness because the insights do not confirm an
existing viewpoint and behavior.152 The result is a scotosis, a blind spot in understanding.
Individual bias is egoism that chooses the good of the individual over the common good.
The individual brushes aside further questions or insights which would suggest a moral
course of action favoring the greater good. Individual bias is not totally unaware of its
self-deception.153 Group bias is similar to individual bias, but its intent is to preserve and
promote the interests of a dominant group, at the expense of other groups.154 General
bias raises commonsense knowledge to ultimacy. Theoretical knowledge is dismissed as
irrelevant.155 General bias is the idolatry of commonsense knowledge, and can infect
every member of society.
The Supplement does not explicitly use the language of “bias” to explain
originating evil. Lonergan chose to use different language. Nevertheless, his
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understanding of bias seems equivalent to his understanding of “originating evil.” I base
the judgment on two reasons.
First, both bias and originating evil cannot simply be equated with malum culpae.
Both have a broader meaning. Bias, like originating evil, is a result of sin and an
inclination to further sin. My judgment that bias is a result of sin and a further cause of
sin is based on Lonergan’s statements in Topics in Education, DVI, and the Supplement.
In the first two, Lonergan describes bias as a result of sin and a further cause of sin.156 In
the Supplement, the judgment is implicit based on the mutually reinforcing dynamic
which Lonergan established between originating evil and originated evil. This circular
movement begins with the failure of rational freedom:
If that which is judge and master of all the others is corrupted, it follows necessarily that
the others will be corrupted. Indeed, the very mainspring of progress is thus turned into
something regressive and destructive...Now if the choice of the will is irrational and
absurd, so is the consequent action; and if the action is irrational and absurd, the change
in the objective situation will be no less irrational and absurd...The power of the intellect
is surely very great, since the intellect is that which is able to make and become all
things. But its power is not so great that it can actually understand that which is absurd...
From all this it is clear that that circular movement by which the external situation
influences the intellect which in turn influences the will to act upon that situation can be
not only progressive but also regressive... But to the degree to which the absurd creeps
in, love is replaced by hatred, virtue by vice, good institutions by instruments of
wickedness, cooperation by strife, diligence by inertia, abundance by want, and the
universal power of the mind by intellectual impotence.157
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igitur perspectis, non solum progressivum sed etiam regressivum esse constat motum illum circularem, quo
situatio in intelligentiam, intelligentia in voluntatem, voluntas in actionem, actio denique in situationem
mutandam agit...Sed quatenus subrepit absurdum, eatenus amor in odium, virtutes in vitia, instituta in
instrumenta nequitiae, coordinatio in pugnam, operatio in inertiam, bonorum profluvium in egestatem,
ipsiusque intellectus ad omnia potentia in impotentiam transit.” DBM 34-36 [Supplement, 15-16].
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If bias results from sin as originated evil results from originating evil, then it
would seem we can correlate Lonergan’s notions of bias to his understanding of
originated evil. Originated evils include particular evils, the evil of order, or cultural evil.
Our use of bias to interpret originated evils will be limited to individual, group, and
general bias because our focus here is on the social dynamic of decline. The source of
individual, group, and general bias results from a social dynamic, an aberration in social
attitudes ultimately traced to the dialectical tension between spontaneous human
intersubjectivity and an intelligently designed social order.158 Both individual and group
bias are evils of order because, as originated evil, they allow and even promote the gain
of individuals and groups at the expense of others. These represent corruptions of the
external good of order (that is, our social structures). Examples of group bias, embedded
in our social structures, include sexism and racism.
On the other hand, general bias is cultural evil. In the article on evil, Lonergan
distinguishes two types of cultural good. One is conceived and developed by the natural
desire for understanding, uprightness, true happiness, and immortality. The other is
patterned after the concrete circumstances of human living, where theory and praxis are
hardly distinguished.159 When culture is infected with evil, the culture does not
sufficiently recognize the value of theory. Culture adapts theory to praxis, and theory is
essentially rendered impotent for cultural transformation:
So long as this initial irrationality remains, people will travel along another less arduous
road, so that culture becomes adapted to life, theory to praxis, and that ideal itself
dismissed as a mere myth, or but a dream.160
158

Lonergan, Insight, 243-244. The intelligently designed social order would equate to our external good
of order.
159
Lonergan, DBM, 37 [Supplement, 16].
160
“Stante primo irrationali, aliam minusque arduam incedunt homines viam, et cultura vitae accomodetur,
theoria praxi adaptetur, et ipsum ideale quasi mythus vel somnium reputetur.” DBM, 38 [Supplement, 16].
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This corresponds to Lonergan’s thought in Insight on the characteristic of general
bias. General bias sacrifices theory to praxis because it sees no value in reaching abstract
or universal knowledge.161 If we interpret cultural evil as general bias, we can understand
Lonergan to mean that rational consciousness elevates common sense to such a degree as
effectively regulating other forms of knowledge to irrelevancy. Rationalization of the
absurd becomes a byproduct: culture is adapted to the way things already are and theory
is adapted to praxis. Ultimately, the effect of cultural evil or general bias is that it renders
a culture impotent to direct history. Where emergent probability was society’s ally in
directing progress, general bias renders this cooperation impotent:
The challenge of history is for man progressively to restrict the realm of chance or fate or
destiny and progressively to enlarge the realm of conscious grasp and deliberate choice.
Common sense accepts the challenge, but it does so only partially. It needs to be guided
but it is incompetent to choose its guide. It becomes involved in incoherent enterprises.
It is subjected to disasters that no one expects, that remain unexplained after their
occurrence, that can be explained only on the level of scientific or philosophical thought,
that even when explained can be prevented from recurring only by subordinating
common sense to a higher specialization of human intelligence.162

In short, common sense on its own is not up to the task of directing history toward
progress because common sense is unequal to human science in the task of thinking on
the level of history.163 The solution, which in Insight is named “cosmopolis,” would have
common sense yield to human science. This is not to downplay the value of common
sense, of practicality. In fact, as Lonergan states, it is a “withdrawal from practicality to
save practicality.”164
What is more alarming is the cultural aberration which results from cultural evil.
When the external good of order breaks down, it reveals its corruption. But cultural evil
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Lonergan, Insight, 251.
Lonergan, Insight, 253.
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Lonergan, Insight, 253.
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Lonergan, Insight, 266.
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hides its corruption. It spreads the false under the guise of truth, and less rational
individuals may even be drawn to such evil.165 Lonergan makes an equivalent judgment
in Insight.166 This is why it is so difficult to cure general bias or cultural evils, and this is
why in Insight Lonergan associates general bias to the longer cycle of decline.

2.6

The Human Good of Order and Restoration
Our term “restoration” includes restoration in the natural sense. However, it also

includes restoration in the supernatural sense. In the Supplement, Lonergan’s discussion
of restoration through human resources is contained in the sixth article (From Evil,
Good). In this article Lonergan establishes the possibility of restoration. The ground of
this possibility is that a changeable material creature can be renewed from evil and
restored to good.167 But the focus of the article is on restoration through human
resources, and the recognition of its limits. Lonergan emphasizes “renewal” and
“restoration” in the human good of order, but he does not explicitly refer to “redemption”
(redemptione).168 He does, however, state that cultural evils call for a heaven-sent
redeemer (redemptorem divinitus).169
Lonergan’s understanding of restoration in the sixth article carries a wider
meaning than redemption typically understood. His notion of restoration is natural or
165

Lonergan, DBM, 39 [Supplement, 16-17].
Lonergan, Insight, 260.
167
Lonergan, DBM, 43 [Supplement, 18]. Lonergan’s reference to a changeable material creature may be
thought of in terms of the distinction between (1) central potency, form, and act, and (2) conjugate potency,
form, and act. The metaphysical principle of unity (and continuity) in a material creature is central form.
The metaphysical principle of change is an aggregate of conjugate forms. See Insight, 460-463, 535.
168
Lonergan’s vocabulary includes the terms “renewed” (renovari), “restored” (restaurari), “renewal”
(renovationem), “renaissance,” (renascatur), and “restoration” (restauratio). Lonergan, DBM, 43
[Supplement, 18].
169
Lonergan, DBM, 43 [Supplement, 18]. In fact the first chapter makes only one explicit reference to the
word “redemption.” It is found in article 8 (Original Sin) where Lonergan refers to our need for
redemption (redemptione). See DBM, 65 [Supplement, 26].
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supernatural. Either way, restoration is not an obliteration of individuals or society. It is
bringing good out of evil. This wider meaning of redemption is consistent with
Lonergan’s discussion of redemption in Topics in Education.170 Restoration through
strictly human resources occurs when our experience of particular evils reveals what
good order is and leads us to design a more effective external good of order and promotes
the cultural good.171 But human resources on their own cannot overcome cultural evil.
Cultural evils call for a heaven-sent redeemer.
Although Lonergan will explicitly consider redemption in chapters 3-6, this first
chapter of the Supplement includes scattered references to supernatural restoration,
corresponding to Lonergan’s third approximation in his theological view of history.
One example is in the third article (Communication: Signs and Symbols).
Lonergan speaks of the most perfect kind of sign, God’s Word-made-Flesh, who through
his divine person and human nature communicates through signs as an instrument for
advancing human life in all its aspects.172
Another example is in the fourth article. Lonergan identifies personal
relationships as having the most bearing on the collaboration and cooperation that
preserves and develops the good of order and the cultural good. Personal relationships
are grounded on a certain degree of understanding and agreement, or in other words a
certain coming together in one mind and heart. Personal relationships are the foundation
of cooperation. If human beings make their own history, then personal relationships must
be at the very heart of historical process. In fact, later in the Supplement Lonergan will
170

There he discusses the third differential, redemption, as (1) a break with the past, (2) redemption as
“new soil,” (3) redemption as revolution, and (4) redemption in Christ Jesus. See Lonergan, Topics in
Education, 65-66.
171
Lonergan, DBM, 43 [Supplement, 18].
172
Lonergan, DBM, 23 [Supplement, 10].
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state that “...understanding and agreement is the foundation of all human cooperation--in
fact, virtually the whole of what is properly human causality.”173 But in terms of the
personal relationships constitutive of the cultural good, Lonergan describes these
relationships as being perfected, and receiving their efficacy, from sanctifying grace. 174
Lonergan’s point here, since it is found in the fourth article on the comparison of goods,
is to explain that the cultural good, though superior to the good of order, is not the
ultimate value. The ultimate value is God’s value which enters into humanity through
grace, transforming our own values. When we take into account God’s gift of grace,
cultural good is now subordinate to what later in Method will be called religious value.
The gift of grace has the greatest influence in the hierarchy of the human good, and this
grace develops interpersonal relationships, between God and us, and between ourselves.
Interpersonal relationships are integral to Lonergan’s understanding of the historical
drama of redemption.175

2.7

Summary

In this first chapter Lonergan has made the first step in articulating his
presuppositions, the framework if you will for his Christology. The first chapter
develops a notion of the human good of order as a three-tiered structure of particular
goods, an external good of order, and culture good. This human good of order undergoes
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“...qua in intelligentia atque consensu fundatur omnis cooperatio humana, imo fere tota propria humana
causalitas.” Lonergan, DBM, *236 [Supplement, 100]. In a separate text he states that interpersonal
relations claim a “certain priority” in the human good of order. See The Triune God: Systematics, 495.
174
Lonergan, DBM, 28 [Supplement, 12].
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In The Triune God: Systematics, Lonergan states that the end of a divine mission is carried out not so
much that works be done as new personal relations be initiated and strengthened. See The Triune God:
Systematics, 485. In the same chapter he goes on to state that interpersonal relations claim “a certain
priority” in the human good of order since the proximate end of the divine missions is a good of order
which is the Kingdom of God, the Body of Christ. See The Triune God: Systematics, 495-497.
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progress, decline, and restoration. With respect to restoration, human resources can
transform some evils into good, but not cultural evils. Cultural evils reveal our need for a
supernatural restoration.
This first chapter of the Supplement, concerned as it is with the human good of
order, is primarily an anthropology. But it is a historical-minded anthropology. This
does not rule out the validity of a universal human nature. A historical-minded
anthropology is a higher synthesis. Lonergan once stated that “A contemporary ontology
would distinguish between two components in the concrete human reality: on the one
hand, a constant human nature; on the other hand, a variable human historicity. Nature is
given man at birth. Historicity is what man makes of man.”176 Both are valid, and both
are included in Lonergan’s anthropology which serves as a context for his understanding
of redemption and the historical causality of Christ. The Supplement’s second chapter,
on the Justice of God, builds on and fills out the framework. We will turn to this next.
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Lonergan, “Natural Right and Historical Mindedness,” A Third Collection, 170.
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CHAPTER 3:

3.1

THE JUSTICE OF GOD

Introduction
Our purpose here is to interpret the second chapter of the Supplement titled “The

Justice of God.”1 The chapter includes articles 9-15 of the Supplement: (9) The Notion
of Divine Justice, (10) The Just Order of Reality, (11) The Historical Order of Justice,
(12) The Personal Order of Justice, (13) The Just Will of God, (14) Voluntarism and
Related Errors, and (15) Recapitulation of the Foregoing.
The chapter begins with a brief introduction:
The word ‘justice’ conjures up thoughts of law codes and lawyers, judges and juries,
prisons and prison-guards, hangmen and gallows. Immersed as we are in things of sense,
the more strongly a thing impinges upon our senses and moves our feelings, the more true
and real we consider it to be.
But such a notion, or rather general impression, of justice is quite inadequate in dealing
with the justice of God. What the Apostle Paul calls “the manifold wisdom of God” (Eph
3:10) must be understood as being at the same time the law of God's justice. In itself it is
simple and infinite, but so long as we are in this life we cannot contemplate it as it is. We
must proceed, rather, by way of analogy from our knowledge of created things to form
some notion, however imperfect, of infinite perfection.
Not all created things are equally helpful to us in this endeavor. In this chapter, therefore,
we shall move step by step from a consideration of order in the world, of the actual
human condition, and of God's personal justice, while leaving room for the further
development of this idea which in the next chapter can and must be made in treating of
the Incarnate Word.2

1

“Caput Alterum. DE IUSTITIA DEI,” DBM, 66-117 [Supplement, 27-48].
“Qui iustitiam dicit, codices cogitat iurisque consultos, iudices et tribunalia, carceres et custodes,
carnifices atque patibula. Sensibilibus enim immersi, eo magis unumquodque verum et reale ducimus, quo
facilius sensus nostros afficit et efficacius affectum nostrum commovet.
At ipsa haec iustitiae non tam notio quam impressio minime sufficit ubi de Dei iustitia agitur. Quam enim
dixit Apostolus multiformem Dei sapientiam (Eph 3, 10), eamdem divinae iustitiae legem perspici oportet.
Neque eam et simplicem et infinitam, quamdiu peregrinamur a Domino, contemplari possumus, sed e rebus
creatis secundum analogiam procedere debemus, ut imperfectam quamdam infinitae perfectionis notionem
formemus.
Quem in finem non pariter inserviunt omnes et quaelibet creaturae. Pedetentim ergo hoc capite ita ex
rerum ordine, ex conditione humana historica, ex iudicio Dei personali, rationem divinae iustitiae
quaerimus, ut ulteriorem eiusdem rationis perfectionem minime excludamus quae tertio capite in Verbo Dei
carne facto perspici possit atque debeat.” DBM, 66 [Supplement, 27].
2
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3.2

A Brief Description of Articles 9 – 15

3.2.1

Article 9: The Notion of Divine Justice3
Since we can only know God’s justice by analogy,4 Lonergan begins with a

consideration of which divisions of human justice are appropriate analogies for
understanding divine justice. Human justice is divided into commutative, legal,
distributive, and social justice. Lonergan then explains the meaning of these terms:
Justice implies a rightness of order, and order brings a multiplicity of things together into
a unity and whole. When many things taken separately are in right order among
themselves, there is commutative justice; when the many individuals are duly
subordinated to the unity and whole, there is legal justice; when the unity and whole is
correctly related to the many individuals, there is distributive justice; and if the whole
order itself is performing properly, there is social justice--though this latter division is
somewhat disputed.5
3

“Articulus IX. DE NOTIONE DIVINAE IUSTITIAE,” DBM, 67-69 [Supplement, 27-29].
Throughout Lonergan’s career, despite development in his vision of the whole of theology which came
with his development of functional specializations, systematic theology for Lonergan always remained the
imperfect, analogical, obscure, but extremely fruitful understanding of the mysteries of faith. Lonergan
appropriated this understanding from the First Vatican Council (DB 1796, DS 3016, ND 132). See Doran,
What is Systematic Theology, 7-8. See also Robert Doran, “The First Chapter of De Deo Trino, Pars
Systematica: The Issues,” Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies 18 (2000), 39.
5
“Nam iustitia quamdam ordinis rectitudinem dicit. Per ordinem autem e multis efficitur unum quoddam
et totum. Quatenus ergo multa et singula recte inter se ordinantur, commutativa est iustitia; quatenus
eadem multa uni et toti recte subordinantur, legalis est iustitia; quatenus unum totumque ad multa et
singula recte se habet, distributiva est iustitia; quatenus denique ipse ordo rite proficit, disputata et quarta
iustitia socialis est.” DBM, 67 [Supplement, 27]. Lonergan does not give a reason why the division of
social justice is “somewhat disputed.” But may I offer a context to situate his statement. In contrast to
commutative, distributive, and legal justice, which have a long history in the Catholic tradition
(appropriated from Aristotelian ethics), the term “social justice” was only introduced into the parlance of
Catholic social ethics by the Italian theologian Luigi Taparelli D’Azeglio in the mid-1800s, evidently to
“replace Thomas Aquinas’s term legal justice and general justice, which were in danger of being
misconstrued in the modern context.” See Christine Firer Hinze, “Commentary on Quadragesimo anno
(After Forty Years),” Modern Catholic Social Teaching: Commentaries and Interpretations, ed. Kenneth
R. Himes (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2005), 167. The explicit term did not enter
official Catholic social teaching until Pius XI’s social encyclical Quadragesimo Anno (1931). Given the
relatively short history of the explicit term “social justice” in Catholic social teaching, it is not surprising
that in the late 1950s there would have been debate as to what social justice means, that is, whether it is a
new division of justice per se, or whether it is equivalent to the classical notion of general or legal justice.
As Normand Paulhus notes, there is confusion surrounding the term “social justice” in contemporary
ethical dialogue. Paulhus made this statement in the mid 1980s, and if true this confusion would have
certainly existed in the 1950s. See Normand J. Paulhus, “Uses and Misuses of the Term ‘Social Justice’ in
the Roman Catholic Tradition,” The Journal of Religious Ethics 15 (1987), 261. On the background and
origins of “social justice,” see Brian J. Benestad, “The Catholic Concept of Social Justice: A Historical
Perspective,” Communio 11 (winter 1984), 364-381.
4
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Since God cannot be subordinate to creatures nor on the same footing with them,
Lonergan rules out commutative and legal justice as analogies.6 God is however the
source and giver of all gifts, and since distributive justice refers to the right ordering of
these gifts, distributive justice can be attributed to God.7 Finally Lonergan rules out
social justice as an analogy, though his argument is more complex:
Finally, since the order among these gifts is in fact the order of the whole created
universe, an order which without change includes within itself whatever is conducive to
the good of all partial orders, what may be termed ‘social justice’ cannot be attributed to
God.8

Lonergan then lists a number of theological doctrines regarding the order of the
universe, all appropriated from Aquinas. The order of the universe is:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

An artificial form of the universe by which this world is one.9
The good of order and intrinsic end of the universe.10
An arrangement or series of causes, referred to as fate.11
Evidence for the existence of God.12
In its unity evidence for the uniqueness of God.13
In its appropriateness evidence of the distributive justice of God.14
In its goodness the best in all creation, in itself directly intended by God, the cause of
all things, and necessarily an idea in the divine mind containing in its unity the ideas
of all other created things.15
Next Lonergan lists a number of theological doctrines on the relationship between

possible world orders and divine wisdom, power, justice, and will, as well as a number of
theological doctrines related to God’s “idea of order” (ratio ordinis):

6

Lonergan, DBM, 67 [Supplement, 27].
Lonergan, DBM, 67 [Supplement, 27].
8
“Quia denique huius donationis ordo nihil est aliud quam ordo totius universi creati, qui immutatus
omnem partialis ordinis profectum in se includit, iustitia quae forte socialis dicitur Deo convenire haud
potest.” DBM, 67 [Supplement, 27-28].
9
Lonergan, DBM, 68 [Supplement, 28]. Lonergan references ST, I, q. 47, a. 3. For Lonergan’s meaning of
“artificial form,” see section 2.4 in the previous chapter.
10
Lonergan, DBM, 68 [Supplement, 28]. Lonergan references ST, I, q. 103, a. 2, ad 3m.
11
Lonergan, DBM, 68 [Supplement, 28]. Lonergan references ST, I, q. 116, a. 2, 1m; 3 c.
12
Lonergan, DBM, 68 [Supplement, 28]. Lonergan references ST, I, q. 2, a. 3 c.
13
Lonergan, DBM, 68 [Supplement, 28]. Lonergan references ST, I, q. 11, a. 3.
14
Lonergan, DBM, 68 [Supplement, 28]. Lonergan references ST, I, q. 21, a. 1.
15
Lonergan, DBM, 68 [Supplement, 28]. Lonergan references ST, I, q. 15, a. 2.
7
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1. Putting things in order is the function of wisdom. Since divine wisdom is infinite,
extending to all that divine power can effect,16 there is in the divine mind not only the
idea of the order of the universe, but the ideas of all possible orders, so there is
nothing intrinsically possible17 that God could not most wisely do.18
2. It is inadmissible that infinite wisdom should order possible realities in such a way as
to deny to each thing what properly belongs to it; thus any order conceived by God is
most wise and most just.19
3. Since the object of the will is a good apprehended by the mind, it is impossible for
God to will anything not within the purview of his wisdom.20
4. Therefore, as divine wisdom is the law of divine justice, the divine will which follows
divine wisdom is necessarily right and just, whether it chooses to create this world,
some other word, or no world at all.
5. Inasmuch as God's idea of order sees to it that created things are brought to their due
and proper ends, it is called divine providence.21
6. Inasmuch as divine providence is carried out by divine will and power, it is called
divine governance.22
7. Inasmuch as the idea of order, containing in an intentional way all things ordered, is
related to the things that are ordered, the idea of order is the logical truth of divine
knowledge. And inasmuch as the things ordered are related to God’s idea of order,
this is the ontological truth of things.23
8. The idea of order as being in the mind of God is the eternal law.24
9. Participation by creatures in the eternal law is natural law.25
10. Inasmuch as everything that exists or happens is ordained by divine wisdom, a reason
can be assigned to it; but inasmuch as the whole order is freely chosen by the divine
will, the ultimate reason of all things is God's free choice.26
Lonergan concludes the article with a summary:
To sum up: the justice of God in its origin belongs to the divine wisdom, in its exercise to
the just choice of a wise order, and in its effects it is found in created things, inasmuch as
they are wisely and justly ordered, both among themselves and in relation to their
ultimate end, which is God himself.27
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Lonergan, DBM, 68 [Supplement, 28]. Lonergan references ST, I., q. 25, a. 5.
Lonergan, DBM, 68 [Supplement, 28]. Lonergan references ST, I, q. 25, a. 3.
18
Lonergan, DBM, 68 [Supplement, 28]. Lonergan references ST, I, q. 25, a. 5, 1um.
19
Lonergan, DBM, 68 [Supplement, 28]. Lonergan references ST, I, q. 25, a. 5.
20
Lonergan, DBM, 68 [Supplement, 28]. Lonergan references ST, I, q. 21, a. 1, 2um.
21
Lonergan, DBM, 69 [Supplement, 28]. Lonergan references ST, I, q. 22, a. 1.
22
Lonergan, DBM, 69 [Supplement, 28]. Lonergan references ST, I, q. 103, a. 6.
23
Lonergan, DBM, 69 [Supplement, 29]. Lonergan references ST, I, q. 21, a. 2.
24
Lonergan, DBM, 69 [Supplement, 29]. Lonergan references ST, I-II, q. 91, a. 1.
25
Lonergan, DBM, 69 [Supplement, 29]. Lonergan references ST, I-II, q. 91, a. 2.
26
Lonergan, DBM, 69 [Supplement, 29]. Lonergan references SCG, III, 97.
27
“Quae cum ita sint, Dei iustitia originaliter quidem ad divinam sapientiam pertinet, actualiter autem ad
iustam sapientis ordinis electionem, consequenter autem in rebus invenitur creatis quatenus sapienter
iusteque ordinantur tum inter se tum ad finem ultimum qui ipse Deus est.” DBM, 69 [Supplement, 29].
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3.2.2

Article 10: The Just Order of Reality28
Lonergan’s stated purpose in the article is to understand the order of reality

conceived by divine wisdom, chosen by divine will, and effected by divine power.29
Lonergan’s understanding of this order is the concurrence of three elements: (1) innate
forms and laws, (2) a complex of laws, (3) linked complexes of laws.
Innate Forms and Laws: First, all things have an intrinsic order. This intrinsic
order is governed by innate forms and natural laws given to all things:
A natural law is simply a participation in the eternal law by which non-human material
creatures spontaneously proceed to their proper activity and end, while human beings are
moved not only to act but also to know how they ought to act and to freely choose on the
basis of this knowledge.30

A Complex of Laws: Second, certain interrelationships of beings in the order of
reality reveal a whole complex (or series) of laws.31 Natural laws, considered
individually, abstract from concrete reality and thus afford only hypothetical knowledge.
A complex of laws is a concatenation of several laws which moves us to a closer
understanding of reality:
…so it is one thing to determine what theoretically should occur under the proper
conditions and circumstances, but quite another to determine schematically the particular
combination or conjunction of factors as a result of which at certain times the proper
conditions will be fulfilled and the events forecast will actually happen.32

28

“Articulus X. DE IUSTO RERUM ORDINES,” DBM, 70-79 [Supplement, 29-32].
Lonergan, DBM, 70 [Supplement, 29].
30
“Nihil enim aliud est lex naturalis quam participatio quaedam legis aeternae, unde caeterae quidem res
materiales sua sponte in proprium actum finemque procedant, homines autem moveantur, non solum ut
faciant, sed etiam ut quid iis faciendum sit cognoscant, et cognitum libere eligant.” DBM, 70 [Supplement,
29].
31
Lonergan, DBM, 70 [Supplement, 29]. An example is the complex of laws governing planetary
movement. Another example is the complex of laws governing the circulation of moisture on the earth.
32
“…ita in omnibus aliud est determinare quid sub debitis conditionibus atque adiunctis per se fieret, et
aliud longe est schematicam illam rerum coniunctionem seu constellationem invenire, unde certis
temporum intervallis et impleantur conditiones debitae et actu fiant eventus praevisi.” DBM, 70
[Supplement, 29].
29

79
Linked Complexes of Laws: Third, although the notion of a complex of laws
moves us closer to concrete reality, it is still insufficient. There is not just one complex
of laws, but many, and these complexes are interrelated.33
Lonergan then states that the order of reality, considered as a whole, is itself
intended by God and not merely a coincidental byproduct of a linked complex of natures
and natural laws. In other words, the order of reality is itself conceived by divine
wisdom, down to the smallest detail of each being, in its arrangement with other beings
and in relation to its proper end.34
Lonergan admits that we do not have perfect scientific knowledge of this one
order of reality and hence we cannot perfectly understand, in terms of natures and laws,
how divine wisdom and providence arranges and directs each thing to its proper end.35
But he states that where perfect knowledge is lacking imperfect knowledge is possible by
applying certain principles in a general way. Lonergan employs three principles: (1) no
created being is capable of unconditioned operation, (2) the common course of things and
the order of the universe is the proper effect of God, and (3) the proper effect of God is
produced through secondary causes. Let us look at each of these individually.
No created being is capable of unconditioned operation: The operation of any
created being is hypothetical. What this means is that the right conditions must be
fulfilled for that being to operate in accordance with its nature. But what fulfills the
conditions? Ultimately, it is divine providence. Lonergan explains:
33

Lonergan, DBM, 72 [Supplement, 30]. For example, there is a complex of laws explaining the planetary
system. There is a complex of laws explaining the circulation of moisture on the earth. But these
complexes are linked, and this linkage has further implications. Without a sun and its planetary system, the
earth’s moisture would not circulate. Without circulation of moisture there would be no plant life. Without
plant life many species of animals would not exist.
34
Lonergan, DBM, 72-73 [Supplement, 30].
35
Lonergan, DBM, 73 [Supplement, 30].
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Hence in the creation and conservation of all things, since the operations of each one are
conditioned and hypothetical, there is no proportionate cause per se for a thing to actually
operate. If you assert that one thing already operating fulfills the conditions requisite for
the operation of another, you are factually correct but you still do not have an explanation
of the fact. For it is not a matter of chance that (1) some beings operate in such a way as
to fulfill the conditions under which other beings begin to operate; (2) all things are
constantly so arranged that none of them is deprived of the assistance of others that are
already in operation;36 and (3) from this constant arrangement of things and the complex
of laws of nature not only does there result the simple fact of actual operations, but there
is produced also that marvelous and beneficent order which we call the common course
of things and events. Now if all this does not come about by chance, it is divine
providence that sees to it that each being actually operates and that all things are
instruments in bringing about the order of the universe.37

The common course of things and the order of the universe is the proper effect of
God: The common course of things and the order of the universe can, ultimately, only be
produced by God. It is true that the operations of beings, whether individually or
collectively, can fulfill the conditions for the operations of others. But even if beings
operating collectively fulfill the conditions for the operations of others, there must have
already been an ordering in them prior to their operating. All things, taken together,
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Here Lonergan includes a note that he is using the term praemoventium (translated here “already in
operation”) in the Aristotelian, not Bañezian, sense, and refers the reader to Theological Studies 3 (1942),
382. That article in Theological Studies was one of four articles published between 1941-1942 representing
an abbreviated form of his dissertation. His doctoral dissertation was titled Gratia Operans: A Study of the
Speculative Development in the Writings of St. Thomas of Aquin, completed in May 1940 at the Gregorian
University in Rome. The four articles have most recently been published as the first of two works
published together in the first volume of the CWL: Bernard Lonergan, Grace and Freedom: Operative
Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, vol. 1 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, eds.
Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988). CWL 1 also
contains Lonergan’s doctoral thesis in its entirety. The Bañezian doctrine of premotion is natura prius, a
premotion whenever a creature is a cause. The Aristotelian doctrine of premotion is tempore prius, a
premotion whenever a cause acts in time. See Grace and Freedom, 73-75.
37
“Quare in omnibus rebus et creatis et conservatis, cum singularum operatio conditionata atque
hypothetica sit, nulla invenitur causa per se et proportionata ut res ulla actu agat. Quod si dicis aliam per
aliam iam operantem accipere ut conditiones propriae operationis impleantur, factum sane non ignoras, sed
explicationem adhuc omittis. Non enim casu fit ut (1) res aliae ita operentur ut impleantur conditiones sub
quibus aliae operari incipiant, (2) omnes res ita iugiter disponantur ut nulla aliarum et praemoventium
adiutorio privetur, et (3) ex hac perpetua rerum dispositione legumque naturalium complicatione, non
solum merum factum actualis operationis resultet, sed mirus ille atque beneficus efficiatur ordo, quem
communem rerum cursum nominemus. Quod si casu non fit, divina providentia facit tum ut singulae res
actu agant tum ut omnes ipsum universi ordinem instrumentaliter efficiant.” DBM, 74 [Supplement, 3031].
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receive from God the arrangement and ordering enabling them to produce a well-ordered
common effect.38
The proper effect of God is produced through secondary causes: Lonergan states
that beings would be created and conserved in vain if they did not operate, and as he has
already established, this operation is not possible without ordering and direction from
divine wisdom and providence.39 As ordered and directed by God, beings cannot fail in
effecting the common course and order intended by divine wisdom. “Divine goodness or
divine justice has no higher rule than divine wisdom itself.”40
From the foregoing, Lonergan makes a general statement on the nature of divine
justice: (1) the ultimate end to which all things are directed is the manifestation of
divine goodness; (2) the means used by divine wisdom is the nature of things and natural
laws; (3) divine wisdom does not learn by trial and error, but in one intuition has
foreseen, ordered, and commissioned all things from the very beginning of the universe
down to the end; and (4) the purpose of this one divine plan is to arrange and connect
things in serial or circular patterns of operations, through time and co-temporal, so that
the common course of events and the order of the universe results.41
Lonergan ends by addressing a number of hypothetical questions. I will cite two.
First, why the Incarnation? Second, why is the spread of the faith so slow? To these
Lonergan states that it is God’s way to act through secondary causes in accordance with
their natures. God himself became man that he might be a secondary and proportionate
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cause in restoring all things (Eph. 1:10). And the spread of the faith is slow because the
kingdom is proclaimed and propagated through secondary causes, human beings.42
3.2.3

Article 11: The Historical Order of Justice43
Lonergan’s purpose in the article is to apply what he has said about the general

nature of the order of divine justice to human history. He notes an isomorphism between
the three levels of the human good and the three elements in the order of divine justice:
(1) a particular good follows the operation of some law of nature; (2) the external good
of order is a certain schematic pattern, serial or circular; (3) the cultural good is
concerned with spreading and perfecting that interior order by which human beings, in
exercising their reason and will, provide for themselves and also, in some way,
participate in divine providence.44
As evil is also part of human history, evil is not outside the order of divine justice.
Since God works through secondary causes, God makes use of human free will, but
human free will can incline toward evil. Nevertheless, the fact of evil does not invalidate
the order of divine justice. God has arranged the order of this universe such that not only
does good result from good, but good may also come out of evil.
Lonergan concludes with a response to a hypothetical objection that the historical
order of justice is so general, failing to take into account the personal order of justice, that
the historical order of justice might not be just with respect to individuals. Lonergan’s
response situates human nature (that is, the individual) in the context of human history.
An individual’s human nature is not absolved from the development that all other
42
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material creatures must endure through historical process. The whole person, in body,
mind, and through relationships, belongs by his or her very nature to the historical
process. As such, his or her inclusion within this process and subordination to its laws
and order is both wise and just.45

3.2.4

Article 12: The Personal Order of Justice46

Human beings are part of the historical order of justice in order that they may be
taken up into another order. Death will remove each person from the historical order.
This removal brings persons to the day of judgment. The personal order of justice is the
judgment of our quality of life lived here below, and that judgment will bring reward
(praemietur) or punishment (puniatur).47 One’s acts, whether good or evil, not only
contribute to the objective historical process, but they also self-constitute one to be good
or evil. The bulk of the article explains the nature of this self-constitution. While we are
living we can change, but death will bring a halt to change.48
All our actions can be reduced to good or evil. Good acts consent to the dictates
of reason, making oneself an intelligible work. A well-ordered, intelligible individual
had made herself or himself a person in whom sense is subordinated to reason, and reason
is subordinated to God.49 On the other hand, persons who commit evil acts refuse to
consent to the dictates of reason. Through evil acts one makes oneself an unintelligible
work and withdraws from the intelligible order conceived by divine wisdom. The work
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of any person, whether intelligible (good) or absurd (evil), will perdure. This is the
ground of the personal order of justice.50
Lonergan ends the article noting that the distinction between the objective process
of the historical order of justice on the one hand, and the personal order of justice on the
other, implies no distinction on the part of God. There is however a basis for the
distinction in human affairs. What we make of ourselves in this life, whether good or
evil, shall remain in the life to come.51

3.2.5

Article 13: The Just Will of God52

One may ask why God chose this order of reality and not some other? To this
question Lonergan replies that God could have instituted another order, so long as this
involved no internal contradiction.53 But as to why God chose this particular order and
not some other, Lonergan states that we are up against mystery and inquiry must give
way to humble submission. Lonergan refers to the wisdom of St. Augustine: even if God
had created a different order, it would still have failed to satisfy our wisdom.54 Our duty
is simply to acquiesce to God’s choice, and our model for such acquiescence is Christ
himself:
Just as Christ himself did not ask for another world but in all things submitted his will to
his Father's, “becoming obedient unto death, death on the cross” (Phil 2:8), so we also
accept this actual order of reality as a command given to us by God our Father.55
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Following this statement Lonergan makes certain points to dispel
anthropomorphic conceptions of God’s will. As God knows himself and all other things
in one act of understanding, God wills himself and all else in one single volitional act.56
We can conclude from this that if one is to speak with strict theological accuracy, one
will always say that God wills Christ’s atonement because of sin, the forgiveness of sins
because of the atonement, reward on account of merit, and punishment on account of sin.
It is an anthropomorphic error to express the foregoing in language suggesting that God
wills atonement because he hates sin, or that he wills forgiveness of sins because the
atonement has placated him, or that he wills reward because meritorious deeds have
pleased him, or that he wills punishment because sins have offended him.57 Lonergan
explains the error and the implications:
The former set of statements affirm the one act in which God wills many things as
interrelated; the latter imply a multiplicity of volitional acts on the part of God and
sometimes make a created thing the cause and the divine will the effect.
One must not consider this strictness in speaking to be of little importance in the question
at hand. When the main objection to the dogma of the redemption is that it is
anthropomorphic, no Catholic theologian should provide any sort of handle to this
calumny.58

Lonergan then takes up a familiar question: since evil does in fact exist in this
world, does God will evil? Following Aquinas, Lonergan appeals to the distinction
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between indirect and direct willingness. God indirectly wills both the evil of punishment
and the evil of natural defects because God directly wills the good of personal justice and
the good of the order of nature, and these evils are made possible because of God’s direct
willing of these two goods, respectively.59 Since the evil of sin is not connected to any
good whatsoever, God neither directly nor indirectly wills the evil of sin.60
The remainder of the article attends to a number of hypothetical objections to the
theological doctrine that God neither directly nor indirectly wills the evil of sin. Among
these objections is that sin should not be permitted by God. Lonergan replies that it is a
good thing that there exist rational creatures that are truly free and who can sin, and it is
also a good thing for the evil of sin to be transmuted into the goodness of redemption.61

3.2.6

Article 14: Voluntarism and Related Errors62

There are two kinds of voluntarism: (1) one that is relatively conscious, which
praises the role of the will; and (2) one that is relatively unconscious, which ignores the
significance of intelligibility and thus exaggerates the role of the will. Lonergan
considers the former relatively harmless, but refutes the latter through four arguments.
First, “the divine will follows the intellect.”63 Since the object of the will is a good
as known, it is thus impossible for God to will anything that is not in his wisdom.64 To
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assert that justice depends on the will alone is equivalent to asserting that the divine will
does not proceed according to the order of wisdom, which is blasphemy.65
Second, “the order of divine wisdom in not necessary in all things.”66 The
intelligible and the necessary are not synonymous.67 The former has a wider extension.
The fact is most obvious in the redemption. The redemption is intelligible, but not
necessary. Voluntarism holds a too superficial understanding of intelligibility, and as
such falls into the error of giving primacy to the divine intellect in necessary things and
primacy to the divine will in others.
Third, “the possible and the fitting are not strictly demonstrated.”68 The
intelligible is of two kinds: the necessary and the possible. The former is demonstrated
by necessary arguments and the latter by accumulating evidence and making the
connections among the evidence. The natural and human sciences investigate the
possible, not the necessary. Demanding proofs, rather than seeking increasing
understanding, repeats the experience of the fourteenth century when the desire for
certitude trumped the desire for understanding.69
Fourth, “the order of understanding is not the same as the order of wisdom.”70
Lonergan’s purpose here is to account for the non-intelligible evil of sin. Do we include
sins in the order of this universe? If we do, then it would seem God is the author of sin.
If we do not, then it would seem that God’s dominion is not universal. Lonergan’s
solution distinguishes the order of understanding and the order of wisdom. Intelligence
65
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seeks to know the intelligible through the process of experiencing, understanding, and
judgment. The act of understanding is the pivotal point in this process. The intelligible
emerges in the act of understanding. As such, intelligence can put intelligibles into a
meaningful order. But intelligence cannot order the non-intelligible (such as the evil of
sin) because the act of understanding can only know the intelligible. However, the scope
and power of the order of wisdom extends beyond the order of understanding. Wisdom
can order the intelligible and the non-intelligible. “It [wisdom] looks to whatever
actually exist, even if they ought not to exist and cannot be understood.”71 The rule of
divine justice is not divine intelligence, but divine wisdom. As such, God can conceive
an order which includes the evil of sin, even though God neither directly nor indirectly
wills the evil of sin. As such, God is not the author of sin. But since God chose an order
which allows sin, God’s dominion is entirely universal.72
3.2.7 Article 15: Recapitulation of the Foregoing73

This article summarizes major points in the chapter. Lonergan begins by restating
what is perhaps the central theological doctrine: the ground and norm of divine justice is
divine wisdom.74 The exercise of divine justice is God’s free choice, and its effect is the
actual concrete order of the universe in all its determinations.75
Lonergan then recalls that his method has respected the mystery of divine justice.
He has approached divine justice analogically, admitted that our knowledge is imperfect,
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and has made the point that it is fruitless to inquire into what might have been, into other
possible world orders God could have chosen. Our duty is to acquiesce to the choice God
has actually made, to adore the holiness of God’s will, and to obey God’s decrees.76
Lonergan also recalls a consistent theme of the chapter: his concern with
anthropomorphism. Lonergan acknowledges that at times this is difficult to avoid. There
is an inadequacy of all analogy.77 With this caution noted, he reviews the advantages of
his method. He has reached an understanding of divine justice by attending to the actual
order of reality, which in its entirety is the proper effect of God. This is a concrete, not
an abstract method of conceiving divine justice. Also, recourse to God’s simplicity and
immutability minimizes the possibility of anthropomorphism. The distinction between
the order of understanding and the order of wisdom allows us to account for everything
within the actual world order, including the non-intelligible.78
At the end of the article Lonergan introduces a distinction between divine justice
on the one hand, and divine goodness, generosity, and mercy on the other. The
distinction is considered in three ways: (1) as rooted in God, (2) as rooted in the
comparison of created effects, and (3) as rooted in the relationship of God to creatures.
As rooted in God: God is just since he chooses an order of reality conceived by
divine wisdom. God is good since he freely pours forth being and good. God is generous
since his wisdom orders reality to manifest divine goodness. God is merciful because the
ordering to divine goodness is far better than an ordering to created goodness.79
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As rooted in the comparison of created effects: The comparison of created effects
among themselves is based on the distinction between proportionate and nonproportionate effects. The former issues forth from God’s justice, while the latter from
God’s generosity or mercy.80
As rooted in the relationship of God to creatures: This consideration coincides
with the first if God is taken as the foundation of the relation, but it coincides with the
second if the interrelated effects are taken as the foundation. No new element arises from
the conjunction of these two unless a fallacy arises. Unfortunately, the fallacy is not that
rare. God assigns an end to every creature. As such, each creature is “owed” a means to
the end. The fallacy understands this in a context of God owing something to human
beings, rather than a context in which God owes it to himself, for his Name’s sake, to
fulfill the order of his own justice.81
Lonergan ends the chapter noting that the cross of Christ reveals another
dimension of divine justice:
Finally, as will be shown, a special facet of divine justice appears in the cross of our
Lord; but it seems best to defer an explanation of this to Chapter 4.82

3.3

Lonergan’s Understanding of Divine Justice
In the tenth article, the “Just Order of Reality,” Lonergan makes two key

statements on the nature of divine justice. The first statement asserts that the order of the
universe is the proper effect of God produced through secondary causes:
80
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Moreover, since that which is best in all creation is the good of order of the universe, this
order must necessarily be in itself directly intended by God, the cause of all things. In the
divine mind, therefore, there is the idea of the order of the universe, which idea contains
in its unity the ideas of all other created things.83
Moreover - to move a step closer to the notion of divine justice - this common course of
things and order of the universe is (1) the proper effect of God, and (2) produced through
secondary causes. That effect is said to be proper to God which only God can produce;84

The second is Lonergan’s general statement on the nature of divine justice:
In the light of all this [Lonergan’s prior discussion on the order of the universe], we can
make a general statement on the nature of divine justice. First of all, it is universally
agreed that the ultimate end to which all things are to be directed is the manifestation of
the divine goodness. Secondly, we have determined the means used by divine wisdom to
attain this end, namely, the nature of things and the laws of nature or natural laws.
Thirdly, it is obvious that divine wisdom does not learn by experience or by trial and
error, but rather in one immediate intuition has foreseen, ordered, and commissioned all
things from the very first beginnings of the universe right down to the end. Fourthly, we
have determined the purpose of this one plan, namely, so to arrange and connect things as
to result in either serial or circular patterns of operations, and so to order these patterns
both in the course of time and in a co-temporal hierarchic order that the common course
of events and order of the universe results.85

Three major themes stand out in these two statements. The first is Lonergan’s
judgment that the common course of things and the order of the universe is the proper
effect of God produced through secondary causes. The second is Lonergan’s thought on
the nature of things, laws of nature, and the common course of events and the order of the
universe in which the nature of things and the laws of nature are operative. The third is
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Lonergan’s concern about anthropomorphism. I will interpret each of these themes
individually in the following sub-sections: (1) World Order as the Proper Effect of God
Produced through Secondary Causes, (2) World Order and Divine Justice, and (3)
Dispelling Anthropomorphic Understandings of Divine Justice.

3.3.1

World Order as the Proper Effect of God Produced Through Secondary
Causes
Lonergan’s judgment that the common course of things and the order of the

universe is the proper effect of God (effectus Deo proprius), produced through secondary
causes, is essentially an appropriation of Aquinas’s concept of universal
instrumentality.86 Lonergan had addressed this in his dissertation:
...for an instrument is a lower cause moved by a higher so as to produce an effect within
the category of proportionate to the higher; but in the cosmic hierarchy all causes are
moved except the highest, and every effect is at least in the category of being; therefore,
all causes except the highest are instruments.87

For Lonergan, the fact that all causes except the highest are instruments represents
the meaning of “proprius effectus Dei.”88 Any secondary cause is an instrumental cause.
Since the whole universe is the proper effect of God, then all causes in the universe other
than God are instrumental (secondary) causes. So we have universal instrumentality.
To state that the order of the universe is directly intended by God, or is the proper
effect of God, reveals a fundamental aspect of Lonergan’s thought regarding the
relationship between order and essence on the one hand, and divine wisdom on the other.
86
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A proper effect of God cannot be a compound of the logically necessary and/or arbitrary,
but must be directly willed by God in accordance with divine wisdom. And since divine
justice is grounded in the fact that the divine will follows divine wisdom, then divine
wisdom intends world order prior to essences.89 The common course of things and the
order of the universe are indeed produced through secondary causes, but these secondary
causes could not operate in the first place without a prior order conceived by divine
wisdom. It is clear that one of Lonergan’s principal aims is to convince the reader to
reject any notion of a voluntaristically conceived divine will as well as any notion that
would attempt to understand the order of the universe as a coincidental, arbitrary
byproduct of individual essences.

3.3.2

World Order and Divine Justice

Understanding world order is a means to understand divine justice because of the
prior judgment that there is no higher rule for divine justice than divine wisdom, and
divine wisdom has conceived this world order. Lonergan’s understanding of world order
89
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contra Gentiles that the first cause of the distinction and diversity of things in this universe is not caused by
secondary agents (SCG, II, c. 42). In other words, Aquinas teaches that the distinction and order of things
in the universe is not a result of the actions of secondary causes, but the inverse is true: the actions of
secondary causes are on account of the order and the distinction established in things. This doctrine was
also operative as a fundamental presupposition in Lonergan’s thesis in “The Natural Desire to See God.”
Lonergan’s thesis affirmed the existence of a natural desire to see God, but my purpose here is not to enter
into the debate about this disputed question in Catholic theology. This is outside the scope of the
dissertation. My point is an interpretive judgment that when Lonergan speaks of world order as a “proper
effect” of God, this is equivalent to his thought, explicitly mentioned in other works, that divine wisdom
conceives world order prior to finite natures, down to the smallest historical detail. Only consequently, in
as much as God knows a world order, does God know its component parts such as his free gifts, finite
natures, their properties, exigencies, and so on. See Lonergan, “The Natural Desire to See God,” 83-85.
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is articulated primarily in the tenth article titled “The Just Order of Reality.” In this
article, his method of arriving at a concrete understanding of reality is very similar to the
manner in which he arrived at a theological understanding of history: through the use of
successive “approximations.” Lonergan builds up to a concrete understanding of the
universe in a step-by-step fashion, where each step is an approximation toward reality.
The first approximation is the insight that within the order of this universe there
are innate forms and laws of nature. This is a consideration of individual, abstract laws,
isolated from the concrete fulfillment of any conditions necessary for that law to be
operative. This approximation is hypothetical, prescinding from concrete conditions.
The second approximation includes two insights. First, beings are interrelated
and interconnected resulting in a concatenation of several laws in mutual, interconnected
operation.90 Second, there must be a particular combination or conjunction of factors to
fulfill the conditions necessary for a complex of laws to be operative.91 With this insight,
Lonergan is introducing the notion of probability we associate with statistical laws.
The third approximation is the insight that there is not a single complex of laws
operative in the universe, but many. These complexes are often interconnected.
Consider Lonergan’s example:
Without a sun and its planetary system, the earth's moisture would not circulate; without
this circulation of moisture there would be no plant life, and without plants, none of the
many species of animals. Again, every animal has within it several systems that are not
only distinct from one another but marvelously interrelated and interdependent: the
digestive system, the respiratory, the vascular, the skeletal system and musculature, the
nervous system and sensory apparatus.92
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This is what Lonergan calls a “complex” or “series” of laws.
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“Nisi enim prius exsistit systema solis et planetarum, haud circumferuntur aquae; nisi circumeunt aquae,
non vivunt plantae; sine plantis, tot animalium species esse non possunt; et in singulis animalibus non
solum distinguuntur sed mirabiliter etiam inter se coniunguntur atque dependent systemata digestivum,
respirativum, vasculare, ossium et musculorum, nervosum, et sensitivum.” Lonergan, DBM, 72
[Supplement, 30].
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Lonergan’s three approximations clearly depend on the complementary
intelligibility of natural and statistical laws. In fact, this intelligibility expressed through
the complementary use of natural and statistical laws equates to what in Insight Lonergan
calls emergent probability.

3.3.2.1

Emergent Probability
In Insight, emergent probability is defined as “the successive realization in accord

with successive schedules of probability of a conditioned series of schemes of
recurrence.”93 It is a complex theory, and I made reference to it in the previous chapter.
To give a full explanation of emergent probability is not warranted here and would take
us too far afield of our purpose. Nevertheless, we need to address some of the basics.
World process reveals an order, a design, an intelligibility.94 Emergent
probability is essentially Lonergan’s “world-view.”95 It is the articulation of the
intelligibility of world process through the complementary employment of classical and
statistical laws.96 Classical laws are hypothetical in the sense that they are ideal
formulations, observable in concrete reality if the conditions for their operation are
fulfilled. Charles Hefling explains:
There are always ifs, and the ifs keep fanning out like branches on a tree. Consequently
there neither is nor could be a combination of classical laws that grasps all of them in a
single explanatory system.97
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A classical law (or natural law) expresses a particular type of intelligibility in world process, namely a
systematic relationship between data. A classical law is a universal. Its intelligibility is the same whether
the law is operative in an event in Milwaukee or in Mumbai. Classical laws are arrived at by abstracting
from particulars to discover the universal.
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Thus classical laws on their own cannot fully account for the intelligibility of
world process. There is needed an explanation of how often the conditions are fulfilled in
which classical laws become operative in concrete events. This calls for the employment
of statistical laws. As with a classical law, a statistical law also expresses a particular
type of intelligibility.98
Next we need to briefly consider what Lonergan means by a “conditioned series
of schemes of recurrence.” A single scheme of recurrence refers to a series of events that
are related in such a way that the fulfillment of the condition of any particular event in
the series allows the other events to occur.99 For example, consider a scheme represented
as a series of conditioned events named A, B, and C. If A occurs, B will occur; if B
occurs, C will occur; if C occurs, A will recur; and the cycle starts over.
Now imagine a world process where multiple schemes of recurrence are
operative, and these schemes themselves are interrelated. In Insight, Lonergan calls this a
conditioned series of schemes of recurrence. A conditioned series means that a series is
not operative automatically, but only if the conditions for its operation are fulfilled.
Statistical laws govern whether or not the conditions for operation are fulfilled.
Essentially a single scheme of recurrence equates to what in the Supplement is
Lonergan’s second approximation to the order of reality, a pattern of operations resulting
from a single complex or series of laws. For example, the circulation of moisture over
the earth can be considered a scheme of recurrence. A series of schemes of recurrence
98

The intelligibility of a statistical law is the ideal frequency, the probability if you will, that an event
governed by one or more classical laws will occur. Probability is not the same as chance. Probability is an
intelligibility. See Insight, 137. For Lonergan, the intelligibility of probability is that there exists an ideal
frequency from which actual frequencies may vary, but not systematically. If actual frequencies were to
vary systematically, this would indicate that a classical law is operative. See Insight, 125.
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equates to what in the Supplement is Lonergan’s third approximation, a pattern of
operations resulting from many complexes linked together in a reflexive pattern.100
In brief, emergent probability is an explanatory idea combining the notion of a
conditioned series of schemes with respective probabilities of emergence and survival.
What Lonergan means by “emergence” is not limited to the emergence of
schemes at the same “level” of reality. Lonergan’s notion of emergent probability also
implies the emergence of “higher” schemes from “lower” schemes. The emergence and
survival of higher schemes are more or less probable, but given enough time and space,
they become highly probable. The emergence of higher schemes from lower schemes is
the “directed dynamism” of emergent probability.

3.3.2.2

The Directed Dynamism of Emergent Probability

The emergence of higher schemes from lower schemes implies that the universe is
not at rest, not static, not fixed in the present, but is in process. Specifically, there is what
Lonergan calls a “directed dynamism” in this universe, an upthrust if you will, from
lower to higher entities.101 In Insight this directed dynamism also goes by the name of
“finality,”102 and in other works “vertical finality.”103 Sub-atoms unite into atoms, atoms
into compounds, compounds into organisms, and organisms to organic evolution within
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Kenneth Melchin explains that “The basic insight at the center of Lonergan’s notion of the recurrence
scheme is that of reflexivity. The recurrent scheme is reflexive in the sense that the functioning or
operation of the scheme has the effect of curling back upon itself and fulfilling the conditions of the scheme
to recur.” See Kenneth R. Melchin, History, Ethics and Emergent Probability: Ethics, Society and History
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Lonergan, “Finality, Love, Marriage,” Collection, 19-23; “Mission and the Spirit,” Third Collection, 24.
In “Mission and the Spirit,” the latest in these examples, Lonergan states that vertical finality, when
considered in the human sphere, is another name for “self-transcendence,” which Lonergan also equates
with the “passionateness of being.” See “Mission and the Spirit,” 29.
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limited ranges.104 Vertical finality escapes the limitations of an isolated essence through
the fertility that is possible when a plurality of essences is conjoined in space and time.
Vertical finality is integral to Lonergan’s world-view:
Still, though accidental to the isolated object or the abstract essence, vertical finality is of
the very idea of our hierarchic universe, of the ordination of things devised and exploited
by the divine Artisan. For the cosmos is not an aggregate of isolated objects
hierarchically arranged on isolated levels, but a dynamic whole...The interconnections are
endless and manifest. Vertical finality would seem beyond dispute.105

As Lonergan notes, vertical finality is the very reason we have a hierarchical
universe. Specifically, to state that we have a hierarchical universe means that there are
successive levels of intelligibility in the universe.106 Each level represents a more
comprehensive scheme compared to the immediate lower level. Each level is able to
relate events in a systematically intelligible way that could not otherwise be
systematically related at the lower level. Another way of stating this is that through the
directed dynamism of emergent probability, what are otherwise coincidental manifolds at
one level are taken up into a higher integration, a higher intelligibility.107 Charles Hefling
explains:
...in such a world process [a world process characterized by emergent probability] there
are successive levels of intelligibility. Events that defy any systematic explanation in
themselves become intelligible at a “higher” level, that is, within a more comprehensive
scheme. There is no reason why the methods proper to chemistry could not eventually
get around to explaining, one by one, each and every molecular event that goes on in an
amoeba. But the only result would be a very long list of explanations, none of them
related to any other in a systematically intelligible way. Move up to the organic level,
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higher intelligible unity of the psychological level. And the psychological level is taken up into a higher
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though, and there is a systematic pattern to be grasped, and grasping its intelligibility
compensates for the lack of system at the molecular level.108

The term “vertical finality” is not found explicitly in the Supplement. The
concept is nevertheless operative in Lonergan’s thought when he judges that the common
course of things and the order of the universe results from a “co-temporal hierarchic
order” (simultanea hierarchia ordinare),109 or from a “hierarchy of schemes”
(hierarchiam schematum).110 The common course of things and the order of the universe
would not have hierarchical schemes or levels of intelligibility were it not for this
directed dynamism. Furthermore, the “directedness” of this dynamism does not originate
from chance, but is grounded in divine wisdom and providence:
Hence these schematic arrangements of things and complexes of laws are all brought
together under one more concrete and more universal order. This order of reality is
surely that of divine wisdom and providence, which embraces all things down to the
smallest detail of each being, arranges and directs all things and brings each one to its
proper end.111

Lonergan’s understanding of divine justice through his use of his notion of
emergent probability exemplifies his adoption of the Leonine injunction vetera novis
augere et perficere – to enlarge and enrich the old with the new. In the Christian
tradition, redemption and divine justice have always been closely linked, and the category
of divine justice took on a particular emphasis in the tradition with the emergence of
Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo? Lonergan, however, enlarges and enriches our understanding
of divine justice. He is faithful to the tradition,112 yet incorporates knowledge from
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contemporary natural and human sciences.113 What Lonergan is doing in this chapter,
from a methodological perspective, parallels what Aquinas did in the thirteenth century.
Whereas Aquinas sought a synthesis with the best available scientific knowledge of his
time, which for him was found in the thought of Aristotle, Lonergan in the late 1950s
develops an understanding of divine justice that incorporates the best available scientific
knowledge of his time. In Insight, Lonergan’s incorporation of contemporary knowledge
from the natural and human sciences resulted in this theory of emergent probability, and
although the Supplement does not explicitly use the term “emergent probability” there is
no doubt Lonergan is using his thought on emergent probability to advance our
understanding of divine justice by advancing our understanding of how our actual world
operates through natural and statistical laws.

3.3.3

Dispelling Anthropomorphic Understandings of Divine Justice
Our English word “justice” originates from the Latin justitia, where the Latin root

is jus or juris, meaning “right,” “rightness of order,” or “law.” Traditionally the word is
associated with legal rights. In the traditional sense the meaning of justice is essentially
retributive justice (vindication): making things right through the assignment of reward or
punishment (just deserts).

113

Lonergan’s use of analogy, understood through natural knowledge in accordance with the vision of the
First Vatican Council, is the use of what later in Method in Theology would be called general theological
categories. See Doran, “The First Chapter of De Deo Trino, Pars Systematica: The Issues,” 41. General
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reluctant to incorporate knowledge from natural and human sciences. See Doran, “The First Chapter of De
Deo Trino, Pars Systematica: The Issues,” 41. See also Lonergan, “Method in Catholic Theology,”
Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958-1964, 45-46.
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It is obvious Lonergan’s purpose is not only to develop an understanding of
divine justice, but specifically an understanding that dispels anthropomorphic
understandings based exclusively on legal analogies. We can too easily conceive God’s
justice as only retributive (legal) justice. Divine justice does include retributive justice,
but retributive justice does not exhaust the meaning of divine justice. The cross of Christ
reveals another aspect of divine justice, the transformation of evil into good through selfsacrificing love, which Lonergan considers the highest principle in the whole economy of
salvation. We will interpret this aspect of divine justice revealed in the cross of Christ
when we come to chapter 4 of the Supplement, but the point here is that this highest
principle in the economy of salvation is an aspect of divine justice, but it is not retributive
justice. Retributive justice is essentially rendering to each his own in equal measure,
meaning that good is returned to good and the evil is returned to evil. The transformation
of good from evil fits neither of these “sub-orderings” of divine justice; hence it is not
retributive justice.114
Thus one of Lonergan’s intents is to free the reader from the anthropomorphic
tendency to limit the understanding of God’s justice to retributive justice. What
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Lonergan does not explicitly speak of “sub-orders” in his chapter on the justice of God. However, this
is implicit in his understanding through his argument that divine wisdom orders intelligibles and nonintelligibles, and from the non-intelligible brings forth the intelligible, which is simply to say that the order
of divine justice includes a sub-order in which evil is transformed into good. Furthermore, Lonergan
discussed these sub-orderings explicitly in DVI, written only a few years after the Supplement. In DVI,
where Lonergan includes a note on the justice of God, he states that the orderings to be found within the
one justice of God can be divided into four: (1) good follows good, (2) evil follows evil, (3) evil follows
good, and (4) good follows evil. See Lonergan, De Verbo Incarnato, 514. The first two sub-orderings,
which represent retributive justice, are especially relevant to Lonergan’s twelfth article on the personal
order of justice where he discusses that death brings each person to the day of judgment. The third subordering (evil follows good) reflects the Scholastic doctrine that there is always a consequence to sin:
malum poenae always follows malum culpae. This third ordering presupposes God’s permitting (but not
willing) of sin, which in itself is irrational and non-intelligible. The fourth sub-ordering is redemption, the
transformation of evil into good. The fourth sub-ordering, in order to be faithful to the sixth article in the
first chapter of the Supplement, should be understood in the broader sense of “restoration,” and within this
fourth sub-order we must make a distinction between natural and supernatural restoration.
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Lonergan is doing in this chapter is redeeming the notion of divine justice itself,
challenging us to reject anthropomorphic understandings based exclusively on analogies
of law codes and lawyers, judges and juries, prisons and prison guards. Such notions of
God’s justice on their own are inadequate for understanding the justice of God.

3.4

The Function of the Chapter in the Wider Context of the Supplement
We recall Lonergan’s hermeneutical principle that the part is understood through

the whole, and the whole through the part. As we noted in the previous chapter,
Lonergan’s consideration of the justice of God functions primarily as a theology,
background material for the remaining chapters of the Supplement. Our purpose here is
to understand this assertion.
In the introduction to this dissertation, I noted the importance of Insight as a
heuristic to guide the interpretation of the Supplement. Chapter 20 of Insight includes
Lonergan’s heuristic structure of the solution to the problem of evil. The foundational
antecedent determination giving rise to Lonergan’s heuristic structure has a strong
correlation to the material in the Supplement’s chapter on the justice of God. This
foundational antecedent determination can be expressed as follows: there is an
intelligible unity of the actual world order.115 And, since there are no divine
afterthoughts, one of the key elements in Lonergan’s heuristic structure is the following:
the solution to the problem of evil (redemption) will be in harmonious continuation with
the order of this universe.116 I consider this to be perhaps the fundamental point in
Lonergan’s entire heuristic structure.
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It is my intent to use this fundamental point in Lonergan’s heuristic structure as a
tool to interpret the function of Lonergan’s understanding of divine justice in the wider
context of the Supplement. I will do this in two steps. First, I will consider the question
of the function of this chapter in the wider context of the Supplement through the lens of
Lonergan’s heuristic that redemption will be in harmonious continuation with the
intelligible unity of the order of this universe. Second, based on that consideration, I will
conclude with a section which interprets Lonergan’s understanding of divine justice as a
theological principle of his soteriology.

3.4.1

Redemption as Harmonious Continuation with the Order of the Universe
In chapter 20 of Insight Lonergan states that “...the solution [to the problem of

evil] will be in harmonious continuation of the actual order of the universe. For there are
no divine afterthoughts.”117 This means that the existing world order, as we currently
understand it, already has the potential for the solution. To state otherwise would be to
suggest that God changes his mind as humans do, which is an anthropomorphic error.
Next we may ask, what grounds this heuristic element? As we noted earlier,
Lonergan’s antecedent determination grounding this specific element (including the
entire heuristic structure) is his judgment that there is an intelligible unity to the order of
this universe. We may further ask, how does he reach this judgment? The answer to this
question is found in chapter 19 of Insight. There Lonergan discusses God’s “unrestricted
act of understanding” and judges that this must be one act, not multiple acts of
understanding:
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Again, the unrestricted act of understanding is one act. Otherwise, it would be an
aggregate or a succession of acts. If none of these acts was the understanding of
everything about everything, then the denial of unity would be the denial of unrestricted
understanding. If any of these acts was the understanding of everything about
everything, then at least that unrestricted act would be a single act.118

Since God understands the order of this universe in one unrestricted act of
understanding, then there is logically an intelligible unity in the order of this universe.
To deny this intelligible unity is a denial that God’s unrestricted act of understanding is
one act. Such a denial is an anthropomorphic conception of God’s wisdom. Here
Lonergan’s thought in Insight clearly anticipates his judgment in the Supplement that
God’s wisdom conceives the order of the universe in one immediate intuition, not by trial
and error.
Thus the problem of evil and its solution are both related to divine wisdom and
goodness that has conceived and chosen the existing world order. The world order as it
currently exists is good and already has the potency for the solution to the problem of
evil. This potency is not dictated by finite natures but by the intelligible unity of world
order conceived by divine wisdom. H. Daniel Monsour explains:
If finite natures are derivative possibilities of world-order mirroring forth the glory of
God, world-order, the intelligible unity of the whole, not the finite natures, dictates what
is possible within that order. If the actual world-order that God brings about is such that
there is a natural orientation or order among lower strata for the reception of a fulfilling
term from some higher strata, one cannot exclude it as impossible by arguing from finite
natures and their exigencies...The fulfillment occurs in accord with the actual order of
this universe that mirrors forth the glory of God.119

It is therefore not only possible but expected that redemption will be in
harmonious continuation with the actual order of this universe. Stated otherwise, the
intelligibility of redemption is intelligibly subsumed under the one, intelligible unity of
118
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the actual order of the universe. This is the cardinal point. And this point, this
fundamental theological principle if you will, is arrived at when human wisdom seeks to
first understand divine wisdom and to judge that divine wisdom functions as the ground
of divine justice and in one immediate intuition has foreseen, ordered, and commissioned
all things from the very first beginnings of the universe right down to the end, including
salvation history. There are no divine afterthoughts. As such, our redemption and
therefore the historical causality of Christ is to be understood as harmonious with our
understanding of the just and wise order of this universe conceived by divine wisdom.
Now that I have introduced the term “theological principle,” my purpose in the
next section is to explain what I mean by this term, and how Lonergan’s chapter on the
justice of God functions as a theological principle in the wider context of the Supplement.

3.4.2

Divine Justice as a Theological Principle

Near the time Lonergan wrote the Supplement, his articulation of the means used
by the systematic theologian to reach theological understanding considered the
relationship between understanding and principles. In the Triune God: Systematics,
Lonergan states that “understanding is about principles.”120 What Lonergan means is that
understanding depends on principles, and so understanding is only as good as the
principles to which they are connected.121 In that text Lonergan defines a principle as
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“what is first in some order.”122 And it is the function of wisdom itself to put things in
their right order.123
If understanding is about principles, and principles are first in the order proposed
by wisdom, then we should interpret Lonergan’s understanding of divine justice as a
theological principle for his understanding of redemption. This is why, along with
Frederick Crowe, I would judge Lonergan’s chapter on divine justice to function as
“background material” for the explicit Christology presented in the subsequent chapters
of the Supplement.124 My point here is not to suggest that Lonergan’s question on the
nature of divine justice is the absolute first question of the Supplement. Obviously it is
not, for we have already treated his first chapter on good and evil, and there the principal
question or problem is anthropological in nature. That first chapter establishes the
problem of evil in human affairs, the impotence of purely human solutions, and thus the
need for a supernatural solution to the problem of evil. On the other hand, Lonergan’s
understanding of divine justice is a theology, and as a theology it functions as a principle
for working out his understanding of redemption and in particular the historical causality
of Christ. For Lonergan, if divine justice is misunderstood, redemption will be
misunderstood.
Now let us reflect deeper on why it is necessary for Lonergan to understand divine
justice prior to understanding this or that aspect of redemption. In my interpretation,
Lonergan’s chapter on divine justice takes up what is perhaps the first question or
problem one needs to answer if one wants to understand salvation history, and
specifically the historical causality of Christ. In my own words, I would express this
122
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question as follows: In general, how does God operate in our world? If we cannot
answer this question, how can we possibly understand the historical causality of Christ?
For Lonergan, the answer to this question is grounded in his understanding of divine
justice: there is an intelligible unity in the common course of things and the order of the
universe, and this common course and order are the proper effects of God produced
through secondary causes. Any aspect of redemption will be in harmonious continuation
with this common course and order, this intelligible unity, because divine justice has no
higher rule than divine wisdom which has conceived the order of this universe in one
intuitional act. If one follows this principle, one’s soteriology will find its ground in
intelligibility, not necessity. This intelligibility ultimately originates from divine
wisdom, the rule of divine justice. It is important to note that Lonergan wants his reader
to understand that the theologian’s wisdom must not lose sight of divine wisdom.
Lonergan’s understanding of divine justice is grounded in an understanding of this world
conceived by divine wisdom, and not some other possible world God could have created
that human wisdom is tempted to contemplate.125
If Lonergan’s understanding of divine justice establishes the theological principle
that there is an intelligible unity in the order of the universe, then any subsequent
question about the intelligibility of a proper effect of God must be intelligibly related to
125
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the order of the universe, otherwise there would be no intelligible unity to the universe,
amounting to a notion of a voluntaristically conceived divine will, an error Lonergan
refutes. The redemption is not necessary, but it is intelligible. However, voluntarism has
a too superficial understanding of intelligibility to sufficiently grasp the intelligibility of
redemption. And the root cause of this problem is a failure to judge that divine wisdom
intelligibly orders those things that are contingent, those things freely chosen by God. In
short, there is an aspect of voluntarism which ignores the significance of intelligibility,
exaggerates accordingly the role of the will, and obscures the notion of divine justice.126
Let us dwell for the moment on the significance of intelligibility, because it is
critical to interpreting Lonergan. The justice of God is not limited to the events we
associate with salvation history. Every event in history directly willed by God is related
to God in exactly the same way, because anything directly willed by God is
intelligible.127 Charles Hefling explains:
In the universe that actually exists, every event that actually occurs is related to God in
exactly the same way. That is what it means to affirm that God is the First Agent. The
Big Bang, biological evolution, my writing this chapter and your understanding it – if any
of these is occurring or has occurred, it is intelligible, and God is the reason why it is
intelligible. But the same thing is true, in the same way, of miracles, revelation, religious
conversion, and the Incarnation. The sense in which these are acts of God is no different
from the sense in which falling sparrows and lilies of the field are acts of God. Even
“salvation history,” in other words, belongs to the intelligible, emergently probable
universe.128

The cardinal point here is that anything in the created order, including salvation
history, belongs to the intelligible unity of the one order of the universe conceived,
chosen, and effected by God. Therefore the cross of Christ, the satisfaction of Christ, and
the historical causality of Christ, as with anything else in the created order, are intelligible
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Lonergan, DBM, 104 [Supplement, 42].
Hefling, “Philosophy, Theology, and God,” 137.
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Hefling, “Philosophy, Theology, and God,” 137.
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in themselves and intelligibly related to the intelligible unity of this universe. Why?
Because the cross of Christ, the satisfaction made by Christ, and the historical causality
of Christ are part of God’s choice of a wise order, they are part of the course of things
and the order of the universe, and as such they are the proper effects of God. As such,
they are intelligible. If they were not intelligible, they would not be just.
Even though the Supplement is a text on redemption, and certainly Lonergan
includes material that is not explicitly required to understand the historical causality of
Christ, we recall that Lonergan still had the special intent to understand the historical
causality of Christ. We also mentioned in our introduction that we would attend
particularly to the question of Lonergan’s understanding of the historical causality of
Christ based on his own stated purpose. I will explain how this theological principle is at
work in Lonergan’s understanding of the historical causality of Christ.
First, recall how Lonergan understands the intelligible unity of world process. He
understands this intelligible unity in terms of emergent probability. Now emergent
probability includes the intelligibility of statistical laws, and statistical laws imply that if
an event is to take place, the conditions which enable that event to take place must be
fulfilled. Statistical laws attempt to identify the probability that the relevant conditions
will be fulfilled for the event to take place. Well, if the historical causality of Christ is an
aspect of redemption, and if redemption is in harmonious continuation with the actual
order of this universe, then the historical causality of Christ will certainly involve the
fulfillment of conditions not only with respect to Christ as historical agent, but also with
respect to human agents who cooperate in Christ’s redemptive mission.
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In fact, when Lonergan discusses agency in the final chapter of the Supplement,
he will distinguish between agents acting through nature and agents acting through
intellect.129 Persons who choose to cooperate with Christ in God’s plan of redemption
are ministerial agents acting through intellect. As such, they not only intend specific
effects, but they can also come to knowledge of the requisite conditions that must be
fulfilled if their intended effect is to be actualized.
Furthermore, in the final chapter of the Supplement where Lonergan discusses
“Christ the Historical Agent,”130 he will explain why the effect of Christ’s historical
action as a whole is the total human good of order, both external and cultural, past,
present, and future.131 He will explain that Christ’s actions are mediated socially and
historically, which means that Christ’s actions are adapted to human persons. Humans
communicate through expressive signs, and human knowledge begins from the senses.
The Word, in becoming flesh, through his whole ministry on earth involving word and
deed, made perceptible the Word of God to human beings. In my interpretation, this is a
judgment that Christ’s historical actions are in harmonious continuation with the actual
order of the universe because Christ’s actions are adapted to human beings as we actually
exist in this world order. God is certainly the absolute, first historical agent. But as
Lonergan’s article on the “Just Order of Reality” asserts, it is God's way to act through
secondary causes and in accordance with their natures.
129

An agent acting through intellect, as opposed to an agent acting through nature, acts in accordance with
an intentional form. An agent acting through nature can only act in accordance with either an innate form
or a form naturally acquired. In either case, an agent needs the requisite conditions fulfilled in order to
produce their effect. Whereas agents acting through nature are at the mercy of nature to fulfill the
conditions that allow the actuation of their own agency, agents acting through intellect not only intend
effects, but they also have the ability to understand the conditions that need to be fulfilled and can, to a
certain degree, fulfill the necessary conditions that allow the agent to cause the effect. See Lonergan,
DBM, *239 [Supplement, 100-101].
130
Article 42.
131
Lonergan, DBM, *268 [Supplement, 114].
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This is particularly important to acknowledge when it comes to human
communication, since communication is required for the transmission of beliefs. And the
transmission of beliefs is fundamental to the historical causality of Christ, since the
proclamation of the solution to the problem of evil is required if the solution is to be in
harmonious continuation with the actual order of the universe.132 This is why in the
article on the “Just Order of Reality,” Lonergan states that God himself became man that
he might be a secondary and proportionate cause in restoring all things (Eph 1:10) and
making all things new (1 Cor 5:17),133 and that the kingdom is proclaimed and
propagated through secondary causes, namely, human beings.134
It is quite clear then that when it comes to understanding the historical causality of
Christ, this historical causality is not exempt from Lonergan’s assertion that the requisite
conditions need to be fulfilled for a cause to have an effect. Now why do requisite
conditions need to be fulfilled? The answer again goes back to Lonergan’s understanding
of the intelligible unity of world process, understood according to the theory of emergent
probability in which higher schemes emerge from lower schemes. As such, in Insight
Lonergan conceives redemption as a “higher integration” of human living (a higher
scheme if you will).135 Like any higher integration, the solution to the problem of evil
comes about only when the requisite conditions for its fulfillment are actually fulfilled.
This applies equally to the historical causality of Christ. To deny that the historical
causality of Christ is in harmonious continuation with the actual order of the universe is
132

In Lonergan’s heuristic structure of the solution to the problem of evil in chapter 20 of Insight he
includes an excursus on “belief.” Why does he do this? Because most of what any human person knows is
known through belief, not immanently generated knowledge. The transmission of beliefs is fundamentally
part of the intelligible unity of world order. As such, communication of the good news from one generation
to the next, as a belief, is fundamental to a historically-minded understanding of redemption.
133
Lonergan, DBM, 78-79 [Supplement, 32].
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equivalent to denying that the historical causality of Christ is in harmonious continuation
with divine justice, since divine wisdom which has conceived the intelligible unity of
world order is the norm, the ground of divine justice.
In summary, we can state that the intelligibility of divine justice discerned in the
intelligible unity of world order is a theological principle of the Supplement. It is clear
that for Lonergan, understanding redemption presupposes an understanding of divine
justice. In other words, it is a fundamental theological principle operative in Lonergan’s
soteriology, whether he is seeking to understand the meaning of the cross, the meaning of
Christ’s satisfaction, or the meaning of the historical causality of Christ. A principle is
what is first in some order. Every aspect of Lonergan’s understanding of redemption is
influenced by this principle, meaning that the explanatory, systematic conclusions he
reaches regarding redemption are ordered to his understanding of divine justice, as
conclusions are ordered to principles.

3.5

Summary
The focus of Lonergan’s chapter is clearly on divine wisdom, since God’s

wisdom is the law of God’s justice. Lonergan inherited this understanding of divine
justice from Aquinas, and through Lonergan’s adoption of the Leonine injunction of
vetera novis augere et perficere Lonergan has synthesized Aquinas’s understanding of
divine justice with contemporary knowledge from the natural and human sciences. For
Lonergan, knowledge from the natural and human sciences, which is integral to his
worldview of emergent probability developed in Insight, advances our understanding of
divine justice by advancing our understanding of how God operates in this world through
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secondary (instrumental) causes according to the nature of things and natural laws. And
since divine wisdom does not learn by trial and error, redemption in general and the
historical causality of Christ in particular are in harmonious continuation with the
intelligible unity of the order of this universe conceived by divine wisdom. As Lonergan
states in Insight, there are no divine afterthoughts.
This understanding of divine justice functions as a theological principle in the
Supplement. The cross of Christ, the satisfaction of Christ, and the historical causality of
Christ are directly willed by God. Therefore they are most just. And if just, they are
intelligible. And if they are intelligible, they must be intelligently related to the
intelligible unity of the actual order of this universe. Redemption is not necessary, but it
is intelligible. If the theological principle of divine justice is misunderstood, a
misunderstanding of redemption is sure to follow. This chapter on divine justice clearly
shows Lonergan’s concern to conceive divine justice correctly, evidenced by his repeated
emphasis on the problem of anthropomorphic conceptions of divine justice based on legal
analogies.
Finally we should note that this chapter on the justice of God is not Lonergan’s
final word on divine justice. As he notes at the beginning and end of the chapter, he is
leaving room for further development. This further development will appeal to a much
loftier analogy: the cross of Christ.
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CHAPTER 4:

4.1

ON THE DEATH AND RESURRECTION OF CHRIST

Introduction
Our purpose here is to interpret the third chapter of the Supplement titled “On the

Death and Resurrection of Christ.”1 The chapter includes articles 16-21 of the
Supplement: (16) The Death of Christ, (17) The Payment of the Price, (18) The New
Testament Sacrifice, (19) Meritorious Obedience, (20) Vicarious Suffering, and (21) The
Power of the Resurrection.
Lonergan begins with an introductory paragraph:
No Christian doctrine has received a clearer or fuller treatment in the New Testament
than the dogma of the Redemption. Accordingly, it seems best to collect and set forth
first of all whatever teachings are communicated in the primary sources of revelation.
The next six articles, therefore -- on the death of Christ (16), the payment of a price (17),
the sacrifice of the new covenant (18), meritorious obedience (19), vicarious suffering
(20), and the power of the resurrection (21) -- will simply express what is to be found in
scripture.2

4.2

A Brief Description of Articles 16 - 21

4.2.1

Article 16: The Death of Christ3

The article is divided into six sub-sections: (1) Proximate causes, (2) Underlying
principles, (3) God’s intention, (4) Distinctions, (5) Immanent effects, and (6) Universal
effect.
1

“Caput Tertium. DE CHRISTO MORTUO ET RESURRECTO,” DBM, 118-145 [Supplement, 48-60].
“Aliam christianae fidei doctrinam neque clarius neque plenius exposuerunt novi testamenti auctores
quam ipsum redemptionis dogma. Quam ob causam, ea in primis colligere atque recitare visum est, quae in
primariis revelationis fontibus traduntur. Sex ergo quae sequuntur articulis de morte Christi (XVI), de
pretii solutione (XVII), de sacrificio novi testamenti (XVIII), de obedientia meritoria (XIX), de vicaria
passione (XX), et de virtute resurrectionis (XXI), non alia fere continentur quam quae in sripturis
leguntur.” DBM, 118 [Supplement, 48-49]. As we noted in the previous chapter, although Lonergan uses
the word “dogma,” no specific definition of the doctrine of the redemption has been given dogmatic status
by the Catholic Church.
3
“Articulus XVI. De Morte Christi,” DBM, 120-123 [Supplement, 49-50].
2
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Proximate causes: Lonergan identifies four and possibly a fifth proximate cause
of Christ’s death: (1) Judas, his betrayer; (2) the High Priests; (3) the Jerusalem mob
stirred up by the priests; (4) the soldiers; and (5) if one adds those who consented, the
passers-by who jeered at him. Although Lonergan states that these causes are “according
to the gospel narratives” (secundum narrationem evangelicam), Lonergan’s scriptural
references are almost exclusively from the gospel of Mark.4
Underlying principles: Lonergan notes that John’s gospel continually points out
the opposition of the Jews,5 but the same gospel points out general principles of human
nature suggesting that the opposition to Christ was almost inevitable in the normal course
of human events.6 To substantiate this judgment, Lonergan cites many passages, all from
John’s gospel.7 The fundamental opposition Lonergan discusses can be summed up as
follows: Christ was the light of the world (Jn 8:12); the light came into the world but
humans preferred darkness to light, for their deeds were evil (Jn 3:19).8
God’s intention: Lonergan cites Acts 2:23 which teaches that Christ was
delivered up by the deliberate intention and foreknowledge of God.9 The sufferings of
Christ were mandatory (Lk 24:26, 46) and in accordance with the Scriptures (1 Cor
15:13; Acts 3:18).10
To the above references we may add what is said about the command of the Father (Jn
10:18), Christ's own predictions about his passion and death (Mk 9:12, 31, 10:33 ff.), his

4

The article includes six scriptural references. Regarding Judas, Lonergan cites Mk 14:21, 43. Regarding
the High Priest, Mk. 14:55, 64. Regarding the Jerusalem mob, Mk 15:11, 14. Regarding the soldiers, Mk
15:16, 21, 24. Regarding the passers-by who consented, Rom 1:32 and Mk 15:29, 31.
5
Lonergan references the following passages from John: Jn 5:16, 18; 6:53, 60, 66, 70; 7:12-13, 20, 31-32,
43-44, 51-52; 8:48, 59; 9:16, 22, 30-34; 10:19-21, 31, 39; 11:46-53, 56; 12:19, 42-43.
6
Lonergan, DBM, 120 [Supplement, 49].
7
Jn 3:19-21; 7:7; 8:37-47; 9:41; 12: 39 ff.; 19:11.
8
Lonergan, DBM, 120 [Supplement, 49].
9
Lonergan, DBM, 121 [Supplement, 49].
10
Lonergan, DBM, 121 [Supplement, 49].
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voluntary acceptance of his passion and death (Mk 14:36, Mt 26:33), and his obedience
so often mentioned by the apostles (Rom 5:19; Phil 2:8; Heb 5:8, 10:5-7).11

Distinctions: As a physical event the death of Christ is both an action and a
passion. Christ’s death is an action considered as proceeding from the agents who caused
his death, and this same event is a passion as produced in the recipient.12 Distinctions
must be made regarding the wills involved. God in no way wills the evil of sin, so God
in no way willed the sin of those culpable for Christ’s death. God only indirectly wills
the consequences of sin, so God only indirectly willed the evils inflicted upon Christ.
God directly wills the good, so God directly willed the acceptance of suffering and death
on the part of the obedient Christ.13 Lonergan explains why God directly willed this:
Moreover, actions that are in accordance with the precepts of the Gospels are virtuous.
Now the Gospel rejects the law of retaliation, lex talionis, commands love of one's
enemies (Mt 5:38-48), and extols the suffering of evil for the sake of justice (Mt 5:10
ff)...The whole of Christ's passion and death, therefore, inasmuch as it proceeded from
the gentle and humble Christ, was directly willed by God.14

Immanent effects: Lonergan notes that the Epistle to the Hebrews teaches that
Christ was perfected through his sufferings (Heb 2:10; 5:8-9), and St. Paul teaches that
Christ’s exaltation was due to his becoming obedient unto death, even death on a cross
(Phil 2:7 ff.).15 Lonergan notes St. Paul’s teaching that the purpose of Christ’s death and
resurrection is that Christ might be Lord of both the dead and the living (Rom 14:9).16

11

“Quibus accedunt quae de mandato Patris narrantur (Jn 10:18), propriae passionis et mortis praedictiones
a Christo factae (Mk 9:12, 31, 10:33 ff.), voluntaria eiusdem passionis et mortis acceptatio (Mk 14:36, Mt
26:33), et ab apostolis celebrata Christi obedientia (Rom 5:19; Phil 2:8; Heb 5:8, 10:5-7).” DBM, 121
[Supplement, 49].
12
Lonergan, DBM, 121 [Supplement, 49]. Lonergan references ST, I-II, q. 20, a. 6, 2um; Lombard, 3, d.
20, c. 5-7.
13
Lonergan, DBM, 122 [Supplement, 50].
14
“Praeterea, bonae sunt actiones quae secundum praecepta evangelica fiunt; sed evangelium reprobat
legem talionis, inimicorum dilectionem praecipit (Mt 5:38-48), et malorum perpessionem propter iustitiam
summopere laudat (Mt 5:10 ff.)...et ideo totam Christi passionem eiusque mortem, quatenus a voluntate
Christi mitis et humilis processit, directe voluit Deus.” DBM, 122 [Supplement, 50].
15
Lonergan, DBM, 123 [Supplement, 50].
16
Lonergan, DBM, 123 [Supplement, 50].
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Universal effect: The universal effect of Christ’s death is our redemption.
Lonergan cites a number of passages from Scripture:
Scripture teaches above all that Christ died for our sins (1 Cor 15:3; 1 Pet 3:18), on behalf
of sinners (Rom 5:6), for the whole human race (2 Cor 5:15; Heb 2:9), for each individual
(Rom 14:15; 1 Cor 8:11; Gal 2:20), for us (Rom 5:8; 1 Thes 5:10); that we were baptized
in the death of Christ (Rom 6:3), that the Eucharist proclaims the death of the Lord (1 Cor
11:26), a death undergone for redemption from transgressions (Heb 9:15); that he died in
order to gather together the scattered children of God (Jn 11:51-52), and so that all living
men should live no longer for themselves but for him who died and was raised to life for
them (2 Cor 5:15); that he died in order that, alive or dead, we should still live united to
him (1 Thes 5:10); in order to lead us to God (1 Pet 3:18), to bring about a universal
reconciliation (2 Cor 5:19; Rom 5:10; Eph 2:16; Col 1:20-22), and to destroy by his death
him who had power over death, that is, the devil, and set free all those who had been held
in slavery all their lives by the fear of death (Heb 2:14). To all this we may add
everything that Scripture says about the blood and the cross of the Lord, about his
sacrifice, his love and his self-surrender.17

4.2.2

Article 17: The Payment of the Price18

There are two basic parts to this article. In the first, Lonergan considers the literal
meaning of the New Testament word “redemption.” He surveys various Greek words
translated into the Latin as redimere (to redeem) or redemptio (redemption). Some refer
strictly to a commercial transaction, “while others have such a reference but in a much
more general and sometimes remote sense.”19 He considers the latter group first. The

17

“Praecipue vero docet scriptura Christum mortuum esse pro peccatis nostris (1 Cor 15:3; 1 Pet 3:18), pro
impiis (Rom 5:6), pro omnibus (2 Cor 5:15; Heb 2:9) et singulis (Rom 14:15; 1 Cor 8:11; Gal 2:20), pro
nobis (Rom 5:8; 1 Thes 5:10); in morte Christi nos baptizari (Rom 6:3), Eucharistiam mortem Domini
annuntiare (1 Cor 11:26); quam praeterea mortem fuisse in redemptionem praevaricationum (Heb 9:15); ut
filios Dei, qui erant dispersi, congregaret in unum (Jn 11:51-52); ut et qui vivunt, iam non sibi vivant, sed ei
qui pro ipsis mortuus est et resurrexit (2 Cor 5:15); ut sive vigilemus sive dormiamus simul cum illo
vivamus (1 Thes 5:10); ut nos offerret Deo (1 Pet 3:18); in reconciliationem universalem (2 Cor 5:19; Rom
5:10; Eph 2:16; Col 1:20-22); ut per mortem destrueret eum qui habebat mortis imperium, id est diabolum,
et liberaret eos qui timore mortis per totam vitam obnoxii erant servituti (Heb 2:14). Quibus accedunt
omnia quae de sanguine et cruce Domini dicuntur, de eius sacrificio, de eius dilectione, suique traditione.”
DBM, 123 [Supplement, 50].
18
“Articulus XVII. De Pretii Solutione,” DBM, 124-128 [Supplement, 51-53].
19
“...aliae autem connexum quidem sed longe generaliorem sensum eumque interdum remotum habent.”
DBM, 124 [Supplement, 51]. Based on a comparison to Lonergan’s 1958 lecture on redemption, this
somewhat enigmatic statement likely refers to the Hebrew meaning of redemption in the Old Testament
carried forward into the New Testament. The Hebrew understanding of redemption was primarily
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Greek words refer to redemption in various contexts.20 Then he examines specific
passages which speak of redemption using metaphors related to commercial transactions,
such as the Greek lytron, which can be translated “ransom.” Lonergan notes a number of
examples from the New Testament.21 From the New Testament teachings he draws five
conclusions. First, there is a distinction between the means and end of redemption:
Redemption as end is that state in which we are freed from the power of darkness, from
sin, from punishment, from the fear of death, by which we have received the promise, are
reconciled to God, are justified, enjoy the indwelling of the Holy Spirit and adoptive
sonship, are saved in hope, are able to approach God with confidence; by which we await
or will one day enjoy the resurrection of the flesh, life with Christ, and the crown of
glory. Redemption as means refers to that process by which this state arises or is brought
about, not only by causality but also and especially under that condition most
burdensome to Christ, namely, death on the cross. The Word of God could have saved us
without coming down from heaven; the incarnate Word could have saved us without
going through his passion and death; but in actual fact it was through his passion and
death that he did save us.22

liberation or deliverance, and not primarily a meaning expressed in terms of a financial transaction using
metaphors taken from the pagan marketplace and the ancient practice of buying and selling slaves and
captives. The Hebrew meaning is exemplified through the words pâdâh (primarily understood as liberation
from Egypt), gâ’al (primarily understood as liberation from Babylon), and kipper (liberation from sin).
The Hebrew understanding of redemption as liberation or deliverance is especially present in the canticle of
Zachariah (Lk 1:68-79). See Lonergan, “The Redemption,” 17.
20
As liberation expected by devout Jews: lytrōsis (Lk 1:68, 2:38; Heb 9:12). As the remission of sins:
apolytrōsis (Eph 1:7, Col 1:14; Heb 9:15) and lytrousthai (Tit 2:14). As the redemption hoped for on the
last day: apolytrōsis (Lk 21:28; Rom 8:23; Eph 1:14, 4:30). As Christ himself and as Christ having won
an eternal redemption: apolytrōsis (1 Cor 1:30) and lytrōsis (Heb 9:12), respectively. In connection with
grace and the gratuitous justification: apolytrōsis (Rom 3:24). Lonergan, DBM, 122 [Supplement, 51].
21
Lonergan organizes these examples into five groups: (1) The Son of Man came not to serve, but to give
his life as a ransom (lytron) for many (Mk 10:45; Mt. 20:28). Lonergan notes that “to give one’s life”
would seem to be a Semitism, as “to lay down one’s life” in Jn 10:11, 15, 17, and the meaning of
“redemption” (redemptio) associated with the metaphor lytron indicates a means of liberation; (2) Christ
sacrificed himself as a ransom (antilytron) for all (1 Tim 2:6); (3) We were ransomed (elytrōthête) not with
gold or silver, but in the precious blood of Christ (1 Pet 1:18); (4) There are a number of passages where
we find the Greek timê [price], agorazein [to buy], exagorazein [to buy up, buy from]. For example, Paul
tells the Corinthians that they have been bought at a price (1 Cor 6:20); (5) A number of passages speak of
the Lord giving himself up for our sins (Gal 1:4), giving himself up for me (Gal 2:20), for us (Eph 5:2), for
the Church (Eph 5:25), for our sins (Rom 4:25), and for us all (Rom 8:32). Lonergan, DBM, 125-127
[Supplement, 51-52].
22
“Redemptio ut finis est status ille quo liberamur a potestate tenebrarum, a peccatis, a poenis, a timore
mortis, quo repromissionem accipimus, Deo reconciliamur, iustificamur, inhabitationem Spiritus et
filiorum adoptionem habemus, spe salvati sumus, cum fiducia ad Deum accedere possumus, resurrectionem
carnis, vitam cum Christo, gloriae coronam vel adhuc exspectamus vel quandoque possidebimus.
Redemptio autem ut medium dicit id quo hic status oritur et producitur, non solum causalitate, sed etiam et
praecipue sub illa conditione Christo onerosa, quae erat mors crucis. Potuit enim Dei Verbum de caelis nos
salvare; potuit Verbum caro factum praeter passionem et mortem nos salvare; sed de facto passione et
morte nos salvos fecit.” DBM, 127 [Supplement, 52]. Lonergan references ST, III, q. 46, a. 2.
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Second, Christ “wrought the salvation of all mankind” (salutem omnium hominum esse
operatum) under the burdensome condition of “giving his life” (dandi animam suam).23
Lonergan makes this conclusion on the basis of New Testament exegesis, particularly
those passages which understand Christ’s “giving his life” for our redemption
metaphorically as “paying the price” (pretii solutio).24 Lonergan states that “paying the
price” is no doubt a metaphor, but it is a real operation and signifies an exchange
inasmuch as the death of Christ was real, our salvation is real, and a connection between
them is affirmed.25 Third, Christ gave his earthly life in exchange for the eternal life of
humanity.26 Fourth, if one asks to whom the price was paid, this pushes the metaphor too
far. Lonergan notes that the once-widespread opinion that Christ paid the price to the
devil has for a long time been discarded.27 Fifth, as to why God required a price for our
salvation, the reason is a mystery in the fullest sense and we can only understand it
imperfectly and analogically. For Lonergan, such an understanding would be most
fruitful, perhaps more fruitful than any other theological understanding,28 but the means
to this end is to first determine just what is to be understood so that subsequently one
might try to attain some understanding.

23

Lonergan, DBM, 127 [Supplement, 52].
Lonergan, DBM, 127 [Supplement, 52].
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Lonergan, DBM, 127-128 [Supplement, 52].
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Lonergan, DBM, 128 [Supplement, 53].
27
Lonergan, DBM, 128 [Supplement, 53].
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Lonergan, DBM, 128 [Supplement, 53].
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4.2.3

Article 18: The New Testament Sacrifice29
First, Lonergan distinguishes six elements in the New Testament’s notion of a

sacrifice: (1) the effect of the sacrifice, which is the forgiveness of sin, sanctification,
and confident access to God; (2) the recipient of the effect; (3) the agent, the priest; (4)
the sufferer or victim sacrificed; (5) the action of the priest offering the sacrifice; and (6)
the foundation of the sacrificial system, the covenant or testament by virtue of which that
social group, in which priests are appointed to offer sacrifice for the people, is constituted
as holy.30
In the remainder of the article Lonergan explains that the new covenant divinely
instituted by Christ is superior to the Mosaic covenant, and his explanation relies heavily
on an exegesis of the Epistle to the Hebrews. The Epistle to the Hebrews brings out this
theme through its contrasts of (1) the mediator Moses and the mediator Christ, (2) the
priesthood of Levi and the priesthood of Melchisedech, and (3) sacrifices meant to purify
the flesh and sacrifices meant to purify the inner self.31 Lonergan summarizes that Christ
has been made the guarantor, mediator, priest, and victim of the new covenant.

4.2.4

Article 19: Meritorious Obedience32

Lonergan begins with an explanation of what constitutes the mission of the Son.
As it regards the person of the Son, mission refers to his eternal procession from the

29

“Articulus XVIII. De sacrificio novi testamenti,” DBM, 129-132 [Supplement, 53-55].
Lonergan, DBM, 129 [Supplement, 53].
31
Lonergan, DBM, 130 [Supplement, 53].
32
“Articulus XIX. De obedientia meritoria,” DBM, 133-137 [Supplement, 55-56].
30
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Father, with the appropriate extrinsic (created) term.33 With regard to the human acts
performed by the Son, mission refers to dependence upon the Father which Lonergan
names obedience. To command is to move another through reason and will, and to obey
is to be moved by another through reason and will.34
The remainder of the article is essentially a compilation of scriptural passages
which speak of the command of the Father to the Son (for example, Jn 10:17-18; 12:49;
15:10), and the Son’s obedient response to the Father’s command (for example, Jn 4:34;
5:30; 6:38; 8:29; 15:10; 19:30).35 Now Christ’s obedience did not only include
submission of his reason and will, but his bodily obedience as well. Submission of
reason and will are interior acts. But a human act, in the fullest sense, consists not only
of these interior acts, but the addition of an external act that is bodily and perceptible by
the senses.36 This is an important point, since Lonergan will make use of this in his
reflection on Christ’s satisfaction in chapter 5 of the Supplement.
Lonergan ends the article stating that there is no doubt that Christ’s obedience
unto death was free and meritorious. And correlative to Christ’s obedience is the merit or
reward conferred upon his obedience, spoken of by St. Paul in Philippians 2:9 and
Romans 5:19. The same idea is found in Hebrews 2:9. Finally, the Council of Trent
confirmed this New Testament witness, teaching that the meritorious cause of our
33

Lonergan, DBM, 133 [Supplement, 55]. In Lonergan’s Trinitarian theology, the mission of a divine
person is contingent, meaning that it can be or not be. As contingent, a divine mission is constituted by a
divine relation of origin itself; second, although such a mission is constituted by a relation of origin alone,
nevertheless an appropriate external (created) term is required if there is to be a correspondence of truth (a
correspondence with reality). There is no correspondence of truth that there is a mission without an
appropriate external term, although nothing real and intrinsic is added to a divine person as divine on
account of the external term. See Lonergan, The Triune God : Systematics, 457. With respect to the
mission of the Son, the appropriate external term is a secondary act of existence by which Christ assumes a
nonsubsistent human nature. See Lonergan, The Triune God : Systematics, 471.
34
Lonergan, DBM, 133 [Supplement, 55]. On the meaning of “to command” (praecipere) Lonergan cites
ST, II-II, q. 104, a. 1. On the meaning of “to obey” (obedire) Lonergan cites ST, III, q. 47, a. 2, 1um.
35
Lonergan, DBM, 133-134 [Supplement, 55].
36
Lonergan, DBM, 135 [Supplement, 55].
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justification was Christ’s holy suffering on the wood of the cross (DB 799; DS 1529; ND
1932).37
4.2.5

Article 20: Vicarious Suffering38
“Vicarious” (vicarium) refers to that which someone does or suffers in the place

of another.39 A person acting vicariously is a substitute or surrogate. Christ’s vicarious
suffering included an active and passive aspect, and these two should not be separated.
Christ was a surrogate in the active sense, since it is he and not us who paid the price of
our redemption. It was his obedience, and not ours, that was meritorious.40 The passive
aspect included his obedient acceptance of death. The unbreakable relationship between
the passive and active aspects of Christ’s vicarious suffering implies that it was
impossible for Christ to act vicariously on our behalf, without by the same token
suffering vicariously for us. The words “for us” (pro nobis) have a two-sense meaning.
In one sense, Christ’s suffered vicariously to take away our sins. In another sense, Christ
suffered vicariously because we are sinners. In other words, Lonergan distinguishes end
and motive.
Lonergan proceeds to explore the antecedent cause or reason that Christ’s
vicarious suffering was in accordance with the intention of God:
Now if the passion and death of Christ occurred according to the divine intention, it
surely was not without reason. This is the reason we seek, and we declare it to be that
Christ came to redeem us; and he came, not on clouds of glory and sitting at the right
hand of the Power, but in flesh that could suffer and would suffer on account of sin.
37

Lonergan, DBM, 137 [Supplement, 56]. Lonergan includes a footnote referring the reader to DB 790: “If
anyone asserts that this sin of Adam …is taken away by any other remedy than through the merits of the
unique mediator, our Lord Jesus Christ, who has reconciled us with the Father in his own blood …let him
be anathema.” Cf. DS 1513, ND 510.
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“Articulus XX. De vicaria passione,” DBM, 138-141 [Supplement, 56-58].
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Lonergan, DBM, 138 [Supplement, 56].
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Lonergan, DBM, 138 [Supplement, 56].
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Christ, therefore, not only acted vicariously on our behalf but also suffered and died,
because he not only had eternal life to impart to us, but also the task of taking away our
sins and reconciling sinners with God.41

Lonergan cites a number of New Testament passages to support the authority of
his claim. We should note that even though the New Testament witness is sufficient to
ground the affirmation that Christ’s vicarious suffering is for us and for our sins,
Lonergan also appeals to the Old Testament, namely the servant song of Isaiah 53:4-12.
For Lonergan, Jesus himself interpreted his own life as the suffering servant foretold in
Isaiah.42 Lonergan substantiates his judgment by stating that the Catholic tradition has at
all times understood this passage (Isaiah 53:4-12) as referring to the death of the Lord.43

4.2.6

Article 21: The Power of the Resurrection44

Lonergan states that redemption is brought about by a mediator more than by a
means, and is established upon the death and resurrection of Christ rather than upon the
fact of his death alone.45 For example, Lonergan notes that Christ has become a lifegiving Spirit (1 Cor 15:45; Jn 6:62-63), and that Christ is not only our Priest in his death
on the cross, but he has also been made an eternal High Priest (Heb 6:20; 7:28), has been
allotted a “far higher ministry” (melius sortitus ministerium), and now sits at the right
hand of God.46 In his consideration of the power of the resurrection, Lonergan is careful

41

“Quod si passio morsque Christi secundum divinam intentionem facta est, sane sine ratione non est facta.
Quam rationem quaerimus et dicimus Christum ad nos redimendos, non in nubibus caeli et sedentem a
dextris virtutis venisse, sed in carne passibili atque passura propter peccata. Ideo ergo Christus pro nobis
vicarius non solum egit et fecit sed etiam passus et mortuus est, quia non solum vitam aeternam nobis
communicandam habuit sed etiam peccata auferenda et peccatores Deo Patri reconciliandos.” DBM, 139140 [Supplement, 57].
42
Lonergan, DBM, 141 [Supplement, 58].
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Lonergan, DBM, 141 [Supplement, 58].
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“Articulus XXI. De virtute resurrectionis,” DBM, 142-145 [Supplement, 58-60].
45
Lonergan, DBM, 142 [Supplement, 58]. As scriptural evidence that Christ remains a mediator, even after
his death, Lonergan cites 1 Tim 2:5; Heb 8:6, 9:15, 12:24.
46
Lonergan, DBM, 143 [Supplement, 59].
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not to downplay the power of Christ’s death. Lonergan’s point is that Christ is not only a
means, but a mediator of our salvation.47
At the end of the article, Lonergan links the power of the resurrection to its
pneumatological implications. Before Jesus’ glorification the Spirit was not given (Jn.
7:39). We are washed clean, sanctified, and justified in the Spirit of God (1 Cor. 6:11),
and have become children of God by adoption because God has sent into our hearts the
Spirit of his Son crying out, “Abba, Father” (Gal 4:6; Rom 8:15).48 Lonergan ends the
article interpreting that Hebrews 5:9 implies that Christ is the cause of our salvation not
by his death alone, but by his death and resurrection, and his giving of the Spirit:
Besides, the phrase “the source [Gk. αίτιος, ‘cause’] of salvation for all who obey him”
seems to indicate a mode of causality. For from the person of the Father there is sent the
person of the Son to us persons in the work of reconciliation, so that the very same love
with which the Father loves his own Son is given to us, that is, the Holy Spirit, who is
Love proceeding from Father and Son.49

4.3

Lonergan on the Means of Redemption

Our purpose here is to interpret how Lonergan has organized the teachings of the
New Testament on redemption as means. Recall that he makes the distinction between
redemption as end and redemption as means in article 17 (The Payment of the Price). He
made the same distinction in Thesis 15 of DVI. Thesis 15 formally states:
Redemption denotes not only an end but also a mediation: a price that has been paid,
Christ the Mediator’s vicarious suffering and death for sinners and on account of sins, the
sacrifice offered by our High Priest in his own blood, meritorious obedience, the power
of the risen Lord, and the eternal Priest’s intercession.50
47

Lonergan, DBM, 142 [Supplement, 58].
Lonergan, DBM, 144 [Supplement, 59].
49
“Praeterea, cum addatur ‘causa omnibus obtemperantibus sibi,’ causalitatis modus innui videtur. Nam a
Patre persona mittitur Filius persona ad nos personas in opus reconciliationis, ut dilectio, qua Filium
proprium dilexit, etiam nobis detur, ipse nempe Spiritus, qui est Amor a Patre Filioque procedens.” DBM,
145 [Supplement, 59-60].
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In DVI, in the section titled “The Meaning of the Thesis,” Lonergan explains the
meaning of the thesis according to three assertions: 1) the thesis affirms redemption as an
end, (2) the thesis affirms redemption not only as an end but also a mediation, and (3) the
thesis affirms mediation on the part of the one who not only acts, but also suffers,
vicariously.51 Immediately following this Lonergan states the following:
The three assertions made in the thesis will not be given equal attention.
The various aspects of redemption as an end are considered more fully in other
theological treatises dealing with the church, original sin, the moral impotence of the
sinner, grace and virtues, the last things, and the sacraments. Here, all these will be
presupposed rather than repeated.
Our main concern is with the fact of mediation as scripture clearly and explicitly sets it
out; and since it is easy to understand this from the standpoint of vicarious activity, more
attention should in some way be given to the vicarious sufferer.52

Lonergan’s emphasis in the Supplement is the same as in Thesis 15 of DVI: not
on redemption as end, but redemption as means. Redemption as means refers to a
process, and it quite clear that the focus of the present chapter is on that process. After
Lonergan considers the death of Christ, in article 16, he organizes the remainder of the
chapter into the articles on the payment of the price, sacrifice, meritorious obedience,
vicarious suffering, and the power of the resurrection. These are the same categories
listed in Thesis 15 of DVI, although there Lonergan makes a distinction between the
power of the risen Lord and the eternal Priest’s intercession. In the Supplement, these
two categories are combined.

51
52

Lonergan, De Verbo Incarnato, 446-447.
Lonergan, De Verbo Incarnato, 447.
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4.3.1

Lonergan’s Categorizations and Aquinas’s Five Ways

In the tertia pars of the Summa Theologiae, question 48 is an inquiry into how
Christ’s passion brings about our salvation. Aquinas constructs a nexus of five ways or
modes: merit, satisfaction, sacrifice, redemption (ransom), and efficiency. Although
Anselm tried, in a somewhat misguided effort, to unite all these modes into his theory of
satisfaction, it is apparent from a simple reading of Aquinas’s text that Aquinas was more
cautious and content to articulate his understanding of the efficacy of Christ’s passion in
five complementary aspects.53
We must also note that in Aquinas’s five ways, “redemption” is considered not in
the wider sense of salvation itself, but in the restricted sense of the literal meaning of
redemptionis, which derives its meaning from commercial metaphors: “ransom” or
“payment of the price.”
Furthermore, in q. 48 Aquinas’s purpose is not exactly the same as Lonergan’s.
In q. 48, Aquinas is offering explanations. His purpose is not simply to collect and
categorize evidence of the New Testament. In terms of Lonergan’s methodology,
Aquinas is doing systematics, since Aquinas’s aim is to promote understanding rather
than to promote certitude that Christ’s passion and death has wrought our salvation. The
latter is already taken on faith by Aquinas.
In the Supplement, Lonergan has organized the teachings of the New Testament
on “redemption as means” around the same categories Aquinas used in ST, III, q. 48,
though not in the same order as Aquinas. This is the tradition Lonergan inherited. He
did the same type of organization in both his 1958 lecture on redemption at the Thomas
53

See editor’s comment on Lonergan’s inheritance of Aquinas’s five ways and Lonergan’s own orientation
to articulate a unified view: Lonergan, “The Redemption,” 14, n. 26.
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More Institute in Montreal, and as well in Thesis 15 of DVI. And although the third
chapter of the Supplement neither mentions Aquinas’s five ways nor makes any reference
to ST, III, q. 48, there is no doubt that Aquinas’s thought has influenced Lonergan’s
approach to categorizing the teachings of the New Testament. Finally we should note
that Lonergan’s first article on the death of Christ is not part of Aquinas’s consideration
in q. 48. We will consider this article specifically.

4.3.2

The Function of Lonergan’s Article on the Death of Christ
Lonergan’s first article on the death of Christ functions as a foundation for the

subsequent articles which, as we have noted, mirror Aquinas’s five ways. Lonergan
followed the same method in DVI where he considered the death of Christ prior to the
categorizations corresponding to Aquinas’s five ways. In other words, before Lonergan
collects the New Testament teachings on how the death and resurrection of Christ has
wrought our salvation, he first considers the death of Christ himself, much like Aquinas
did in the tertia pars of the Summa Theologiae.54
Now if this article functions as a foundation for the subsequent articles, then what
is the principal aim of this article? In my interpretation the principal aim is to establish
with certitude the New Testament teaching that not only did Christ voluntarily die for our
sins and on behalf of sinners, but Christ’s passion and death were “directly willed by
God” (directe voluit Deus).55
To state that the passion and death of Christ was directly willed by God means
that the passion and death of Christ must be related (connected) to some good. The good
54

In the tertia pars Aquinas took up the question of the efficient cause of Christ’s passion in q. 47 before
discussing the relationship between Christ’s passion and our salvation in q. 48.
55
Lonergan, DBM, 122 [Supplement, 50].
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is always intelligible. In other words, the passion and death of Christ must involve an
intelligibility that is harmonious with the just and intelligible world order conceived by
divine wisdom, though in the present chapter Lonergan is not concerned with explaining
what that intelligibility is per se, but rather with the certitude that there is an intelligibility
to be grasped. God does not directly will the unintelligible. To state otherwise
contradicts the theological principle Lonergan established in the previous chapter.
In fact, Lonergan uses this theological principle in the present chapter to establish
critical distinctions between the different wills involved in Christ’s passion and death.
Since God in no way wills the evil of sin, the cause of Christ’s death by the actions of
those directly involved in his crucifixion constitutes a reprehensible sin (malum culpae).
Since God only indirectly wills the consequences of sin, then God only indirectly willed
the evils inflicted upon Christ (malum poenae). Finally, since God directly wills the
good, God directly willed the acceptance of the suffering and death on the part of the
obedient Christ. So the death of Christ involved at the same time a great good and a most
hideous evil. Lonergan stated the same conclusion in Thesis 15 of DVI:
Yet granted secondary causes, and granted historical causality, it is still almighty God
who nevertheless rules and governs all things through the secondary causes and in
accordance with the historical laws...In itself the suffering and death of Christ is the
series of events narrated in the four gospels...Physically regarded, the same event is both
an acting and a being acted upon...This physical identity does not, however, rule out
diversity of wills. The will of the agent is not the same thing as the will of one who is
acted upon. Thus in the same event there may be both the gravest of crimes and the most
excellent of deeds.56

Furthermore, Lonergan qualifies his language when he states that God directly
willed the passion and death of Christ. We need to understand this qualification to
interpret his understanding of what it means to state that God “directly willed” this event.

56

Lonergan, De Verbo Incarnato, 453-454
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Lonergan’s qualification is meant to dispel an anthropomorphic understanding of God’s
will in relation to Christ’s passion and death that would suggest an image of a vindictive
God who takes pleasure in evils inflicted upon innocent persons. Christ was innocent,
with no fault of his own. God is just. Since God is just, God does not punish innocent
persons.57 Yet God directly willed Christ’s suffering and death. How does one reconcile
the first three propositions with the New Testament teaching that God directly willed
Christ’s passion and death?
The answer is found in how Lonergan qualifies his language with respect to
God’s direct willing of Christ’s passion and death. When Lonergan states that Christ’s
passion and death were directly willed by God, he qualifies the statement, and he does so
twice. First, he states that “God does directly will a good and holy will, and so God
directly willed the acceptance of suffering and death on the part of the obedient Christ.”58
A few sentences later he states “The whole of Christ's passion and death, therefore,
inasmuch as it proceeded from the will of the gentle and humble Christ, was directly
willed by God.”59 In my interpretation the important thing to note here is that with
respect to the object of God’s direct willing, Lonergan’s thought reveals that this object is
not so much the suffering and death of Christ simply qua suffering and death, but rather
the goodness related to Christ’s will, to his internal disposition of obedient acceptance.
Stated otherwise, in terms of the theological principle we identified in the previous
chapter, God directly willed Christ’s obedient acceptance of God’s plan for this world
57

This would contradict retributive justice. And as we noted in the previous chapter, retributive justice,
though it is not the entirety of divine justice, is nevertheless part of the order of divine justice.
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“... [B]onam sanctamque voluntatem directe vult Dues, et secundum hoc Deus directe voluit illam
passionis et mortis acceptationem quam Christus obediens peregit.” DBM, 122 [Supplement, 50, emphasis
mine].
59
“... [E]t ideo totam Christi passionem eiusque mortem, quatenus a voluntate Christi mitis et humilis
processit, directe voluit Deus.” DBM, 122 [Supplement, 50, emphasis mine].
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order, which includes the divine plan of redemption, conceived by divine wisdom and
chosen by the divine goodness in harmonious continuation with this world’s order.

4.3.3

Some Specific Comments on Lonergan’s Categorizations

In this section my purpose is to note a few significant differences between
Lonergan’s categorizations of the New Testament teachings as compared to Aquinas’s
categorizations as well as to two of Lonergan’s other works on redemption, specifically
the 1958 lecture and Thesis 15 of DVI.
The first comment applies to Lonergan’s category of “vicarious suffering” in
article 20. In ST, III, q.48, a. 2, the question Aquinas addresses is whether or not Christ’s
passion brought about our salvation per modum satisfactionis (by way of satisfaction).60
Now in the present chapter, nowhere in the Latin text does Lonergan mention the noun
satisfactio or its genitive satisfactionis. However, article 20 on “Vicarious Suffering” is
meant to correspond to the category of satisfaction (or atonement) in Aquinas’s five
ways. That Christ suffered vicariously is clearly evident in Aquinas’s argument in q. 48,
a. 2.61 Furthermore, in Thesis 15 of DVI, Lonergan clearly establishes the link between
vicarious suffering and satisfaction.62

60

In the translation by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, satisfactionis has been translated as
“atonement.”
61
Whereas Lonergan speaks of “vicarious suffering” (vicaria passione), in q. 48, a. 2, Aquinas does not
explicitly use the word vicaria to qualify the satisfaction given by Christ. The explicit term “vicarious
satisfaction” did not enter the theological language until the 19th century, but the idea was certainly already
present in Aquinas’s theology. Since Aquinas says in q. 48, a. 2 that Christ has made satisfaction for our
sins, he obviously believes that Christ’s satisfaction is vicarious. So when I refer to “vicarious satisfaction”
in Aquinas’s thought I am referring to Aquinas’s understanding that 1) it is possible for one person to make
satisfaction for another if they are one in will by the union of love (see ST, I-II, q. 87, aa. 7-8), and 2) this is
in fact what Christ did (ST, III, q. 48, a. 2).
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The same correlation between vicarious suffering and the doctrine of Christ’s
satisfaction is explicit in Lonergan’s 1958 lecture on redemption. There, rather than
titling the category “vicarious suffering,” he uses the category “vicarious satisfaction,”
since his purpose in the lecture is to explain the various aspects of redemption.63 In the
lecture he notes that “vicarious suffering” is very clear in the New Testament and has
been interpreted in the Church, particularly through the influence of St. Anselm, as
“vicarious satisfaction.”64 Lonergan chooses to use the language of “vicarious suffering,”
rather than “vicarious satisfaction,” because his intent in the chapter is to collect the
evidence of the New Testament. In the New Testament, there is indeed found the notion
of vicarious suffering, but not the notion of vicarious satisfaction per se. That notion is a
later development in the Christian tradition.
The second comment is related to the metaphors of “ransom” or “paying the
price.” Lonergan differs slightly with Aquinas in how far one takes these metaphors. We
recall that these metaphors are taken from the marketplace. As Lonergan noted in article
17, “paying the price” is no doubt a metaphor, but it does signify a real operation, a real
exchange inasmuch as there is a real connection between our salvation and the death of
Christ. Now at least since Anselm, the once widespread opinion that the price was paid
to the devil has been discarded. Lonergan and Aquinas are in full agreement here. The
devil has no rights deserving such a payment. However, where Aquinas states that the
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Lonergan, “The Redemption,” 14. Thus in the lecture Lonergan’s primary purpose was systematic, that
is, to promote an understanding of redemption, whereas in the present chapter of the Supplement his
primary purpose is to collect the New Testament teachings on redemption.
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price was paid to God, and not to the devil,65 Lonergan explicitly states that to ask the
question of to whom the price was paid is pushing the metaphor too far.
Finally, and perhaps most significant given Lonergan’s purpose to explain the
historical causality of Christ, is a development Lonergan makes related to the fifth of
Aquinas’s five ways. For Aquinas, the fifth category in ST, III, q. 48, is “efficient
causality.” In that question (q. 48, a. 6), Aquinas considers whether or not Christ’s
passion brought about our salvation by means of efficient causality. Aquinas answers in
the affirmative, and his answer depends on a twofold distinction in efficient causality
(agency), namely the principal cause and the instrumental cause. Since Christ’s humanity
is an instrument of the Godhead, then all of Christ’s actions and sufferings operate
instrumentally. So Aquinas concludes that Christ accomplishes our salvation through
efficient causality. The point here is that Aquinas’s focus is on Christ’s earthly actions
and in particular Christ’s passion and death.
Now in the Supplement, as well as in DVI, Lonergan’s discussion of the New
Testament witness correlating to Aquinas’s category of efficient causality focuses on the
power of the resurrection, which is not an emphasis in Aquinas’s discussion of efficient
causality. And perhaps we should not expect this of Aquinas, for q. 48 does not ask how
Christ’s resurrection saves us, but rather how Christ’s passion saves us. In q. 53, a. 1,
Aquinas explicitly takes up the question of whether it was necessary for Christ to rise
again. Aquinas answers in the affirmative and in his response he clearly correlates
Christ’s resurrection to the completion of our salvation.
In the Supplement, Lonergan does not explicitly use any Latin term that could be
translated as “efficient causality” in his article on the power of the resurrection. Nor did
65
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he use this terminology in DVI, yet in DVI he states that Aquinas’s category of efficient
causality corresponds to his (Lonergan’s) section on the power of the risen Lord and the
intercession of the eternal Priest.66 If in DVI Lonergan makes this explicit correlation
between Aquinas’s mode of efficient causality and Lonergan’s own discussion of the
power of the resurrection, it is almost certain he has the same intent in the Supplement.
Lonergan’s understanding of Christ’s efficient causality as mediator of redemption
intends to establish the fact that our redemption does not come about by the fact of
Christ’s death alone, but comes about through Christ’s death and resurrection.
Furthermore, in that same article, Lonergan correlates Christ’s resurrection to the
teaching in Hebrews that Christ has become for us not only our Priest in his death on the
cross, but an eternal High Priest (Heb 6:20; 7:28), and has been allotted a far higher
ministry (Heb 8:6) sitting at the right hand of God.67 The emphasis of the article is that
Christ was, is, and remains forever the mediator of salvation not only because of his
death, but because of his resurrection. In that same article, Lonergan also describes the
resurrection as a condition for Christ’s sending of the Spirit.68
We may ask the following: what basic point is Lonergan trying to make in
discerning from the New Testament the certitude that our redemption is not brought
about by Christ’s death alone, but by his death and resurrection?
In my interpretation, given Lonergan’s stated purpose to explain the historical
causality of Christ, I believe the answer to this question is found in the last paragraph of
the chapter. Here Lonergan refers to the passage in Hebrews 5:9 which states that Christ
became the source of salvation for all who obey him. Lonergan notes that this passage
66
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seems to indicate a “causality” (causalitatis) between Christ and those who “obey”
(obtemperantibus) him.69 Lonergan is indicating a causality between Christ and those
who obey him because, as he indicated in article 19 (Meritorious Obedience), to
command is to move another through reason and will, and to obey is to be moved by
another through reason and will. Now these two linked concepts of commanding and
obeying are central to Lonergan’s understanding of agency, and in particular to Christ’s
agency. In chapter 6, article 39, where Lonergan will discuss “Christ as Agent,”
Lonergan will state Christ acts both as God and as man, and so Christ’s agency involves
two principles of operation, divine and human. Lonergan states:
The ordering of these operations is had through divine command and human obedience.
To command is to move another through reason and will; to obey is to be moved in
accordance with the reason and will of another [ref. to ST, II-II, q. 104, a.1.c.].70

This reference to Aquinas in the above quotation is also found in article 19 of the
present chapter. Lonergan understands agency, in this case the causality of agents acting
through intellect, in terms of command and obedience. This applies to Christ as man, as
well as to human agents who cooperate with Christ. What Lonergan is doing in this
chapter, particularly in article 21 on the “Power of the Resurrection” is laying the
groundwork for understanding the historical causality of Christ not just through the
means of Christ’s passion and death, but also through Christ’s ongoing role as Mediator
of salvation through the course of history, and this emphasis on Mediator rather than
means must take into account the resurrection of Christ. The contrast between means and
mediator is Lonergan’s own distinction made in article 21 on the “Power of the

69
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Resurrection.” Recall in the first paragraph of the article, which we quoted earlier,
Lonergan states that our redemption is brought about by a mediator more than by a means
and is established upon the death and resurrection of Christ rather than upon the fact of
his death alone.71
Hence it follows that “if Christ has not risen, your faith is pointless, and you are still in
your sins” (1 Cor 15:17). Of course, this is not to be understood in the sense that the
death of Christ was insufficient to take away sin; the purpose of these statements is to
bring to mind not only the means but also the Mediator of our salvation.72

It is clear Lonergan is making an intelligible connection between the power of the
resurrection and Christ as mediator. Through the power of the resurrection, Christ
becomes an ongoing mediator of redemption in history. It is no coincidence that in
chapter 6, where Lonergan will explicitly develop an understanding of the historical
causality of Christ, he will not limit Christ’s historical causality to the actions of Christ
the man during his life on earth. Christ’s historical causality continues as he sits at the
right hand of the Father. Lonergan will consider this specific aspect of Christ’s historical
causality in article 43 titled “The Mediator in Heaven.” In my interpretation we have
here a development of the mode of salvation that Aquinas had termed “efficient
causality” that takes into account the New Testament teaching that Christ has wrought
our salvation not only by means of giving his life, but also as ongoing mediator of
redemption in history because of the influence he continues to exert as our eternal high
Priest, a life-giving Spirit, seated at the right hand of the Father.
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4.4

The Function of the Chapter in the Wider Context of the Supplement

4.4.1

Lonergan’s Purpose: Collecting the Teachings on Redemption
As Frederick Crowe has noted, according to Lonergan’s own introductory

statement the purpose of the chapter is to do little more than collect the relevant passages
of scripture which function as authoritative teachings on redemption.73 As Crowe also
notes, Lonergan may have already collected these passages in his class lectures of the
Christology courses he taught at the Gregorian.74 As to why Lonergan collects the
relevant New Testament teachings at this point in the Supplement, the reason is based on
his method. We will examine this in the next sub-section.
Also, Lonergan’s introductory statement that no doctrine in the New Testament
has received a clearer or fuller treatment than the “dogma” of the Redemption is not an
isolated statement found only in the Supplement. He maintained this position in his later
years. In the 1973 Christology lectures in Toronto, he emphasized the same fact: that the
New Testament witness is much more concerned with the work of Christ than the
ontological constitution of Christ.75 The early Church assumed Christ was truly the Son
of God. Its emphasis was to proclaim the good news of Christ’s saving deeds, not to
explain how a divine person could assume a human nature.

73

Crowe, Christ and History, 103.
Crowe, Christ and History, 103.
75
In the first lecture in Lonergan’s course in Christology at the Toronto School of Theology, 1973,
Lonergan stated the following: “Christology is the doctrine of the person of Christ. It is distinguished from
soteriology – soter, the savior - the doctrine of the work of Christ. The New Testament is much more a
soteriology than a Christology...but who he [Christ] is was not the question predominant in the New
Testament. The question predominant in the New Testament is that he was the savior.” An audio
recording of this lecture can be found in the Bernard Lonergan Archive at www.bernardlonergan.com, file
73100A0E070 / CD/mp3 731.
74
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4.4.2

Lonergan’s Method: Doctrines Precede Systematics
If Lonergan’s purpose in the chapter is to do little more than collect the

authoritative teachings of the New Testament on redemption, we might ask the following:
why is Lonergan’s chapter restricted to this purpose? The answer to this question is
found in Lonergan’s theological methodology.
In Lonergan’s theological methodology, he distinguishes between dogmatic
(doctrinal) theology and systematic theology.76 The basis for this distinction is his
judgment (which he inherited from Aristotle) that ultimately human inquiry and wonder
comes down to two fundamental questions: what is it? (quid sit) and is it so? (an sit).
In human cognitional processes, the former precedes the latter. We experience, then we
attempt to understand, then we attempt to judge whether our understanding is true. In
theological method, specifically with respect to the relationship between doctrines and
systematics, the reverse is true. The natural light of human reason, on its own, cannot
reach certitude about the mysteries of faith. We must depend on revelation of scripture
and the teaching authority of the Church. Then, presuming an acceptance of these
teachings (doctrines) through faith, we then attempt understanding (systematics). Here
the an sit precedes the quid sit. Lonergan appeals to this method explicitly in article 17:

76

I mentioned in a footnote in the prior chapter, throughout Lonergan’s career despite development in his
vision of the whole of theology which came with his development of functional specializations, systematic
theology for Lonergan always remained the imperfect, analogical, obscure, but extremely fruitful
understanding of the mysteries of faith according to the teaching of the First Vatican Council. See Doran,
What is Systematic Theology, 7-8. Now if Lonergan’s vision of systematic theology remained essentially
unchanged throughout his career, then by logical deduction it is a meaningful assumption that throughout
his career, Lonergan would have also understood the need to define what is to be understood before one
attempts to attain some understanding of it. This is the function of establishing teachings (doctrines).
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A further question may be asked, however, as to why God required a price for our
salvation. Even though there certainly must be a fully sufficient reason for this, one that
is most just, it is also quite certain that we can only understand it imperfectly and by
analogy. Therefore, although such an understanding might be more fruitful than any
other theological understanding, it would be more prudent to determine first just what is
to be understood, so that subsequently one might try to attain some understanding of it.77

The relationship of Thesis 15 to Theses 16-17 of DVI reveals the same
methodology. Thesis 15 is only interested in establishing the certitude, the various facts
associated with the mystery of redemption as revealed in the New Testament. Lonergan
explicitly states in Thesis 15 that there is no intent on theological speculation. He makes
this statement with respect to the New Testament’s notion of Christ’s vicarious suffering:
For the present, however, the point is not to understand vicarious suffering but to arrive at
certitude as to the fact of vicarious suffering drawn from the scriptural text. For this
reason, theological speculation is kept out of this thesis [Thesis 15]...78

Although this statement specifically refers to the category of vicarious suffering, the
distinction between establishing facts (truths) and subsequent speculation applies to the
whole of Thesis 15. In brief, then, Lonergan’s purpose in chapter 3 of the Supplement is
to establish theological certitude, from the New Testament witness, of the doctrine of
redemption, just as in DVI his purpose in Thesis 15 was to establish the truths (facts) of
the New Testament’s teaching on redemption before proceeding to speculate on the
meaning of those truths in Theses 16 and 17.

77

“At ulterius quaeri potest curnam Deus pretium nostrae salutis exegerit. Sed quamvis certissimum sit
adesse rationem prorsus sufficientem, eamque iustissimam, certum etiam est nos non posse eam intelligere
nisi imperfecte et analogice. Quare, quamvis haec intelligentia forte fructuosior sit quam reliqua
intelligentia theologica, prudentius tamen procedit qui primo clare determinet quid sit intelligendum ut
postea aliquam intelligentiam assequi nitatur.” DBM, 128 [Supplement, 53, emphasis mine].
78
Lonergan, De Verbo Incarnato, 448-449.
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4.5

Summary
Lonergan’s chapter on the death and resurrection of Christ has one major purpose:

to collect the New Testament teachings on Christ’s death and resurrection as means of
our redemption. His purpose, methodologically, is to establish doctrines before
proceeding to systematics. His methodology also reflects his inheritance of the tradition
of Aquinas, who was content to understand the efficacy of Christ’s passion according to
five different ways or modes in q. 48 of the tertia pars of the Summa Theologiae. In
addition to the Supplement, q. 48 provides the framework in which Lonergan categorized
the means of redemption in two other works: the 1958 lecture on redemption, and Thesis
15 of DVI.
Perhaps the most significant development in Lonergan’s thought, compared to
Aquinas’s five ways, is Lonergan’s emphasis on the power of Christ’s resurrection. This
is not to suggest that the power of the resurrection was ignored by Aquinas. It was not,
but it was treated in a separate question of the Summa Theologiae. The New Testament
teaches that Christ is the ongoing Mediator of redemption in history because, through the
power of the resurrection, he has become a life-giving Spirit and an eternal high Priest,
living forever to intercede on our behalf. Lonergan has integrated this teaching to expand
our notion of “efficient causality” beyond Christ’s earthly actions and sufferings. When
we come to chapter 6 of the Supplement which deals with the historical causality of
Christ, Lonergan includes an article titled “The Mediator in Heaven.” The present
chapter, by establishing the certitude that our redemption is established upon the death
and resurrection of Christ rather than upon his death alone, establishes a doctrinal
foundation for this later systematic development in chapter 6 of the Supplement.
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CHAPTER 5:

5.1

THE CROSS OF CHRIST

Introduction
Our purpose here is to interpret the fourth chapter of the Supplement titled “The

Cross of Christ.”1 The fourth chapter includes articles 22-25 of the Supplement: (22)
The Idea of the Cross, (23) The Law of the Cross, (24) The Mystery of the Cross, and
(25) The Justice of the Cross.
The fourth chapter begins with a brief introduction:
The doctrines of the Christian faith are usually contained explicitly in the New Testament
as to their factual basis, while a fuller understanding of these facts is to be found
explicitly only in the writings of the Church Fathers and the theologians. But the dogma
of our redemption is not only very fully expounded in the inspired word of God, but is
also further elucidated by a law so that there can be no doubt as to how it is to be
understood. For the cross of Christ is not only a fact, but also a precept and an example
for us to follow: we are to be conformed to and associated with Christ crucified. In the
whole economy of salvation there is no higher principle than the transformation of evil
into good. For this reason we have judged it best to treat of the meaning, the law, the
mystery, and the justice of the cross before going on to other theological questions.2

5.2

A Brief Description of Articles 22 - 25

5.2.1

Article 22: The Meaning of the Cross3

Lonergan begins by identifying the fundamental meaning (ratio) of the cross:
The fundamental meaning of the cross is the transformation of evil into good: “Do not let
evil defeat you; instead overcome evil with good” (Rom 12:21). Thus there are three
1

“Caput Quartum. DE CRUCE CHRISTI,” DBM, 146-179 [Supplement, 60-74].
“Alias christianae fidei doctrinas saepius contingit quoad ipsum factum in novo testamento explicite
contineri sed quoad pleniorem facti intelligentiam nisi a Patribus et theologis non explicite proponi. Sed
nostrae redemptionis dogma, sicut abundantius in verbo Dei inspirato exponitur, ita etiam ea lege declaratur
ut, quemadmodum sit intelligendum, haud dubitari possit. Crux enim Christi non solum factum quoddam
est sed etiam praeceptum atque exemplum; Christo crucifixo conformari eique consociari debemus; neque
aliud principium in tota nostrae salutis oeconomia altius iacet quam malorum in bonum transformatio.
Quam ob causam, prius de ratione, lege, mysterio, iustitia crucis agendum esse duximus, quam alias et
theologicas quaestiones adgrederemur.” DBM, 146 [Supplement, 60].
3
“Articulus XXII. De ratione crucis,” DBM, 147-150 [Supplement, 60-62].
2
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elements here: (1) evil to be overcome, (2) a victory of the will, and (3) good that
emerges from evil through this victory.4

The article is organized around these three elements.
Evil to be Overcome: Lonergan makes the distinction between the evil of sin
(malum culpae) and the consequent evil of punishment (malum poenae). The
consequences of sin incline individuals and society to further sin. Both types of evil are
to be overcome according to the meaning of the cross through a victory of the will.5
Victory of the Will: Things are cured by their contraries.6 Since the evil to be
overcome includes both the evil of sin and the consequent evil of punishment, there are
two senses in which Lonergan conceives the victory of the will. The evil of sin arises
through a defect in rational consciousness and aversion to God, so the victory of the will
is a conversion to God and restoration of rational consciousness.7 The consequences of
sin result in evils within the human good of order, both interior (the cultural good of
order) and exterior (the external good of order), so the victory of the will is a painful
absorption of the evil consequences of sin for the sake of a more difficult good.8 A
victory of the will in the transformation of evil into good is not a triumph of justice in the
sense of legal, retributive justice. It is a triumph grounded in a superabundant generosity
of the humble of heart.9
Good that Emerges from this Victory: The good is twofold. The first is the
perfection of the one who wins the victory of the will. The second is the improved

4

“Ratio crucis est mali in bonum transformatio, secundum illud, ‘Noli vinci a malo, sed vince in bono
malum’ (Rom 12, 21). Dicit ergo (1) malum vincendum, (2) victoriam voluntariam, et (3) bonum e malo
per victoriam ortum.” DBM, 147 [Supplement, 60].
5
Lonergan, DBM, 149 [Supplement, 61].
6
Lonergan, DBM, 149 [Supplement, 61].
7
Lonergan, DBM, 149 [Supplement, 61].
8
Lonergan, DBM, 149 [Supplement, 61].
9
Lonergan, DBM, 150 [Supplement, 61-62].
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human situation. Lonergan ends the article noting that the transformation bringing good
out of evil is grounded in divine providence: divine providence brings it about that for
those who love God all things work unto good (Rom 8:28).10

5.2.2

Article 23: The Law of the Cross11

The law of the cross is an understanding of how the meaning of the cross
functions concretely in the total context of the Christian life:
The law of the cross is the notion of the cross as it pertains to the new covenant. This it
does by way of precept, by way of example, conformation, and association, and by way
of the economy of salvation.12

Lonergan organizes the article by discussing the law of the cross as (1) precept,
(2) precept and example, (3) conformation to and association with Christ, and (4) the
basic law governing the economy of salvation.
As precept, the law of the cross is proclaimed in many different ways. He gives
three examples: Matthew 5:38-48, Matthew 8:34-35, and John 12:24-25.13 Matthew
5:38-48 is the first scripture passage quoted in the article, and the longest in the
Supplement. This passage is from the Sermon on the Mount, where Christ instructs his
disciples to not resist evil, to turn the other cheek, to give to anyone who asks, to love
their enemies and to do good to those who hate them, so that they will be true children of
their heavenly Father who makes his sun shine on the good and bad alike and his rain to
fall on both the virtuous and the wicked.
As precept and example, Christ’s teaching found in Mark 10:42-45 and Matthew
10

Lonergan, DBM, 150 [Supplement, 62].
“Articulus XXIII. De lege crucis,” DBM, 151-157 [Supplement, 62-65].
12
“Lex crucis est ratio crucis prout ad novum testamentum pertinet. Pertinet autem per modum praecepti,
per modum exempli, conformationis, et consociationis, et per modum oeconomiae.” DBM, 151
[Supplement, 62].
13
Lonergan, DBM, 151-152 [Supplement, 62].
11
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20:25-28 instructs the disciples that any among them who wants to be great must be a
servant to all:
“Jesus called [the Twelve] to him and said to them, ‘You know that among the Gentiles
their so-called rulers lord it over them, and their great men make their authority felt. This
is not to happen among you. No; anyone who wants to be great among you must be your
servant, and anyone who wants to be first among you must be slave to all. For the Son of
Man himself did not come to be served but to serve, and to give his life as a ransom for
many.’”14

As conformation to and association with Christ, we are called to imitate Christ
and thus to share in Christ’s sufferings. Lonergan appeals to a number of New Testament
passages (Jn 10:17-18; Rom 8:17; Phil 3:10-11; 1 Pet 4:13; Jn 17:14; Col 1:24; Rom
8:29). He notes that the New Testament passages that teach love for Christ crucified,
imitation of Christ, conformation to Christ, and association with Christ are almost too
numerous to mention.15
As the basic law governing the economy of salvation, Christ and the law of the
cross were neither the type of savior nor the means of salvation expected by the disciples.
The wisdom of this world desired salvation through a destruction of the present order and
expected a kingdom of justice in which there would be no injustices to be patiently borne
by good people. But the wisdom of God discerned in Christ crucified, which seems folly
to human wisdom, reveals a God who has chosen the law of the cross as the basic law
governing the economy of salvation. The revelation of this divine wisdom cannot be
grasped by the unspiritual person, but only by the spiritual person who has received the
14

“ ‘Iesus autem vocans eos ait illis: Scitis quia hi qui videntur principiari gentibus, dominantur eis, et
principes eorum potestatem habent ipsorum. Non ita est autem in vobis, sed quicumque voluerit fieri
maior, erit omnium minister; et quicumque voluerit in vobis primus esse, erit omnium servus. Nam et
Filius hominis non venit ut ministraretur ei, sed ut ministraret et daret animam suam redemptionem pro
multis.’ ” DBM, 152 [Supplement, 62]. Lonergan includes a footnote referencing Mk 10:42-45; Mt 20:2528; cf. 1 Pet 5, 3. Lonergan calls to mind two other teachings in 1 Peter 2:19-24 and Philippians 2:3, 7-8.
Lonergan, DBM, 152-153 [Supplement, 63].
15
Lonergan, DBM, 151 [Supplement, 63]. Lonergan does however list a number of passages: Rom 8:35
ff., 12:2, 13:13 f.; 1 Cor 15:49; 2 Cor 4:7-14, 5:14 f.; Gal 2:19 f., 3:26-28, 4:19; Eph 4:22-24; Phil 3:20 f.;
Col 3:9-11.
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mind of Christ through the enlightenment of the Holy Spirit.16
Lonergan then states that the pervasiveness of the law of the cross in the whole
economy of salvation is clear from the three elements within the meaning of the cross
itself. First, the law of the cross presupposes evil to be overcome, the evils all-pervasive
in the human race. Second, evil is overcome by a victory of the will. The victory
belongs first to Christ, but we imitate Christ’s victory sacramentally, morally, and
physically. We imitate Christ’s victory sacramentally through our baptism. We imitate
Christ’s victory morally inasmuch as we become obedient to Christ, rather than slaves to
sin. We imitate Christ’s victory physically when Christ will transfigure our bodies into
copies of his own glorious body (Phil 3:20-21).17 Third, there is the good that emerges
from the victory of the will. Here Lonergan contrasts the true good that results from the
law of the cross against evils that the wisdom of the world misconstrues as good.18
Lonergan speaks of the true good using the metaphor of the fruits of the good tree. The
first fruit is seen in the risen Lord himself, who is now eternal High Priest, and secondly
in his followers who conform themselves to the image of the Son.19 This conformation is
possible through the free gift of the Father’s love, the uncreated gift of the Holy Spirit
which makes us adopted children of God.20

16

Lonergan, DBM, 154 [Supplement, 63].
Lonergan, DBM, 155 [Supplement, 64].
18
Lonergan gives the example of Nietzsche, who according to Lonergan ridiculed the idea of divine
wisdom being manifested in the cross on the grounds that the cross expresses a servile mentality more
deserving to be called cowardice than virtue. Lonergan also uses the example of Marx to describe a
widespread attitude which rejects the law of the cross and advocates class struggle and violent revolution.
See Lonergan, DBM, 156 [Supplement, 64-65].
19
Lonergan, DBM, 157 [Supplement, 65].
20
Lonergan, DBM, 157 [Supplement, 65].
17
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5.2.3

Article 24: The Mystery of the Cross21

Lonergan states that the fact that the human race is redeemed from sin by way of
the cross is hardly a mystery in itself, but that it is a great mystery that the Son of God
himself shared so completely in our humanity (Heb 2:14) that he himself through the
cross brought us out of sin to live the life of God. This mystery is that all things be
brought together in Christ (Eph 1:9-10), the mystery Paul says has been kept secret for
endless ages but now so clear it must be proclaimed to all nations according to the decree
of the eternal God (Rom 16:25-26).22 God’s hidden plan, kept secret for ages, is revealed
to us through God’s Spirit (1 Cor 2:10-16).23 In brief then, the New Testament’s
conception of “mystery” is the first way Lonergan considers the mystery of the cross, and
according to the exegetes Lonergan cites, this mystery is to be understood as the hidden
plan of God’s will.24
Lonergan then transitions to a more specific consideration of the mystery of the
cross. He states that the work of our redemption involves mysteries in the strict sense of
the word: the mercy of the Father, the incarnation of the Son, the sanctifying work of the
Spirit, and our absolutely supernatural end.25 There is also general agreement that in the
work of our redemption God is made known to us in a way that we could never know by
natural knowledge. By the natural light of human reason we can come to judge that God

21

“Articulus XXIV. De mysterio crucis,” DBM, 158-167 [Supplement, 65-69].
Lonergan, DBM, 158 [Supplement, 65].
23
Lonergan, DBM, 158-159 [Supplement, 66].
24
Lonergan cites Deden, Vogt, and Prümm, but gives no textual references. However, based on reference
to the same three authors in De Verbo Incarnato, where he establishes the same general conclusion that in
the New Testament “mystery” in its primary sense refers to the hidden plan of God, we may judge that
Lonergan is using the following texts: D. Deden, Ephemerides Theologicae Lovaniensis 13 (1936): 414; E.
Vogt, Biblica 37 (1956): 247-257; K. Prümm, Biblica 37 (1956): 135-161 and “Mystère,” Dictionnaire de
la Bible, Supplément, 6: 151-225. See Lonergan, De Verbo Incarnato, 583.
25
Lonergan, DBM, 160 [Supplement, 66].
22
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is wise, free, loving, merciful, and just, but these judgments are made by way of analogy
from creatures. However, the Son’s incarnation, death, and resurrection provide “another
and much loftier analogy” (aliam longeque altiorem analogiam) to understand God as he
is in himself, and both the authors of the New Testament and the whole Catholic tradition
have marveled at this new revelation of divine mercy and love.26
Lonergan then considers three additional ways in which we can consider the
meaning of the word mystery. First, in the sense that we speak of the mysteries of
Christ’s life or the mysteries of the Rosary. In this way the material body of the Lord in
its suffering, dying, and rising gives expression to his human mind and heart, translating
for us his divinity into human terms.27 Second, there is the mystery of iniquity. Here
Lonergan repeats material from his chapter on divine justice. Sin is irrational, the absurd,
the non-intelligible. There is nothing about sin to be understood other than to understand
that there is nothing to be understood.28 Third, there is the mystery of death. Scripture
reveals that death has the element of penalty of sin (Gen 2:15, 3:19; Wis 2:24; Rom 5:12;
Rom 6:22-23). All of these passages speak of the justice of God in which retribution and
punishment are consequences of sin.29 However, Christ has transformed death into a
means of salvation through the divine wisdom of the cross which deemed it better not to
wipe out past evil and create a brand-new good, as Jewish eschatological expectations
would have it, but rather that through Christ evil should be transformed into good.30
Lonergan ends the article listing five aspects of the mystery of the cross: (1)
26

Lonergan, DBM, 160 [Supplement, 66].
Lonergan DBM, 161 [Supplement, 67].
28
Lonergan DBM, 161 [Supplement, 67]. This equates to what in Insight Lonergan calls an “inverse
insight.” An inverse insight apprehends that there is no intelligibility to be grasped where one expected to
find it. See Lonergan, Insight, 43-50.
29
Lonergan, DBM, 163 [Supplement, 68].
30
Lonergan, DBM, 162 [Supplement, 67].
27
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symbolic, (2) intellectual, (3) volitional, (4) providential, and (5) divine.
Symbolically, the sensible depiction of the body of Christ, and the shedding of his
blood, express outwardly Christ’s interior acts of his mind and heart.31
Intellectually, the cross of Christ expresses some intelligible meaning. For the
human intellect this poses two limitations. First, although the meaning of the cross is
intelligible within the order conceived by divine wisdom, this meaning still presupposes
the non-intelligibility of sin. Second, the intelligibility of the cross involves an infinite
intelligibility which in this life we can only understand imperfectly and analogically. 32
Volitionally, the cross of Christ represents a diversity of wills. Physically, it was
one event. Morally, it represents two volitions. As willed by Pilate, the priests, and the
mob, the cross represents a most heinous sin. As willed by an accepting Christ, the cross
represents a most excellent deed in which evil is transformed into good.33
Providentially, the cross of Christ is meant to overcome evil with a victory of the
will. Christ’s followers are meant to embrace the law of the cross as precept and
example. But there is a difference between Christ and his followers. Christ atoned not
for his own sins, but for those of others. He won resurrection not for himself alone, but
for the whole human race. He offered himself as a sacrificial victim on behalf of others.
He gave his life as a ransom for many. As such, in accordance with the divine plan and
because of the dignity of the Son, Christ’s victory stands as the cause, the exemplar, and
the motive of every other such victory.34
Divinely, the cross of Christ is a revelation of God. One who grasps the wisdom

31

Lonergan, DBM, 164 [Supplement, 68].
Lonergan, DBM, 164-165 [Supplement, 68].
33
Lonergan, DBM, 165 [Supplement, 68].
34
Lonergan, DBM 166, [Supplement, 69].
32
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and goodness of God not by analogy from creatures but from the man Christ Jesus and
his death and resurrection has a far more profound knowledge of God.35

5.2.4

Article 25: The Justice of the Cross36

In this article Lonergan reviews the general principles of divine justice developed
in his second chapter, and then applies these principles to the meaning of the cross.
Lonergan recalls five principles: (1) God can do anything that does not involve
an intrinsic contradiction; (2) since God’s wisdom is manifold, it comprehends the entire
range of divine power and directs absolutely everything that God can do; (3) God’s will
is just in that it chooses to put into effect any order of reality determined by divine
wisdom; (4) thus the actual order of things is most fitting because it is ordained by divine
wisdom and most just because God’s choice follows God’s wisdom; and (5) God’s
choice of the order of things is most free since with equally infinite wisdom and equally
infinite goodness God can do whatever absolutely speaking He can do.37
Before applying these principles to the cross, Lonergan lists five elements
discerned in the meaning, law, and mystery of the cross:
These are: (1) God's salvific intention and activity; (2) the meaning and the law of the
cross according to which this activity unfolds; (3) the intervention of a mediator through
whom this salvific activity is carried out; (4) this mediator himself as accomplishing his
work according to the meaning of the cross; (5) the manifestation of divine goodness in
letting evils happen in such a way that good may be drawn out of them.38

35

Lonergan, DBM, 167 [Supplement, 69].
“Articulus XXV. De iustitia crucis,” DBM, 168-179 [Supplement, 69-74].
37
Lonergan, DBM, 168 [Supplement, 69-70].
38
“Quorum prima est ipsa divina intentio salvifica atque activitas; altera est ratio atque lex crucis
secundum quam evolvitur haec activitas; tertia est mediatoris interventio per quem activitas salvifica
procedit; quartum est ipsum mediatorem secundum rationem crucis opus suum peragere; quinta denique
est ea divinae bonitatis manifestatio quae mala fieri permittit ut de malis efficiat bonum.” DBM, 170
[Supplement, 70].
36
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Lonergan then applies the basic principles of divine justice to these five elements.
First, God’s salvific intention and activity is to restore goods lost and to offer the free gift
of justification to those who believe. Lonergan states that this salvific activity is what
Paul speaks of as the “justice of God” (Dei iustitiam).39
Second, God’s salvific activity is done in accordance with the meaning of the
cross. With respect to God’s salvific intent, God could (1) destroy the corrupted good
and create an entirely new good in its place, (2) transform evil into good without human
cooperation, or (3) transform evil into good with human cooperation. The third
alternative embodies the meaning of the cross and is more fitting than the first two.40 The
first alternative does not redeem the corrupted good but simply replaces it. The second
alternative is not fitting because evil would be transformed into good without human
consent to conversion. Lonergan then includes a lengthy quote from Augustine’s De
Trinitate41 to make the point that the Fathers of the Church understood God’s justice and
insisted that the devil had to be defeated not by power but by justice.42
Third, the work of salvation was carried out through a mediator, God’s own Son.
Again, Lonergan uses the argument of fittingness. It would not be fitting to inaugurate
the Kingdom of God all at once through the immediate conversion of all, nor through
some group of believers who in turn would convert others. The former has the weakness
that not all human beings are in existence at the same time as well as the fact that the
common course of events and the order of the universe would not be maintained if all

39

Lonergan, DBM, 170 [Supplement, 70]. Lonergan includes reference to Rom 3:21-22, 25-26. Lonergan
also includes reference to the exegesis of S. Lyonnet, “De ‘Iustitia Dei’ in Epistola ad Romanos 3, 25-26,”
Verbum Domini 25 (1947).
40
Lonergan, DBM, 170-171[Supplement, 70]
41
St. Augustine, De Trinitate XIII, xiii, 17; PL 42:1026 f.
42
Lonergan, DBM, 171 [Supplement, 71].
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people living at one given time were miraculously converted. The latter has the
weakness that there is no fitting reason why one group of persons, as opposed to an
individual, should have the privilege of being the first to have the power and authority to
convert others. So Lonergan concludes that it is fitting that the Kingdom of God be
inaugurated by one person, and the most fitting person would be the one who is most
likely to be able to bring others into the kingdom.43
Fourth, the Son as mediator brings us to salvation according to the meaning of the
cross through a twofold assimilation.44 The first assimilation (that of the Son to us) is
effected through the Incarnation and the love of the Incarnate Word. The second
assimilation (that of us to the Son) is a union, almost an identification, which is the effect
of love. This is possible because a friend regards his or her friends as a “second self” (ut
alterum se). A person desires the same good for her friend as she does for herself. The
notion of a “second self” comes from Aristotle’s notion that a friend is one’s “alter ego”
(alter ipse), and from Augustine’s notion that a friend regards another friend as “half of
his soul” (dimidium animae suae).45
Fifth, in the order of reality established by divine wisdom, God’s goodness is
manifested in that God in no way would permit evil in his works unless He was also
omnipotent to draw good out of evil.46 And in no other way does God draw good out of
evil than according to the meaning, the law, the mystery, and justice of the cross. God
does not ask others to do what He has not done first.47
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5.3

Lonergan on the Meaning, Law, and Mystery of the Cross

In the previous chapter Lonergan stated that his purpose was simply to collect and
express the relevant teachings found in scripture regarding the doctrine of redemption. In
the present chapter, based on the introductory paragraph alone, we can rightly judge that
Lonergan’s purpose is now to offer an explanation as to how the doctrine of redemption
is to be understood. In other words, he is now shifting to systematic theology. And in
the introductory paragraph, he does not hesitate in getting to the heart of the matter. He
states upfront that within the whole economy of salvation there is no higher principle than
the transformation of evil into good. He equates this principle to the “fundamental idea”
or “notion” of the cross, and in the first article titled “The Idea of the Cross” he states that
this notion can be considered in three different ways:
analytically, by examining the meaning itself; in general, by looking at the meaning of
the cross in the total context of the Christian life; and specifically, by contemplating the
wisdom of God in Christ crucified (1 Cor. 1:23-24).48

The analytical consideration corresponds to article 22. The general consideration
corresponds to article 23. The specific consideration corresponds to article 24. The three
subsections below interpret each of these three considerations.

5.3.1

An Analytical Consideration: The Meaning of the Cross
When Lonergan “analyzes” the threefold process by which evil is transformed

into good, he is specifying an intelligibility to be grasped through the terms and relations
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expressed in the following process: (1) evil to be overcome, (2) a victory of the will, and
(3) good that emerges from evil through this victory.49
However, as an analytical consideration per se, Lonergan’s consideration
abstracts from concrete instances of evil, concrete instances of a victory of the will, and
concrete instances of the good that emerges from evil through this victory. In this sense,
each element of the process could be considered as what in Insight Lonergan terms a
“heuristic notion.” A heuristic notion is an anticipation of an unknown content.50 For
example, an analytic consideration of the first element, as a heuristic notion, does not
specify any particular evil of sin, any particular consequence of sin. Again, the second
element identifies a victory of the will but does not specify what specific form the victory
of the will might be expressed in a concrete situation. And again, an analytic
consideration of the third element abstracts from any concrete specification of the good
which emerges. For example, the good could be an improvement in the human situation,
and this improvement could take any number of concrete forms: improvements in the
economy, in technology, in the polity, or changes in the meanings and values of a culture
which enhance the common good resulting in a more equitable distribution of particular
goods.
Now I will consider each element in the process in more detail. First, regarding
the evil to be overcome. I interpret this evil as both the evil of sin (malum culpae) and
the evil consequences of sin (malum poenae) because Lonergan explicitly includes both
in the first element.51 I emphasize what might seem obvious because readers familiar
with Thesis 17 of DVI may miss this detail and assume that in the Supplement the evil to
49
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be overcome is solely malum poenae, since in DVI Lonergan is explicit that the evil to be
overcome is malum poenae, not malum culpae.52
Lonergan includes both malum culpae and malum poenae in the evil to be
overcome based on the reinforcing influence between the two evils. Lonergan dedicates
two paragraphs to explaining this reinforcing influence. The evil of punishment not only
results from the evil of sin but strongly inclines one to the evil of sin as well because the
evil of punishment, considered internally to the sinner, distorts the rational consciousness
of the individual. And the external, social consequences of sin incline everyone in that
social order to further sin because individuals within that social order must live and
work.53 This reinforcing influence creates what Lonergan calls the “kingdom of sin”
(regnum peccati).54 In Insight, he names this kingdom of sin the “social surd,”55 a
cumulative deterioration of the social situation which he equates to the “longer cycle” of
decline in human history.56
The pivot point in the process is a “victory of the will” (victoriam voluntariam),
and to understand Lonergan we should begin with what a victory of the will is not:
This victory does not mean that sinners are wiped out so that no traces of guilt or
punishment remain. Nor does it involve the suspension of the laws of nature,
psychological, social, religious, or historical, according to which the private sin of one
individual can inflict all sorts of evil consequences upon us and incite us to further evil
acts. Rather, while sin and its consequences remain, their evil is overcome by good
through the victory of the will.57
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Lonergan’s understanding is consistent with the theological principle he
established in the chapter on divine justice. Since divine wisdom has conceived both the
world order itself and the redemption of this order in one intuitive act, then redemption
will be in harmonious continuation with the order of this universe. Thus a victory of the
will does not involve the suspension of laws which govern human living.58
The notion of the victory of the will also explains how evil is overcome. The evil
of sin, since it arises through a defect in rational consciousness59 and aversion to God, is
overcome through conversion to God and the restoration of rational consciousness. The
evil consequences of sin are overcome by painfully absorbing the evil to bring forth
good.60
It is also important to note that the victory of the will is not merely the
transformation of the evil consequences of sin. The victory of the will, since it also
involves overcoming malum culpae, can be a victory in which a person refuses to sin in
the first place despite the temptation to sin. This of course does not mean that we will
always succeed. The Catholic doctrine of original sin grounds the doctrine of human

religiosae, historicae, quibus ex privato et individuali malo culpae per innumera poenae mala premimur
atque urgemur in mala culpae multiplicanda. Sed manentibus malo culpae et malo poenae, vincitur malum
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powerlessness. Ultimately we cannot avoid sinning. But victories of the will can reduce
the occurrence of sin by overcoming the temptation to sin in a given situation. In brief,
then, to correctly interpret Lonergan, a victory of the will in overcoming evil is (1)
avoiding sin in the first place and doing the good, and (2) lovingly absorbing the evil
consequences of sin and returning good in the process.61
Furthermore, the victory of the will is not retributive justice:
This victory of the will, therefore, does not directly bear upon justice itself but upon the
possibility of justice among sinners. Human justice renders “to each his own” and “in
equal measure.” ...After the sin has been committed, just tribunals or a just war seek to
redress the situation and restore it to the state in which it was before the seizure...The
triumph of justice is one thing, however, and the meaning of the cross is quite another.
Those who win the victory of the cross are not judges or military leaders but the gentle
and humble of heart. The cross triumphs over the law of rapine, “another's for me,” by
its law, “mine for the other.”62

The first sentence is somewhat enigmatic: “This victory of the will, therefore,
does not directly bear upon justice itself but upon the possibility of justice among
sinners.” The sentence, interpreted in the context of the paragraph, means that the victory
of the will is not related to the type of justice we equate with retributive justice. What
Lonergan means by “the possibility of justice among sinners” is not simply the possibility
of righting wrongs by restoring things to the way they were before. What he means is
that the kingdom of sin is a potential good that can be actualized, but only according to
the method of the cross rather than retributive justice. As an example of the latter he
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This is also consistent with Lonergan’s later statement in Method in Theology: “As human authenticity
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refers to just tribunals or just war. In my interpretation Lonergan is not refuting the
validity of just tribunals or just war. His point is to contrast the results of retributive
justice against the results of a victory of the will that transforms the potential good into
actual good. Retributive justice does not transform situations. Retributive justice
intends, to the degree possible, equality, meaning a restoration of the situation to the state
it was before. The meaning of the cross, on the other hand, is meant to transform the
situation itself. I believe this is the cardinal point Lonergan is making. He made the
same point in De ratione convenientiae:
When the objective situation is intelligible, the rule of right reason suffices to perpetuate
this intelligibility. But when the objective situation has already been corrupted through
accumulated wrongs and deep-rooted errors, right reason calling for justice hardly
suffices to eradicate the irrational element. For justice is directed towards equality, and
unless transformed by charity it will not wipe out enmity and hatred. When individuals
suffering under wretched conditions, or oppressed classes of society, or subjugated
nations have to be raised up again, I know of no other remedy than that charity that does
not insist on its rights, that voluntarily does good when that is feasible, and that is ready
to love its enemies and to lay down its life for those whom it loves.63

In and of itself, juridical or retributive justice is not evil. Lonergan’s point in De
ratione convenientiae and here in the Supplement is that this type of justice is inadequate
as an ultimate remedy to the problem of evil. What is needed is the method of the cross,
and the pivot point in this method, the victory of the will, is motivated by charity. The
victory of the will is a cure because it is contrarian to the actual problem.64
Lonergan’s reference in the Supplement to the “humble of heart” who win the
victory of the cross raises an interpretive question of what constitutes an appropriate
Christian response to social injustice. I do not interpret Lonergan’s understanding of
victoriam voluntariam as merely passive submission to evil. The proliferation of evil
63
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means that we are going to suffer, and suffering is not easily tolerated. The victory of the
will refers to voluntary action that refuses to shrink from this suffering. I do not interpret
Lonergan as suggesting we remain passive victims of abuse amidst the evils of unjust
social structures. In my interpretation it is inconceivable that Lonergan would not agree
that self-sacrificing love may need to take the form of nonviolent resistance.65
Finally, regarding the good drawn out of evil. This good is twofold: a
contribution to the perfection of the individual and an improvement in the “human
situation” (situationem humanam).66 The “human situation” should be interpreted as the
human good of order, both external and cultural, given that in the first chapter Lonergan
provides us an understanding of the human situation in terms of the human good of
order.67 The human good of order, external and cultural, is Lonergan’s category for
expressing the earthly realities that are to be brought together under Christ.

5.3.2

A General Consideration: The Law of the Cross

When Lonergan states that the meaning of the cross pertains to the new covenant
by way of precept, by way of example, by conformation to and association with Christ,
and by way of the economy of salvation, he is essentially considering the meaning of the
cross in the total context of the Christian life. Thus Lonergan’s general consideration of
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the meaning of the cross takes the form of a “law” because of the complete generality the
meaning of the cross has in the economy of salvation.68
We can also understand why the idea of the cross is also a “law” through the
insights Lonergan provides in DVI:
‘Law’ can be understood as a link that cannot be otherwise, as it is in logic and
metaphysics. Again, ‘law’ can be understood as a link which can be otherwise, but which
in itself is positively intelligible or fitting and is, as a matter of fact, always verified in
every particular instance. The natural laws investigated by the empirical sciences are
laws of this second kind. Thirdly, ‘law’ can pertain to the spiritual order in a way that is
neither absolutely necessary nor verified in every particular instance. And this third
sense has three subdivisions. (1) Law in the spiritual order can be just a precept and
nothing more. There is nothing fitting about it; what it expresses is the will and the
exercise of power, rather than wisdom and right reason. (2) Law in the spiritual order can
be a precept that is altogether good and appropriate, yet remains ineffective since it is not
observed. Finally (3) law in the spiritual order can be a precept that is good and effective
and universal even though it does not exclude the possibility of sin. And such is the Law
of the Cross.69

In the Supplement, Lonergan does not provide a contrast between natural laws
(here meaning laws investigated by the empirical sciences) and laws in the spiritual order
to explain why the law of the cross is a “law.” But his explanation in DVI is applicable to
what he means in the Supplement. The law of the cross is a spiritual, universal law. The
universal dimension is grounded on the universal nature of the human spirit. The human
spirit is not moved toward its goals by the blind forces of nature, but by laws in the
spiritual order, or what in DVI Lonergan identifies as “laws that lead free spirit toward its
goal.”70 And according to the theological principle Lonergan established in his chapter
on divine justice, in order for redemption to be in harmonious continuation with the
actual order of the universe divine wisdom has conceived, redemption will be in
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harmonious continuation not only with the laws we associate with the empirical sciences,
but also the laws we associate with the human sciences, laws which govern the human
spirit. So the law of the cross does not abrogate the psychological, social, religious, or
historical laws which govern the human spirit. Otherwise, if these laws were violated,
then the law of the cross would seem to be a divine afterthought of a voluntaristically
conceived divine will. But for Lonergan there are no divine afterthoughts.
This complete generality of the meaning of the cross is also evident if we consider
what the meaning of the cross presupposes. Recall that in his analytical consideration of
the meaning of the cross, Lonergan discusses the “kingdom of sin.” The kingdom of sin
itself has a complete generality: it has spread through the whole human race.71 The
problem is all-pervasive. So the law of the cross is an all-pervasive solution to an allpervasive problem.
We should also note that in Lonergan’s general consideration of the meaning of
the cross he returns to a consideration of the good that emerges from a victory of the will.
He does so through the analogy of the fruits of the good tree. The fruits of the good tree
are first to be seen in the risen Lord.72 The fruits of the good tree are seen secondly in
those who become true images of God’s Son, through adoption as children of God made
possible by the free gift of the Father’s love, the uncreated gift of the Holy Spirit.73
Lonergan does not specifically use the term “Body of Christ” to name this relationship
between Christ and the adopted children of God, but I interpret his meaning as such. This
interpretation is supported by statements in the final article of the chapter on the justice of
the cross. There Lonergan states that through Christ’s vicarious suffering, sacrifice, and
71

Lonergan, DBM, 154 [Supplement, 63-64].
Lonergan, DBM, 157 [Supplement, 65].
73
Lonergan, DBM, 157 [Supplement, 65].
72

160
giving of his life, the Church, according to ancient symbolism, was born from the side of
Christ. And there Lonergan correlates the Church to the union of Head and members.74
Thus in my interpretation this good resulting from a victory of the will is not just a
natural improvement of the human situation, but the creation of a new community, a
supernatural human good of order that is the whole Christ, Head and members.75
Next I will consider Lonergan’s criteria for judging that the meaning of the cross
is also a law governing the entire economy of salvation. The criteria are overwhelmingly
based on the witness of the New Testament.76 Lonergan includes approximately sixtyeight references to passages from the New Testament. The first passage quoted captures
perhaps for Lonergan the essence of the New Testament witness: Matthew 5:38-48 from
Christ’s Sermon on the Mount.77 His method of arriving at this judgment is the method
that in Divinarum personarum78 Lonergan calls “systematic exegesis,” which is an
abstraction from all of the relevant passages in scripture to find the systematic
74
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understanding common to all of the passages.79 The systematic understanding common
to all of the passages is the meaning of the cross. Again, this helps to understand why
Lonergan would consider the meaning of the cross as a “law.” The meaning of the cross,
as law, is for Lonergan an inescapable practical conclusion from the New Testament.
Given Lonergan’s overwhelming reliance on scripture and my interpretation that
he considers the law of the cross as an inescapable practical conclusion from the New
Testament, I interpret that for Lonergan the law of the cross becomes a doctrine. This
does not mean that the law of the cross is only a doctrine. In the present chapter, there is
no doubt that the law of the cross is the systematic intelligibility associated with the
meaning of the cross considered in its complete generality to the entire economy of
salvation. But the law of the cross, even though it is a systematic theological
achievement, also takes on a doctrinal status. To help explain this I will rely on the work
of Robert Doran.
In What is Systematic Theology, Doran discusses the meaning of theological
doctrines that systematics attempts to understand, based on his interpretation of
Lonergan’s methodology. In Lonergan’s methodology, “doctrines” are not limited to
mysteries of faith that can only be known through revelation. As Doran notes, there are
also doctrines, both theological and ecclesial, that do not directly express mysteries of
faith, but nevertheless that systematic theologians attempt to work into a synthetic
construction.80 Doran asks the following question: What would qualify theological
achievements with a certain doctrinal status? Here he is not limiting doctrinal status to
ecclesial doctrines, but includes those judgments of fact or value in which a theologian
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confers something of a doctrinal status for his or her own theological reflection.81
Doran’s basis for this inclusion is grounded on Lonergan’s methodology, where doctrines
correspond to judgments of fact or value. Systematics attempts to understand those
judgments. Doran lists three criteria that would qualify a theological achievement with a
certain doctrinal status.82 The first is that the achievement has brought definitive closure
to a particular theological debate. The second is that the achievement provides the only
analogy of nature yet discovered and developed useful for understanding a particular
divine mystery. The third is that the achievement is an inescapable practical conclusion
of the Gospel of Jesus Christ.83
As I have noted, Lonergan’s criteria for interpreting the meaning of the cross as
“law” is overwhelmingly based on the witness of the New Testament. In terms of
Doran’s criteria, the law of the cross is for Lonergan an inescapable practical conclusion
of the Gospel of Jesus Christ. Lonergan’s inescapable practical conclusion is a judgment
of fact, and this judgment is supported by Lonergan’s own words in the introductory
paragraph of the chapter. He states that doctrines of the Christian faith are typically
contained explicitly in the New Testament with respect to their factual basis while a fuller
understanding is found only in the writings of the Church Fathers and the theologians.
But he states that the dogma of our redemption is not only fully expounded in scripture
but is also further elucidated by a “law” so that there can be no doubt as to how it is to be
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understood.84 Lonergan is making a judgment of fact regarding how this law is to be
understood, and judgments of fact in his methodology correspond to doctrines. Thus I
interpret that for Lonergan, the law of the cross is not only a systematic theological
achievement, but it is also a doctrine within a doctrine, where the latter is the wider
doctrine of redemption. And as I will note later, the law of the cross qua doctrine
functions in the remaining chapters of the Supplement to help control the systematic
meaning Lonergan develops with respect to the further theological questions he will take
up, specifically the doctrine of Christ’s satisfaction and the historical causality of Christ.

5.3.3

A Specific Consideration: The Mystery of the Cross
In the article “The Mystery of the Cross,” Lonergan moves from an analytical and

general consideration of the meaning of the cross to a specific consideration of Christ
crucified. For Lonergan, the fact that the Son of God made the law of the cross his own
to bring us out of sin to live the life of God is a great mystery.85 He clearly correlates this
mystery to what the New Testament terms the “hidden plan of his [God’s] will”
(sacramentum voluntatis suae) which Paul speaks of in Ephesians 1:9.86 It is the mystery
that all things be brought together in Christ (Eph 1:9-10).87 Lonergan made the same
correlation between “mystery” and the hidden plan of God’s will in his 1958 lecture on
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redemption,88 as well as in Thesis 17 of DVI.89 God’s hidden plan of redemption is still a
mystery, but a revealed mystery. And although there are a number of mysteries involved
in the work of our redemption, the cross of Christ holds a special place not only in terms
of the revelation of God’s plan, but as the analogy par excellence in which to understand
the wisdom, the will, the love, the mercy, and the justice of God.90
Thus in the Supplement when Lonergan speaks of the “mystery” of the cross he is
referring to a supernatural reality. But at the beginning of the article on the mystery of
the cross he states that the fact that the human race is redeemed from sin by way of the
cross is hardly a mystery in itself.91 This statement is enigmatic, a seeming contradiction.
We can reconcile this apparent contradiction by considering the contrast Lonergan makes
in the same paragraph where this statement appears. The contrast is between the way or
law of the cross in itself, as opposed to the fact that the Son of God made the cross his
own as the means of our redemption. Considered analytically (abstractly), the law of the
cross as a threefold process of transforming evil into good can be understood by the
natural light of human reason. I believe this is why Lonergan states that it is hardly a
mystery in itself. But the fact that the Son of God made the cross his own is a revelation
of God’s wisdom that cannot be known by the natural light of human reason. This is why
the revelation of the Holy Spirit is required to discern the wisdom of God in Christ
crucified. Without this revelation, the law of the cross as God’s solution to the problem
of evil (as opposed to an abstract understanding of the law of the cross in itself) seems
like folly, irrationality, a stumbling-block.
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Next, we recall from Lonergan’s chapter on divine justice that he hinted there was
a special facet of divine justice revealed in the cross of our Lord, and that he would defer
an explanation of this to chapter 4. In article 24 we find his explanation:
There is likewise general agreement that in the work of our redemption God is made
known to us in a way that we could never know by our natural knowledge. Even if by the
natural light of human reason we were able to show that God is wise, free, loving,
merciful, and just, we could only draw these conclusions by way of analogy from
creatures. But from the Son's incarnation, death, and resurrection we have another and
much loftier analogy for coming to know God as he is in himself. St. Paul often speaks
of this new knowledge of God's wisdom (1 Cor 1:18-2:16, 3:18-19; Rom 11:33,
16:2)...We know what his justice is like, no longer only on the analogy of law courts and
prisons and gallows, but also from the crucifixion of his own Son.92

The cross of Christ not only reveals divine justice, but it is the loftier analogy for
coming to know God as he is in himself. Lonergan reiterates this in the last paragraph of
the article on “The Mystery of the Cross” where he states that the death and resurrection
of Christ allows us to grasp the wisdom and goodness of God not by analogy from
creatures but from the man Christ Jesus, providing us a far more profound knowledge of
God.93
Lonergan’s conviction that Christ Jesus is the loftier analogy is expounded when
we consider his Trinitarian theology. The Incarnation is a supernatural reality, yet
because the mission of the Son involves a contingent, created external term which is the
esse secundarium of the human nature assumed by the Son, God has entered into human
history as intimately as God can, to take part in what Lonergan later called “man’s
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making of man.”94 Essential to Lonergan’s Trinitarian theology is his understanding that
the secondary act of existence of the Incarnation (the esse of the assumed human nature
of the Incarnate Word) is a created participation of paternity.95 Thus Jesus Christ, as the
Word made flesh, reveals the Father. Therefore since the esse of the assumed human
nature of the Word is a created participation of paternity, any aspect of the life of Christ
can be an analogy for understanding God as he is in himself.
We also recall that Lonergan listed five modes in which the mystery of the cross
may be considered.96 We have already touched on the last mode where Lonergan
considers the cross of Christ as a revelation of God, the loftier analogy for coming to
know God as he is in himself. For reasons of space I will not consider all of the other
modes, but I do want to briefly consider the first where Lonergan considers the mystery
of the cross through the category of “symbol.” This aspect of the mystery of the cross
will show up again in the next chapter in Lonergan’s understanding of what it means to
state that Christ has made satisfaction for our sins.
Readers familiar with Insight may recall Lonergan’s discussion of the relationship
between mystery and symbol in that text. Let us consider this discussion because it will
aid our interpretation of what Lonergan means when he states that “symbol” is an aspect
of the mystery of the cross. In Insight, Lonergan’s definition of “mystery” is the
paradoxical category of the “known unknown.”97 The very fact that we are cognizant of
a mystery, and that we ask questions regarding a mystery, means that there is a “known”
element in the unknown. If there were no “known” element, the mystery would be

94

Lonergan, “Natural Right and Historical Mindedness,” Third Collection, 171.
Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, 473.
96
Symbolic, intellectual, volitional, providential, and divine.
97
Lonergan, Insight, 555, 569.
95

167
completely outside our horizon of awareness and we would not even have the ability to
ask questions of the mystery in the first place. In Insight Lonergan also states that “some
sensitive awareness and response, symbolic of the known unknown, must be regarded as
a generally and permanently recurring feature of human living.”98
This is the same point Lonergan is making in the Supplement. He describes the
symbol of the cross as an expression of mystery, giving rise to sensitive awareness and
response:
The sensible depiction of the body and the shed blood of Christ on the cross represents
and expresses outwardly the interior acts of his mind and heart; it forcefully strikes our
senses and deeply moves our emotions, so that we receive spiritual benefit from the very
act of gazing at the crucifix and from the consequent affections of our will.99

Lonergan stated essentially the same insight in article 19 (Meritorious Obedience)
of the prior chapter of the Supplement. There he stated that since a human being not only
has a soul but a body as well, then a human act in the fullest sense consists not only of the
interior acts of knowing and willing, but also an external act, bodily and perceptible by
the senses, which gives expression to the interior acts of knowing and willing.100

5.4

The Justice of the Cross

In article 25 Lonergan takes the general principles of divine justice, developed in
chapter 2 of the Supplement, and applies these principles to five elements he discerns in
the meaning, law, and mystery of the cross. Lonergan’s statement below captures the
essence of the general principles of divine justice:
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From this [Lonergan’s prior consideration of the general principles of divine justice] we
conclude that the actual order of things is most fitting because ordained by divine wisdom
and most just because God's choice follows his wisdom, and also is most free since with
equally infinite wisdom and equally infinite goodness God can do whatever absolutely
speaking he can do.101

Let us also recall the five elements Lonergan discerns in the meaning, law, and
mystery of the cross: (1) God's salvific intention and activity to restore goods lost, (2) the
meaning and the law of the cross according to which this activity unfolds, (3) the
presence of a mediator through whom this salvific activity unfolds, (4) this mediator
himself as accomplishing his work according to the meaning of the cross, and (5) the
manifestation of divine goodness in letting evils happen in such a way that good may be
drawn out of them.102
In my interpretation, the first thing we should attempt to understand is the basis
from which Lonergan can state that there is “little difficulty” (facillima) in applying the
general principles of divine justice to the meaning, law, and mystery of the cross.103 Why
little difficulty? The reason is based on the fundamental principle of divine justice itself.
Whatever God does is done in accordance with the supremely free, wise, fitting, right and
just divine plan.104 Lonergan is reiterating his fundamental position that there is no such
thing as a voluntaristically conceived divine will. There are no divine afterthoughts. So
if God has willed our salvation through the mediation of Christ Jesus by way of the
meaning, law, and mystery of the cross, then God’s “willing” of this mediation must be in
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accord with divine wisdom, since divine wisdom is the rule of divine justice. The
application of the general principles of divine justice to the meaning, law, and mystery of
the cross are just as reasonable and straightforward as are the application of these general
principles to absolutely any other thing that God wills in the order of this universe,
whether natural or supernatural. The principles of divine justice apply to absolutely
everything that God wills, the cross included.105
Next we can turn to the substance of the article. What this article intends is to
explain the fittingness of whatever God does with respect to the economy of salvation. I
will consider four basic points Lonergan makes.
The first is closely related to what we have just stated. Lonergan desires to
impress upon his reader that the meaning, law, and mystery of the cross is not
contradictory to God’s justice. The first general principle of divine justice is that God
can do anything that does not involve an intrinsic contradiction.106 Whatever God does is
just and often our human wisdom has trouble accepting this. For example, it is evident
that by the time of Aquinas a question arose as to whether God’s mercy conflicts with
God’s justice.107 Aquinas rejected this conclusion. Whatever God does is both merciful
and just.108 Lonergan himself refers to the mercy of God on six occasions in the article
on the mystery of the cross,109 and there he also states how the mystery of the cross, as
revelation, caused both the authors of the New Testament and the whole Catholic
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tradition to marvel at this new revelation of divine mercy and love.110 Nowhere in the
present chapter is divine mercy pitted against divine justice. But the objection
exemplified in the question taken up by Aquinas, whether raised in the thirteenth century
or today, reveals an anthropomorphic tendency to see mercy and justice as contradictory
rather than complementary, and to conceive God in such a way that if God is too merciful
then God is irrational, that God is contradicting God’s own justice. And since God is not
irrational, this anthropomorphic tendency comes down on the side of justice, but justice
conceived by human wisdom. Human wisdom with its anthropomorphic bias tries to
control what is possible and not possible for God. Lonergan’s point is that God is not
bound by God’s own justice to provide us a solution to the problem of evil according to
retributive justice.
Of course this is not to deny the fact that human sin incurs a debt of penalty
according to God’s own justice. For Lonergan, following Aquinas, sin does incur a debt
of penalty. So God would not be unjust if God were to exact retributive justice on the
whole human race by destroying the corrupted good and creating a completely new good
in its place. Nor would God be unjust if God chose to transform evil into good without
human cooperation. But by God’s own justice, God is not obliged to choose either of
these options. For Lonergan, it is clear from the New Testament that God chose the
option to convert evil into good through a victory of the will, and that the mystery of the
cross in this drama is not to be understood in the context of retributive justice. For
Lonergan, God’s choosing of this option is more fitting than the others and there is no
intrinsic contradiction if God chooses this option.
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Second, Lonergan recalls the Patristic understanding that the devil had to be
defeated not by power but by justice.111 Power and domination are not evils in
themselves, but as a solution to the problem of evil, they are an illusion.112 As Lonergan
stated previously in article 22, those who win the victory of the cross are not judges or
military leaders but the gentle and humble of heart. The justice of the cross is grounded
not in power and domination, but in superabundant generosity. This is not to be
understood as if there is no “power” in the justice of the cross. The justice of the cross is
a power, but power properly conceived, a power grounded in generosity rather than force.
Third, the justice of the cross reveals that we are saved by a Mediator. If all the
people living at one given time were by some miraculous divine intervention successfully
converted from a multitude of evils to one true good, then this would not be in keeping
with the common course of events in the order of this universe established by divine
wisdom.113 We see at work here Lonergan’s theological principle he established in the
chapter on divine justice. Thus having a Mediator is in harmonious continuation with the
common course of events and the order of the universe established by divine wisdom.
For Lonergan it is fitting that the kingdom of God be inaugurated by one person, the
Mediator Jesus Christ, the foundation and head of the whole economy of salvation.114
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Fourth, to understand the justice of the cross we must also understand how the
Son of God brings us to salvation according to the meaning, law, and mystery of the
cross. Again, Lonergan’s focus is on fittingness. A key statement he makes captures the
essence of this fourth point:
It is fitting for the Father to love us with the same love with which he loves his Son, to
the extent that we and the Son are one. But we and the Son are one inasmuch as the Son
is assimilated and joined to us and we in turn are assimilated and joined to the Son.115

For Lonergan we are assimilated to Christ in two ways. First, through the effect
of the Incarnation. The Word has assumed a human nature, and assimilates Himself to all
humanity.116 Second, there is what Lonergan calls a “union” (coniunctio) or “almost an
identification” (quasi identificatio) with Christ that is the effect of love:117
A friend regards his friend as a ‘second self’ in that he wants the same good for his friend
as he does for himself. So it is that a friend is said to be one's alter ego;118 and Augustine
in the Confessions exclaims, “Well has someone said of his friend that he is half of his
soul.”119 As to the greatness and excellence of Christ's love for us, he himself has given
ample testimony by his deeds and also in his words: “A man can have no greater love
than to lay down his life for his friends” (Jn 15:13).120

This notion of the “union of love” is fundamental to Lonergan’s understanding of
how Christ, as Head of the Body, is united to His members thus allowing the members to
appropriate the work of the Head. In the next chapter where Lonergan considers the
doctrine of Christ’s satisfaction, his argument will include the judgment that those who
115
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are unequal in guilt are one in will through their union in love. For Lonergan, the union
of wills through love is the foundation of vicarious satisfaction.121 Lonergan will thus
use this notion of the union of wills through love to explain how Christ, as Head, can
make satisfaction for Christ’s members.

5.5

The Function of the Chapter in the Wider Context of the Supplement

In the present section I will interpret the function of the current chapter within the
wider context of the Supplement. There are three considerations here. The first considers
the present chapter in relation to Lonergan’s summarization of the New Testament
teachings on redemption (chapter 3 of the Supplement). The second and third
considerations interpret the present chapter in relation to Lonergan’s understanding of the
satisfaction given by Christ (chapter 5 of the Supplement) and the historical causality of
Christ (chapter 6 of the Supplement).

5.5.1

Lonergan’s Understanding of the Cross of Christ in Relation to the
Teachings of the New Testament
We recall that in Lonergan’s chapter on the death and resurrection of Christ his

purpose was to collect the New Testament teachings relevant to the doctrine of
redemption. We also recall that Lonergan’s methodology in that chapter reflects his
inheritance of the tradition of Aquinas, who was content to explain the salvific efficacy of
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Christ’s passion in five complementary aspects rather than in some single, unified
viewpoint.122
In Lonergan’s 1958 lecture on redemption, given only a few months after he had
completed a draft of the Supplement,123 he discussed the various aspects of redemption
according to Aquinas’s five ways. In the same lecture he stated that the mystery of
redemption is not an intelligibility that can be put in a single formula, then later in the
lecture suggested how one might move toward a “total view” to synthesize Aquinas’s
five ways.124 There is an apparent conflict in these statements. With respect to the
apparent conflict, an editorial comment was inserted in the published transcript of the
lecture. The editorial note states “it is more of a conflict between aspects of thought
growing toward unity than between two positions already taken and fixed for life.”125
The editorial note goes on to state: “Three factors are involved here: the understanding
of the redemption Lonergan inherited, his own habitual orientation toward a unified
understanding, and the unity he was able to achieve by further thought.”126 The editorial
note equates the unity Lonergan was able to achieve to the “Law of the Cross” articulated
in Thesis 17 of DVI.127 Much of the material in the present chapter of the Supplement
was later synthesized by Lonergan into Thesis 17 of DVI. Thus the editorial note in the
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transcript of the 1958 lecture correlating Lonergan’s achievement in Thesis 17 of DVI to
a synthesis of the tradition Lonergan inherited raises an interpretive question of how the
present chapter relates to the previous chapter. Should we interpret Lonergan’s
understanding of the meaning, law, mystery, and justice of the cross as a synthesis of
Aquinas’s five ways?
In my interpretation the answer to this question is that it is highly probable that in
the Supplement Lonergan did consider his understanding of the meaning, law, mystery,
and justice of the cross as a synthesis of Aquinas’s five ways, but not as a “unified view”
of redemption. Let me first explain why I believe Lonergan considered his understanding
to be a synthesis of Aquinas’s five ways. There are two basic reasons.
The first reason is that the Supplement itself exhibits the methodology that in the
1958 lecture Lonergan indicated was the clue to a unified view of the traditional five
aspects (ways) enumerated by Aquinas. In the 1958 lecture Lonergan did not offer a
unified view, but he did state that in his opinion the key to such a total view is the
fundamental category of mystery. What Lonergan meant by mystery is not the
theologian’s sense of a truth we cannot fully understand in this life, nor in the sense of
Christian piety that meditates on the mysteries of the life of Christ. Lonergan was
referring to mystery as the writers of the New Testament would have understood this
word. In the 1958 lecture he stated that the New Testament’s understanding of mystery
refers to the secret counsel of God, the hidden plan of God’s will.128 In the present
chapter, by progressing from an analytical and general understanding of the fundamental
meaning of the cross to the specific consideration of the cross as mystery, Lonergan is
sublating the meaning and law of the cross into the mystery of redemption, God’s hidden
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plan now revealed, to gather all things together under Christ. He is doing what he hinted
was the key to a unified view of the tradition he inherited from Aquinas. The meaning of
the cross, whether considered in itself, as law, as mystery, or as divine justice is at its
core the systematic understanding of what Lonergan considers the highest principle in the
economy of salvation: the transformation of evil into good. The four articles in the
present chapter are simply different considerations of this fundamental principle. But at
its core, it is a systematic intelligibility expressed in a set of terms and relations where the
terms are (1) evil to be overcome, (2) a victory of the will that overcomes this evil, and
(3) good that emerges from evil through this victory. In my interpretation, this systematic
intelligibility is for Lonergan the common intelligibility to be found in the traditional
images and theories of redemption he inherited from Aquinas. In other words, in each of
Aquinas’s five ways Lonergan discerns a common denominator whether the image is
“price paid” (ransom), sacrifice, meritorious obedience, vicarious suffering, or efficient
causality.129 That common denominator, the unity that is found in all the images, is the
transformation of evil into good through a victory of the will.
The second reason is based on Lonergan’s statements in DVI. In Thesis 17 he
states that the law of the cross is the “intrinsic intelligibility of redemption” (intrinseca
redemptionis intelligibilitas),130 and the “essence of redemption” (essentia
redemptionis).131 Thesis 17 represents a unified, systematic viewpoint of the teachings of
the New Testament Lonergan presented in Thesis 15 of the same text. In Thesis 15 he
also categorized the teachings of the New Testament according to the traditional five
129
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aspects enumerated by Aquinas. The organization of the Supplement shows the same
pattern. Chapter 3 of the Supplement is to Thesis 15 of DVI as the present chapter of the
Supplement is to Thesis 17 of DVI. Given the short time span between the two texts, it is
highly probable that Lonergan had this same understanding in mind in the Supplement,
that is, that his articles on the meaning, law, mystery, and justice of the cross provide a
systematic unification of the teachings of the previous chapter which are organized
according to the traditional five aspects enumerated by Aquinas.
Now the question of whether Lonergan understands this synthesis to be a “unified
view” of redemption is a different matter. The question relies on a distinction between
the meanings of “intrinsic intelligibility” and “unified view.” In my judgment the
meanings are not the same. In DVI, when Lonergan identifies the “Law of the Cross” as
the intrinsic intelligibility of redemption, he explains what he means by contrasting the
four Aristotelian causes to make a distinction between “intrinsic” and “extrinsic”
intelligibility:
The Law of the Cross is the intrinsic intelligibility of redemption. Intelligibility is either
intrinsic or extrinsic. The extrinsic intelligibility of a thing is always sought in something
else—in the final, the exemplary, or the efficient cause. But intrinsic intelligibility is
grasped in and through the thing itself, as the definition is grasped in that which is
defined, or an invariant relationship of things in the very things that are invariably and
cogently connected.132

Thus for Lonergan, “intrinsic intelligibility” does not exhaust the full meaning of
intelligibility. Logically then, the intrinsic intelligibility of redemption does not exhaust
the full intelligibility of redemption.
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Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, in my interpretation Lonergan would
not consider any view of redemption as a unified view without an explanatory account of
how the economy of salvation evolves historically.133 Such a consideration would
include the intelligibility of Christ’s historical causality on human development, which is
the theological question Lonergan takes up in the last chapter of the Supplement. At the
time of Aquinas, the question of history was not on the table, so Aquinas’s five ways do
not address the efficacy of Christ’s salvific action from a historical perspective.134 Thus
if one synthesizes Aquinas’s five aspects without introducing historical categories, then
one may have a synthesis of Aquinas, but not a unified view of redemption.
To support this interpretation I will offer three additional pieces of evidence, all
from Lonergan’s works. I will do so chronologically.135 First, there is a statement
Lonergan makes in his epilogue to Insight. He states that with regard to any individual
who has embraced God’s solution, there is to be added the consideration of cumulative

133

This judgment is supported by a statement Lonergan made to Joseph Komonchak. Komonchak states
the following: “When we were studying theology in Rome, David Tracy and I would occasionally go to see
Fr. Lonergan and pester him with questions...In one of those conversations I asked him about redemption,
phrasing my question, as I recall it, in terms of Aristotle’s four causes. In reply, Fr. Lonergan suggested
that redemption was one of those realities that could not be adequately dealt with in Aristotelian categories,
that it required a theory of history and historical categories.” Joseph Komonchak, “The Church,” The
Desires of the Human Heart: An Introduction to the Theology of Bernard Lonergan, 222. See also Joseph
Komonchak, “Lonergan’s Early Essays on the Redemption of History,” Lonergan Workshop 10: The
Legacy of Lonergan, ed. Frederick Lawrence (Chestnut Hill: Boston College, 1994), 160.
134
In “The Future of Thomism,” Lonergan states: “A contemporary theology must take and has taken the
fact of history into account. Inasmuch as it does so, St. Thomas ceases to be the arbiter to whom all can
appeal for the solution of contemporary questions; for, by and large, contemporary questions are not the
same as the questions he treated, and the contemporary context is not the context in which he treated them.
But he remains a magnificent and venerable figure in the history of Catholic thought. He stands before us
as a model, inviting us to do for our age what he did for his.” Lonergan, “The Future of Thomism,” Second
Collection, 49. And again: “St. Thomas did not have the modern concern for history and man’s
historicity...and if one wishes to evade history and historicity, one wishes to live in a world that no longer
exists.” Lonergan, “The Future of Thomism,” 53.
135
The chronology is based on the following: (1) the dating of Insight, written between 1949 and 1953,
published in 1957; (2) the dating of Divinarum personarum, 1957; (3) the dating of De Verbo Incarnato,
first published in 1960.
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historical development.136 Lonergan suggests that this historical aspect possesses a
peculiar relevance to the treatise on the mystical body of Christ and states that such a
treatise remains incomplete as long as it fails to draw upon a theory of history.137
Second, there is a relevant statement Lonergan makes in Divinarum personarum.
In that text Lonergan explains the notion of systematic exegesis we discussed previously.
He also discusses a new step in theological comprehension complementing this exegesis:
According to Aristotle, science has two meanings: it is science in potency when it is
merely of universals; it is science in act when it is applied to particular things. Besides
systematic exegesis, therefore, there is historical exegesis, which, far from omitting the
accidentals, includes them synthetically. Besides systematic theology, there is a theology
that is more concrete and more comprehensive, which deals with and seeks to understand
the economy of salvation as it evolves historically. This new step in comprehension has
over a lengthy period of time been gradually prepared by copious studies in the biblical,
conciliar, patristic, medieval, liturgical, ascetical, and other areas of research, but in such
a way that its synthetic character is not yet clearly apparent, since today’s scholars seem
to resemble more the twelfth-century compilers than they do the thirteenth-century
theologians in the proper sense.138

Finally, there is a statement in DVI. In Thesis 12 titled “Christ’s Knowledge,”
Lonergan includes two scholions at the end of the thesis. The second scholion is titled
“The Power of Christ the Man.” The scholion is extremely brief, but the second sentence
states the following: “There is need for further consideration of the historical causality
that Christ the man manifestly exercises.”139 Lonergan would not add this comment to
DVI if he thought the Law of the Cross in Thesis 17 of that same text addressed this need.
Thesis 17 on the “Law of the Cross” does not address Christ’s historical causality.
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Lonergan, Insight, 763.
Lonergan, Insight, 764.
138
Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, 753, emphasis mine. As Robert Doran notes, Lonergan’s
statement about twelfth-century compilers was not meant as a criticism, but a factual comment on the
historical situation Lonergan found himself in 1957 when this text was published. See Doran, What is
Systematic Theology, 146-147.
139
“Ulterius desideratur consideratio de causalitate historica quam Christus homo manifeste exercet.” De
Verbo Incarnato, 416 (trans. Hefling).
137
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In summary then, I interpret that Lonergan’s understanding of the meaning, law,
mystery, and justice of the cross represents for Lonergan a synthesis of the traditional
five aspects enumerated by Aquinas, but I do not interpret that Lonergan himself
considered this synthesis as a unified view of redemption. Otherwise there would be no
need for Lonergan to take up the theological question of Christ’s historical causality in
the final chapter of the Supplement.

5.5.2

Lonergan’s Understanding of the Cross of Christ in Relation to the
Satisfaction Given by Christ
In chapter 5 on the “The Satisfaction Given by Christ,” Lonergan will make four

specific references to “the meaning, law, mystery, and justice of the Cross.”140 At other
times he will simply refer to the “meaning of the Cross,” again on four specific
occasions.141 All eight of these references are found in article 29, “The Punishment of
Christ.” What Lonergan is doing in this article is attempting to clear away what he
considers false interpretations of Christ’s experience of “punishment” and lay a firm
foundation for determining the truth of the matter.142 The punishment involved in the
satisfaction given by Christ is part of the mystery of the cross, but in order to understand
the nature of this punishment in its proper theological context, Lonergan will correlate the
punishment of Christ to the threefold process of the law of the cross. As inflicted on
Christ, the punishment was unjust. As accepted by Christ, the punishment was
140

Lonergan, DBM, *196, *198, *199, *202 [Supplement, 83, 84 (2x), 85].
Lonergan, DBM, *197 (3x), *199 [Supplement, 83 (3x) 84].
142
Lonergan, DBM, *199[Supplement, 84]. The context of the question is that with Anselm, there was the
disjunction aut satisfactio aut poena (either satisfaction or punishment). But since Christ did indeed die on
the cross, and according to scripture death is a consequence of sin, then it would seem that Christ suffered
punishment. As Lonergan will state in the next chapter, Peter Lombard, Alexander of Hales, and Aquinas
reintroduced the word poena with respect to the notion of Christ’s satisfaction. This is the context of
Lonergan’s article on the punishment of Christ. The question, however, is how to understand what the
“punishment of Christ” means.
141
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transformed from an unjust evil inflicted upon Christ to a voluntary sacrifice (a victory of
the will). As rewarded by the Father, Christ’s victory of the will becomes the source of
eternal salvation to all who obey him.143 Lonergan states that this divine plan was
realized in the meaning, the law, the mystery, and the justice of the cross, by reason of
which Christ crucified is acknowledged to be the wisdom of God (1 Cor 1: 23 f.).144
Then, in article 30 on “The Transference of Punishment to Christ,” Lonergan will
begin to use the term “the justice of the cross” in contrast to what he terms “the justice of
a judge” (iustitia iudicis).145 The justice of a judge refers to retributive justice. Lonergan
will argue that Christ’s passion and death, as punishment, is to be understood in the
context of the justice of the cross, not the justice of a judge. Lonergan’s purpose is to
refute the error that Christ received punishment in the strict sense of retributive justice.
And he refutes this error by appealing to his prior judgment, found in the current chapter,
that Christ suffered, died, and was raised up in accordance with the divine wisdom and
justice of the cross, which is not retributive justice.
Lonergan is not only developing a systematic understanding of the cross of Christ
in terms of its meaning, law, mystery, and justice, but as I stated earlier the law of the
cross functions as a doctrine. In the next chapter, this law, as doctrine, will provide a
framework for Lonergan to control meaning in a systematic explanation of the doctrine of
Christ’s satisfaction.
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Lonergan, DBM, *202 [Supplement, 85].
Lonergan, DBM, *202 [Supplement, 85].
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Lonergan, DBM, *223, *226, *228, *230, *230, *231, *231, *233 [Supplement, 85, 86, 88, 88, 89, 89,
89, 90].
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5.5.3

Lonergan’s Understanding of the Cross of Christ in Relation to the
Historical Causality of Christ

In the last chapter of the Supplement Lonergan takes up the theological question
of the historical causality of Christ. He does so from a number of different
understandings of Christ’s agency. Lonergan does not explicitly mention the meaning,
law, mystery, or justice of the cross until the last article where he takes up Anselm’s
question Cur Deus homo. This does not mean that the meaning, law, mystery, or justice
of the cross is not operative implicitly in other articles of the last chapter. My
interpretation is based on Lonergan’s understanding that one of the purposes of Christ’s
historical action is to advance the total human good of order, both external and cultural.
Specifically, in Lonergan’s discussion of Christ as historical agent (article 42), he
will state that (1) Christ’s historical action is directly aimed at ordering human life on
earth to the future life in heaven; and (2) since this ordering liberates human beings from
evils and turns them towards true good with the result that the human good of order is
greatly improved, this improvement itself is necessarily intended indirectly by Christ as
an historical agent.146 Thus Christ’s historical action as a whole is for the total human
good of order both external and cultural, past, present, and future. Implicitly then,
advancement of the human good of order implies the law of the cross since advancing the
human good of order means that Christ’s historical causality liberates persons from evils
and turns them toward the good.
As I previously noted, Lonergan’s reference to the law of the cross is most
explicit in the final article of the Supplement. His purpose there is to explain why a God-
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Lonergan, DBM, *269 [Supplement, 114].
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man was required to achieve the secondary end of redemption.147 But how is this
secondary end achieved? Lonergan will state that unless psychological and social laws
are suspended, contradictory to what he calls the “principle of continuity,” humans
cannot be turned from evil to good except according to the method (law) of the cross and
as such it is fitting that the God-man not only teach and prescribe the law of the cross but
also perform his work according to the mystery of the cross.148
Once again, the law of the cross is functioning as a doctrine. It is also functioning
as a systematic component in Lonergan’s understanding of Christ’s historical causality,
since he states that it is fitting that the God-man teach and prescribe the law of the cross.
The ground for this insight is the prior judgment, the doctrine, that in no other way does
God draw good out of evil than according to the law of the cross.

5.6

Summary
In the introduction to his chapter “The Cross of Christ,” Lonergan states that in

the whole economy of salvation there is no higher principle than the transformation of
evil into good.149 And in the first sentence of the first article he equates the fundamental
idea of the cross to this principle of transformation.150 This principle of transformation
presupposes evil to be overcome, then overcomes this evil through a victory of the will,
such that good emerges from evil. This principle of transformation is discerned in the
event of the cross itself, but from the New Testament witness this principle of
transformation becomes a precept and example to follow, a law governing the entire
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Lonergan, DBM, *285 [Supplement, 121].
Lonergan, DBM, *292 [Supplement, 124].
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Lonergan, DBM, 146 [Supplement, 60].
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Lonergan, DBM, 147 [Supplement, 60].
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economy of salvation. For Lonergan, the meaning, law, mystery, and justice of the cross
is not only a synthesis of the traditional five aspects of redemption enumerated by
Aquinas, but the law of the cross in particular takes on for Lonergan himself a doctrinal
status because it is an inescapable practical conclusion of the New Testament.
Much of the material in this chapter was later synthesized by Lonergan into
Thesis 17 of DVI, titled “Understanding the Mystery: The Law of the Cross.” As Robert
Doran has correctly noted, Lonergan’s position on the Law of the Cross “has been
acknowledged as one of his most profound theological achievements.”151 Since our
working hypothesis is that Lonergan completed a draft of the Supplement prior to DVI,
then this chapter of the Supplement may be the earliest extant writing on what is one of
Lonergan’s most profound theological achievements.
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Doran, “The Nonviolent Cross: Lonergan and Girard on Redemption,” 49.
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CHAPTER 6:

6.1

THE SATISFACTION GIVEN BY CHRIST

Introduction
Here we will interpret the Supplement’s fifth chapter titled “The Satisfaction

Given by Christ.”1 The chapter includes articles 26-34: (26) Division of the Question,
(27) The Meaning of Necessity, (28) The Meaning of Punishment, (29) The Punishment
of Christ, (30) The Transference of Punishment to Christ, (31) The Sacramental Analogy,
(32) The Sorrows of Christ, (33) The Satisfaction Given by Christ, and (34) The
Superabundant Satisfaction Given by Christ.
The fifth chapter begins with a one-paragraph introduction:
Since the doctrine of Christ's satisfaction draws some of its basic elements from Scripture
and tradition and others from St. Anselm's speculation about the reason for the God-man,
we shall first divide the question itself (Art. 26), then seek to understand the meaning of
the Anselmian disjunction, “either satisfaction or punishment” (aut satisfactio aut poena).
To this end, we first of all deny that a third member besides satisfaction and punishment
is absolutely impossible (Art. 27), next we likewise deny that satisfaction has to be
understood in such a way as to exclude per se any notion of punishment (Art. 28 and 29),
and thirdly we deny that the punishments of sinners, as such, have been transferred to the
sinless Christ (Art. 30). Having established these premises, we go on to determine that
Christ's satisfaction is to be understood according to the analogy of sacramental
satisfaction (Art. 31), that the man Christ grieved for our sins (Art. 32), and that as an
expression of this sorrow he accepted his passion and death so that through this passion
and this death satisfaction might be truly (Art. 33) and indeed superabundantly (Art. 34)
given.2

1

“CAPUT QUINTUM. DE SATISFACTIONE CHRISTI,” DBM, *180-228 [Supplement, 74-97].
Cum doctrina de satisfactione Christi elementa alia ex scripturis et traditione ducat, alia autem ex
speculatione S. Anselmi cur Deus homo, primo ipsam quaestionem dividimus (art. XXVI), et deinde
anselmianae disiunctionis intelligentiam quaerimus, quonam scilicet sensu dicatur aut satisfactio aut poena.
Quem in finem, primo negamus absolute fieri non potuisse ut tertium praeter satisfactionem et poenam
daretur (art. XXVII), deinde pariter negamus ita intelligendam esse satisfactionem ut ab ea per se omnis
ratio poenae excludatur (art. XXVIII et XXIX), tertio denique negamus ipsas peccatorum poenas
simpliciter dictas esse in Christum innocentem translatas (art. XXX). Quibus stabilitis, determinatur
satisfactionem Christi esse intelligendam secundum analogiam satisfactionis sacramentalis (art. XXXI),
Christum hominem de nostris peccatis doluisse (art. XXXII) et in expressionem huius doloris passionem
mortemque suam acceptasse ut haec passio haecque mors satisfactionis rationem haberent (art. XXXIII) et
quidem superabundantius (art. XXXIV).” DBM, *180 [Supplement, 74-75].
2
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6.2

A Brief Description of Articles 26 - 34

6.2.1

Article 26: Division of the Question3
Lonergan begins noting the different meanings of the noun “satisfaction”

(satisfactio). 4 For example, in law courts there is the distinction between the payment of
a debt and satisfaction: satisfaction is made when the creditor freely agrees that the debt
may be extinguished in some other manner. There is also the meaning associated with
the sacrament of penance. The sacrament includes three acts: contrition, confession, and
satisfaction (DB 896, 904; DS 1673, 1689; ND 1620, 1630). Ecclesial doctrine states that
Christ has given satisfaction for our sins (DB 799, 904; DS 1529, 1689; ND 1932, 1630).
Lonergan states that what this doctrine means, since there are several opinions, cannot be
stated briefly.5 So he begins with a distinction between dogmatic and speculative
meanings of Christ’s satisfaction.
In the dogmatic sense, Christ’s satisfaction means (1) the redemption, as a means,
carried out by our Lord; (2) Christ’s vicarious suffering and death for us and for our sins
in accordance with the intention of God; (3) the payment of a certain price through his
death; (4) a sacrifice that efficaciously takes away sins and provides access to God, as
shown by God's appeasement; and (5) Christ's obedience unto death meriting our
justification, which through baptism removes all guilt and liability to punishment.6

3

“Articulus XXVI. Dividitur quaestio,” DBM, *181-184 [Supplement, 75-76].
Lonergan, DBM, *181[Supplement, 75].
5
Lonergan, DBM, *181 [Supplement, 75].
6
Lonergan, DBM, *181-182 [Supplement, 75].
4
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Anselm was virtually the first to treat the satisfaction of Christ, but he had a
speculative interest in mind. Anselm was looking for a necessary reason to Cur Deus
homo? For Lonergan, Anselm’s argument boils down to the following:
It is therefore necessary that either the dishonoring [of God by sin] be redressed, or that
punishment be meted out. Otherwise God would not be just towards himself, or else
powerless to do either - which is utterly unthinkable.7

For Lonergan, this argument grounds the rest of Anselm’s theory, a theory
Lonergan summarizes as follows: (1) a mere human being owes absolutely everything to
God and therefore cannot give supererogatory satisfaction for sins, (2) but a God-man is
not liable to death and thus by dying can give satisfaction, and (3) such satisfaction is
greater than all sins whatsoever and merits the remission of all sins.8 Lonergan, noting
that every theory gives rise to further questions, ends with questions of his own:
The question arises, why was it necessary for Christ to die, and why did his death
necessarily call for the remission of sins? Secondly, was the death of Christ in some way
a punishment, and if so by what sort of justice was Christ punished? Thirdly, in what
precisely does the satisfaction made by Christ consist? Was it superabundant? How
could it have been vicarious, and how could vicarious satisfaction remove the aftermath
of sin and restore the order of reality? Fourthly, must the whole work of Christ be
deduced from Anselm's necessary reason, or is there some other way to come to a
theological understanding of this matter?9

7

“Necesse est ergo ut aut sublatus honor solvatur aut poena sequatur. Alioquin aut sibi deus iustus non erit
aut ad utrumque impotens erit; quod nefas est vel cogitare.” DBM, *183 [Supplement, 76]. This is a direct
quote of the Latin text from Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo, I, 13. See S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi
Opera Omnia, vol. 2, ed. F. S. Schmitt (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1946), 71. Lonergan notes
that Anselm sometimes used arguments of appropriateness and distinguished between compelling and noncompelling necessity. Lonergan nonetheless judges that Anselm’s theory is based on a necessary reason.
8
Lonergan, DBM, *183 [Supplement, 76].
9
“Quaeritur enim qua necessitate mortuus sit Christus et qua necessitate propter eius mortem concedatur
peccatorum remissio. Quaeritur deinde utrum mors Christi rationem poenae habuerit et qua iustitia haec
poena a Christo sit sumpta. Quaeritur tertio in quonam praecise consistat satisfactio Christi, utrum fuerit
superabundans, quemadmodum vicaria esse potuerit, quemadmodum per vicariam satisfactionem reliquiae
peccatorum tollantur et rerum ordo restauretur. Quaeritur quarto utrum totum Christi opus deduci oporteat
ex ratione anselmiana necessaria, an alia via ad intelligentiam theologicam procedendum sit.” DBM, *183184 [Supplement, 76].

188
6.2.2

Article 27: The Meaning of Necessity10
Lonergan notes that Anselm’s argument is based on the disjunction aut satisfactio

aut poena. Is there a third possibility where neither satisfaction is given nor punishment
undergone? Hypothetically the answer is yes. God can do anything that does not involve
an intrinsic contradiction, and God is not bound by any stricture of justice to require
satisfaction.11 Furthermore, God could have gratuitously pardoned all sins, or even if
God had wanted satisfaction the slightest suffering on the part of Christ would have
sufficed.12 However, in the present order of reality the answer is no since we have the
ecclesial doctrine of Christ’s satisfaction. Lonergan notes that theologians ask the further
question, why did Christ suffer such great pain? Lonergan quotes Aquinas:
“Christ wanted to free mankind from sin not only by exerting his power but also by
fulfilling the requirements of justice. Therefore he not only considered the value his
sorrow would have by virtue of his divine nature, but also how far his pain would go by
virtue of his human nature towards giving so great a satisfaction as was needed for sin.”13

Aquinas understood this in terms of fittingness, but later theologians took a
voluntaristic or hypothetical approach to understand this in terms of necessity. The
former appealed to a divine decree of acceptance. The latter concocted supersubtle
distinctions to show that Christ gave condign satisfaction according to the full rigor of
justice.14

10

“Articulus XXVII. De Ratione Necessitatis,” DBM, *185-186 [Supplement, 76-77].
Lonergan, DBM, *185-186 [Supplement, 77].
12
Lonergan, DBM, *186 [Supplement, 77]. Lonergan cites Aquinas as the authoritative source of this
doctrine (ST, III, q. 46, a. 5, 3um). He also notes this is the teaching of Pope Clement VI (DB 550).
13
“‘Christus voluit genus humanum a peccatis liberare non sola potestate sed etiam iustitia. Et ideo non
solum attendit quantam virtutem dolor eius haberet ex divinitate unita: sed etiam quantum dolor eius
sufficeret secundum naturam humanam ad tantam satisfactionem.’” DBM, *186 [Supplement, 77]. This
quotation is from ST, III, q.46, a. 6, 6um.
14
Lonergan, DBM, *186 [Supplement, 77]. Lonergan does not identify any particular theologian.
However, in Thesis 16 of DVI he gives the same illustrations of voluntaristic and hypothetical approaches.
Scotus and Suarez are named explicitly, the former to the error of voluntarism and the latter to solutions
based on hypothetical legal contracts. De Verbo Incarnato, 493.
11
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6.2.3

Article 28: The Meaning of Punishment15
Lonergan begins with the question of whether Anselm’s disjunction means, in the

real sense, either punishment undergone by Christ or punishment undergone by sinners.16
Christ did die, and according to scripture death is a punishment for sin. Logically, then,
Christ suffered punishment.
Aside from scripture Lonergan also considers the pre-Anselmian and postAnselmian traditions. Representing the pre-Anselmian tradition, Lonergan notes the
teaching of Augustine. Augustine understood death as a penalty for sin but declared that
Christ, in undergoing punishment and yet not accepting guilt, wiped away both guilt and
punishment.17 Representing the post-Anselmian tradition, Lonergan begins with Catholic
thinkers. He notes the positions of Peter Lombard, Alexander of Hales, and Thomas
Aquinas, all of whom retrieved the pre-Anselmian tradition that Christ suffered
punishment.18 Aquinas held that in matters pertaining to human volition, evil is divided
into sin and punishment (penalty).19 Aquinas distinguished three types of punishment:
(1) simple or punitive, (2) medicinal or remedial, and (3) satisfactory or expiatory.20
Christ’s punishment is to be understood as satisfactory, or expiatory.21

15

“Articulus XXVIII. De Ratione Poenae,” DBM, *187-193 [Supplement, 77-81].
Lonergan, DBM, *187 [Supplement, 77].
17
Lonergan, DBM, *187 [Supplement, 77]. Lonergan references Serm. 171, 3; PL 38:934.
18
Lonergan, DBM, *189 [Supplement, 77-78].
19
ST, I, q. 48, a. 5.
20
Simple punishment means that each person is punished for his or her own sin (ST, I-II, q. 87, a. 8 c).
Medicinal punishment is suffering the loss of a lesser good for a greater good (ST, I-II, q. 87, a. 7 c).
Satisfactory punishment is undergone voluntarily when one person who has not committed a fault willingly
undergoes punishment in place of another, because in some cases, persons unequal in guilt are one in will
through their union in love (ST, I-II, q. 87, a. 7 c). Lonergan, DBM, *189 [Supplement, 79].
21
Lonergan, DBM, *189 [Supplement, 79]. Lonergan recalls Aquinas’s teaching that to inflict punishment
without regard to guilt or innocence is brutality, while to punish beyond the proportion of fault is cruelty.
Lonergan references ST, II-II, q. 159, a. 2.
16
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Lonergan then transitions to a consideration of the sixteenth-century reformers.22
Their denial of sacramental satisfaction removed the basis of the analogy for
understanding Christ’s satisfaction. By bringing in the notion of fiduciary faith and the
notion that the righteousness of Christ has been imputed to us, the door was opened to the
notion that our unrighteousness was imputed to Christ.23 The opinion was fully
developed through Quenstedt (1617-1688), who taught that by reason of God’s justice
God was obliged to require full payment of the debt incurred by sin. Without this
payment God could not remit sins. So Christ voluntarily had our sins charged to
himself.24 Based on scripture and tradition (Catholic and Protestant), Lonergan judges
that Anselm’s disjunction cannot be maintained.25
The remainder of the article primarily considers the opinion of Jacques Rivière.26
Rivière distinguished three possible modes for explaining Christ’s satisfaction: (1)
chastisement, (2) expiation, or (3) reparation. Rivière opted for reparation understood
along the lines of how Aquinas understood satisfaction.27 Rivière acknowledged the
added element of expiation in Christ’s sufferings but understood Christ’s submission to
evil as subordinate, secondary, and external. Others view Rivière’s opinion as doubtful,
such as Xiberta who held that Christ’s sufferings were by divine ordination, suggesting
another alternative to Anselm’s disjunction: either punitive expiation or punishment.28

22

Lonergan notes the positions of Melanchton, Calvin, F. Socinus (1534-1604), H. Grotius (1583-1645),
and Quenstedt (1617-1688).
23
Lonergan, DBM, *189 [Supplement, 79].
24
Lonergan, DBM, *189-191 [Supplement, 79-80].
25
Lonergan, DBM, *191 [Supplement, 80].
26
Rivière authored the entry “Redemptionis” in the Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique (DTC), vol. 13.
27
Lonergan, DBM, *192 [Supplement, 80]. For Aquinas, one satisfies (atones) for an offence when he or
she displays to the offended person something which pleases that person as much or more than what
displeased the person by the offense. ST, III, q. 48, a. 2.
28
Lonergan, DBM, *192 [Supplement, 81].
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6.2.4

Article 29: The Punishment of Christ29
Lonergan begins with the statement that the Latin word poena (“punishment” or

“penalty”) cannot be separated from Christ’s redemptive work. He notes how Peter
Lombard, Alexander of Hales, and Aquinas reintroduced the word poena, but his
emphasis is on Aquinas. Aquinas understood satisfaction in the proper sense as not
having an intrinsic connection with undergoing evil,30 but at the same time Aquinas
spoke of “satisfactory punishment.”31 Lonergan comes to the following judgment:
Granted that one can put forth a coherent theory according to which satisfaction would
not necessarily and of itself include suffering evil, nevertheless in our opinion such a
theory would contribute little to the present discussion, since it is universally
acknowledged that Christ, in accordance with God's will, suffered and died for us and for
our sins.32

For Lonergan, elements of a coherent theory must affirm the compatibility of the
following judgments, which Lonergan appropriates from Rivière: (1) God does not
directly will evil; (2) Christ’s passion and death was not simply good, nor a simple
absence of good, but a privation of good and indeed a privation of the most painful and
severe kind; and (3) God did directly will Christ's atonement, and so that satisfaction
given by Christ cannot simply be identified with the suffering of evil.33
He then states that an objection to this position may be raised, based on the
assumption that the following three elements are incompatible: (1) Christ made
atonement by suffering, (2) God directly willed Christ’s atonement, and (3) God did not
29

“Articulus XXIX. De Poena Christi,” DBM, *194-202 [Supplement, 81-85].
Lonergan, DBM, *194 [Supplement, 81]. Lonergan references ST, III, q. 48, a. 2.
31
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directly will Christ’s passion.34 Lonergan argues that these elements are quite
compatible, and on two levels. On the first level, he uses the terminology of scripture
and the Church Fathers. On the second level, he uses scholastic terminology.
Lonergan summarizes the scriptural and Patristic witness as an interplay of three
roles: (1) the role of the devil perpetrating Christ’s passion and death, where this passion
and death, as inflicted on Christ, was a most grave sin;35 (2) the role of Christ who
voluntarily submitted to his passion and death, while at the same time never in the least
indicated that the ridicule heaped upon him and the scourging and crucifixion he suffered
were being inflicted upon him by his Father;36 and (3) the role of the Father resurrecting
and exalting his beloved Son, making the Son Lord and Christ and giving to the Son the
promise of the Father, the Holy Spirit.37 Lonergan then relates these roles to his
speculative work from the previous chapter:
It is not difficult to discern in these three roles the meaning, the law, the mystery, and the
justice of the cross. For the cross presupposes evil, it includes the notion of the triumph
of the will over evil, and leads to superabundant good lavished by God the Father.
Besides, these three aspects all converge in the meaning of the cross. However divergent
these three roles are among themselves, they come together in the single meaning of the
cross which presupposes evil to be overcome, transforms that evil into good, and through
that transformation leads us to understand the meaning of the text, “In all things God
works for good with those who love him” (Rom 8:28).38
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Lonergan then begins his argument using a scholastic mode of expression. The
argument is mediated by replying to the following questions: Why would an all-powerful
God have dealings with the devil? Why did God not spare his own Son but instead
handed him over on behalf of us all? Lonergan’s reply is that human reason can go no
farther than Augustine’s dictum that God judged it better to draw good out of evil than to
allow no evils to exist.39 Despite the existence of evil, divine wisdom did not ordain that
evils should exist. God neither directly nor indirectly wills sin, but allows sin and the evil
consequences of sin and arranges for good to be drawn out of this evil. God’s absolute
and universal dominion remains intact without God being in any way the cause or author
of sin. Sin cannot be attributed to God as if it were intelligible, because sin is the nonintelligible, the absurd, the irrational.40
Accordingly, since the evil of sin truly exists and is not from God and only exists by his
permission, we now know what is represented by the devil in the above-mentioned
picture, and in a way lies hidden under the name of devil. Ours is not to ask why an
omnipotent God should be condescend to deal with the devil, but rather to humbly accept
the fact that God who alone is wise (Rom 16:27) lets the evil of sin happen.41

Once God’s allowance of evil was granted, there was nothing to do but draw good
out of evil through the meaning, law, mystery, and justice of the cross.42 Lonergan
acknowledges that this does not fully explain what is meant by Christ’s satisfaction, “but
it does serve the useful purpose of clearing away false opinions and laying a firm
foundation for determining the truth of the matter.”43 He states that we can also see this
39
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foundation by examining the notion of Christ’s punishment. Punishment was involved in
the passion and death of Christ because (1) passion and death are evils in themselves, and
(2) these evils resulted from the sins of others. Christ’s passion and death were a
privation of the good, and privation of the good is the definition of evil.
Furthermore, since punishment is evil that results from sin, there are going to be
as many species of punishment as there are connections according to God’s manifold
wisdom by which evil is linked to sin.44 Since divine wisdom regulates divine justice, all
these kinds of punishment are just according to the wisdom and justice of God. Lonergan
reiterates the three types of punishment he already covered in article 28: simple
punishment, medicinal punishment, and satisfactory punishment. Simple punishment is
not applicable to Christ, since Christ’s sinlessness is frequently mentioned in scripture.
Medicinal punishment is not applicable to Christ, since theologians agree that Christ was
incapable of sinning and needed no such remedy. The punishment of Christ is to be
understood as satisfactory punishment.45 The nature of satisfactory punishment is to be
found in the mystery of the cross wherein Christ crucified is the wisdom of God.46
Lonergan concludes with four distinctions with respect to Christ’s punishment.
As inflicted, it was unjust. As accepted, it was transformed. As rewarded by the Father,
it made Christ the source of eternal salvation to all who obey him. Finally, inasmuch as
God in his eternal decree allowed this punishment to be inflicted, accepted, and rewarded,
we can discern with Augustine the plan of divine wisdom that judged it better to draw
good out of evil than to allow no evils to exist.47

44

Lonergan, DBM, *199 [Supplement, 84]. Lonergan references ST, I, q. 21, a. 1, 2um.
Lonergan, DBM, *200 [Supplement, 84].
46
Lonergan, DBM, *201 [Supplement, 85].
47
Lonergan, DBM, *202 [Supplement, 85].
45

195

6.2.5 Article 30: The Transference of Punishment to Christ48

In this article Lonergan rejects any theory that Christ was in some way
condemned or chastised by the Father according to retributive justice. Christ did suffer
punishment, so there is a penal element to understand. But what are the possible contexts
to understand this? Here is Lonergan’s answer:
For Christ's satisfaction or atonement, although it may be referred to as punishment, is
made according to the divine wisdom and justice of the cross; but simple punishment,
punishment as such, is imposed upon sinners themselves according to the wisdom and
justice of a divine judge. And so the disjunction, “either satisfaction or punishment,”
comes back in a fourth form -- the correct one -- that in the actual order of reality this is
the operative disjunction, “either the justice of the cross or the justice of a judge.”49

Lonergan provides five arguments why Christ’s punishment is to be understood
according to the justice of the cross, not the justice of a judge.
First, a just judge does not punish twice for the same offence. If Christ was
punished for all sins via the justice of a judge, hell and purgatory would be empty.50
Second, due punishment in the strict sense for mortal sin is eternal damnation. If
Christ was duly punished for sin then he received this form of punishment. But this is
obviously false since Christ is now exalted at the right hand of the Father.51
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Third, it is contrary to the teaching of the New Testament to state that the anger of
God was directed against his Son. Christ is not a child of God’s wrath but the Son that
the Father loves.52 God is not unjust and does not condemn one without sin.53
Fourth, those who interpret the passion and death of Christ in the context of the
justice of a judge do an injustice to God the Father, to Christ himself, and to Christ’s
example and precept.54 For Lonergan, these injustices stem from mixing fact with fiction
(fictitious anger of the Father towards Christ, fictitious imputation of guilt to Christ,
fictitious condemnation of Christ, fictitious punishment of Christ).55 Even though Christ
repudiated the law of retaliation and preached the wisdom of the Cross, the Father would
seem to have ignored his own wisdom and followed the law of retaliation.56 This is a
contradiction and an injustice to the Father, since scripture is clear that the Father first
loved us (1 Jn 4:9), and being rich in mercy, because of this love for us sent his Son
reconciling the world to himself (2 Cor 5:19) proving his love for us (Rom 5:8).57
Furthermore, according to the opinion that Christ was punished according to the justice of
a judge, one is equating Christ with the First Adam and this is an injustice to Christ since
Christ is not the head of sinful humanity but Head of the Church which he loves.58
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Finally, if Christ’s example and precept is the justice of the cross, we contradict Christ’s
example and precept if we interpret his passion and death in the context of the justice of a
judge because such an interpretation suggests to us to ignore Christ and follow a precept
of retributive justice instead.59
Fifth, there is a distinction between the condemnation of sin and the
condemnation of a person. The latter changes a person's status in society and concludes
that the condemned is guilty of sin and to be punished. Lonergan does not deny that in
Christ crucified we see an extreme condemnation of sin. But this is condemnation of sin,
not condemnation of Christ. To condemn Christ is to condemn the second person of the
Trinity. A suggestion that one person of the Trinity condemns another is blasphemous.60
6.2.6

Article 31: The Sacramental Analogy61
Lonergan begins by noting three assertions from previous articles: (1) Christ’s

satisfaction was not absolutely necessary; (2) this satisfaction did not necessarily rule out
Christ’s physical passion and death; and (3) this satisfaction was not punishment for the
sins of others in accordance with the justice of a judge.62
Lonergan then recalls two teachings of Trent. First, our Lord Jesus Christ merited
justification for us by his most holy passion and cross, and made atonement (satisfecit) to
God the father on our behalf (DB 799; DS 1529; ND 1932).63 Second, as we suffer
something in making atonement for sin we become like Christ who atoned for our sins

59

Lonergan, DBM, *208 [Supplement, 88].
Lonergan, DBM, *209-210 [Supplement, 88-89].
61
“Articulus XXXI. De analogia sacramentali,” DBM, *211-214 [Supplement, 89-91].
62
Lonergan, DBM, *211 [Supplement, 89].
63
Lonergan, DBM, *211 [Supplement, 89].
60

198
(DB 904; DS 1689; ND 1630).64 Based on these teachings, Lonergan concludes that
Christ’s satisfaction is to be understood by way of analogy to the sacrament of penance.
Theological tradition65 and sacramental theology66 support this conclusion.
Lonergan also appeals to the argument he developed previously that Christ's satisfaction
was not a matter of juridical justice, but the justice of the cross. Satisfaction understood
from an analogy from jurisprudence must be rejected.67 Also, a theory which
understands Christ’s physical sufferings as “un élément de fait,” “un trait secondaire et
superficiel” expound a theory contributing little to understanding the vicarious suffering
of Christ.68 Lonergan ends the article noting that the satisfaction given by Christ and the
satisfaction given by penitents is not a univocal predication but an analogous
predication.69 Christ offered satisfaction not for his own sins, but for the sins of others,
and not according to the justice of a judge but according to the justice of the cross. A
penitent however atones for his or her own sins which by a judicial act of absolution fully
remits the guilt but not as to the punishment due. Christ never had a sinful past life
needing renewal, nor the guilt associated with sins, nor the punishment due to sins which
would have required retributive chastisement.
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6.2.7

Article 32: The Sorrows of Christ70

In this article Lonergan explains that although satisfaction consists in an external
act in such a way that one person can make satisfaction on behalf of another, the external
act springs from an interior source or principle.71 In the case of Christ, the interior source
or principle was the sorrow Christ had for our sins. Lonergan grounds this judgment on
the authority of Aquinas and also on theological reasoning.
Regarding the authority of Aquinas, Lonergan notes four points. First, the cause
of Christ’s interior pain or sorrow was the sins of the whole human race.72 Second,
Aquinas, drawing on Augustine, states that there is a type of sadness that is praiseworthy
when it stems from a holy love. This sadness can be of help towards atoning for sin.
Thus Christ in atoning for all sins experienced the most profound sadness though not as
much as to go beyond the bounds of reason.73 Third, this sorrow surpassed any sorrow
ever felt by a repentant sinner because it proceeded from a greater wisdom and love and
because Christ grieved for all sins at once.74 Fourth, since Christ wished to free us from
sin not only through his power but also in accordance with justice, Christ not only
considered the value his pain would have by virtue of his own divine nature but also the
value his pain would have by virtue of his humanity towards giving as much satisfaction
as was called for by sin.75
Lonergan also provides an argument from theological reasoning. He makes five
points. First, the Son’s will was not different from the Father’s will. Therefore it was the
70
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Son’s own will to suffer and die for sins. Second, if this was the Son’s intention he
would not do this without detesting sins, grieving for sins, and resolving to take away
sins. Third, Christ certainly detested sins because Christ had the immediate vision of the
divine goodness. As such, he had a more profound understanding of sin than any other
person could have. Christ also loved the Father with the utmost love and so regarded
offenses against the Father with the utmost detestation. Fourth, Christ grieved over sins.
The greater one’s love for God, the greater one’s love for his or her neighbor. Since
Christ had the greatest love of God and the greatest love of neighbor, our sins were the
cause of the most intense grief for Christ. Christ’s great love for the Father, and his love
for us who were at enmity with God, is what makes Christ the mediator between God and
humanity. The juxtaposition between the good Christ loved and the greatest of evils was
the root, source, and cause of Christ’s sorrow. Fifth, the more we detest evil and grieve
over it, the more firmly we resolve to get rid of it. Christ had the greatest possible
detestation of sin and sorrow because of sins, so Christ had the most resolute
determination to take away the sins of the world.76 In brief, then, the interior source of
Christ’s satisfaction is his detestation of sin, his sorrow and grief for our sins, and his
firm determination to take away sins.77

6.2.8

Article 33: The Satisfaction Given by Christ78

Lonergan begins by recalling the conclusion of the previous article. Christ had a
love for God the Father and for us, and knowledge of the seriousness of sin. As such he
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had a detestation for sin and sorrow for our sins together with a firm resolve to take away
sin and prevent future sin. This interior source can be referred to as an “interior act”
(actum interiorem).79 Christ could have exercised this act in three ways. First, through
his immediate knowledge of God and consequent volition, neither of which depend on
sentient operations. Second, through acquired knowledge and “interior sensibility”
(sensibilitatem interiorem) added to his immediate knowledge of God. This second way
presupposes sentient operations. Third, through an expression of the interior act via
exterior senses and physical movements. This includes the first two but it makes the
interior act a more completely human act.80 Since Christ’s satisfaction did indeed involve
an outward expression of his inward detestation and sorrow for our sins, this third way is
the way Christ actually exercised his interior act.81 Outward expressions manifest human
interior acts into the public realm, and this is fitting since humans are, by nature, political
and social beings who need the cooperation and contributions of others. Furthermore,
signs are divided principally into denotative and expressive. The former cause others to
perceive and understand. The latter add to this understanding an affectivity such that
others are moved to will and act accordingly.82 Christ’s outward act was the latter.
Having laid down these premises Lonergan comes to four conclusions. First, it
was appropriate for our Lord to outwardly express his interior sorrow. The Word
assumed a human nature in its totality, and it is fitting that complete human operations
79
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are performed not only in the intellectual part of a person, but also through external
expression. It is also fitting that Christ should express publicly what he was doing for our
benefit and what he desired for our imitation.83 Second, it was appropriate that Christ
accept his passion and death to express his interior sorrow, because only a supreme act
would be proportionate to his sorrow.84 Third, Christ’s expression of his interior sorrow
is rightly understood as vicarious suffering, and this vicarious suffering and death was not
only for the purpose of taking away sin but it was also the result of sin.85 Fourth, Christ’s
vicarious suffering, accepted as an expression of his interior sorrow, is rightly understood
as vicarious satisfaction because it fulfills the definition of vicarious satisfaction: a penal
work undertaken out of detestation for sin, sorrow for sin, and intent of wiping away sins
and guarding against future sins.86

6.2.9

Article 34: The Superabundant Satisfaction Given by Christ87
In this article Lonergan explains why Christ’s satisfaction was superabundant, a

common doctrine among theologians.88 Christ’s satisfaction is not to be measured in
terms of sin, but in terms of grace: like other graces the satisfaction given by Christ was
superabundant.89 Lonergan makes seven points supporting this judgment.
First, the ontological and psychological subject making satisfaction was the Word
of God, one of the Persons of the Trinity, and the Lord of Glory. Second, the formal
83
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element of Christ’s satisfaction is his interior act flowing from his immediate vision of
God and love for the Father. This interior act includes a commensurate detestation of sin,
sorrow over sins, and resolve to redeem us from sin. In each is the formality of
supernaturality since Christ is a divine person operating in an assumed human nature.
Third, since the interior act informs the exterior act, it is through Christ’s exterior act that
we can apprehend the humility, obedience, and love of a divine person as well as a
detestation of sin, sorrow for our sins, and resolve to take away sins. Fourth, all of
Christ’s acts, interior and exterior, were positively and directly offered to the service and
honor of God the Father. Fifth, Christ’s satisfaction is far greater than the heinousness of
all sins. Sin has a note of infinity since it offends God, but it is nevertheless an act of a
creature and an ontological privation. Christ’s satisfaction is a positive reality with an
infinite quality because of the Father to whom it was offered and from the Son who
offered it. Sixth, Christ’s satisfaction did not go beyond God’s intention, the obedience
Christ owed to the Father, or the mode of operation proper to a divine person. Seventh,
the satisfaction made by Christ and offered by us are analogical terms, and although
satisfaction has been made by the Head there remains satisfaction to be made by the
members.90

6.3

Lonergan’s Understanding of the Doctrine of Christ’s Satisfaction
In April of 1959, Lonergan gave a lecture titled “Method in Catholic Theology.”91

The content of that lecture corresponded very closely to the course De intellectu et
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methedo Lonergan was teaching in the Gregorian University from February to June
1959.92 In the lecture Lonergan discussed five precepts of method in Catholic Theology:
(1) Understand, (2) Understand Systematically, (3) Develop Positions, (4) Reverse
Counterpositions, (5) Accept the Responsibility of Judgment. All are evident in
Lonergan’s speculative understanding of Christ’s satisfaction. However, his work is
perhaps one of the clearest examples in his entire Latin theology of two of these five
precepts: develop positions and reverse counterpositions. The precepts of developing
positions and reversing counterpositions were previously worked out in Insight, then
subsequently applied to the field of theology.93
The formulation of theological discoveries can be divided into two classes:
positions and counterpositions.94 Positions are the result of intelligent inquiry and critical
reflection, of what Lonergan calls “intellectual conversion.”95 Counterpositions are
contradictory to positions and rooted in the lack of intellectual conversion. Positions
head for development and counterpositions head for reversal. Counterpositions can be
coherent with other counterpositions, providing a mask of authenticity, but once the
contradiction of the counterposition is revealed the counterposition heads for its own
reversal. Since the precepts of developing positions and reversing counterpositions are so
clearly apparent in this chapter, my interpretation will identify where Lonergan is either
92
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developing a position or reversing a counterposition as I consider the major elements in
his speculative understanding of Christ’s satisfaction.
I will focus on four major elements: (1) The integration of satisfactio and poena;
(2) Christ’s poena understood in terms of fittingness, not necessity; (3) The intelligible
context to interpret the poena associated with Christ’s redemptive work; and (4) The
analogy to understand Christ’s satisfaction.
This is certainly not to suggest that Lonergan’s speculative understanding of
Christ’s satisfaction includes only these four elements. More could always be said in any
interpretation, but there is not room to say everything. For reasons of space and
relevancy to Lonergan’s stated purpose to explain the historical causality of Christ, I have
chosen these four.96

6.3.1

The Integration of Satisfactio and Poena

For Lonergan, the Latin word poena can hardly be separated from any speculative
(systematic) understanding of Christ’s redemptive work.97 But Anselm’s disjunction aut
96

For example, another element is Lonergan’s understanding of how Christ’s satisfaction is superabundant,
and this is a development of Anselm’s position. The theorem of the supernatural had not yet been
developed in Anselm’s time. As such, he conceived superabundancy in terms of supererogation. Christ’s
giving of his life was meritorious because it was excessive, in other words, essentially an overpayment.
There is a difficulty with this approach. As Charles Hefling notes, the difficulty with such an argument is
that excess implies that what exceeds and what is exceeded share a common measure. The implication is
that merit before God does not depend on grace, since there is no distinction between the natural and the
supernatural. For Lonergan, Christ’s satisfaction is superabundant not because it was supererogatory in the
Anselmian sense, but because Christ’s satisfaction is to be measured in relation to grace, which is a
judgment ultimately grounded in the Christological affirmation that Christ is a divine person operating in
an assumed human nature. For an interpretation of this development see Hefling, “Lonergan’s Cur Deus
Homo,” 148.
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Lonergan understands poena, punishment, in the technical sense used in medieval theology. In the order
of divine justice, the punishment consequent upon sin is the privation of a good, and the privation of a good
is the definition of evil. So Christ’s suffering of poena is the suffering of evil. In the technical sense one
can suffer the evil consequences of sin even though one is not guilty of the sin that gave rise to the
consequences. The contemporary meaning of the English word “punishment” does not adequately convey
this technical meaning. For example, as Charles Hefling points out, “We do not ordinarily think of all the
ills [of societies, nations, world] that are consequent upon basic sin as punishments in quite the same sense
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satisfactio aut poena implies that satisfaction and punishment are mutually exclusive.
Does Lonergan consider Anselm’s disjunction a counterposition?
In my interpretation the answer is no. We would not have the doctrine of Christ’s
satisfaction had it not been for Anselm’s speculative theory. Lonergan is not outright
rejecting Anselm’s disjunction. It is a position, but it is incomplete. Lonergan is
advancing that position, not in the sense that he is the first to retrieve the notion of poena,
but in the sense that his chapter demonstrates intelligent inquiry and critical reflection as
to why poena cannot be separated from Christ’s redemptive work. Although Lonergan
appeals to the pre-Anselmian and post-Anselmian tradition, I interpret that the ultimate
ground of why he judges that poena cannot be separated from Christ’s redemptive work
is based on his previous work in the third chapter of the Supplement, where he
categorized certain teachings of the New Testament under the heading “Vicarious
Suffering” (article 20). For Lonergan, the fact that scripture witnesses to the vicarious
suffering of Christ is the authoritative reason why satisfaction and poena must be
integrated in a speculative understanding of Christ’s satisfaction. This is why Lonergan
states that even though one could put forth a theory in which satisfaction would not
necessarily include the suffering of evil, that theory would contribute little to a
speculative understanding given that it is universally acknowledged that Christ, in
accordance with God’s will, suffered and died for us and for our sins.98

as we think of imprisonment as the punishment for tax-evasion.” Hefling, “A Perhaps Permanently Valid
Achievement,” 57.
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6.3.2

Christ’s Poena Understood in terms of Fittingness, not Necessity

That Christ suffered punishment is, for Lonergan, a true judgment. For Lonergan
there is a deeper question: if the slightest sufferings of Christ would have sufficed to
make satisfaction for us to God the Father, which is a common and certain doctrine, then
why did Christ suffer such great pain? To ask why is to anticipate an intelligibility. For
Lonergan, there must be an intelligibility as to why Christ suffered such great pain. Why
must there an intelligibility? Christ’s great pain is the suffering of an evil, and evil has no
intrinsic intelligibility. So why is there an expected intelligibility?
To answer this let us start with a conviction Lonergan repeatedly recalls from
scripture: the wisdom of God is revealed in Christ crucified. If Christ crucified was
simply a matter of divine free choice, without any regard to divine wisdom, then there
would be no “why,” no “reason” in answer to the question, “Why did Christ suffer such
great pain?” For Lonergan, if a contingent truth is not ordained by divine wisdom, then
that contingent truth has no “why,” no “reason.”99 Contingent truths simply become
arbitrary facts. The fact that Christ suffered great pain is not a necessary truth, but a
contingent truth ordained by divine wisdom. Contingent truths ordained by divine
wisdom do have an intelligibility, but a non-necessary intelligibility, which is the
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In the Lonergan archives there is a set of notes dating back to the 1940s. In these notes Lonergan
explicitly treats the problem of voluntarism. These notes are helpful for us to understand why Lonergan
states that voluntarism ignores the significance of intelligibility. In these notes Lonergan states that
contingent truth conceived as a product of free choice cannot be an object of scientific knowledge. If a
contingent truth is grounded merely in a matter of divine free choice, without any connection to divine
wisdom, then that contingent truth is a pure matter of fact, but there is no “why,” no “reason” for that pure
matter of fact. As such, there is no intelligibility, not even the non-necessary intelligibility that is
convenientiae. The archival material is 6 pages treating voluntarism and the root of voluntarism, available
in pdf file 32300DTE040/A323 at www.bernardlonergan.com. The remarks of Lonergan to which I refer
are found on pg. 2.
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meaning of convenientia.100 And the reason there must be an intelligibility is grounded in
Lonergan’s position that in the order of this universe created by God, there is a reason (an
intelligibility) for everything that exists or happens if it is ordained by divine wisdom.101
Since the wisdom of God is revealed in Christ crucified, there must be a reason, a nonnecessary intelligibility as to why Christ suffered such great pain. This is why Lonergan
is critical of voluntaristic and hypothetical approaches that try to explain Christ’s great
pain in terms of necessity. As Lonergan mentions in his notes from the 1940s on the
problem of voluntarism, necessity is one thing and intelligibility another.102 This is why
voluntarism, since it denies a link between contingent truth and divine wisdom, answers
the question of why Christ suffered such great pain by resorting to what Lonergan calls
“a divine decree of acceptance” (beneplacitum divinae acceptationis).103 In my
interpretation what this means is a conception of divine causality in the created order
where such causality is linked to divine will without union to divine wisdom.104 In other
words, there is a difference between a “divine decree” and a “divine decree of
acceptance.” In the former, there is a union of intellect and will in God. In the latter it is
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only a matter of divine will, contrary to Aquinas’s doctrine that the knowledge of God is
the cause of all things.105
The hypothetical approach prescinds from the actual order of reality and seeks
intelligibility in some hypothetical world so as to accord to this intelligibility the status of
“necessity.” For Lonergan, to seek intelligibility in a hypothetical world is an intrinsic
contradiction. We know nothing of other possible worlds other than that these worlds are
possible. But the divine will has chosen this world conceived by divine wisdom. So the
intelligibility we grasp must attend to the present order of reality. This explains why
Lonergan states, in his article on the notion of necessity, that later theologians (after
Aquinas), rather than seeking understanding of Christ’s suffering in terms of fittingness
related to the actual order of reality “concocted supersubtle distinctions to show that
Christ gave condign satisfaction in accordance with the full rigor of justice.”106 The “full
rigor of justice” means retributive justice. But hypothetical concoctions are not based on
reality. They fail to grasp any intelligibility because the only intelligibility we can grasp
is the intelligibility in the actual, present order of reality.107 Each of these approaches
(voluntarism and hypothetical) is a counterposition in terms of methodology. Lonergan
reverses the counterposition by arguing intelligently and critically that Christ’s great pain
is to be understood in terms of fittingness, not necessity.
105
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6.3.3

The Intelligible Context to Interpret the Poena Associated with Christ’s
Redemptive Work
Once one judges that poena can hardly be separated from Christ’s redemptive

work, and that this poena must be understood in terms of fittingness and not necessity,
there arises the problem of understanding how this poena is intelligibly connected with
Christ’s redemptive work. This understanding, in and of itself, is not equivalent to an
understanding of Christ’s satisfaction. Lonergan will not get to that point until he takes
up the sacramental analogy. But a starting point is to understand how poena fits in the
picture. This problem is the same problem that later in DVI Lonergan calls the “problem
of integration.”108 The problem of integration is clearly present in the Supplement,
though Lonergan does not use this explicit phrase. The problem of integration involves
choosing what in DVI Lonergan calls the correct “intelligible context” to interpret
Christ’s punishment.109
My understanding of “intelligible context,” in using this term to interpret
Lonergan, is the meaning associated to a notion Lonergan introduced later in 1962 in a
set of lectures on “The Method of Theology” delivered at Regis College in Toronto.110 In
those lectures, Lonergan introduced the notion of the “dogmatic-theological context.”
Lonergan calls the dogmatic-theological context a “remainder concept,” meaning all the
rest that is relevant to understanding a topic. Therefore, the dogmatic-theological context
refers to all of the other remaining factors that must be taken into account if a specific
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30200A0E060. A transcription of the lectures has been recently published in part 1 of Early Works on
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theological conclusion is to be understood correctly.111 In the first lecture, Lonergan
underscores the importance of the dogmatic-theological context through the general
example of heresy. He raises the following question: what is wrong with heretics? His
answer is that a heretic may be saying something true from a factual context, yet at the
same time the statement may be incompatible with the dogmatic-theological context, thus
denying elements which implicitly or explicitly pertain to that context.112
Lonergan’s judgment that the Latin word poena can hardly be separated from
Christ’s redemptive work is a theological conclusion grounded in the teaching of the New
Testament. That theological conclusion, in order to be understood correctly, needs a
proper intelligible context, what Lonergan later called a dogmatic-theological context.113
The intelligible context needs to account for remaining factors essential to properly
interpreting the meaning of the poena associated with Christ’s’ redemptive work. What
are the factors involved?
Let us begin with a statement Lonergan makes in DVI and then relate this to the
Supplement. In Thesis 16 of DVI, on Christ’s Satisfaction, Lonergan states that
satisfaction, regarded formally, is the vicarious suffering and death of Christ understood
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according to some interpretation, some intelligible context. He identifies three elements
in the intelligible context:
Now such an interpretation or intelligible context is a systematic theology, nothing else,
and theology is not made systematic by fits and starts. The theology of sin and
punishment is involved; likewise the theology of God’s justice; and finally the theology
of redemption should not be left out.114

The three elements identified in DVI are thus (1) the theology of sin and
punishment, (2) the theology of God’s justice, and (3) the theology of redemption. In the
Supplement, Lonergan’s methodology in arguing that the “justice of the cross” is the
correct context in which to interpret the poena associated with Christ’s redemptive work
includes consideration of all three of these elements.
The first element, the theology of sin and punishment, is found in Lonergan’s
argument that there are distinctions that must be made in the relationship between sin and
punishment. Here he follows Aquinas in identifying three types of punishment related to
sin: simple, medicinal, and satisfactory. Christ was without fault, and he neither took on
nor incurred fault. But he did voluntarily take on poena. Since Christ’s poena was
voluntarily taken on, and not imputed to him, then this poena cannot be interpreted as
simple punishment. Medicinal punishment can also be ruled out. Christ neither sinned
nor could sin. To speak of medicinal punishment for one who never sinned and cannot
sin makes no sense. Therefore we are left with satisfactory punishment. In my
interpretation, this whole discussion on the types of punishment is essentially Lonergan’s
integration of the theology of sin and punishment into the intelligible context.
The second element, the theology of God’s justice, is found in Lonergan’s
argument that the following are compatible: (1) Christ made satisfaction by suffering, (2)
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God directly willed Christ's satisfaction, and (3) God did not directly will Christ's
passion. The first is a true judgment based on ecclesial doctrine. The second is a true
judgment based on revelation.115 The third is a true judgment based on Lonergan’s
theological principle of divine justice. Anything directly willed by God must be a good.
The passion represents the poena suffered by Christ, and since poena is an evil, it cannot
be directly willed by God. What God directly wills must be a good, not evil. In short,
the judgments are compatible due to Lonergan’s understanding of divine justice.
The third element, the theology of redemption, is found in Lonergan’s argument
that in the suffering and death of Christ we can discern the meaning, mystery, law, and
justice of the cross. In other words, Lonergan is introducing into the intelligible context
the theology of redemption developed in the previous chapter. As we noted in that
chapter, when the meaning of the cross is generalized with respect to the entire economy
of salvation, we have the “law of the cross,” what later in DVI Lonergan called the
“intrinsic intelligibility” of redemption and whose essential meaning is the transformation
of evil into a greater good through a victory of the will in self-sacrificing love. There are
no less than eight references in article 29 (“The Punishment of Christ”) to the “meaning
of the cross”116 and/or the “meaning, law, mystery, and justice of the cross.”117 The
purpose of these references is to convince the reader that the poena associated with
Christ’s redemptive work is nothing other than the evil presupposed, voluntarily taken on,

115

Lonergan knows that scripture does not use the word “satisfaction,” but scripture is clear that God
directly willed Christ’s saving work through his passion and death, and for Lonergan “satisfaction” is
simply a concept employed in a speculative effort to understand how Christ’s suffering and death are
salvific. Logically then, God directly willed Christ’s satisfaction.
116
Lonergan, DBM, *197 (3x), *199 [Supplement, 83 (3x) 84].
117
Lonergan, DBM, *196, *198, *199, *202 [Supplement, 83, 84 (2x), 85].

214
and transformed into a greater good through the law of the cross. What Lonergan is
doing here is bringing into the intelligible context the theology of redemption.
Through a consideration of these three elements, Lonergan judges that that proper
intelligible context to interpret the poena associated with Christ’s redemptive work is the
“justice of the cross.” The meaning and law of the cross are grounded in divine wisdom.
Understood in the context of divine justice, the meaning and law of the cross becomes the
“justice of the cross.” This intelligible context also aids our understanding of how
Christ’s redemptive work is related to sinners. Lonergan states that Christ’s satisfaction
merits the remission (remissionem; remissio; auferenda) of all sins and punishment
alike.118 But the remission of sins is the definition of pardon. In the Supplement,
Lonergan does not explicitly state that the remission of sins is the definition of pardon,
but the notion of pardon is without doubt part of the intelligible context Lonergan is
calling the “justice of the cross” given Lonergan’s emphasis that Christ’s satisfaction
merits the remission of all sins and punishment alike. In DVI, Lonergan does explicitly
state that the definition of pardon (venia) is the remission of an offense,119 and explains
the intelligible context for interpreting Christ’s vicarious suffering and death is “pardon
being sought and granted, detestation and sorrow regarding the offense, remission of fault
and punishment alike.”120 Therefore the “justice of the cross” means that the poena
associated with Christ’s redemptive work is to be understood as suffering and death

118

Lonergan, DBM, *183 (3x) [Supplement, 76 (3x)]. Lonergan does note the distinction that through the
sacrament of baptism, there is the remission of all sins and punishment alike, while in the sacrament of
penance there is the remission of all sins but not punishment, though the latter is mitigated. Lonergan,
DBM, *204 [Supplement, 86].
119
Lonergan, De Verbo Incarnato, 507.
120
Lonergan, De Verbo Incarnato, 490.

215
willingly taken on in the context of pardon sought and granted for the remission of both
the guilt and punishment of sinners.
Lonergan’s intelligent inquiry and critical reflection into the intelligible context in
which to interpret the poena associated with Christ’s redemptive work represents a
development of the position Lonergan has already established: that satisfaction and
poena must be integrated. The development is a response to the new question that arises
once the position is established that Anselm’s disjunction cannot be maintained. But
Lonergan’s intelligent inquiry and critical reflection into the intelligible context is not
simply the development of a position. It also includes reversal of a counterposition.
The counterposition is the judgment that the poena associated with Christ’s
redemptive work is to be interpreted in the context of the “justice of a judge.” This is an
intelligible context taken from the world of jurisprudence, meaning retributive justice.
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the counterposition is the image of the Father
suggested by the counterposition. The image is that of a vindictive Father who demands
retributive justice for the sins of the human race, even if this means inflicting suffering
and death on an innocent person. For Lonergan, such an image of the Father does an
injustice to the image of the Father revealed by scripture.
Lonergan’s reversal of the counterposition is found principally in article 30, “The
Transference of Punishment to Christ.” The title reflects what Lonergan considers the
ground of the counterposition. The counterposition is only coherent if the one punished
is in some way guilty of the sins committed. But Christ was without sin. So the way the
counterposition gets around this problem is the judgment that our guilt, our liability for
punishment, has been “transferred” (our “imputed”) to Christ. Without a notion of this
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transference, the counterposition does not have the cloak of coherence. Without a cloak
of coherence, the counterposition would not survive.
In that article, Lonergan sets up his argument to reverse the counterposition by
coming to what he states is the operative disjunction in the actual order of reality: either
the justice of the cross or the justice of a judge. Lonergan’s reference to the actual order
of reality reveals his fidelity to a theological method that in Insight he describes as “the
sobriety of Aquinas,” referring to Aquinas’s concern to come to knowledge of the actual
world conceived by divine wisdom and chosen by divine goodness, not a concern with
hypothetical worlds.121 In the previous section we spoke of Lonergan’s focus on the
actual order of reality. Lonergan emphasized this in the Boston College Lectures on
Mathematical Logic and Existentialism, as we noted in his chapter on divine justice. He
emphasized this again in the 1958 Halifax lectures on Insight, where he stated the
following in response to a question during an evening Q&A session:
With Scotus, unless you are asking about possible worlds, you are not doing science,
because Scotus was concerned with necessary propositions that would be true in any
possible world, and consequently, his discussions become scientific insofar as he is
talking about any possible world. But you have an entirely different slant in Thomas.
What Thomas is doing is seeking the intelligibility of this world, trying to see the wisdom
of the divine plan and counsel in this world – just as the empirical scientist is not
concerned with what the law of gravity might be, but with what de facto that intelligible
law is in this world.122

What Lonergan is implying in the Supplement is the following: if we attend to the
actual order of reality conceived by divine wisdom and chosen by divine will, then there
are two and only two possible intelligible contexts in the actual order of reality to
interpret the poena associated with Christ’s redemptive work. The reason why there are
only two intelligible contexts goes back to Lonergan’s understanding of divine justice.
121
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Divine wisdom has conceived a world order in which human works can be reduced to
one of two categories: good or evil. Logically then there are four possible relationships
between good and evil, four suborders if you will within the one order of divine justice:
(1) good follows good, (2) evil follows evil, (3) evil follows good, and (4) good follows
evil. The first two suborders represent retributive justice, but the very first is not relevant
here because Lonergan’s purpose is to interpret the poena associated with Christ’s
redemptive work. The second suborder represents retributive justice, what Lonergan
calls the “justice of a judge.” The third suborder represents God’s allowing of sin, and
the evil consequences of sin, because it is good that there exist rational creatures that are
truly free. The forth suborder is restoration, natural or supernatural. Supernatural
restoration is redemption in the proper theological sense. In this context, the “justice of
the cross” is the third suborder linked to the fourth suborder (supernatural, not natural
restoration).
All of the other three disjunctions fail in one way or another to harmonize with
the actual order of reality. The original Anselmian disjunction “either satisfaction or
punishment” cannot be maintained since the pre-Anselmian tradition, in their reading of
scripture, always maintained that Christ suffered punishment. That Christ suffered and
died implies that Christ suffered punishment. This is a fact of history. Facts of history
are part of the actual order of reality. This rules out the first disjunction. The second
disjunction, “either punishment undergone by Christ or punishment undergone by
sinners,” lacks precision. In the actual order of reality there are different types of
punishment. This disjunction invites misinterpretation of Christ’s punishment in the
actual order of reality, hence Lonergan’s desire to transpose this into the categories of
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justice. So this rules out the second disjunction. The third disjunction, “either punitive
expiation or punishment,” suggests that the suffering of evil itself is directly willed by
God, contradicting Lonergan’s theological principle of divine justice.123 God never
directly wills evil, so the disjunction contradicts the actual order of reality conceived by
divine wisdom. This rules out the third disjunction.
The problem of the counterposition is not a failure to recognize the contingent
truth of Christ’s vicarious suffering, but choosing the wrong intelligible context to
interpret this truth. If the context is wrong, an incorrect understanding is sure to follow.
Each of Lonergan’s five arguments against the counterposition, in its own way, reverses
the counterposition by exposing the counterposition’s lack of coherence with the Catholic
dogmatic-theological context. Consider a specific example. In article 30, on “The
Transference of Punishment to Christ,” we reviewed Lonergan’s five arguments. In the
fourth argument he states that those who see in the passion and death of Christ the justice
of a judge, and not the justice of the cross, do an injustice to God the Father, to Christ
himself, and to Christ’s example and precept. My focus here is on injustice to the Father:
Furthermore, according to this opinion [the counterposition], even though Christ himself
repudiated the law of retaliation and preached the wisdom of the cross, God the Father
would seem to have ignored this wisdom and followed that discredited law instead.124

The counterposition suggests that the Father does not follow His own precept
spoken through the Son. Why would Lonergan point out this contradiction? First, notice
that there is a presupposition here that Christ’s spoken precept is the Father’s wisdom.
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What is the basis of this presupposition? It is Lonergan’s Catholic dogmatic-theological
context, specifically the relationship between two mysteries: the mystery of the Trinity
and the mystery of the Incarnation. In Lonergan’s understanding of the immanent
Trinitarian relations, the Word does not speak: the Word is spoken by the Father.125 And
the Son is sent to the world by the Father, not to teach his own doctrine (the Son’s), but
that of the Father.126 It is a counterposition, a contradiction with Lonergan’s dogmatictheological context, to suggest that the Father ignores the wisdom of Christ’s example
and precept, since that very example and precept is to be interpreted as the Father’s
doctrine spoken through the Son. This is the cardinal point. Lonergan makes the same
point in Thesis 12 of DVI, titled “The Knowledge of Christ:”
The reason why Christ ought to be believed in is that no discontinuity is acknowledged
between God the Father and the words that Jesus the man speaks. ‘For he whom God has
sent utters the words of God’ (Jn 3:34).127

In exposing the counterposition’s implication that the Father is unjust, Lonergan
is freeing the meaning of Christ’s satisfaction from what Charles Hefling terms extrinsic
legalism and questionable morality.128 Consider the following statement from DVI.
What Lonergan states there reflects accurately his thought in the Supplement:
To put it very briefly, then, those who say it was under God’s retributive justice that God
the Son was flogged and crucified and died are assuming one of two things: either (1)
that the Son had fault or took on fault, or else (2) that God’s retributive justice proceeds
on the sole basis that wrongdoing exists, leaving out any consideration of fault, original
or actual or taken on, in the one who is punished. The first assumption is not catholic.
The second is either immoral or amoral. Hence it is not easy to see how the conclusion
differs from blasphemy.129
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Given Lonergan’s desire to counter conclusions which are immoral or amoral, one
might ask why Lonergan sticks to the language of poena in the first place, since this
language would seem to invite the very misinterpretations he abhors, such as the theories
of penal substitution and satispassion. We need to remember that Lonergan, as he later
stated in Method, understood himself to be a Roman Catholic with “quite conservative
views on religious and church doctrines.”130 His conservative orientation is evident in the
Supplement. He accepts the doctrine of Christ’s satisfaction and he sticks to the
traditional language of “punishment.” On the other hand he is trying to redeem the
interpretation of that language from aberrations.131
For Lonergan, these aberrations are not the product of intelligent inquiry and
critical reflection (judgment), but the product of a symbolic apprehension where images
and feelings predominate. When feelings predominate, the speculative theologian may
arrive at an interpretation of Christ’s poena faithful to the theologian’s own psychic
experience but not faithful to the Catholic dogmatic-theological context. In DVI, he
states that a conception of the Lord’s suffering and death in terms of substitution and
satispassion is, in itself, a symbolic apprehension and nothing else.132 In my
interpretation, the symbolic apprehension is the root of the “fictions” Lonergan mentions
in his fourth argument in article 30, where he criticizes those who try to “explain realities
by means of fictions” (realissima per fictiones explicare).133 The symbolic apprehension
in and of itself is not the problem. Every person and every culture cannot escape the
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reality of symbolic apprehension. It may surprise some readers that in DVI Lonergan
even states that this symbolic apprehension which sometimes conceives Christ’s physical
sufferings in terms of substitution or satispassion can be praiseworthy if it produces fruit
in the concrete context of Catholic life.134 The problem is to confuse symbolic
apprehension as theory. For Lonergan, the notions of penal substitution and satispassion
are not counterpositions at the level of symbolic apprehension. They become
counterpositions when these notions are passed off as theory.

6.3.4

The Analogy to Understand Christ’s Satisfaction
The Council of Trent compared Christ’s satisfaction to the satisfaction a penitent

makes in the sacrament of penance. But Trent did not develop this analogy. Lonergan
adopts and develops this analogy. In doing so Lonergan is developing a position.
To develop the sacramental analogy Lonergan makes a distinction between the
interior and exterior acts of Christ’s satisfaction, analogous to the distinction between
contrition and penance (satisfaction) in the sacrament. Satisfaction given by a penitent
stems from contrition as exterior act stems from interior act.
Lonergan understands Christ’s interior act as Christ’s detestation of sin, his
sorrow and grief for our sins, and his firm determination to take away sin. Lonergan
gives most attention to the sorrows of Christ and uses the authority of Aquinas to defend
his position that Christ grieved for the sins of all people. But Lonergan also defends his
position through theological reasoning. And this theological reasoning is very much
dependent on positions Lonergan developed prior to the Supplement regarding the
ontological and psychological constitution of Christ. The principal site of that
134

Lonergan, De Verbo Incarnato, 536

222
development is found in De constitutione Christi ontologica et psychologica, now
published in English as The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ.135
Chalcedon’s definition that Christ is one person operating in two natures, divine
and human, is an ontological explanation of the Incarnation. But for Lonergan,
correlative to the ontological constitution of Christ is the psychological constitution of
Christ. Just as Christ is one subject, ontologically of two natures, Christ is also one
subject, psychologically of two consciousnesses, one divine and one human.136
In The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ, Lonergan makes the
following assertion with respect to the human consciousness of Christ: “Christ as man,
through his human consciousness and his beatific knowledge, clearly understands, and
with certainty judges, himself to be the natural Son of God and true God.”137 The
statement applies to Christ as man, that is, prescinding from the divine nature.138 But
Christ as man also acquired knowledge through the operations of experiencing,
understanding, and judging, like any other human being. Therefore Christ as man had
two types of knowledge. In DVI Lonergan introduced two terms for these two types:
Living on this earth, Christ had human knowledge both effable and ineffable, besides his
divine knowledge. As a beholder, he immediately knew God by that ineffable knowledge
which is also called beatific, and in the same act, though mediately, he also knew
everything else that pertained to his work. As a pilgrim, however, he elicited by effable
knowledge those natural and supernatural cognitional acts which constituted his human
and historical life.139

135

Bernard Lonergan, The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ, vol. 7 of the Collected
Works of Bernard Lonergan, eds. Michael G. Shields, Frederick E. Crowe, and Robert M. Doran, trans.
Michael G. Shields (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002). De constitutione Christi was originally
published in 1956 ad usum auditorium.
136
Lonergan, The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ, 7. See also “The Dehellenization
of Dogma,” Second Collection, 25.
137
Lonergan, The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ, 205.
138
Lonergan, The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ, 205.
139
Lonergan, De Verbo Incarnato, 332 [emphasis mine]. The statement is found in Thesis 12 titled
“Christ’s Knowledge.”

223
In DVI Lonergan states that effable knowledge can, in itself, be manifested in a
human way. Ineffable knowledge on the other hand cannot in itself be manifested in a
human way.140 Ineffable or beatific knowledge is not mediated by anything sensible.
Knowledge that was never mediated in the first place is not capable of being expressed,
because expression is itself a mediation through the sensible.141 If this were all that we
could say on the matter, we would seem to find ourselves in a contradiction. Christian
theology affirms that Christ is the definitive source of revelation. As Charles Hefling
notes, “revelation is the passage, as it were, from hiddenness to communicability.”142
Therefore revelation implies that Christ’s ineffable knowledge is communicated, but it
cannot be communicated directly. How is it then communicated? It is communicated
through effable knowledge. Christ needed effable knowledge to reveal, manifest, and
communicate his ineffable knowledge in an incarnate way.143 This does not mean that
Christ needed effable knowledge to detest sin, grieve over our sins, and know that his
work involved taking away our sins.144 In the Supplement Lonergan clearly links
Christ’s detestation, sorrow, and resolve to his immediate knowledge of God. This
judgment is also supported by the passage quoted above, where Lonergan notes that
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Christ’s ineffable knowledge not only includes beatific knowledge, but also knowledge of
everything else pertaining to his work. But Christ did need to learn, over time, how to
express what he knew, how to express his interior act. For Lonergan, Christ’s voluntary
acceptance of his suffering and death represents this expression, analogous to how in the
sacrament of penance one does penance to concretely express one’s contrition.
Even though Lonergan does not explicitly use the words ineffable and effable
knowledge in the Supplement, these notions are implicit.145 How so? Recall that for
Lonergan, Christ could have exercised this interior act in three ways: (1) through his
immediate knowledge of God and consequent volition, neither of which depend upon
sentient operations; (2) through acquired knowledge and “interior sensibility”
(sensibilitatem interiorem) added to his immediate knowledge of God, both of which do
depend on sentient operations; or (3) through an expression of the interior act via exterior
senses and physical movements. This third way includes the first two but makes the
interior act a more completely human act.146
In my interpretation, the first way corresponds to “ineffable” knowledge.
Ineffable knowledge is beatific knowledge, and such knowledge does not depend on any
sensitive operations. This meaning is implicit in the first way. The second way
corresponds to “effable” knowledge since it refers to acquired knowledge dependent
upon sentient operations. The third way corresponds to Christ’s outward expression of
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his effable knowledge because the expression depends on exterior senses and physical
movements.
There is further evidence in the Supplement that what Lonergan means is what he
later meant using the terminology of ineffable and effable knowledge. This is found in
his explanation of why it was appropriate for our Lord to accept his passion and death as
an outward expression of his interior sorrow:
The more deeply one plumbs the depths of the human spirit, the more difficult it is to find
nouns and verbs and other commonly used signs to give correct and adequate expression
to one's interior mind and heart. And if this is true of ordinary men it is all the more so in
the case of Christ, when we touch upon his love for the Father and for us, his detestation
of sin, his sorrow for our sins, and his intention of redeeming us. So immense and so
excellent were these realities that they could not even be intimated, let alone fully
expressed, except by some supreme act.147

I interpret realities that “could not even be intimated” to Christ’s ineffable
knowledge. I interpret “some supreme act” to Christ’s voluntary acceptance of his
suffering and death. That supreme act is Christ’s effable knowledge given concrete,
outward, and proportionate expression.
Next we will consider Lonergan’s understanding of Christ’s exterior act. Again,
Christ’s exterior act stands to his interior act as penance stands to contrition:
Thus, just as the satisfaction given by a penitent stems from contrition which is defined as
“interior sorrow and detestation for sin together with the intention of not sinning in the
future” (DB 897), so in a similar way Christ's satisfaction stemmed from his detestation
of sin, his sorrow and grief for our sins, and his firm determination to take away sin.148
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What Lonergan means here is that satisfaction is not just a feeling, not just the
state of one’s interior mind and heart. Satisfaction involves a concrete act that flows
from one’s interior mind and heart. As act, satisfaction gives concrete expression to
contrition. For Lonergan, the exterior act is not to be confused as the interior source or
principle of Christ’s satisfaction. But Christ’s satisfaction would not be satisfaction in
the proper sense without this concrete expression.
Lonergan’s understanding of the exterior act is also what Charles Hefling calls an
expression of meaning and value incarnately conveyed.149 Hefling is referring to what
the later Lonergan termed “incarnate meaning.”150 “Incarnate meaning” is one of many
different carriers of meaning (others being linguistic, intersubjective, symbolic, and
artistic). It is the meaning of a person, of his way of life, of his words, or of his deeds.151
In Lonergan’s notes for an institute given in 1964 at Georgetown University, there is an
explicit correlation of Christ’s passion to incarnate meaning.152 The meaning and value
Christ incarnately conveyed flowed from his immediate knowledge of God, his great love
of God, and his great love of neighbor. The greater one’s love of God the greater is one’s
love of neighbor.153 So the entire context in which to understand Christ’s exterior act is
meaningless unless we understand the intensity of Christ’s interpersonal relationships
with both God the Father and with humanity. This is why we should interpret Lonergan’s
understanding of Christ’s satisfaction along the lines of interpersonal relations rather than
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commercial transactions. This notion of understanding Christ’s satisfaction along the
lines of interpersonal relations is explicit in DVI, yet clearly implicit in the Supplement.154

6.4

The Function of the Chapter in the Wider Context of the Supplement

In the Supplement, why does Lonergan develop a speculative understanding of the
doctrine of Christ’s satisfaction? In DVI his justification for adding a separate thesis on
Christ’s satisfaction was the fact that in his opinion Catholic thought on Aquinas’s five
ways was so deeply settled that there was no need for further elaboration than what he
had already presented in Thesis 15. But then he stated that when it comes to satisfaction,
opinions differ, and accordingly he presents a separate thesis.155 Although one could
argue that in this era of Lonergan’s career, Catholic theologians gave “pride of place” to
the doctrine of Christ’s satisfaction,156 I take Lonergan at his word that in DVI his
principal reason for including a separate thesis on Christ’s satisfaction is grounded in his
concern over conflicting interpretations. In my interpretation this is also the case with the
Supplement. Lonergan is clearly sensitive to the fact that the doctrine of Christ’s
satisfaction has wildly varying interpretations, some of which he considers blasphemous.
It seems reasonable that Lonergan would want to take up the challenge to “redeem” the
understanding of Christ’s satisfaction.
154
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Given that Lonergan includes a chapter on Christ’s satisfaction, an interpretive
question is the following: how does this chapter advance Lonergan’s stated purpose to
explain the historical causality of Christ? I will begin with a brief consideration of the
location of the chapter. I judge that given Lonergan’s decision to include a chapter on
Christ’s satisfaction, he located that chapter in such a way as to also make the chapter
relevant to his stated purpose of explaining the historical causality of Christ. I base this
interpretation on the location and content of two statements which bracket the present
chapter. The first statement concludes the previous chapter:
There is a third step. In no other way does God draw good out of evil than according to
the meaning, the law, the mystery, and the justice of the cross. Nor does God himself
impose this voluntary transformation of evil into good upon others without himself, “who
should be first in every way” (cf. Col 1:18), doing first what he requires of others for the
sake of his glory.157

Prior to this “third step” Lonergan described two other steps in the same article.158
Lonergan’s description of the third step is extremely brief. I interpret the brevity to a
judgment that the statement functions as a transition to the next chapter. The second
statement is found in the last paragraph of the present chapter:
Seventh, although Christ superabundantly atoned for all the world's sins, it by no means
follows that we are relieved of the duty of offering satisfaction for our sins. The
satisfaction made by Christ and that offered by us are not univocal, but analogical terms;
hence while satisfaction has been made by the Head, there still remains satisfaction to be
made by the members. How this is to be understood will be explained later when we
come to treat of the effects of the redemption.159
157
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There is a common theme in both statements: the correlation between what God
has done first through Christ and what we are asked to do in cooperation with Christ. In
the first statement we find the first instance in the Supplement where Lonergan introduces
the notion that God does not ask us to do what God himself is unwilling to do first. This
is consistent with a judgment he makes in the next chapter: we have been justified by
Christ but we have not yet wholly appropriated salvation.160 Redemption is an ongoing
historical process involving human cooperation. The second statement takes the same
theme and applies it to the concrete example of offering satisfaction. The two statements
reveal an intent to make the chapter relevant to Lonergan’s stated purpose.
That intent is concretely realized in the next chapter. As we will see, Lonergan’s
understanding of the historical causality of Christ derives in part from his understanding
of the Body of Christ, Head and members. Lonergan will use the example of satisfaction
as a “work” that is shared by the Head and the members, though it is done first by the
Head. To avoid a Pelagian interpretation he will state that Christ's satisfaction is an
efficient cause of both our willing to make satisfaction and our act of making
satisfaction.161 In addition to the “work” of satisfaction, he will discuss our cooperation
with Christ in terms of sacrifice, meritorious obedience, and intercessory prayer. In
summary, Lonergan uses the category of satisfaction to explain the historical causality of
Christ, but not to carry the full weight of that explanation.
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6.5

Summary

For Lonergan, the passion of Christ, qua satisfaction, is the outward expression of
an interior act where that interior act is Christ’s detestation for sin, sorrow because of our
sins, and resolute determination to take away the sins of the world. Lonergan has
retrieved the pre-Anselmian tradition that Christ did indeed suffer punishment, but
understands that poena as an outward expression of an interior act, of what grieved
Christ. As such, Lonergan grounds his understanding of Christ’s satisfaction in the realm
of interiority, that is, in Christ’s conscious intentionality and meaning flowing from his
love for the Father and his love for sinners. In other words, Lonergan understands
Christ’s satisfaction in terms of interpersonal relationships, not commercial transactions.
Lonergan also reverses the counterposition which interprets Christ’s satisfaction
in the context of retributive justice. As an orthodox theologian, Lonergan accepts the
doctrine of Christ’s satisfaction and the traditional language of poena. But it is clear he is
motivated to redeem the meaning of that doctrine, and language, from disturbing
aberrations, some which he is not hesitant to label blasphemous. I find his interpretation
both orthodox and yet reasonable to modern sensibilities regarding the violence of the
cross, even though the language of “punishment” may be repugnant to contemporary
readers. We have to remember that Lonergan was writing in the late 1950s. If he were
writing today, perhaps he would avoid such language given his understanding of Christ’s
satisfaction. Or perhaps he would not. But I do believe that Lonergan’s speculative
understanding of the poena associated with the satisfaction Christ offered to God the
Father on our behalf is a brilliant achievement and example of his commitment to the
Leonine injunction vetera novis augere et perficere.
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Chapter 7:

7.1

The Work of Christ in History1

Introduction
Lonergan’s final chapter explicitly addresses the historical causality of Christ.

The chapter has no title in the Latin typescript. Our interpretation will recall material
from previous chapters since each of those chapters contributes, in the ordo doctrinae, to
Lonergan’s explicit treatment of the historical causality of Christ. The chapter includes
articles 35-45: (35) The Work of Christ, (36) Agents Acting Through Intellect, (37) The
Social Agent, (38) The Historical Agent, (39) Christ the Agent, (40) Christ the Exemplar,
(41) Christ the Head, (42) Christ the Historical Agent, (43) The Mediator in Heaven, (44)
The Purpose of the Incarnation, and (45) Why the God-man?

7.2

A Brief Description of Articles 35 – 45

7.2.1

Article 35: The Work of Christ2

Lonergan begins the article recalling a Lucan conception of redemption:
The redemption hoped for and waited for by devout Jews (Lk 2:38, 24:21) was a light for
revelation to the Gentiles and for the glory of his people (Lk 2:32), because the blessed
Lord God of Israel in his tender mercy and in accordance with his covenant and his oath
to Abraham visited and redeemed his people, so that, delivered from the hands of their
enemies, they might without fear serve God in holiness and justice in his presence all
their days (Lk 1:68-78) .3
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suae secundum testamentum suum et iusiurandum Abrahae factum visitaret redemptionemque faceret
plebis suae ut, de manu inimicorum liberati, sine timore Deo servirent in sanctitate et iustitia coram ipso
omnibus diebus suis (Lc 2, 68-78).” DBM, *229 [Supplement, 97].
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He then makes a distinction between the means and the end of redemption.
Payment of the price, sacrifice, meritorious obedience, and vicarious suffering refer only
to redemption as a means (medium) or, better yet, as a principle (principium).4 In terms
of end, he makes two points. First, there is redemption already achieved through the
remission of sins, the gratuitous justification by God’s grace through the redemption that
is in Christ Jesus. Second, there is the redemption still hoped for: namely, the heavenly
prize, the beatific vision, and ultimately the second coming of the Lord and redemption of
our bodies.5 Therefore, since the redemption is ongoing, Lonergan argues that a further
study of the work of the Lord is necessary:
If, therefore, we consider the word redemption itself, or if we reflect that in neglecting the
end we have a poor knowledge of the means, and that ignoring the effect we have a poor
knowledge of its cause, we must now undertake a broader and fuller survey of the work
of the Lord. 6

The broader and fuller survey is left for subsequent articles. The aim of the
present article is to provide a foundation for that survey. This foundation amounts to a
biblical synthesis of the end or purpose correlative to the work of the Lord:
...(1) the kingdom of God and (2) salvation in Christ, whereby being freed from (3) sins
and (4) the Jewish Law and worship, we have access to (5) God who is faithful and just
(6) with confidence, since (7) through our personal acts (8) we are incorporated into
Christ and the People of God.7

Lonergan describes each of these aspects through extensive references to
scripture. First, from a New Testament perspective, Christ’s purpose is first and foremost
the kingdom of God. Arriving in this kingdom is what salvation means. Before arriving
4
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5

233
in this kingdom, we are sinners, enemies of God. Through this kingdom, we are liberated
from sin, from the power of darkness, and from the body itself.8 Second, God is both
faithful and just. The blessing promised to Abraham is to be realized. There is now also
the promised Holy Spirit and the future promise of the parousia, eternal life, participation
in the divine nature, a new heaven and earth. God is also the justifier of the one who has
faith in Christ. Justified by faith, we are both at peace with God and can approach God
with confidence. Finally, through Christ, we become adopted children of God and
receive the Holy Spirit as a pledge of our inheritance. We are not enrolled in Christ
without personal repentance and faith. Once enrolled, we are one body in Christ and
ought to love one another as Christ has loved us. This Body of Christ is the Church.9

7.2.2

Article 36: Agents Acting Through Intellect10
A cause is whatever influences another in its existence. An effect is whatever

depends upon another in its existence. As cause and effect are correlative, so are
influence and dependence:
Such influence or dependence is not perceptible but intelligible. Therefore one who has a
picture of oxen huffing and puffing as they strain at pulling a plow does not know what
causal influence is; but one who makes a true affirmation that there is an intelligible
relation of dependence in the plow as moved does know this influence in its true reality.11

Furthermore, one must not confuse the intelligible with the necessary. Nonnecessary causality is no less true, real causality. The reality of causality is based on
8

Lonergan, DBM, *231-233 [Supplement, 98-99]. Lonergan adds that the Jewish Law, though good in
itself, was unable to liberate those enslaved to sin. The Law gave knowledge of sin but it was impossible
for the blood of bulls and goats to take away sin. Only through the blood of Christ are we freed of sin that
we may then serve the living God.
9
Lonergan, DBM, *233-235 [Supplement, 99-100].
10
“Articulus XXXVI. De Agente per Intellectum,” DBM, *236-239 [Supplement, 100-101].
11
“Qui influxus vel dependentia non sensibilis est sed intelligibilis. Quare influxum causalem nescit qui
boves aratrum trahentes imaginatur nitentes atque anhelantes; et eumdem influxum cognoscit verum et
realem qui in aratro moto intelligibilem dependentiae relationem vere affirmat.” DBM, *236 [Supplement,
100].
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intelligibility, not necessity. An example is human cooperation. Mutual understanding
and agreement is the foundation of this cooperation. In fact, cooperation is virtually the
whole of what is human causality. It is causality because mutual understanding is
intelligible and mutual agreement is reasonable. However, it is not necessary causality. 12
Lonergan then distinguishes three kinds of causality: (1) an intrinsic cause
influences that by reason of which (ut quo) something is what it is, (2) a final cause
influences for the sake of which (ut cuius gratia) it is, and (3) an agent cause is that by
which (ut a quo) a thing is produced.13
The remainder of the article focuses on the agent cause. Agents are subdivided
into agents acting through nature and agents acting through intellect. The agent acting
through nature (1) acts in accordance with either an innate or naturally acquired form, (2)
is at the mercy of nature to fulfill any requisite conditions for the cause to produce the
effect, (3) is limited to producing effects proportionate to its form, and (4) can only
influence objects in spatiotemporal proximity. The agent acting through intellect (1) acts
in accordance with an intentional form (formam intentionalem) to produce an effect, (2)
can understand requisite conditions and thus has the potential to fulfill those conditions,
(3) is limited only to the extent it lacks a perfect intellect, and (4) can influence other
agents beyond its own spatiotemporal proximity if it understands the conditions for
extending its influence and sees to their fulfillment. Causal influence extended through
others is real causality predicated of the originating agent since there remains an
intelligible relation of dependence in the created effect on the originating agent.14
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Lonergan, DBM, *236 [Supplement, 100].
Lonergan, DBM, *237 [Supplement, 100].
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Lonergan, DBM, *237-238 [Supplement, 100-101].
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7.2.3

Article 37: The Social Agent15
Virtually everything we produce is produced through and for others.16 We are

proportionate causes inasmuch as have in our minds the idea to produce an effect. We
are actual causes when we have the power to actually produce the effect. Actual causes
are more commonly found in persons linked together than in a single individual.17
Therefore, effective human agency is based primarily on social agency. Social
agency is based on common understanding of the situation, common willingness to fulfill
requisite conditions, and common assistance in actually fulfilling those conditions. The
effect of social agency is preservation, improvement, or worsening of the external and/or
cultural levels of an existing human good of order.18
Since a social agent is comprised of many persons linked together with common
understanding and agreement about a possible course of action, this common
understanding and agreement precedes any effects produced by the social agent. For
Lonergan, this common understanding and agreement is already a human good of order.
By implication, a social agent is always working from an existing human good of order.
This means that a social agent is de facto a historical agent. It also means that even
though social agency freely determines the future, this agency depends very greatly on
the past.19

15

“Articulus XXXVII. De Agente Sociali,” DBM, *240-243 [Supplement, 101-103].
Lonergan, DBM, *240 [Supplement, 101].
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Lonergan, DBM, *241-242 [Supplement, 102].
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7.2.4

Article 38: The Historical Agent20

A historical agent is one who causally influences the external or cultural level of a
human good of order.21 A historical agent is (1) more or less historical, depending on the
duration of the effect; (2) partial or total, depending on whether the effect is part or whole
of the good of order; (3) an agent per se or per accidens, depending on whether the effect
occurs according to or beyond the agent’s intention; (4) a proportionate or actual cause,
depending on whether the agent conceives an idea or also implements it; (5) an
originating or conservative cause, depending on whether the agent is the first to conceive
and implement an idea or only safeguards implementation; (6) a restorative or destructive
cause, depending on whether the effect improves or worsens the good of order.22
The absolute first historical agent is God. God infallibly orders, chooses, and
affects the divine plan. God does not impose necessity upon things, but conditioned
necessity. Conditioned necessity does not take away freedom. This plan of divine
wisdom governs the course of events through secondary causes and in accordance with
their natures (cf. Articles 10-11). This implies a role for human beings in the divine plan:
What divine wisdom has ordered and divine goodness has chosen comes into existence
through human beings who understand, judge, and agree. Since, then, God is the
principal agent, man is only an instrumental agent; but because man is an instrument that
acts through intellect, he is called ministerial.23

Among originating agents, some are more historical because they have a more
lasting influence on future action. The greatest historical agent is the Incarnate Word.24

20

“Articulus XXXVIII. De Agente Historico,” DBM, *244-248 [Supplement, 103-105].
Lonergan, DBM, *244 [Supplement, 103].
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instrumentum est quod per intellectum agit, ministeriale dicitur.” DBM, *246 [Supplement, 104].
24
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21

237
7.2.5

Article 39: Christ the Agent25

Christ acts as both God and man. As God, he does what the Father and the Spirit
do. As man, he acted during his earthly life and continues to do so from heaven.26
He who acts in two different ways has two principles of action, divine and human, so that
as God he acts in one way and as man in another. As God he does some things that he
does not do as man, since man has not created a man. Other things he does both as God
and as man, in such a way that there are two operations ordered to each other, but one
effect produced.27

These two operations are ordered to each other through divine command and
human obedience. To command is to move another through reason and will. To obey is
to be moved in accordance with the reason and will of another. God commands
inasmuch as in his goodness he chooses what his wisdom ordains. Christ as man obeys
inasmuch as he knows the actual order of reality in the secondary object of his beatific
vision and wills this same order to be carried out. Christ’s obedience is true and genuine
obedience. The divine command was simultaneous with Christ’s obedience, though prior
to that obedience in nature, causality, and precept.28
Lonergan then refutes possible objections. Among these objections is the notion
that the divine command imposed necessity on Christ’s obedience. Lonergan counters
that God’s knowledge and wisdom impose only conditioned necessity. However,
conditioned necessity does not eliminate freedom. As such, Christ’s knowledge had
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“Articulus XXXIX. De Christo Agente,” DBM, *249-253 [Supplement, 105-107].
Lonergan, DBM, *249 [Supplement, 105].
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autem facit tum ut Deus tum ut homo, ut duae sint operationes inter se ordinatae sed unus sit effectus
productus.” DBM, *249 [Supplement, 105].
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Lonergan, DBM, *249-251 [Supplement, 105-106]. On the nature of command and obedience, Lonergan
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through his beatific vision did not force his will. In fact, his impeccable will was already
willing to obey whatever specification Christ obtained through his beatific knowledge.29
Finally, since Christ freely obeyed, he was a ministerial instrument for carrying
out the ordinations of God’s wisdom and the decision of God’s will. Because Christ was
an agent acting through intellect, he acted by commanding and exercised his influence
through others (for example, the ministers of the sacraments).30

7.2.6

Article 40: Christ the Exemplar31

An exemplar can be understood in two ways: (1) as what an agent looks at when
operating through intellect; or (2) as belonging to a dispensation, an ordering of reality,
such that the exemplar is to be imitated by others in the same dispensation. In the first
way, Christ is an exemplar when we look to him to imitate him. In the second way,
Christ has wrought our salvation by way of an exemplar.32
Lonergan’s focus is on understanding this second way, through (1) the principle
of the dispensation itself, (2) the determination of this principle as realized in Christ, and
(3) the application of this determination as realized in us.33
The principle of the dispensation itself comes from God’s ordination and decision
that what is done in Christ ought to be done in others. The determination of this principle
is derived from Christ’s life. The principle, as realized in Christ, is grounded on his
knowledge of all actual reality.34 Christ knew this principle, accepted this principle, and
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Lonergan, DBM, *252 [Supplement, 106-107]. Lonergan references ST, II-II, q. 171, a. 6, 3m.
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understood its consequences. In accordance with this principle, it was impossible for
Christ to determine anything in regards to himself without determining the same with
regard to us. This principle governed all Christ’s activity such that he might be a fitting
exemplar for all.35
The application of this determination as realized in us is grounded on divine
intention and is confirmed by example. For example, we are loved with a similar love in
which the Father loves the Son. The Father’s love for the Son is proceeding Love itself,
the Holy Spirit. According to the principle of exemplarity, this same love has us as its
term: we receive sanctifying grace, are made adopted children of God, and have dwelling
within us the uncreated gift of the Holy Spirit.36 Likewise, the ontological constitution of
Christ is an exemplar. Christ operates according to the pattern of a divine person
operating in a lower nature. We operate in a similar manner: we receive sanctifying
grace, the infused virtues, gifts and movements of the Spirit. Finally, we are called to
imitate Christ; in particular, to complete what is lacking in the sufferings of Christ.37
Lonergan concludes by affirming that Christ’s exemplary causality is true causality:
...there are two kinds of causality: one that is merely apparent, as in the case of the oxen
pulling a plow, in which causality is known only inasmuch as the effort of the oxen is
imagined; then there is the other causality that is real and true, which is known in those
same oxen inasmuch as the movement of the plow is understood and affirmed to be
dependent upon them. Now in Christ there is no such merely apparent causality, but only
this real and true causality that is grasped by those who are intelligent and truly affirmed
by those who are rational.38
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37
Lonergan, DBM, *257 [Supplement, 108-109].
38
“...duplicem esse causalitatem: aliam mere apparentem, quae v. g. in bobus aratrum trahentibus eatenus
cognoscitur quatenus ipsum bovum nisum imaginamur; aliam autem veram et realem, quae in iisdem bobus
cognoscitur quatenus motus aratri a bobus dependere et intelligitur et vere affirmatur. Iam vero in Christo
exemplari illa causalitas mere apparens non habetur, sed haec vera et realis et ab intelligentibus perspicitur
et a rationalibus vere affirmatur. Et hoc ad nostrum propositum sufficit prorsus.” DBM, *257 [Supplement,
109].
36

240
7.2.7

Article 41: Christ the Head39

The members of the Body of Christ are members of one another. The principal
member is Christ the head, and what is done in Christ is now done in and for the whole
body.40 This causal aspect proper to the head is not to be confused with efficient or
exemplary causality. Lonergan uses Christ’s satisfaction to make the point:
Because Christ has made satisfaction for sins, he is an exemplar of what ought to occur in
his members. Besides, Christ’s satisfaction itself is in different ways an efficient cause of
our willing to make satisfaction and of our act of making satisfaction. And there is
nothing to prevent us from attributing this exemplarity and efficient causality to Christ
the head, so long as we do not exclude that third aspect that is proper to the head alone,
namely, that through Christ’s satisfaction we have already made satisfaction.41

Though Christ as head exercises causality proper to the head, and though this
work is done in and for the whole body, this fact does not exclude work on our part.42
Lonergan makes several points to obviate misunderstandings of this causality
proper to the head. First, the union between head and body must not be exaggerated as to
turn it into a substantial union. Second, Christ’s work on our behalf does not exclude
work on our part. Third, we must rule out an exaggerated distinction that would repeat
Pelagianism or deny the redemption as means, that is, denying what is sometimes called
objective redemption (redemptio obiectiva) since objective redemption refers to the work
of Christ done for the sake of the members. Fourth, we must reject rationalism that tries
39

“Articulus XLI. De Christo Capite,” DBM, *258-266 [Supplement, 109-113].
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to prove the causality of Christ as head through necessary reasons or by the light of
reason alone. Fifth, we must also reject semi-rationalism that argues that if we
presuppose the fact that the mystery of redemption has been revealed by God we can then
produce proofs. Sixth, God could have forgiven all sins without Christ’s vicarious
satisfaction. Seventh, Christ’s death was not simply a matter of God’s will since God’s
will follows God’s wisdom as the norm of divine justice.43
Now divine wisdom ordains that necessary effects result from necessary causes
and contingent effects from contingent causes. The causality proper to the head is
contingent causality. Therefore, the causality proper to the head cannot be understood
according to necessary reasons, but only according to reasons of fittingness:
This being the case, we do not follow those theologians who are entirely preoccupied
with deducing necessary conclusions from an hypothesis of condign satisfaction or any
other hypothesis; rather we subscribe to the method of St. Thomas who looked at the
concrete work of Christ and put down as many reasons for it as he could, whether reasons
of necessity or of appropriateness. This method can be easily seen both in a lengthy
series of articles and in a single outstanding article.44

Having treated doctrinal and methodological errors, Lonergan turns to
understanding the causality proper to the head. He offers six elements. First, as the
members of a body work not for themselves alone but for the whole body, Christ made
satisfaction not for himself but for us, did not merit primarily for himself but for us, did
not offer sacrifice for himself but for us, and lives forever interceding not for himself but
for us. Second, these actions are vicarious because the head and members are unified by
love. Third, as individuals achieve objectives through cooperation, it is in keeping with
43
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human nature that individuals attain salvation through others. Fourth, as we are often
involved in sin by reason of the sins of others, it is appropriate we are restored through
the good offices of another. Fifth, since through one person sin and death entered the
world, it is appropriate that through one person grace and justification is offered. Finally,
just as in the realm of the secular we go to the person most skilled in what we need, the
same is appropriate in the realm of the sacred. Among all people there is no one who can
more appropriately bring us back to God than the Word-made-flesh. It is appropriate
therefore that Christ be the one to acquire the merit of obedience for us, to make
satisfaction for our sins, and to offer for us an expiatory sacrifice.45

7.2.8

Article 42: Christ the Historical Agent46

In this article Lonergan explains the causality related to Christ as historical
person. Christ influenced history while he was alive and continues to do so to the end of
time. Christ’s agency, as a historical person, is in the category of efficient causality.
Through this agency Christ brings members into the body so as to apply to them his
merit, the freedom resulting from satisfaction for sin, the fruits of his sacrifice, and the
benefit of his intercession. Through this agency, Christ also perfects those members by
enabling similar operations of merit, satisfaction, sacrifice, and intercession.47
Lonergan distinguishes three aspects of Christ’s agency as a historical person: (1)
the effect of the agency as a whole, (2) the effect directly intended by Christ, and (3) the
effect indirectly intended by Christ.
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The effect as a whole is the total human good of order, past, present, and future.48
This effect is part of the order of the universe produced by God as prime agent according
to divine wisdom and justice. There is, however, a distinction between the historical
order of justice and the personal order of justice (cf. articles 11-12). The distinction is the
basis for a related distinction between what Christ directly and indirectly intends:
Accordingly, the total historical effect, considered in itself, is good inasmuch as it is
ordered to the future life in heaven; and therefore one who directly intends to effect this
right ordering, by that very fact indirectly intends the advancement of the total historical
effect...
Christ’s action is directly aimed at ordering human life on earth to the future life in
heaven. Since, however, this ordering liberates man from evils and turns him towards
true good with the result that the human good of order in itself is greatly improved, this
improvement itself is necessarily intended indirectly by Christ as an historical agent.49

Lonergan then explains the qualities of Christ’s historical agency. Christ is the
most historical agent since his intended effect perdures to the end of the world. Christ is
a total historical agent not because he directly controls the total human good, but rather
because he directly influences it in principle. Christ is an historical agent per se because
he knows all actual reality and produces a total historical effect commensurate with that
knowledge. Nothing produced by Christ is beyond his intention. Finally, Christ is a
restorative historical agent. He directly intends restoration of the image of God.50
The article ends with a consideration of the means Christ uses as historical agent.
First, all social or historical action presupposes an existing good of order. In the case of
Christ, this is the lengthy preparation of the Jewish people, their expectation of a
48

Lonergan, DBM, *267 [Supplement, 114].
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Messiah, the cultural achievement of the Gentiles, and their recognition of human
impotence.51 Second, all social or historical action is achieved through others who
understand and agree. Thus Christ’s kingdom is propagated through others, specifically
through preaching of the gospel, through faith, and through repentance. The preaching of
the gospel itself is another example of social and historical action since the gospel is
preached through the apostolic mission, succession, and tradition.52 Third, Christ acts
specifically through his members.53 Fourth, Christ acts socially and historically through
his members not as isolated individuals, but as one body.54 Fifth, although Christ’s
actions are mediated socially and historically, his actions are nevertheless personal:
adapted to how human persons actually communicate. As such, his words and deeds
make perceptible to us the Word of God.55 Sixth, Christ’s actions mediated through his
body extend not only to instructing our minds and drawing our hearts to Christ but also to
bringing about and deepening the interior renewal of the person through the grace of the
sacraments. The sacraments trace their origin to Christ and confer grace ex opere
operato (DB 844, 851; DS 1601, 1608; ND 1311, 1318).56 Finally, there is a distinction
between Christ’s human power qua human, and this human power as an instrument of his
divinity. Christ’s human power qua human works contingently and produces contingent
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effects. However, as an instrument of divinity, this human power effects what God
infallibly knows, effectively wills to be done, and irresistibly causes to be done.57
7.2.9

Article 43: The Mediator in Heaven58
Christ’s agency as a historical person is agency as efficient causality. So is

Christ’s agency now performed from heaven seated at the right hand of the Father. The
purpose of the article is to explain this second aspect of Christ’s efficient causality.
Lonergan begins by citing a number of scriptural passages to categorize the nature
of the ongoing work of Christ now originating from heaven. First, Christ is the one
mediator between God and humanity (1 Tim 2:5), the mediator of a new and better
covenant (Heb 8:6, 9:15, 12:24). Second, having risen, Christ lives on interceding on our
behalf (Heb 7:25; Rom 8:34; 1 Jn 2:7). Third, Christ maintains his priesthood forever
(Heb 7:24). He offered one sacrifice for all sins, and by this single offering perfected for
all time those who are sanctified (Heb 10:12, 14). He entered into heaven, where he now
shows himself in the presence of God on our behalf (Heb 9:24) as the Lamb that was
slain (Rev 5:6-12, 13:8).59 In brief, then, Lonergan frames this ongoing work of Christ in
terms of mediation, intercession, and everlasting sacrifice.
This celestial mediation, intercession, and everlasting sacrifice finds its true image
(cf. Heb 10:1), not merely its shadow, in the Eucharist.60 Through participation in the
Eucharistic mystery the members of Christ’s body draw near to God with confidence.
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Lonergan explains that this drawing near expresses in a spatial metaphor what
scripture refers to as reconciliation. Reconciliation is the mission of Christ through
whom all are reconciled to God and to one another. This work of reconciliation comes
from the Father through the Son and is accomplished in the Holy Spirit. 61 Lonergan ends
the article by further elaborating on the meaning of reconciliation:
The entire work of Christ is summed up in this reconciliation. Just as the human good of
order refers to the steady stream of particular goods, coordinated operations, and interior
habits and external institutions as all being closely knit together and vivified in a concrete
synthesis through interpersonal relationships, so also is the kingdom of God, the Church,
Christ's body and pleroma. For this kingdom, this body, is a supernatural good of order
in which are found the particular goods of grace and glory, the operations by which we
do everything in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ (Col 3:17), the infused virtues and
gifts of the Holy Spirit, and all the institutions of the Church. All of this is held together
through interpersonal relationships, since to be in this body and a member of this
kingdom is nothing other than what St. Paul so often calls being “in Christ” or “in the
Spirit.”62

7.2.10 Article 44: The Purpose of the Incarnation63

The purpose of the incarnation is to redeem the human race. In the Nicene Creed
the Son is said to become incarnate for us and for our salvation. Since Christ is the head
of the Church and is said to have first place in everything (Col 1:18), Lonergan asks
whether this contradicts “for us and for our salvation.” In other words, is Christ ordered
to us or are we ordered to him? Lonergan’s answer is based on the principle that what is
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said to belong to another is for the other. Since we belong to Christ, we are ordered to
him as our end, not the other way around.64
Lonergan then explains how one can understand this judgment. He begins with a
distinction between a means and an end. A means is a relative good. If the means shares
in or communicates the very goodness of the end then it qualifies as a secondary end. If
it does not, it is merely a means and is relinquished once the end is produced. If a means
is also a secondary end, it is loved for its own sake out of superabundant love for the
primary end. Furthermore, a secondary end can consist of many related parts. If so, one
who wills a secondary end also wills its parts and its ordering.65
The primary end of redemption is the divine goodness itself. The secondary end
includes all created things in their ordering to one another as conceived by divine
wisdom. Christ loves this secondary end out of superabundant love for the primary end.
This secondary end goes by more than one name:
Again, this secondary end is also called the external glory of God, or the order of the
universe, which is the most excellent thing in creation and shares more perfectly in the
divine goodness and more perfectly reflects it than any other creature whatsoever.
Besides, according to sacred Scripture this same secondary end is the Body of Christ,
head and members, as all things in heaven and on earth are brought together and
reconciled in him (Eph 1:10; Col 1:20).66

Since Christ loves the secondary end out of superabundant love for the primary
end, he not only loves both head and members as parts of his body, but also wills them
duly ordered such that the members are subordinate to the head.67
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7.2.11 Article 45: Why the God-man?68
Lonergan states that to ask “why?” is to ask about a cause.69 Causes are intrinsic
or extrinsic. Extrinsic causes are both the agent and the end. With regard to Christ, the
intrinsic causes are dealt with in his ontological constitution. His extrinsic cause, the
agent, is the triune God in God’s external operation.70 A final cause is divided into
primary and secondary. The primary end is the divine goodness itself. The secondary
end is the external glory of God, the order of the universe, and the Body of Christ
wherein all things are restored and reconciled in Christ.71
Lonergan then asks the following question: why was a divine person subsisting in
a human nature required to accomplish this end? His answer is that the Son of God
became man “...to communicate God’s friendship to his enemies in due order.”72
Friendship is mutual benevolent love in the sharing of some good. To love is to will
good to someone. Benevolent love is to will good to another. Mutual benevolent love is
had when many will some common good, each to the others. Divine friendship is mutual
benevolent love with respect to that which is good by its very essence. This friendship is
communicated to intellectual creatures contingently and in time: first in hope, in
possessing the indwelling Holy Spirit as a pledge of their inheritance; then in the beatific
vision. Sinners are enemies of God since they are tainted by either original or mortal sin.
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God’s friendship is communicated to these enemies in due order, according to the plan
conceived by divine wisdom and chosen by divine goodness.73
He then explains the theological principles he will use to deduce reasons for the
God-man: (1) the principle of cause, (2) the principle of continuity, and (3) the principle
of the extension of friendship. The principle of cause is that God customarily acts
through secondary causes. The principle of continuity is that God customarily acts
according to the nature of things and the laws of nature, physical or human. The
principle of the extension of friendship is that a friend loves his or her friend’s friends,
even so far as to love one’s enemies for the sake of one’s friend.74
Lonergan applies these principles to the economy of salvation. He understands
this economy as a movement away from evil (the terminus a quo) to the state of
friendship with God (the terminus ad quem). With respect to the terminus ad quem, he
applies both the principle of cause and the principle of the extension of friendship. Only
a divine person is a friend of God according to divine friendship. A divine person, in and
of itself, is not a secondary cause. To preserve both principles, it is fitting to have a
divine person subsisting in a human nature. One who in his own right enjoys God’s
friendship, if he is human, also enjoys all the supernatural gifts. This leads to the second
reason. Such a person is a proportionate exemplary cause according to which these gifts
can be communicated to others.75 The third reason is to have an intermediary through
which God’s enemies, once they are turned into friends, come to have love for God. If
they have love for the man who is God then they have love for God himself.76
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Lonergan then turns his attention to how the intermediary turns enemies into
friends. Unless human psychological and social laws are suspended, contrary to the
principle of continuity, humans cannot be turned from evil to good except according to
the law of the cross. It is thus appropriate that the God-man prescribe the law of the cross
and exemplify the law by performing his proper work according to this same law.77
Finally, in accordance with the teaching that no one comes to the Father except
through Christ (Jn 6:44), in addition to the God-man’s display of love and inducement in
others to return this love, he must enable them to actually do so. This requires the
supernatural gifts of grace.78
Lonergan begins to explain how the God-man produces these supernatural gifts.
The God-man is a divine person, and so communicates grace abundantly. Where sin
abounded, grace was all the more abundant (Rom 5:20). Lonergan begins to explain why
grace is superabundant. His explanation, though likely unfinished, ends the Supplement:
But grace is above all superabundant if a divine person brings it about that men work for
themselves but also himself works for them, as the head working for the members, a
priest working for his people, a shepherd for his sheep, a king for his subjects, a deputy
for those whom he represents, a friend for his friends. It is appropriate that it be so,
because men ordinarily do not act by themselves but through others, because they fall
into sin not only through their own vices but also through those of others, and because,
even when elevated and assisted by grace, their actions on their own behalf fall short of
perfection.
It is appropriate, therefore, that an intermediary friend should make superabundant
satisfaction for sin.79

77

Lonergan, DBM, *292 [Supplement, 124].
Lonergan, DBM, *293 [Supplement, 125].
79
“Sed in primis superabundat gratia, si divina persona non solum facit ut homines pro se faciant sed etiam
ipsa pro iis agit, sicut caput pro membris, sacerdos pro populo, pastor pro ovibus, rex pro subditis, vicarius
pro repraesentatis, amicus pro amicis. Quod quidem fieri convenit, tum quia homines communiter non per
se sed per alios agunt, tum quia in peccata impelluntur non solum suis vitiis sed etiam alienis, tum quia ipsi
pro se etiam gratia elevati atque adiuti nisi imperfecte non agunt.
Convenit ergo amicum intermedium superabundanter pro peccatis satisfacere.” DBM, *294 [Supplement,
125].
78

251
7.3

Lonergan’s General Understanding of Historical Causality
Before we interpret Lonergan’s understanding of the historical causality of Christ,

it is appropriate to begin with an interpretation of his general understanding of historical
causality itself. We will treat his general understanding of history, then his general
understanding of causality. Then we will bring these two together.

7.3.1

History

Throughout his career, Lonergan made the distinction between the history that is
written (Historie) and the history that is lived and written about (Geschichte). He
appropriated this distinction from the German Historical School.80 In the Supplement, his
concern is with the latter: the history lived, the world of human affairs. The history
lived, from an empirical level, is the totality of human thoughts, words, and deeds. In an
early essay he equated this empirical level to the material object of history.81
Lonergan’s understanding of history is not strictly equivalent to the empirical
level of history. Just as there is a difference between empirical data as data and empirical
data as intelligible, Lonergan anticipates a particular intelligibility in the empirical data of
history. His heuristic structure to anticipate this intelligibility is the human good of order.
Let us recall the structure of the human good of order. The human good of order
is simply the good of order as it pertains to human affairs. The human good of order is
comprised of (1) the cultural good, which is essentially the interior roots of human
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activity located in the human intellect and will but understood in its social context; (2) the
social good, or what Lonergan calls the “external good of order,” which includes the
external institutions and coordinated operations which order particular goods and aim at
securing these goods on a continuous basis; and (3) the continuous and secure flow of
particular goods.
The cultural level is superior and the most influential level. In culture one finds
the intrinsic principle of human development: the desires of the human mind to make
and to become all things. At the level of culture one also finds the common meanings
and values governing a way of life. The cultural level influences the external good of
order, and the external good of order determines the particular goods produced, how they
are produced, and how they are obtained. On the other hand, human beings are impotent
to heal evils at the cultural level. As cultural good is superior, cultural evil is the most
hideous of all evils. Since cultural good is ultimately rooted in interiority, human beings
are impotent against such evil through their own powers. This is why Lonergan stated in
his first chapter that it is precisely cultural evil that calls for a heaven-sent redeemer.82
No doubt then that for Lonergan, culture is the basic unit in thinking about
history. He appropriated this from Christopher Dawson.83 Dawson once remarked that
culture is the fundamental social unit upon which all other social phenomena depend.84
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Lonergan’s heuristic structure amounts to a structure that anticipates the intelligibility of
any culture. As a heuristic structure, it does not specify the particular meanings and
values of a culture, what social institutions are in place there, nor the particular goods
valued by that culture. Nevertheless, the human good of order, as a heuristic structure, is
an intelligible set of terms and relations anticipating the intelligibility of the history that is
lived, the world of human affairs, where the basic unit of history is culture. This
structure functions as Lonergan’s formal object of history. Using the human good of
order as a formal object, he abstracts from the empirical level of history to grasp the
intelligibility of the history that is lived within human cultures.
However, the intelligibility anticipated is not simply the static structure of a given
culture at a given place and time in history. On one hand, we can think of a human good
of order as a snapshot of a culture at any given place and time. But cultures develop and
cultures decline. So history is a flow, a process. To explain this dynamic element,
Lonergan developed his threefold approximation of progress, decline, and redemption, as
we interpreted from his first chapter. Without redemption, historical decline would win
out due to moral impotence. With redemption, the line of progress is restored.
Lonergan considers all three approximations as always operative in history. Since
the redemptive vector is operative, the net effect in history is progress. This does not
mean that every culture at every given point in history is necessarily progressing. The
judgment is a theological one. Through Christ, God has introduced a redemptive vector
into human history according to the divine plan. The divine plan cannot be frustrated. So
from a theological perspective, Lonergan holds the general view that history is one of net
progress. So when he refers to progress in the “total” human good of order, he is
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referring to a net process and is not suggesting that every culture at every point in time in
history is progressing.
Let us name this progress human development. Human development is a matter
of fact that can be verified empirically through the study of cultural development.85 This
could be verified at particular places and times in history even prescinding from the
redemptive vector. But given that God’s redemptive vector has entered into human
history, Lonergan holds the theological position that the net effect in history is ongoing
human development. This is a long-range view. In specific cultures, and specific times,
there may still be decline. But in the long-range view, he affirms that there is human
development because there is a redemptive vector operative in history which has restored
the net line of progress. So to understand history is to understand human development.
As such, Lonergan’s general understanding of history amounts to an answer to the
following question: what makes human development what it is?
To understand human development, one does not need to account for every single
human thought, word, or deed in history. Just as the intelligibility of the circle does not
depend on the empirical accidents of radius, color, or thickness, the intelligibility of
human development does not depend on every thought, word, or deed. For Lonergan,
data not relevant to a specific intelligibility one is seeking is called the “empirical
residue.”86 To grasp the intelligible from the empirical one abstracts from the incidental.
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This abstraction is the selectivity of intelligence. The same method applies to Lonergan’s
approach to understanding human development. What makes human development what
it is is not based on every thought, word, or deed. What makes human development what
it is is based on the intelligible relations of thoughts, words, and deeds producing effects
in history where those effects amount to improvements in the human good of order.
Although Lonergan understands history through a social structure, the human
good of order, he does not ignore individual human development. Quite the opposite. He
understands individual development as mediated through social development. No person
lives in a metaphorical vacuum. It is through community that one comes to appropriate
one’s self, to know one’s self.87 As we noted in our interpretation of Lonergan’s first
chapter, there is indeed such a thing as constant human nature. But there is also variable
human history, and this historical dimension is also constitutive of persons as persons.
This historical dimension is what Lonergan later meant by the term “historicity.”88
The notion of historicity affirms that (1) meaning plays a constitutive role in human
living, and (2) meaning develops in history because meaning develops in cultures. So
meaning itself is a function of historical process. Human beings are embedded in this
process. As Lonergan noted in his second chapter, with the possible exception of the
mystics, no person is so individual as not to be related essentially to the historical
process.89
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7.3.2

Causality

Lonergan stated that a cause is whatever influences another in its existence and
an effect is whatever depends upon another in its existence.90 Causality is an intelligible
relation of dependence of a created effect as influenced by a cause. The change is in the
effect, not the cause. There is no change in the cause qua cause.91
In his explanation of causality, it is clear that Lonergan wants to refute the error of
understanding causality through picture-thinking. Causality is a reality and is therefore
intelligible. However, to know causality is not had merely by the cognitional operation
of experience (perception). Knowledge of causality is had through the further operations
of understanding and judgment. Picture-thinking is a misunderstanding that knowledge is
perception and so it fails to grasp the reality of causality. In explaining how one knows
causality, Lonergan is simply adhering to his own cognitional theory.92
Among Aristotle’s four causes, the efficient cause is perhaps most open to
misunderstanding. Efficient causality is known not because one “sees” physical contact.
Efficient causality is known because (1) one grasps an intelligible relation of dependence
in an effect as “moved” by a cause, and (2) one subsequently judges this intelligible
relation to be true. Efficient causality may involve physical contact. However, the reality
of efficient causality is not exclusively physical.93
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Lonergan’s explanation of what causality is applies to any form of causality.
Furthermore, any effect is not dependent on a single cause. Near the time he wrote the
Supplement, Lonergan often appealed to the classical Aristotelian definition of science as
“a certain knowledge of things through their causes” (certa rerum per causas cognitio).94
To know things through their causes is obtained by analysis, by resolving a thing into its
causes. This resolution applies only to created realities. There are no causes in God.
Furthermore, since in created realities there is distinction between essence and
existence, there is a distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic causality. An intrinsic
cause is that by reason of which a thing is what it is. It is the formal cause. It is
intelligible in itself. So intrinsic causality is a means of knowing why a thing is what it
is, prescinding from extrinsic causality. Extrinsic causality applies when there is a
distinction between the essence of a thing and its existence. This distinction is
constitutive of every created being. However, no created being can activate its own
existence. One needs recourse to extrinsic causality to grasp the intelligibility of the
being’s existence. This is equivalent to the metaphysical principles that potency and act
are not intelligible in themselves.95 They are intelligible in the other, in the extrinsic
causes. Extrinsic causes are final, efficient, and exemplary cause. So although one can
speak of intrinsic causality or intrinsic intelligibility, this does not exhaust the
intelligibility of created realities.
Turning back to efficient causality, an agent acting through intellect can exert this
type of causality without physical contact by moving another agent acting through
intellect, specifically through the other agent’s reason and will. This movement can be
94
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extended through space and time in a causal series. If the agent’s influence is extended
through space and time in a causal series, then human cooperation is constitutive of this
causal series. Even if an agent’s ability to produce an effect depends on the free consent
of others, the causality is no less real. There is still an intelligible relation of dependence
in the created effect on the originating agent.
Since we have introduced the notion of a causal series it is appropriate we explain
this in more detail. Lonergan distinguishes two types of causal series: accidental and
proper. An example of the former is Abraham (A) begetting Isaac (B), and Isaac (B)
begetting Jacob (C). In this accidental causal series there are only two real relations of
dependence: B depends on A, and C depends on B. The relation of C to A is not a real
relation of dependence. The relation of C to A is of a conditioned to a condition.
Abraham is not a cause but a condition of begetting Jacob. Furthermore, in an accidental
causal series there is no reality of mediate efficient causality since the relation of C to A
is not a real relation of dependence.
An example of the latter is the typist (A), the typewriter (B), and the typescript
(C). In this causal series there are three real relations of dependence: B depends on A, C
depends on B, and C depends on A even more than on B.96 C depends on A even more
than on B because only A is by nature proportionate to creating the effect even though A
uses a secondary (instrumental) cause (B).97 A is the mediate efficient cause of C.
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7.3.3

Historical Causality
In one of Lonergan’s early essays on history he understood the relationship

between human causality and human development as “the making and unmaking of man
by man.”98 The essence of the phrase would stay with him throughout his career. In one
of his later essays he stated that it is in history that “man’s making of man” occurs.99
Each person does not make himself or herself in an individual sense of “making.” Even
though each of us has the use of free will, we do not make ourselves out of ourselves.
This is a metaphysical impossibility because of the principle that anything moved is
moved by something else, quidquid movetur ab alio movetur. This is a familiar
scholastic tag that Lonergan appropriated from Aquinas. It is explicitly employed in his
early theory of history and implicit in his view of history offered in the Supplement.100
No contingent effect is its own cause.101
Lonergan’s understanding of human solidarity, developed in his first chapter,
exemplifies the principle that anything moved is moved by something else. Any person’s
thought, original or otherwise, depends upon external experience and beliefs handed on
from previous generations. Since action follows thought, everything we do is to some
degree based on the influence of the past, for better or for worse. This is the ground of
Lonergan’s notion of human solidarity. Human progress is progress of the whole, not

trans. Michael Shields, S.J. (Toronto: Lonergan Research Institute, 1992), 20. De ente supernaturali will
be published in vol. 19 of the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan.
98
Lonergan, “Analytic Concept of History,” 10.
99
Lonergan, “Natural Right and Historical Mindedness,” 171.
100
Lonergan, “Analytic Concept of History,” 11; See ST, I, q. 2, a. 3.
101
“Just as motion in the cause as such implies an infinite series of movers with no first mover, so motion
in the self-determining agent as agent involves an infinite regress of the self-determination.” Lonergan,
Grace and Freedom, 68-69.

260
progress of the individual.102 As Lonergan explained in his first chapter, the human good
of order is an immense accumulation of insights, discoveries, and decisions of the past. 103
This explains why in his last chapter he judges that even though social agents freely
determine the future, this very determination, to the extent that it is common and
effective, depends very greatly upon the past.104 Thus, historical causality depends very
greatly on the past even though it can freely determine the future.
How does historical causality freely determine the future? The answer ultimately
depends on the fact that there are creatures who are agents acting through intellect. In his
first chapter, Lonergan laid the foundation for his explanation of such an agent. There he
discussed human nature, specifically the human mind, as that which can make and
become all things.105 In the last chapter this agency is explained in a more systematic
fashion: according to the category of the agent acting through intellect who can
understand the requisite conditions needed to be fulfilled for an effect to be produced and
who can see to the fulfillment of those conditions. Of course, it is much more likely that
conditions are fulfilled through human cooperation than by a single individual.
The requisite conditions governing the production of an effect are to be
understood in accordance with Lonergan’s theory of emergent probability. Lonergan’s
second chapter provides an explanation why there are conditions in the first place and
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why these conditions can be understood. Conditions are regulated by innate laws which
govern the operation of each individual thing according to its nature, as well as the whole
complex or series of natural laws, both classic and statistical, which govern the universal
order of reality. An agent acting through intellect can understand these conditions
precisely because they are intelligible. The conditions are intelligible because they are
intelligently related to the intelligible operation of this universe conceived by divine
wisdom. Since they are intelligible they can be known. And if they can be known it is
possible they can be fulfilled through intentional human agency.
Just as emergent probability governs events in the natural world, it does as well in
the world of human affairs. At the heart of emergent probability is the notion of the
scheme of recurrence. The human good of order itself is a scheme of recurrence. The
external situation influences the members of the order, each of which is an agent acting
through intellect. This in turn influences the human will of the agent to change the
situation for the better. As Lonergan noted in his second chapter, there would not be
improvement if the human intellect looked only at the present order and could not
imagine an improved, yet future, human good of order. If others can be persuaded by the
new ideas originated by the individual agent, there can then be mutual understanding and
agreement on a future course of action. If this is realized, the situation is improved.
When this change is complete, the cycle starts over. We have a scheme of recurrence.
Since the human mind wants to become and make all things, there is no reason why this
scheme of recurrence, this progressive cycle if you will, should come to an end.106
Given the foregoing, let us summarize Lonergan’s general understanding of
historical causality. The “historical” in historical causality refers to the developing
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human good of order. The “causality” in historical causality refers to an intelligible
relationship of dependence in the developing human good of order (the historical effect)
on any and all influences (historical causes). Historical influences can and often do
originate from a single agent. This is the originating agent, an agent as potential cause.
However, in the vast majority of cases an agent becomes an actual cause through the free
consent of others, through human cooperation, because no single person can fulfill all of
the requisite conditions to produce the intended effect.
Since historical causality involves more than one cause, to understand historical
causality amounts to resolving the development of the human good of order into its
causes. Resolving this development into its causes would explain how the human good
of order develops. Since to know causality in the general sense is to make a true
affirmation that there is an intelligible relation of dependence in an effect as influenced
by a cause, then to know a historical cause is to make a true affirmation that there is an
intelligible relation of dependence in an improvement within the human good of order on
a particular historical influence.
As we noted earlier, the category of efficient causality is particularly problematic
if one does not explain the nature of the agency involved. Efficient causality, as with any
of the Aristotelian causes, is a metaphysical category. It is abstract and necessarily
vague. But human history is concrete. To grasp a concrete understanding of historical
causality one needs an explanation commensurate with the concrete nature of history
itself. Lonergan’s categories of individual, social, and historical agency serve this
purpose. These categories add further specification to the Aristotelian categories,
bringing these vague metaphysical categories down to earth. These categories of agency
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amount to a sociology, both of knowledge and of action. Of knowledge, because of the
social nature of human thought. Of action, because virtually everything we do is done
either through others or for others. So historical causality is essentially a social dynamic.
It is fundamentally communitarian since the vast majority of actual causes are had
through mutual understanding and agreement. The key here is actual causality.
Certainly there is the causality related to the individual agent. At a minimum, the
individual agent is a potential cause. However, to become an actual cause is a different
matter. When it comes to improving the human good of order, actual causes are in the
vast majority of times the product of social agency.

7.4

The Historical Causality of Christ: Preliminary Remarks
Lonergan’s approach to understanding the historical causality of Christ is by way

of analysis. He resolves Christ’s work in history into its causes. The articles “Christ the
Exemplar,” “Christ the Head,” “Christ the Historical Agent,” and “The Mediator in
Heaven” are Lonergan’s way of resolving the work of Christ into its causes.
The triune God is, of course, the absolute first historical cause of every historical
effect. This simply reflects the ad extra doctrine. The judgment also proceeds from the
metaphysical distinction between the effectiveness of God and God’s instruments: “the
cause of a cause is a cause of the effect” (causa causae est causa causati).107 Since God
is the cause of every other cause, God is the cause of the effect. So God is the first and
principal efficient cause of any created effect. But why is God the cause of all created
causes? Because a created being cannot move from potency to act by its own resources.
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Act is greater than potency.108 The created being must be moved from potency to act by
another cause in order to actually produce an effect. God is the only efficient cause
proportionate to producing action itself. Hence the fundamental theorem of divine
concurrence: “God operates in everything that operates” (Deus operature in omni
operante).109
Now we turn to Christ. Christ acts as both God and man. As God, Christ shares
in this divine agency of God. Whenever Lonergan speaks of Christ acting as God, he is
referring to the divine knowledge, will, and power through which Christ acts and where
these attributes of knowledge, will, and power are common to the three divine persons.
At this point we have yet entered into any causal series. There is no causal series
between God as first cause and Christ acting as God. They are the same.
We enter into a proper causal series, with respect to divine causality, the moment
we begin speaking of Christ acting as man. Christ, acting as man, is a secondary cause.
There may or may not be additional secondary causes, that is, human agents through
which Christ as man mediates his work. If not, the work is proper to Christ. In this case
the causal series is (1) God as first cause, which includes Christ acting as God; (2) Christ
acting as man, as a secondary cause; and (2) the created effect.
If there are additional secondary causes, the work is not proper to Christ alone but
the effect is proportionate only to Christ. In this case the causal series is (1) God as first
cause, which includes Christ acting as God; (2) Christ acting as man, as a secondary
cause; (3) other secondary causes who are ministerial agents of Christ; and (4) the created
effect. Here Christ is mediate efficient cause in relation to his ministerial agents. The
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work is not strictly proper to Christ since Christ is mediating his work through other
secondary causes. But the created effect is proportionate only to Christ. His ministerial
agents exert true causality, but only instrumental causality. So there is a proper causal
series here. Nevertheless, Christ is more the cause of the effect than his agents.
In Lonergan’s understanding of the historical causality of Christ, there is always
operative some causal series. Which one depends on the context. To explain this I will
use the notion of stages in the work of Christ in history. The work of Christ in history of
course presupposes the Incarnation, and Lonergan’s final article on cur Deus homo
addresses this specifically. For now I intend to focus on Christ’s work in history.
There is an implicit structure operative in Lonergan’s thought of how Christ’s
work in history unfolds. This structure is one of stages. There are three basic stages
implicit in Lonergan’s thought. The first is what Catholic dogmatic theology
traditionally understands as objective redemption: the work proper to Christ alone, yet
done for the sake of all. The second is the first stage of subjective redemption: the work
of Christ to apply to his members the fruits of his objective redemption. The third is the
unfolding of subjective redemption: the ongoing work of Christ in history mediated
through the members of his body. This third element can also be understood as the
perfection of the members through the production of similar operations in the members,
as are produced in the head, according to exemplary causality.
In all three stages, the work is the work of Christ. The first is the principle of the
second, since objective redemption is the principle of subjective redemption. The second
is the principle of the third, since the application of Christ’s objective redemption is the
principle of the unfolding of subjective redemption.
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Lonergan’s final chapter is, for the most part, an explanation of this third element:
the unfolding of subjective redemption in history. Lonergan’s motive is evident from the
very beginning of the chapter. He stated that what was said in his third chapter about the
price paid, sacrifice, meritorious obedience, and the vicarious suffering of Christ refers
only to redemption as means (ut medium), or, better, as a principle (ut principium).
Lonergan prefers the term principium since what he said in his third chapter, considered
in itself, corresponds to objective redemption. However, redemption as means cannot be
reduced to objective redemption. Christ’s objective work is better understood as a
principium, since a principle is what is first in some order. Lonergan’s primary objective
in his final chapter is to understand what follows from this principium. Hence his call for
a broader and fuller survey of the work of the Lord.
Let us take our bearings. Lonergan understands the historical causality of Christ
in terms of objective and subjective redemption. He rarely uses this explicit language. In
fact, he never mentions subjective redemption and he mentions objective redemption only
one time. But the distinction is implicit and it is a practical way to frame our
interpretation. Furthermore, in this chapter Lonergan understands subjective redemption
primarily in terms of Christ’s extrinsic causality in history. Christ’s intrinsic causality
refers to his ontological constitution. This is not his focus. He had already treated this in
De constitutione Christi ontologica et psychologica (1956).
Now we will turn to specific aspects of Lonergan’s understanding of the historical
causality of Christ. It is appropriate to begin with final causality.
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7.5

The Historical Causality of Christ: Final Causality

The end for the sake of which Christ acts in history is the historical effect
intended by Christ in accordance with the divine plan of redemption. When any end is
for the sake of which an agent acts, the end is not simply an end but a final cause. The
primary end of redemption is the divine goodness itself, the good by essence. Lonergan
does not explicitly correlate this primary end with the beatific vision but this is what he
means.110 This end lies outside the field of history and is not our direct concern. Our
concern is with the secondary end of redemption as final cause, since this end is found
within the field of history. Our interpretation here will include (1) references to the
secondary end whether implicit or explicit, (2) an interpretive synthesis of these
references, and (3) an interpretation of how this secondary end is a final cause in
Lonergan’s understanding of the historical causality of Christ.

7.5.1

References to the Secondary End of Redemption

References to the secondary end are found in the first, second, third, and sixth
chapters of the Supplement. The references are implicit until the final chapter. In the
introduction of the first chapter Lonergan follows scripture in judging that the hidden
plan of God’s will is to gather all creation in heaven and earth under one head, Christ.
The end in history is equated to the gathering up of earthly realities.111 Lonergan
appropriates Aquinas’s teaching that “...the purpose of the universe is a good existing in
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it, namely, the order of the universe itself.”112 In the first chapter he also states that the
end of creation is to manifest divine goodness.113
In the second chapter he states that the order of the universe is a good of order and
the intrinsic end of the universe.114 He reiterates that the justice of God is grounded in
divine wisdom, in its exercise to the just choice of a wise order, and in its effects is found
in created things inasmuch as they are wisely and justly ordered among themselves and in
relation to their ultimate end which is God himself.115 There is again a judgment that the
ultimate end to which all things are directed is to manifest the divine goodness.116
In the third chapter, redemption as end is described as that state in which we are
freed from the power of darkness, from sin, from punishment, from the fear of death, by
which we have received the promise, are reconciled to God, are justified, enjoy the
indwelling of the Holy Spirit and adoptive sonship, are saved in hope, and are able to
approach God with confidence.117 Here there are no references to eschatological effects.
Lonergan is describing redemptive effects in history. He goes on to explain the
distinction between redemption as end and redemption as means. As end, it is to restore
all things in Christ. As means, it is the payment of the price, sacrifice, meritorious
obedience, and Christ’s vicarious suffering and death.118
At the beginning of the final chapter Lonergan provides a biblical synthesis of the
historical effect correlative to the work of the Lord. The effect is described as the
Kingdom of God, the Body of Christ, and the specific salvific effects which are had
112

“...‘finis quidem universi est aliquod bonum in ipso exsistens, scilicet ordo ipsius universi.’” DBM, 6
[Supplement, 3]. This is a citation from ST I, q. 103, a. 2 ad 3m.
113
Lonergan, DBM, 24 [Supplement, 11].
114
Lonergan, DBM, 68 [Supplement, 28]. Lonergan references ST, I, q. 47, a. 3; q. 103, a. 2, ad 3m.
115
Lonergan, DBM, 69 [Supplement, 29].
116
Lonergan, DBM, 77 [Supplement, 31].
117
Lonergan, DBM, 127 [Supplement, 52].
118
Lonergan, DBM, 142 [Supplement, 58].

269
through incorporation into this body. Then he states: “The reader of the New Testament
understands that Christ’s end or purpose is first and foremost the kingdom of God...To
arrive in this kingdom is what salvation means...”119 Later he makes the distinction
between the effects directly and indirectly intended by Christ. Christ directly intends to
order human life on earth to the future life in heaven. This ordering liberates us from evil
to the good such that the total human good of order is greatly improved. Christ indirectly
intends this improvement. He then explains the secondary end of redemption in terms of
reconciliation, expressed through the spatial metaphor of drawing near to God. The
entire work of Christ is summed up in this reconciliation which is had within the Body of
Christ.120 Next we come to his explanation of the purpose of the Incarnation. There he
describes the secondary end as all created things in their due order to one another, the
external glory of God, and the order of the universe. This same end is the Body of Christ,
head and members, as all things in heaven and on earth are brought together and
reconciled in him.121 In the final article he reiterates that the end is divided into primary
and secondary. The secondary end is the external glory of God, the order of the universe,
and the Body of Christ wherein all things are brought together and reconciled in him.122

7.5.2

Toward a Synthesis

References to the secondary end of redemption reveal three contexts. The first is
anthropological from an individualistic perspective. The second is anthropological from
a social perspective. The third is cosmological.
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Anthropological and Individual: The secondary end is a new state (status) of the
human person: liberation from darkness, from sin, from punishment, from fear of death,
and by which the person receives the promise of eternal redemption, justification, the gift
of the Holy Spirit, adoptive sonship, salvation in hope, reconciliation, and interior
renewal which includes restoration of the image of God.
Anthropological and Social: The secondary end is the Kingdom of God, the Body
of Christ, the Church.123 Through the Body of Christ we are reconciled to God and to
one another. This context includes improvement in the total human good of order since
the members of the body, now converted from enemies of God into friends of God,
perform good works which improve the overall human situation.
Cosmological: The secondary end is the order of the universe, the external glory
of God, all created things in their ordering to one another, the restoration and
reconciliation of all things in Christ, and the manifestation of divine goodness.
Now we move towards a synthesis. The notion of order is common to all three
contexts. The secondary end of redemption can thus be understood through the following
synthesis. In terms of order, the secondary end refers to a restoration of (1) the interior
order of the human person, (2) the order of human history, and (3) the order of the
universe itself. The Body of Christ, which is a supernatural human good of order, is an
end in itself through which these restorations are obtained. I argue that for Lonergan the
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secondary end is the Body of Christ, the Church, and I will explain how the end
understood in this way synthesizes all of these contexts.
Within Lonergan’s notion of order, a part exists for the whole and the whole for
the part. In his first chapter he cited Aquinas’s teaching that the universe as a whole is
not only a good of order but as a whole is a more perfect participation in and reflection of
the divine goodness than any individual creature. His second chapter made the teaching
even more explicit. Since what is best in creation is the good of order of the universe,
this order is itself directly intended by God.124 The order of the universe encompasses all
created realities in their ordered relationship to one another. The key here is relationality.
The order of the universe is not simply an aggregate of parts where intelligibility is found
only in each separate part. The ordering itself is intelligible. This ordering is understood
by Lonergan as a hierarchical order in which vertical finality is operative, as we
explained in our interpretation of his second chapter. The point is that each part of the
universe does not exist for its own sake. Each part is related to the whole for the sake of
the whole. As Lonergan stated in Insight, the actual order of the universe includes the
excellence of every other good within the universe. To will any good is to will the order
of the universe.125
The order of the universe includes the world of human affairs, the total human
good of order. In De ratione convenientiae, this is the “historical order of the universe”
(ordine universi historico).126 In the Supplement, it is the “historical order of justice.”
Thus history itself can be understood as an order within the order of the universe.
History is related to the universe as a part to the whole.
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Individuals are inherently part of this historical order. Individuals can also be
understood in terms of their own intrinsic ordering. In Lonergan’s first chapter, he
explained that if wisdom and goodness are for each individual most valuable by reason of
their intrinsic excellence, then in addition to the external order and its progressive
development there is another, “...an interior order, in which our sensitive part is
subordinated to reason, and weak human reason is in turn subordinated to the supreme
being, supreme truth, and supreme good.”127 Without this right ordering the sensitive
element is in control. If the sensitive element is in control an animal is in control.
We come now to the heart of the matter. Because of sin, human beings, qua
individuals, are disordered. For now we are prescinding from the healing effect of grace.
This disorder can be understood as corruption of the intrinsic order of the individual. Sin
gives rise to the evil consequences of sin which then corrupt and disorder the order of
history itself. Since a part exists for the sake of the whole, when one part is corrupted the
whole is corrupted. Since the historical order of the universe has been corrupted by the
evil consequences of sin, the whole universe has been corrupted. But if one corrupted
part leads to the corruption of the whole, then restoration of that part leads to restoration
of the whole. Through the Body of Christ, which restores the individual as well as the
historical order, the universe itself is restored. Understanding this relationship between
the individual, historical, and cosmological order is critical to understanding why
127
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Lonergan can mention, in the same breath, that the secondary end of redemption is the
external glory of God, the order of the universe, and the Body of Christ wherein all things
are brought together and reconciled in him.
We can now focus more specifically on the Body of Christ in itself. This body is
a supernatural human good of order. Like any human good of order we can expect to
find in this body the following levels: (1) particular goods, (2) the social or external good
of order, and (3) the cultural good. The supernatural gifts of grace, the infused virtues,
the gifts and movements of the Spirit correspond to particular goods. The external
institutions of the Church and the operations of its members correspond to the external
good of order. The interpersonal relationships as well as the shared meanings and values
of the members correspond to the cultural good. Shared meanings refer to mutual
understandings and judgments on reality. Shared values refers to mutual judgments on
what ends are truly good and worthy to be chosen.
Through these interpersonal relationships the members are reconciled to one
another and to Christ. As Lonergan explained in his answer to cur Deus homo, through
loving the God-man one comes to have love for God. Through loving Christ the
members are reconciled to God. Lonergan stated that the entire work of Christ is
summed up in this reconciliation. The secondary end of redemption, interpreted as the
Body of Christ, is consistent with this statement. The Body of Christ is a supernatural
community reconciling the members to God and to one another.128
128

This supernatural human good of order is what in De Verbo Incarnato Lonergan describes as the
“supreme good” into which human evils are transformed. This supreme good is “the whole Christ, head
and members, in this life as well as in the life to come...” Lonergan, De Verbo Incarnato, 553. In
Lonergan’s most developed systematics of the Trinity, he understands this supreme good as a “state or
situation of grace” (statum seu situationem gratiae) referring to many distinct subjects together in a divinehuman interpersonal situation in which the divine persons and the just are in one another as those who are
known are in those who know them and those who are loved are in those who love them. Thus in

274
Since the Body of Christ is the end for the sake of which Christ acts in history,
there is no doubt that Lonergan would judge it as God’s will that all become members of
Christ’s body.129 However, this does not mean that the Body of Christ, as end, is meant
to replace what Lonergan understands as the total human good of order. The Body of
Christ is not meant to eliminate or replace the total human good of order, but to transform
that order, to transform human history through the leavening of human history.130
This leavening of human history is indirectly intended by Christ. Recall that the
Body of Christ, as end, is directly intended to prepare members of the body for the future
life in heaven. But it is also intended, albeit indirectly, to improve the overall human
situation. Through the good works of the members, the Body of Christ introduces and
propagates a redemptive vector into human history to leaven human history. This vector
is redemptive and absolutely supernatural because it is conceived by divine wisdom, is
chosen by divine goodness, and is affected by divine causality with the intent to
transform cultural evil into cultural good. The redemptive vector leavens human history
by transforming cultural meanings and values operative in history to more closely
approximate God’s meanings and values revealed in Christ.

7.5.3

Final Causality and Christ’s Intentionality

The secondary end of redemption, as final cause, is the end for the sake of which
Christ acts in history. The key here is “for the sake of.” We are not interested in the
Lonergan’s theology he makes a distinction between the habit of grace and the state of grace. The former
is a physical accident received in the soul of the just. The latter is a social, interpersonal reality between
human persons, qua community, and the divine persons of the Trinity. See The Triune God: Systematics,
517.
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secondary end as end, but as final cause. There is a difference. Any end, in and of itself,
is not a final cause. It is simply an end. In and of itself an end is what Lonergan once
termed the end in ordo executionis, the end in the order of execution.131 We are
interested in how Lonergan understands the secondary end of redemption not simply as
an end but an end qua final cause, the end in ordo intentionis.132 To interpret him on this
aspect of the historical causality of Christ, three points are particularly relevant.
First, a final cause is not simply an end as cause. A final cause is the good as
cause.133 In other words, there is final causality in the strict sense if and only if that for
the sake of which the agent acts is truly a good end. Second, the end must be an
apprehended end. Without the end as apprehended, there would be no such thing as final
causality. Third, the end as apprehended is the efficient cause of the act of appetition.134
This third point is important because one can easily confuse final causality with efficient
causality in the effort to understand the intentionality of the agent. The point here is that
there is a difference between (1) the relationship of the good as cause to the end as
apprehended, and (2) the relationship of the end as apprehended to the willingness to
attain the end. The former is understood by Lonergan according to final causality. The
latter to efficient causality. We can apply these general elements to interpret how final
causality operates in Lonergan’s understanding of the historical causality of Christ.
First, there is no difficulty with judging that the secondary end of redemption is a
good. The secondary end is a supernatural good, and this is in fact why it is an end and
not merely a means. Second, this secondary end is apprehended by Christ. Christ
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apprehends the secondary end of redemption because he apprehends the divine plan as
part of his apprehension of the actual order of reality. He apprehends the actual order of
reality as a secondary object of his beatific knowledge.135 This end as apprehended is
perhaps the key element to understanding the historical causality of Christ under the
aspect of final causality. Since a final cause is a real cause, then according to Lonergan’s
own definition we should anticipate an intelligible relation of dependence in a created
effect as influenced by the end as cause. If this were not the case, Lonergan’s general
understanding of causality would not apply to final causality, but this is inadmissible.
Final causality refers to an intelligible relation of dependence in an effect as influenced
by a cause, as with any type of causality.
The third element helps us to interpret what this created effect is. The created
effect is the end as apprehended by Christ. Recall that an agent acting through intellect
acts in accordance with an intentional form (formam intentionalem).136 Here the forman
intentionalem is not the likeness of the thing understood, since the thing (the effect) is not
yet produced. It is the term of an act of understanding which devises the form intended in
the thing to be produced and which, as understood, guides operation to produce the
effect.137 Christ as man is an agent acting through intellect. The intentional form in
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Christ is the secondary end of redemption as apprehended by Christ. This intentional
form is the created effect dependent on the secondary end as final cause. This effect
resides in Christ’s human intellect. The effect is not located in Christ’s will. Christ’s
willingness to achieve the end is to be understood as an effect of efficient causality,
where the cause is the end as apprehended. In other words, the end as apprehended is the
efficient cause of the act of appetition. As such, the final cause can be understood as the
immediate cause of the efficient cause of willing the end.
Lonergan’s understanding of the historical causality of Christ, under the aspect of
final causality, is indeed related to Christ’s intentionality as one would expect. But given
his general understanding of final causality operative in intellectual agents, he would not
conflate final causality and efficient causality. The secondary end of redemption, as
apprehended by Christ, governs his intentionality according to final causality not in the
sense that it moves his will to desire the end, but in the sense that there is an intentional
form in his intellect according to which the secondary end of redemption is produced.
This intentional form includes the means to the end, where the means can be understood
as the inauguration, propagation, and perfection of the Body of Christ in history. Christ’s
intentionality is what is first in order of his historical causality, and that intentionality,
understood according to final causality, is an intentional form residing in Christ’s human
intellect. This secondary end of redemption, as final cause, is mediated into Christ’s
intentionality through this intentional form such that it is a true judgment that the
secondary end of redemption is that for the sake of which Christ acts in history. Without
the intentional form, we could not make this judgment.
way, a form can be in the intellect not in the sense of something pre-existing by which understanding takes
place, but rather by which, when understood, the one understanding operates. Lonergan cites Aquinas, De
veritate, q. 3, a. 2.

278
A clarification is in order. We explained that Christ knows the divine plan of
redemption because he knows the actual order of reality conceived by divine wisdom and
chosen by divine goodness. And Christ knows the actual order of reality because he has
the beatific vision. Christ’s apprehension of the actual order of reality is not located in
his divine knowledge. It is located in his human knowledge. It is Christ as man who has
the beatific vision, not Christ as God. However, Christ’s beatific knowledge, in and of
itself, is not an apprehension of the actual order of reality and thus not an apprehension of
the secondary end of redemption. It is an apprehension and enjoyment of the divine
goodness itself. Through this apprehension Christ also apprehends the actual order of
reality, the divine plan, and thus the secondary end of redemption. This is why Lonergan
identifies Christ’s knowledge of the actual order of reality as a “secondary object” of his
beatific vision. He wants to affirm that Christ apprehends the actual order of reality
through the beatific vision, but simultaneously he also wants to affirm that the beatific
vision in the strict sense of the word is the apprehension of the divine goodness itself,
prescinding from any apprehension of the order of reality proceeding from the decision of
divine goodness.
Finally, we should take up the nature of Christ’s willingness to carry out this
actual order of reality. This will serve as a transition to our next section where we treat
Christ’s objective work. Though Lonergan would consider Christ’s willingness to pursue
the end intended as a product of efficient causality (internal to Christ) because of his
general understanding of final causality in intellectual agents, he also noted how such
efficiency is intimately connected with finality.138 The point is that despite the technical
distinction between the end as apprehended and this same apprehension as the efficient
138
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cause of Christ’s willingness, it is hard not to associate Christ’s intentionality, under the
aspect of final causality, with Christ’s willingness (obedience) to fulfill the divine
command. And so another clarification is in order.
Christ’s human obedience to carry out the means to attain the end as apprehended
is not ultimately grounded on Christ’s human knowledge. His obedience is grounded on
his love for the Father. As such, his obedience is not blind obedience, not obedience in
any pejorative sense, but obedience flowing from his love of a person for who that person
is, not on what that person commands. What the Father commands, which is the divine
command common to the three divine persons, is that Christ the man carry out the
ordination of divine wisdom and goodness which Christ apprehends as end. The
motivation to carry this out is not based on the ordination itself, but on the love for the
one commanding the ordination. Therefore, the obedience we associate with Christ’s
intentionality cannot properly be understood simply by affirming that Christ apprehends
this end and the end as apprehended is the cause of Christ obedience. Christ’s
intentionality, in terms of willingness, is ultimately grounded in Christ the man’s love for
the Father. Christ’s human knowledge adds specification to Christ’s intentionality. This
is why Lonergan stated that the impeccable will of Christ was always willing to obey
before seeking a specification from his knowledge of reality.139 In fact, Lonergan even
stated that Christ the man did not know of other possible world orders conceived by
divine wisdom. He only knew the actual world order chosen by divine goodness from
among the possibilities conceived by divine wisdom. So Christ the man could have
certainly wondered whether or not, in another world, he could have been spared the
burdensome condition of giving his life for the salvation of others. But he accepted this
139
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actual order of reality out of his love for the Father, out of his knowledge not of the plan
per se, but of his knowledge of, and love for, the goodness of the Father.
We now turn to the historical causality of Christ proceeding from Christ’s
intentionality. That which first proceeds is Christ’s objective work, otherwise known as
objective redemption.

7.6

The Historical Causality of Christ: Christ’s Objective Work in History
Christ’s objective work in history was treated by Lonergan in his third chapter.

This work considered in and of itself corresponds to what the Christian tradition terms
objective redemption. This is not the focus in Lonergan’s final chapter, but it is certainly
presupposed and he does touch on it in his article “Christ the Head.” That article
explains the transition from objective redemption to subjective redemption because it
explains how “...what is done in Christ is now done in and for the whole body” (quod in
Christo perficitur, hoc iam in toto et pro toto perficitur).140
What is done in Christo is objective redemption, although Christ does his
objective work not primarily for himself but for others. That work, when it is now done
in and for the whole body, applies to subjective redemption and thus assumes unification
of head and members. We will treat that in the next section. For now, the point is that
the objective work of Christ considered in itself prescinds from (1) any unification of
head and members such that the members appropriate this objective work, and (2) any
unification of head and members such that Christ’s ongoing work is mediated through the
members by similar operations produced in the members.
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Since the work of Christ produces effects, the objective work of Christ produces
objective effects in Christ himself. Lonergan understands these effects through the
categories of the payment of the price, meritorious obedience, satisfaction, sacrifice, and
intercession. The power of the resurrection, which was also a category in his third
chapter, is not ignored. It is operative in Christ’s objective work understood through the
category of intercession. Celestial intercession or mediation proceeds from Christ’s
ascension to the right hand of the Father, and the ascension proceeds from the
resurrection. So the “power” of the resurrection is not simply the power of the
resurrection in and of itself, but the full meaning bound up with the fact of Christ’s
resurrection: that Christ has now been made Lord and Savior, that Christ is now the
eternal High Priest sitting at the right hand of the Father, that Christ is interceding forever
on our behalf. This is why Lonergan stated, in his third chapter, that scriptural passages
on the resurrection are not only meant to call to mind the means of redemption but also
the Mediator of our salvation.
In relation to those who are saved, this objective work of Christ is not redemption
in act but redemption in potency, as offer, as work done for the sake of every person in
human history without implying that every person in history is saved. In Christ himself,
this redemption is in act, meaning that it is a true effect regardless of whether any person
accepts the offer of salvation.
Salvation comes through the appropriation of Christ’s objective work. For
Lonergan, at this time in his career, this appropriation is initiated when one enters into the
Kingdom of God, the Church, since he equated these two when he wrote the Supplement.
However, the work of appropriation is still the objective, proper work of Christ.
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7.7

The Historical Causality of Christ: Christ’s Objective Work Applied to the
Members
The article “Christ the Head” functions as a bridge from objective redemption to

subjective redemption. The work of Christ resolved into the cause titled “Christ the
Head” not only recalls Christ’s objective work but it is primarily meant to explain the
application of Christ’s objective work to his members such that what has been done in the
head is now done in and for the whole body.
Lonergan faces a challenge to explain this causal relationship. There is no readymade metaphysical category for explaining the causal relationship. He certainly does not
want to use the categories of efficient or exemplary causality:
It is true that Christ is the efficient cause of our performance of salutary works...It is true
that Christ is the exemplar of Christian life...but it is not true that Christ's entire work on
our behalf is reduced to the category of efficient and exemplar causality, since
redemption as a means, or, as it is sometime called, objective redemption, means more
than that.141

What Lonergan is essentially explaining here is that if Christ’s work, such as
satisfaction, is appropriated such that the body has already made satisfaction, then it is
meaningless to understand this causal relationship in terms of efficient or exemplary
causality. For efficient and exemplary causality are only meaningful in reference to the
production of similar operations in the members. This is a judgment made by Lonergan
which is only meaningful if one understands Lonergan’s context informing his judgment
on what aspects of the work of Christ qualify as efficient causality. This needs a bit of
explanation.
141
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Lonergan resolves the historical causality of Christ into its causes. How each
“cause” is to be interpreted through classical metaphysical categories depends on the
context in which one is trying to understand the work under investigation. Lonergan
understands the work of the Lord with a view towards the end intended, the big picture if
you will. This is more easily explained through example. Take the example of grace.
On the one hand, we could say that Christ’s communication of grace is proper to Christ
alone, which it is. We could also say that this communication falls under the category of
extrinsic causality, which it does. The causal sequence, in this context, is Christ as cause
and the reception of grace as effect. In this context, the causal relationship can be
understood according to efficient causality since that by which one receives grace is
Christ’s communication of grace. In this context, Christ’s work is not mediated through
others. Christ is the only cause. The work is proper to Christ.
This, however, is not Lonergan’s context. His context is wider. His is an
enlarged context which includes Christ’s purpose for communicating grace. In the more
limited context, the communication of grace does liberate the sinner from bondage to sin.
In the wider context, this liberation enables the members to mediate Christ’s work. The
purpose is to liberate the one who receives grace from the bondage of sin so as to set up
similar operations of satisfaction, merit, sacrifice, and intercession in the members of
Christ’s body. Recall how Lonergan began his final chapter. He recalled how the
evangelist Luke understood the purpose of redemption. Liberated from their enemies,
God’s people are free to serve God in holiness and justice. Likewise, liberated from sins,
God’s people are free to serve God in holiness and justice. Serving God is had by
mediating Christ’s ongoing work in history.
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Christ mediates his ongoing work in history, through his members, by producing
similar operations in the members. These similar operations perfect the Body of Christ
and improve the total human good of order. In this wider context, the causal sequence
does not “stop” in the recipient but rather the recipient is a secondary cause to mediate
Christ’s work in history. Therefore, in Lonergan’s framework the criteria for using the
category of efficient or exemplary causality depends on whether Christ’s work is proper
to Christ or mediated through secondary causes. When the work is done in Christ, it is
work proper to Christ, objective redemption. When that work is applied to others, it is
still work proper to Christ even though faith and repentance are required. However, faith
and repentance are not the efficient cause of the application of Christ’s objective work.
They are conditions for such application. When that work is done through Christ’s
members, it is not work proper to Christ alone. In this case, what is “proper” to Christ is
the proportionality of the effect. But the work is mediated through secondary causes. In
all three stages, it is the work of Christ. In all three stages, there is an effect correlative to
the work as cause. However, in the first two stages the intelligible relation between cause
and effect involves no mediation.
The foregoing explains why Lonergan reserves the categories of efficient and
exemplary causality to the work of Christ which is mediated through others, that is, when
there is a proper causal series from Christ as man, to his ministerial agents, to the created
effect. In the application of Christ’s objective work to his members, there is no notion of
mediation. Therefore neither efficient nor exemplary causality apply.
Nevertheless, there is a causal relationship when what has been done in Christ is
now done in and for the whole body. The challenge for Lonergan is to explain this causal
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relationship without recourse to either efficient or exemplary causality. How then is the
application of Christ’s objective work to be understood?
The causal relationship in the application of Christ’s objective work is a mystery.
We cannot understand this mystery perfectly. We can understand it imperfectly and
analogically. The key analogy for Lonergan is the unification of two or more through the
love which is called friendship. A friend is a second self, “half of one’s soul.”142
Therefore two or more persons can be as one through the unification of love.143 Since
friends are one through a union of love, then a friend can do “something” for another
friend, and that “something” is a reality, not just a notion. There is a real effect. Using
this analogy to understand the relation of head and members, Lonergan explains how one
can understand, imperfectly and analogically, why what is done in Christ is now done in
and for the whole body.
In brief, then, the historical causality of Christ involves a form of causality not to
be confused with efficient or exemplary causality. It is a cause absolutely proper to
Christ, that is, not mediated through further secondary causes. It presumes unification of
head and members for the cause to be activated. Christ’s objective work is the cause.
Application of his work is the effect. How is the cause activated? It is activated through
union with Christ when one becomes a member of Christ’s body. In Lonergan’s thought,
this unification in and of itself is not a cause in the strict sense. It is a condition for the
application of Christ’s objective work.
For Lonergan, this unification is initiated through the sacrament of baptism. If we
lose sight of Lonergan’s context we can misinterpret him, particularly when we try to
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reconcile what the Church has taught regarding the causes of justification. The Council
of Trent taught that the efficient cause of justification is God, the meritorious cause is
Christ, and the instrumental cause is the sacrament of baptism (DB 799; DS 1529; ND
1932). Lonergan is consistent with Trent, though when it comes to the sacrament of
baptism he does not explicitly refer to this sacrament as an instrumental cause. He holds
this view implicitly. In his final chapter he had called to mind the teaching that the
sacraments confer grace ex opere operato (DB 851; DS 1608; ND 1318). As an
instrumental cause, the sacrament in and of itself does not possess the power to confer
grace. In Lonergan’s notes he distributed in 1940-1941 for the course De sacramentis in
genere,144 he explains that sacraments act by signifying because Christ acts by signifying
when he commands the effect of the sacrament.145 Signification, on its own, does not
possess the causal power proportionate to the effect. Again, we have recourse to the
reality of mediate efficient causality. No instrumental cause in and of itself is
proportionate to creating an effect. Baptism confers grace not because of the mechanics
of the sacrament itself, but because Christ has commanded that through this sacrament
grace be conferred.
144
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7.8

The Historical Causality of Christ: Christ’s Work Mediated through the
Members

7.8.1

Preliminary Remarks
Christ’s ongoing work in history is mediated through the Body of Christ. One

aspect of this ongoing work is the set of similar operations of satisfaction, merit,
obedience, and intercession produced in the members. Through these similar operations
the members not only mediate the work of Christ in history but are themselves perfected
as members of the body. Christ directly intends this perfection because he directly
intends that the members be prepared for the future life in heaven. The members can
only be perfected if they become members in the first place. Therefore, Christ also
intends to propagate the Body of Christ in history.
According to the principle of continuity, it is fitting that the Body of Christ is
realized on earth not in an apocalyptic fashion, but rather through propagation. This
propagation, if it is to conform to the principle of continuity, fittingly involves
communication of, and conformation to, Christ’s message. The former necessitates the
preaching of the gospel. The latter necessitates faith and repentance. This propagation
proceeds from Christ as mediate efficient cause and is realized within a social dynamic.
The gospel is preached, understood, and actualized through human cooperation which
depends on mutual understanding and agreement. This causal sequence is not a
necessity, but it is intelligible and fitting given the principle of continuity. Any single
person is a potential cause. Actual causes, however, are typically social agents.
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Lonergan understands the propagation and perfection of the Body of Christ
through the categories of efficient and exemplary causality. Propagation is primarily
through efficient causality. Perfection involves both, but Lonergan’s emphasis is on
exemplary causality. As such, we will treat his understanding of Christ’s ongoing work
in history according to the division of efficient and exemplary causality.
Christ’s efficient causality is operative in two ways:
One is that which he now performs in heaven seated at the right hand of the Father and
living for ever interceding on our behalf...The other action is that which he performed
twenty centuries ago in Palestine but which has never ceased to have an influence on
history in the past and will continue to do so always, to the end of time.146

In the next three sections we will treat Christ’s efficient and exemplary causality.
The first two sections are related to Christ’s efficient causality, divided according to the
distinction in action Lonergan describes in the above passage. The third section will treat
Christ’s exemplary causality.

7.8.2

Christ’s Efficient Causality as Historical Agent

As a historical person, Christ is an agent who exerted and continues to exert
efficient causality. This agency originated at a particular place and time in history. This
is the work of Christ in history which Lonergan resolves into the specific cause “Christ
the Historical Agent.” He does not mean that Christ’s historical causality is limited to the
work strictly associated to the historical Jesus. When he speaks of Christ as a “historical”
agent he is referring to the agency associated with Christ acting specifically as a historical
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person. He is not implying that other categories of Christ’s agency are not historical.
They are also historical since they produce historical effects.
Historical agency can be individual or social, but it is highly unlikely that
individual agency will create a lasting effect without social agency. Lonergan certainly
knows that originating ideas come from the creative genius or the creative minority, to
use Toynbee’s terminology.147 However, ideas are rarely actualized without the
cooperation of others. For Lonergan, human cooperation is the foundation of virtually
the whole of human causality.148 We need to explain why he holds this position.
Human beings desire particular goods. They desire these goods on a recurrent
basis. A human being is also an agent acting through intellect, meaning that he or she
can understand the conditions which need to be fulfilled in order to produce an effect.
The effect desired is the recurrent availability of particular goods. What determines the
conditions? God’s governance of the actual world order ultimately determines the
conditions. For Lonergan, the intelligibility of actual world order is explained through
the theory of emergent probability. It is thus emergent probability which governs any
requisite conditions for a potential cause to be an actual cause.
There is however an overriding condition which precedes any particular condition
whatsoever. Lonergan noted earlier in the Supplement that no created being is capable of
unconditioned operation.149 What he means is that every finite efficient cause is
conditioned. Finite causes are conditioned in two ways. First, to exercise efficient
causality assumes the fundamental conditions that there is an object, a patient if you will,
upon which the finite cause acts in the first place. However, no finite cause is capable of
147
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creating. God alone can create. Second, every finite cause presupposes the fulfillment of
other, specific conditions which place the cause and the object of its influence in an
appropriate relationship such that the cause can actually produce an effect in the object.
Unless these conditions are fulfilled, a finite cause cannot produce an effect.150 It is true
that another finite cause can fulfill one or more of these conditions. But that finite cause
is also operating according to efficient causality, and so its efficient causality is also
conditioned. Going down this route ends up in an infinite regression and so we can judge
with Lonergan that no finite cause is proportionate to fulfilling the conditions. Only God
is proportionate to fulfilling the conditions.151 Hence the judgment that no created being
is capable of unconditioned operation.
Furthermore, and this is the critical point, it is very rare for all the requisite
conditions to be fulfilled by a single agent. Even though any one of us can be a cause in
potentiality, it is another matter to be a cause in actuality. We need others to fulfill the
conditions so that we can be actual causes in the production of a recurrent series of
particular goods. This is why human causality, especially in modern cultures which have
so many series of particular goods, is so dependent on human cooperation. There are
conditions for any created cause to produce an effect, and those conditions are not so low
in number or trivial in nature that a single person can fulfill all the requisite conditions.
The foregoing is an interpretation of why, in Lonergan’s thought, human causality
is essentially a communitarian enterprise. Since there are no divine afterthoughts in the
design and governance of world order, the principle of continuity can be used to
understand Christ’s efficient causality as a historical agent. Christ’s agency as a
150
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historical person is not exempt from the practical need of human cooperation to fulfill
requisite conditions such that potential causes become actual causes. Therefore, it is
fitting that Christ’s work is mediated through others who understand and agree. Since
Christ is an agent acting through intellect he can and does influence other agents acting
through intellect, resulting in a proper causal series. The causal series began in Palestine.
The series radiates outwards, in space and time, through generation after generation. In
this series, Christ acting as God remains the principal efficient cause. And Christ acting
as man is the principal secondary cause.
These are true judgments regardless of the time elapsed, the space traversed, or
the number of secondary causes involved in the causal series. In Lonergan’s
understanding of causality, the reason why the principal cause is precisely principal
cannot be defended in terms of spatiotemporal proximity. The inclination to use this as a
criterion is a product of picture-thinking, of allowing the imagination to control how one
is to understand the axiom “God operates in everything that operates.” Causality is real
because there is a real relation of dependence in an effect as influenced by a cause. This
is true regardless of whether God uses secondary causes or not, or how many secondary
causes are involved in the causal sequence. God is really, and not in name only, the
efficient cause of every event.152 When we apply this to the agency of Christ the
historical person, it is not only true that he is the principal secondary cause of the causal
sequence, but it is equally true that he remains the principal secondary cause no matter
the time elapsed, no matter the space traversed, no matter the number and generations of
secondary causes who mediate his work in history. The intelligible relation of
dependence can always be traced back to Christ the historical person as cause.
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The foregoing provides a general explanation of why a principal cause remains a
principal cause even in a causal series that traverses time and space. Since history is
concrete, Lonergan does not leave us with a vague notion of how to understand this
causal series. He explains the nature of the agency. The ultimate ground of the reason
why Christ the historical person remains principal cause in the causal series is because
Christ is an agent acting through intellect. A single idea from a single agent acting
through intellect can effectively determine a flow of human operations in history. As an
agent acting through intellect, Christ influences other agents acting through intellect. He
informs an indefinite number of acts of the will through history. As such, this aspect of
Christ’s historical causality is real and ongoing. It is to be interpreted as a proper causal
series beginning with the agency of Christ the historical person (A), mediated through
others (B), producing historical effects (C). The historical effects are the propagation and
perfection of the Body of Christ. Christ is the mediate efficient cause. His members are
ministerial agents (secondary causes). The effect is only proportionate to Christ,
therefore the effect depends more on Christ than on the members.
Though the effect depends more on Christ than on Christ’s members, Christ’s
agency is adapted to human persons:
In addition, Christ's action, although mediated socially and historically, is personal and is
adapted to human persons. For the Word became flesh in order to be for human persons
an expressive sign of a divine person (cf. Art. 3). Since human knowledge begins from
the senses, the Word of God became perceptible.153

Governing this statement is the principle of continuity. It was appropriate that
Christ’s agency be mediated through others according to the nature of human
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communication. Human communication is based on signs and symbols, as Lonergan
explained in his first chapter. He explained there that the first and basic medium of
human communication is the human body. The body, as a medium of communication, is
constitutive of what Lonergan later described in Method as “incarnate meaning:”
Incarnate meaning combines all or at least many of the other carriers of meaning. It can
be at once intersubjective, artistic, symbolic, linguistic. It is the meaning of a person, his
way of life, of his words, or of his deeds. It may be his meaning for just one other
person, or for a small group, or for a whole national, or social, or cultural, or religious
tradition.154

In that first chapter, Lonergan also elaborated that if the whole body manifests the
hidden movements of the soul, then articulate speech and its transmission admits of a far
greater development and specialization.155 He is referring here to what he later described
in Method as “linguistic meaning:” meaning mediated through speech or writing.
In Lonergan’s first chapter, in his article on signs and symbols, he did not provide
an explicit definition of the “meaning” (sensus) of signs.156 We do have an explicit
definition in Insight, which is consistent with a later definition in Method.157 In each text,
in so far as meaning is simply cognitive, what is meant is the real. The real is known
through experience, understanding, and judgment. The term of meaning is the meant, the
known. A formal act of meaning is conceptualization, but a full act of meaning includes
judgment on whether that conceptualization is true. An instrumental act of meaning is an
expression, a sensible manifestation of a full act of meaning, for example through
gestures, deeds, speech, or writing.158
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Christ’s communication of incarnate meaning, which includes linguistic meaning,
is an instrumental act of meaning, a sensible manifestation of his full act of meaning.
This communication then informs the very meaning of the Body of Christ. Christ
communicates his individual meaning to his members, and this meaning is meant to
become common meaning. The Body of Christ is a community, and community is not
just a group of people in spatiotemporal proximity, but an achievement of common
meaning.159 Just as a full act of meaning in the individual involves experiencing,
understanding, and judging, common meaning includes the common field of experience,
common understanding, and common judgment. In terms of constitutive or effective
meaning, we add the elements of decision and action. In this regard, common meaning
includes common commitment and common action intended to achieve a course of action
proceeding from a common understanding and agreement (judgment).
Thus, Christ’s efficient causality includes the communication of meaning, but in a
way fittingly commensurate with the nature of human communication because of the
principle of continuity. Christ’s communication of meaning is meant to produce common
meaning within the Body of Christ. That common meaning is not simply cognitive
meaning, but constitutive and effective meaning. The members mediate Christ’s agency
in history to produce actual effects in accord with Christ’s intentionality. These effects
are the propagation and the perfection of the Body of Christ, and improvement in the
overall human situation.
Though Christ is the mediate efficient cause in this proper causal series, the
members of the body cannot perform works as a secondary cause without the assistance
of grace. One might expect therefore that the Supplement would include a significant
159
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treatment of grace. This is not the case, at least in my interpretation. This is easily
explained. There are two primary reasons.
First, Lonergan is not one to rehearse significant developments which he had
already addressed in his corpus. To produce a theology of grace, in and of itself, is a
significant and difficult undertaking. Prior to the Supplement, he had already written a
substantial systematic theology of grace, De ente supernaturali.160 He did not feel the
need to rehearse what is otherwise a large systematic effort.
Second, Lonergan’s explanation of the historical causality of Christ focuses on
extrinsic causality. He would consider the imperfect and analogical understanding of
grace operative within the human person as knowledge known through intrinsic causes,
just as he had stated that the intrinsic causes of Christ are dealt with in the treatise on
Christ’s ontological constitution.161 For example, in De ente supernaturali, Lonergan’s
first thesis assumes the doctrine that intellectual creatures can and do obtain God as he is
in himself. The purpose of the thesis is to explain how this is possible.162 The thesis
already assumes the uncreated communication of divine nature to intellectual creatures.
If one is focused on extrinsic causality, the focus will then be on the uncreated
communication of the divine nature rather than the intrinsic causes of grace, as is the
focus of De ente supernaturali. Not surprisingly, the Supplement’s treatment of grace
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focuses on the uncreated communication of divine nature. That focus is most explicit in
Lonergan’s final article where he answers the question cur Deus homo?
In Lonergan’s theology of grace, the uncreated communication of divine nature to
intellectual creatures is the efficient (extrinsic) cause of the created communication of
divine nature in the intellectual creature. In De ente supernaturali, this created
communication (created, habitual grace) is explained as the remote principle of the habit
of charity. In turn, the habit of charity is explained as the proximate principle of
operations (acts) of charity by which God is attained as God is in God’s self. In De ente
supernaturali, Lonergan focuses on the intelligibility to be had in the intelligible
relationships between the remote principle (habitual grace), the proximate principle (habit
of charity), and the operation (act of charity). The focus is on intrinsic intelligibility, that
which is intelligible in itself. This does not exhaust the intelligibility, since there is an
extrinsic cause. However, one can treat this intrinsic intelligibility in its own right.
In the Supplement, Lonergan does not ignore the role of sanctifying grace, the
infused virtues and gifts of the Holy Spirit, or sacramental grace. Yet there is a focus on
the uncreated communication of the divine nature, the gift of the Holy Spirit. Even here,
the most extensive treatment of uncreated grace in the Supplement is not meant to explain
why God chooses to communicate grace in the first place. It is meant to explain why
God chooses to communicate this grace through one who is both divine and human. That
grace enables one to perform truly supernatural works is assumed. Lonergan had already
worked out his own systematic understanding of this in De ente supernaturali. Why God
chooses to communicate grace through a God-man is a different question. For Lonergan,
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the answer to this “why” is one of the reasons for the God-man, part of his explanation of
cur Deus homo.
Cur Deus homo is of course also the title of Anselm’s famous work.163 It is
inconceivable that Lonergan’s treatment of the question is not meant to provide a contrast
to Anselm. It is not my purpose here to provide a full interpretation of Lonergan’s
answer. My intent is to uncover how his answer informs his understanding of the
historical causality of Christ.
The final article where Lonergan takes up the question cur Deus homo begins
with the judgment that to ask “why?” is to ask about a cause. His question is not so much
on how Christ as cause does what he does, but rather why Christ is the type of cause that
he is. The question in a certain respect is related to the question of final causality. It is a
question of why it is fitting that the end of redemption be brought about not just by one
who is divine, but by one who is both divine and human.
Lonergan’s answer is that the Son of God became man to communicate divine
friendship to God’s enemies in due order. The key to why this communication is from
one who is both divine and human is the qualification in due order. Before we attend to
this we will explain what this communication is in itself.
Divine friendship is the mutual benevolent love proper to the divine persons. It is
the friendship in which the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit necessarily and
eternally will divine good to each other. Since this willing of divine good is common to
all three divine persons, it is the divine goodness itself, the good by essence which only
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applies to God. Lonergan explained this in his first chapter. Friendship with God means
that divine goodness itself, which is both eternal and proper to the divine persons alone,
is communicated to intellectual creatures in time such that it then becomes common or
shared by intellectual creatures. Specifically, this communication is communication of
proceeding Love itself, the uncreated gift of the Holy Spirit.164 The distinction between
communication of divine goodness itself and communication of proceeding Love is based
on the scholastic distinction between essential and notional attributes of God.165
God could have communicated God’s friendship directly from heaven. However,
the qualification that this communication is in due order is a qualification meaning that
God works according to the divine plan of redemption conceived by divine wisdom and
chosen by divine goodness. Since this plan is in harmonious continuation with the actual
order of reality, it is fitting that this divine plan of redemption be carried out through (1)
secondary causes, (2) in accordance with their natures, and (3) in accordance with the
nature of friendship. The first is the principle of cause. The second is the principle of
continuity. The third includes the principle of the extension of friendship.
Without the last principle Lonergan would not be able to offer fitting reasons for
the God-man. God communicates grace through the God-man because it is customary for
God to act through secondary causes according to the principle of cause. However, this
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secondary cause cannot be a human person simpliciter. The principle of cause would be
preserved, but that person would not be a friend of God by his own right. The principle
of the extension of friendship is only preserved if this person is a friend of God by his
own right. Only a divine person subsisting in a human nature preserves both of these
principles. With respect to the communication of uncreated grace, Lonergan’s answer to
cur Deus homo not only explains why God chooses to communicate his goodness to
finite creatures but also why he chooses to communicate it the way he does, that is,
through a God-man. Ultimately, God communicates his goodness to finite creatures so
that enemies of God can become friends of God. God communicates this grace through
the God-man because it is fitting to do so in accordance with both the principle of cause
and the principle of the extension of friendship.
The principle of continuity also adds to Lonergan’s fitting reasons for the Godman. However, this has more to do with Christ as exemplary cause, not the efficient
cause of the communication of uncreated grace. We will treat that when we come to our
section on Christ as Exemplar. But before we do so I will return to Lonergan’s
understanding of sacramental grace.
Christ’s action in history, mediated through the Church, brings about and deepens
the renewal of the interior person through the grace conferred in the sacraments, grace ex
opere operato (DB 844, 851; DS 1601, 1608; ND 1311, 1318).166 Lonergan does not
treat sacramental grace to any large extent. Again, since his focus is on extrinsic
causality, his focus is on Christ as mediate efficient cause of the sacraments even though
there are ministers of the sacraments operating as secondary causes. The ministers of the
sacraments have the power to confer grace, but that power comes from Christ. There is a
166
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proper causal series. The effect is only proportionate to the mediate efficient cause
(Christ) even though a secondary cause (the minister) is operative. Christ as mediate
efficient cause of sacramental grace is not to be thought of in terms of a mechanical
causal sequence. The causal sequence in sacramental grace has nothing to do with bodily
contact, nothing like an artisan using an instrument to produce a work of art. In
Lonergan’s understanding, the grace conferred in the sacraments is grace ex opere
operato not because Christ’s human nature is some sort of literal instrument but rather
because Christ commands that grace be conferred through the sacraments. He can do so
because he is not limited to acting on his own physical body, that is, not limited to
physical causality. Christ is an agent acting through intellect. The causal power of the
sacraments is rooted in Christ’s intentionality, in Christ’s command, not in his human
nature. His human nature is the instrument of the signification.
In summary, Lonergan’s explanation of Christ’s efficient causality, as a historical
person, is an explanation of how Christ propagates and perfects the Body of Christ in
terms of extrinsic causality. In this regard, Christ, acting as man, is a ministerial
historical agent of God. Those whom Christ works through are also ministerial historical
agents. Some are also ministers of the sacraments. All are called to be ministerial
historical agents in the sense that Christ intends to perfect them by producing in them
operations similar to which Christ produces in himself. Through these operations the
members are not only perfected, not only prepared for the future life in heaven, but
turned from evil to good, from enemies of God to friends of God, such that through their
good works they are ministers of Christ who improve the overall human situation
according to Christ’s intention.
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7.8.3

Christ’s Efficient Causality as Ongoing Mediator

Christ continues to work in history after his death, and Lonergan understands this
through the category of efficient causality. There are three basic elements in Lonergan’s
thought: (1) Christ mediates a new and better covenant; (2) Christ lives on interceding on
our behalf; and (3) Christ maintains his priesthood forever and his offering is one,
complete, and everlasting sacrifice.
Lonergan’s focus is on the third element. It is true that the members of the body
are to offer sacrifice as Christ has offered sacrifice. For Lonergan, a sacrifice is a proper
symbol of a sacrificial attitude.167 Though each member of the body is to offer their
entire life to God as an expression of his or her sacrificial attitude, Lonergan’s focus is on
the social dimension of the sacrificial attitude, the Eucharistic sacrifice. The Eucharist is
the proper symbol of the sacrificial attitude of the members of the Body of Christ.168
Why is this the focus? Lonergan wants to explain the historical causality of
Christ in terms of reconciliation because, for Lonergan, the entire work of Christ is
summed up in reconciliation. Reconciliation is expressed metaphorically as drawing near
to God, or approaching God with confidence. The focus is thus on the Eucharist because
the members draw near to God and to one another through participation in the Eucharist.
This does not mean that Christ’s work as historical person is not also oriented to
reconciliation. The entire work of Christ, resolved into causes, is oriented to
reconciliation. Since Lonergan is proceeding by way of analysis, he is selecting a
category in which to discuss reconciliation. Reconciliation is an effect of participation in
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the Eucharist. In the very mystery of the Eucharist the victim is the same and the
principal priest is the same. Christ is now the eternal Priest at the right hand of the
Father. It is appropriate that the category in which to explain the causal relationship
between the work of Christ and the historical effect of reconciliation be under the heading
of Christ as ongoing mediator.
The significance of interpersonal relationships is also clear in Lonergan’s
understanding of reconciliation. Reconciliation occurs through the interpersonal
relationships which hold together and vivify the Body of Christ. From the outset of the
Supplement, the importance of interpersonal relationships has been established based on
Lonergan’s understanding of the nature of any human good of order. Interpersonal
relationships hold together and vivify any particular human good of order. The same is
true for the Body of Christ. The Body of Christ is also a human good of order, but a
supernatural order. So the relationships themselves are supernatural.169 They are
supernatural because they are ultimately grounded in the uncreated gift of the Holy Spirit,
proceeding Love itself. This is why Lonergan states that reconciliation comes from the
Father through the Son and is accomplished in the Holy Spirit.
Lonergan’s category of Christ as celestial mediator certainly accords with the
creedal affirmation that Christ ascended into heaven. Here Lonergan is also establishing
a causal link to the resurrection. He is implying that the power of the resurrection is a
means of redemption rather than the death of Christ alone, in accordance with the
169
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doctrine established in his third chapter. In article 21 (“The Power of the Resurrection”)
he stated that the redemption is brought about by a Mediator more than by a means, and
is established upon the death and resurrection of Christ than upon the fact of his death
alone.170 The power of the resurrection includes the ascension to the right hand of the
Father and the sending of the Spirit. Through this category, Lonergan is weaving into an
explanation of Christ’s historical causality both the relevance of Christ’s resurrection and
the relevance of Christ’s sending of the Spirit at Pentecost.
Finally, although Christ’s agency as celestial mediator is a work of Christ which
originated outside of history, the effect is still within history. The work of Christ
resolved in the particular cause of Christ as ongoing mediator is still constitutive of
Christ’s historical causality. The effect is produced in history.

7.8.4

Christ’s Exemplary Causality
Lonergan’s explanation of Christ’s exemplary causality is not meant simply to

explain how Christ’s members ought to imitate Christ. This is true but rather obvious.
Lonergan’s point is that Christ’s exemplary causality is grounded in divine wisdom and
chosen by divine goodness, and as such reveals what he calls the “principle of the
dispensation” (principium oeconomiae).171 The principle is a “...certain dispensation or
ordering of reality in such a way that what is done with respect to the exemplar should of
necessity be done with respect to the other members of that dispensation.”172

170

Lonergan, DBM, 142 [Supplement, 58].
Lonergan, DBM, *254 [Supplement, 107].
172
“...quamdam oeconomiam seu rerum ordinationem ut, quod in exemplari factum sit, etiam in caeteris
fiat necesse est; et sic Christus per modum exemplaris nostram salutem operatus est.” DBM, *254
[Supplement, 107].
171

304
The principle itself is clear from scripture. Those whom God foreknew he also
predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son (Rom 8:29).173 The principle is
revealed through the life of Christ, both with respect to who Christ is and what Christ
does. If we can determine the principle as concretely realized in the life of Christ, we can
explain how it should fittingly apply to Christ’s members. This is Lonergan’s approach.
For Lonergan, there are three basic elements determined in the life of Christ that
are also, by way of an exemplar, to be realized in Christ’s members. These elements are
based on (1) the Father’s relationship to Christ, (2) who Christ is in himself, and (3) what
Christ does.
The Father’s Relationship to Christ: God the Father loves as his natural Son
Christ the man. Since what is true concerning the exemplar himself ought to be true for
us, then the Father loves us with a similar love. The Father’s love for the Son is
Proceeding Love itself, the Holy Spirit. Fittingly, this love is communicated to Christ’s
members according to exemplary causality. Through the sending of the Spirit the
members receive created, sanctifying grace, and are made adopted children of the Father.
Lonergan makes the link between uncreated and created grace by stating that the Holy
Spirit has us as its “term” (terminetur).174 The notion of adoption is a fitting analogy
since it is an exemplar of filiation yet it preserves the distinction between a child of God
according to nature (Christ) and children of God according to grace (Christ’s members).
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Who Christ is: Since Christ is a divine person operating in a human nature, Christ
not only has human powers but also habits and acts which are supernatural. Again, since
what is true concerning the exemplar ought to be true for the members, the operations of
the members ought to be modeled on the pattern of a divine person operating in a human
nature. As such, along with sanctifying grace the members receive the infused virtues,
gifts of the Holy Spirit, and actual graces (movements of the Spirit).
What Christ does: Lonergan states that, according to the principle of exemplarity,
it behooves us to complete what are lacking in the sufferings of Christ (Col 1:24). The
members are to suffer with him so that they may be glorified with him (Rom 8:17).175
Lonergan identifies the pattern of Christ’s suffering, death, resurrection, and glorification
as Christ’s “principal acts” (principalibus actibus), though he notes that the principle of
exemplarity applies to Christ’s other actions as well.176
This pattern implicitly refers to the law of the cross, which Lonergan explained in
his fourth chapter. I have no doubt that for Lonergan the principal act of Christ which the
members are to imitate is self-sacrificing love that returns good to evil done such that
God can transform evil into good. In no other way does God draw good out of evil than
according to this law. It is appropriate to refer to this principle act as the “law of the
cross” precisely because the term “law” is the meaning of the cross generalized in such a
way that it applies to Christ as well as to the whole economy of salvation. For Lonergan,
the law of the cross is the governing principle in the economy of salvation.
Our choosing this law, understood according to exemplary causality, involves (1)
grasping the intelligibility of this principle, (2) judging this principle to be true, and (3)
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judging this principle to be of utmost value and thus worthy to be chosen. This process is
what Lonergan had, in “Essay on Fundamental Sociology,” described as an effective
assent to the intellectual form.177 This affective assent is an act of love for the intelligible
form such that the individual or community is not merely swept up and predetermined by
the physical flow of history. To be swept up by the physical flow of history is to be
swept up in the reign of sin, to accept the status quo, as to either (1) shrink from the
redemptive suffering that would return good to evil, or (2) perpetually return evil to evil
in a vicious cycle of violence as if this would solve the underlying problem. Either way,
the action performatively treats the absurd as if it were intelligible.
No doubt there are some, whether individuals, groups, or even nations, who do so
without even realizing they are doing so. For them, to return good to evil is
counterintuitive, folly, weakness. No doubt, there are those who see this approach for
what it is: counterproductive and bound for failure. They know this intellectually, but
they performatively choose to return evil for evil anyway, because returning good to evil
is simply not a value, or perhaps not valuable enough. The law of the cross is not able to
trump the other values they hold, even if those other values, from a theological
perspective, are only apparent values. In no way am I suggesting that there are not cases
where returning evil to evil may be necessary. For example, Lonergan’s understanding
of the law of the cross is not one that suggests we should abandon our legal system, a
system that returns the evil of punishment (for example, incarceration) to the evil of sin
(for example, crime). In my interpretation, although Lonergan would acknowledge such
cases, these are not to be used as argumentative examples to undermine the fact that God
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has revealed that, all else being equal, it is God’s will that we return good to evil done in
accordance with the law of the cross.
For Lonergan, at the very heart of subjective redemption is the liberation of
human beings from a mindset that either (1) shrinks from redemptive suffering that
would return good to evil, or (2) perpetually returns evil to evil in a vicious cycle of
violence. Evil is an objective absurdity, and it invites a choice. For Lonergan, if we
refuse to suffer evils willingly we deny that the absurd is absurd and therefore to be
endured. Responding to evil with evil treats the absurd as if it were intelligible. The
reign of sin only propagates. A real solution to the problem of evil is one that reverses
this absurd propagation in history to improve the human situation. However, returning
good to evil is counterintuitive to sinful human nature. As Lonergan notes in DVI, the
law of the cross is recognized only through the Holy Spirit.178 The one who has not been
enlightened by the Holy Spirit, the one who does not have the mind of Christ, will judge
that the law of the cross is folly.179
The historical causality of Christ that overcomes this sinful mindset involves a
proper causal series. This needs a bit of explanation. Since both the Head and members
are agents acting through intellect, there is a causal series originating from divine
wisdom, mediated through the agency of Christ as man, communicated to Christ’s
members, such that both Christ as man and his members perform operations according to
the model that is the law of the cross. The communication of this law from God to Christ
as man, and from Christ as man to Christ’s members, are each instances of exemplary
causality. The communication of grace through efficient causality makes it possible to
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return good to evil in the first place. The communication of grace, understood according
to efficient causality, heals and elevates the human person to be able to perform such an
operation. For Lonergan, this communication of grace has a wider scope. The
communication of grace is not simply the communication of divine friendship under the
aspect of efficient causality. Lonergan’s answer to cur Deus homo reveals a deeper
meaning. There is also revelatory grace, which is to be understood according to
exemplary causality. The grace of revelation instructs the minds and hearts of the
members as to how to act according to this law.
Christ’s communication of the law of the cross, understood in terms of exemplary
causality, complements Christ’s communication of grace, understood in terms of efficient
causality. In fact, a substantial influence underlying Lonergan’s fitting reasons for the
God-man is the influence of exemplary causality. It is fitting that human beings know
this law, know it as precept, and have an example to follow. However, in order for it to
be known and known as precept, it must be taught and believed. Human beings are
incapable of knowing this law through immanently generated knowledge. Most
importantly, human beings learn through linguistic and incarnate meaning. Even if we
know this law, we are more likely to choose it if we have a leader, an exemplar who has
chosen it first so that we might choose it too. The principle of continuity takes into
account the nature of human communication and its relationship to human imitation.
According to the principle of continuity, it was appropriate that divine agency
communicate and exemplify this law incarnately in Christ. This is one of Lonergan’s
reasons for the God-man.
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From the perspective of Christ, the law of the cross is communicated through
linguistic and incarnate meaning. From the perspective of his members, it is received as
intelligible and recognized as an utmost value. As an utmost value, it is a good worthy to
be chosen. All this is had through the assistance of the Spirit. Since the Body of Christ is
a supernatural good of order constituted by common meanings and values, the law of the
cross is meant to become a common meaning and value of the Church. When the law of
the cross becomes a common meaning and value, the members, collectively, are much
more likely to be actual causes in transforming evil into good rather than merely potential
causes. The reason goes back to the social nature of human causality. A member of
Christ’s body is more likely to be an actual cause when he or she is linked with others.
Effective cooperation with Christ is fundamentally a social reality.

7.9

Summary

Lonergan made a distinction between redemption as end and redemption as
means. In his final chapter, his focus is on the latter. Redemption as end is considered
inasmuch as it lays the foundation for the study of redemption as means. As end, it is
first in intention. As end, it is the created effect. Causality in history is not real unless
there is a created effect, since there is no change in the cause as cause. For this reason, he
stated at the beginning of the chapter that if we neglect the end we have a poor
knowledge of the means, and that if we ignore the effect we have a poor knowledge of its
cause. He starts with the end, the effect, in order to understand the means, the cause.
Understanding the means is equivalent to understanding the cause of redemption.
God is the absolute first cause. God’s agency entered human history through Christ.
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Lonergan’s understanding of the historical causality of Christ is essentially an
understanding of God’s entry into human history, into “man’s making of man,” mediated
through Christ. Christ as God shares this ultimate agency with the three divine persons.
Christ as man is a secondary, ministerial agent of God. All aspects of Christ’s work
prescind from Christ’s intentionality and are oriented to redemption as end. The ultimate
end is the divine goodness itself, outside of history. There is a secondary end within
history, the Body of Christ. It is an end because it possesses the goodness of the primary
end, and is loved by Christ for its own sake. The historical causality of Christ, as means
to this end, is the inauguration, propagation, and perfection of his body in history.
Through incorporation into his body, members are reconciled to God and to one another.
This reconciliation restores the historical order of the universe. Since a part exists for the
sake of the whole, this restoration restores the order of the universe itself. How does
Christ gather all earthly realities to himself? For Lonergan, he does so by gathering and
reconciling the historical order to himself.
Finally, Lonergan’s understanding of the historical causality of Christ is not
understanding of a new truth. It is a more comprehensive understanding of an existing
truth, the doctrine of redemption. What he has presented amounts to what in Divinarum
personarum he calls a “new step” in comprehension: a theology that is more concrete
and more comprehensive that both deals with and seeks to understand the economy of
salvation as it evolves historically.180 His understanding of the historical causality of
Christ represents an answer to a question of intelligence that seeks more fully to
understand the mystery of redemption given the advent of historical consciousness. We
will explain this in our conclusion.
180
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CHAPTER 8:

CONCLUSIONS

In our introduction, we noted Bernard Lonergan’s comment to Frederick Crowe,
in August 1972, that the Supplement was to be an addition to his book De Verbo
Incarnato (DVI). In our conclusion, I will begin with a brief hypothesis explaining what
I believe to be the relationship between the Supplement and DVI.

8.1

The Supplement’s Relation to De Verbo Incarnato: A Hypothesis

In a Q&A session at the1974 Lonergan Workshop, Bernard Lonergan was asked
what he was currently doing in Christology:
Question: Would you say something about what you are now doing in Christology as
distinct from what you did in De Verbo Incarnato?
Lonergan: Well, what I am now doing in Christology is nothing!...When you write a
textbook in theology, you do what you can, for the rest you hand out the commune
doctorum. One of the things that I wanted to treat and worked toward treating but never
got around to actually putting it in a thesis form, is the historical causality of Christ. It is
the sort of thing that you need the theory of history and Christ as historical cause; even to
communicate the notions connected with it in Latin would be a matter of some difficulty,
which I did not altogether surmount, didn’t get around to doing when I was teaching. But
it is a fundamental question, a fundamental issue, and it’s perhaps the expression in our
time of Christ the King, Christ the historical cause fit in more with the way people have
been thinking. Categories that have meaning, a category more than a symbol.1

In this statement Lonergan refers to the historical causality of Christ that he
wanted to treat and worked toward treating. It is inconceivable that this unnamed work
is not the Supplement. Lonergan did not forget this text.2 In his response quoted above,
there is concrete evidence that he intended to put the Supplement, or part thereof, into
thesis form.
1

Lonergan Workshop Q&A, June 19, 1974. Transcription available at 812A0DTE070 / TC 812 A&B at
www.bernardlonergan.com.
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I state this position in response to Frederick Crowe’s comment that “the work that he [Lonergan] forgot
he had written had actually treated the historical causality in 1958, and indeed had done so at some length.”
Crowe, Christ and History, 19. Crowe does however grant the possibility that Lonergan may have not
counted as a “work” a manuscript he never published. I believe this to be the case.
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The question is then raised about how this thesis form would be published. If it
was to be an additional thesis to one of his own texts, it would have been intended as an
additional thesis to DVI. This is supported by a statement he made in 1962:
Finally, there is the theological mediation of history, the point I have already made when
I spoke about the human good as corrupted by sin and restored by the redemption. This
is the notion that I developed in Insight in chapter 20 – well, the corruption by sin in
chapters 7 and 18 and the conception, the introduction, in chapter 20 of the supernatural
as the one way in which the surd of sin can be eliminated from the human good. And I
have developed that in the seventeenth thesis of my notes De Verbo incarnato on the
meaning of redemption. The meaning of the death of Christ is that death is at once the
penalty of sin and the source of our salvation. There is a reversal of roles. What had
been the penalty of sin becomes the source of our salvation. And that reversal of roles is
the key Christian, Catholic point in history. The doctrine of loving your enemies and
being good to those that hate you, that doctrine of the Sermon on the Mount, is what
meets the problem of evil in human life, what breaks the venom of the virus of sin, stops
it, as it were, in its tracks, transforms it into something entirely different. And that is the
fundamental aspect, to my mind, of the intelligibility of history. I hope some time to add
a further thesis to my De Verbo Incarnato that will bring that out somewhat more: the
historical action of Christ.3

Given the dating of the Supplement, and given the statement above, the first
element of my hypothesis is that the Supplement, considered as a whole, is not a
supplement to DVI. In fact, I do not believe it was ever originally intended as a
supplement to anything Lonergan wrote. I do believe, however, that after publication of
DVI Lonergan had the subsequent intent to pull material from the Supplement, explicitly
on the historical causality of Christ, and transpose it to thesis format with the intent of
adding it to DVI.
This element of the hypothesis, however, does not answer the question of why
Lonergan started on this project in the first place. I will reply to this question in the next
section. How Lonergan would follow this through in a practical manner is a different
question. He could have intended this to be a standalone text; a work unrelated to any

3

A lecture at Regis College where the topic was “Method in Catholic Theology:” Lonergan, Early Works
on Theological Method I, 259.

313
course at the Gregorian. On the other hand, perhaps he intended it as a supplement to one
of his courses. If this was the case, it would have been intended as a supplement to his
Christology course, specifically during the cycles when he was using Boyer’s manual.4
During his Roman period, Lonergan taught Christology seven times.5 For the first
three courses he used Boyer’s manual. As Crowe notes, Lonergan was not yet ready to
provide his own manual. Using Boyer’s manual meant that he was not entirely free to
plot his own course and soon felt the need to write supplements on certain questions.6 In
1954 he produced the notes De ratione convenientiae. Then, in 1956, De constitutione
Christi ontologica et psychologica. It is not an unreasonable possibility that Lonergan
originally intended the text as a supplement to Boyer’s manual.

4

Writing supplements was not uncommon. Furthermore, Lonergan had already written De ratione
convenientiae (1954) and De constitutione Christi ontologica et psychologica (1956) to supplement his
course while he was using Boyer’s manual. As to why Lonergan would feel the need for a supplement on
redemption, I can only speculate. In the next section I will indicate that Lonergan explicitly refutes any
view that reduces redemption essentially to the notion of satisfaction. Boyer certainly notes that Christ’s
satisfaction was not necessary, but convenientiae. There is no disagreement with Lonergan here. Most any
theologian at the time would agree to this. Nevertheless, Boyer does tend to reduce the means of
redemption to the means of satisfaction, and Lonergan most certainly would have taken issue with this. In
the third of Boyer’s four articles on redemption, he asks: “Utrum Christus moriendo pro nobis
satisfecerit?” The status quaestionis begins with the following statement: “Sensus tituli: Tota vis
praesentis quaestionis in determinato conceptu satisfactionis reponitur. Satisfactio pluribus sensibus accipi
potest. Ibi enim satisfactionis nomen rite iam usurpari potest, ubi mors unius quocumque modo alios a
poena vel malo quocumque liberat: quo sensu latiori iam nobis certum est Christum pro nobis satisfecisse,
cum in thesi XXV ostenderimus Christum per passionem suam a peccato et daemone nos liberasse. At
satisfactio magis determinatur includendo modum quo liberatio obtineatur; ita ut determinare modum quo
passio Christi pro nobis satisfecerit idem sit ac theologicam et ultimam rationem rederre ipsius
redemptionis.” [Meaning of the Question: The entire force of the present question is based on a
determinate concept of satisfaction. Satisfaction can be taken in many senses. For instance at the present
time the term satisfaction can rightly apply when the death of one in any way liberates others from
punishment or evil: now in the broader sense it is certain to us that Christ has made satisfaction for us, since
in thesis 25 we had shown that Christ through his passion liberated us from sin and evil spirits. But
satisfaction is more accurately defined by limiting it to the means in which liberation is obtained; in such a
way that to determine the means that the passion of Christ has made satisfaction for us is the same as to
express the theological and ultimate meaning of redemption itself.] Boyer, De Verbo incarnato, 340,
translation mine.
5
1953-1954, 1955-1956, 1957-1958, 1959-1960, 1961-1962, 1963-1964, and finally 1964-1965. Crowe,
Christ and History, 65.
6
Crowe, Christ and History, 65.
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Evidently the Gregorian ran out of stock of Boyer’s manual and Lonergan was
faced with options of finding another manual or writing his own. He chose the latter, and
in the course cycle 1959-1960 issued the first edition of De Verbo incarnato. The second
edition was issued in 1961, and a third in 1964. Again, it is not unreasonable that the
subsequent writing and publication of DVI preempted completion of the Supplement.
When Lonergan published DVI, the Supplement would have been in a file with an
unknown future, but there is evidence suggesting Lonergan may have continued to edit
the final chapter.7 In any event, a comparison of the structure and content of the
Supplement to DVI reveals that Lonergan most likely used the Supplement as a primary
source for Theses 15-17 of DVI.8 If this was the case, then the future of the Supplement
would hinge on the future of chapter 6. It is quite possible, even likely, that Lonergan
subsequently intended to use chapter 6 as source for the new thesis. I believe that having
completed a draft of the Supplement in May of 1958, and having then published DVI in
1960 with a second revision in 1961, Lonergan had in mind the notion of transposing
chapter 6 of the Supplement into thesis format with the intention of adding this as an
additional thesis to DVI. For some reason, when DVI was published he either did not
judge the material from chapter 6 as ready for publication or, as he stated in the 1974
workshop, there were difficulties he did not surmount in communicating notions of a
theory of history and Christ as historical cause into Latin.
In brief, then, it is my hypothesis that Lonergan’s original intent was to write a
systematic treatise on redemption which included treatment of the historical causality of
Christ. This was likely intended as a standalone text. However, we cannot rule out that it
7

Crowe, Christ and History, 101.
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 of the Supplement correspond to Thesis 15, 17, and 16 of De Verbo Incarnato,
respectively. Also, some passages are basically verbatim between the two texts.
8
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may have been intended as a supplement to his Christology course while he was using
Boyer’s manual. Regardless, once it was evident that Boyer’s manual would go out of
print, Lonergan wrote his own Christology manual. The Supplement went into a file. But
he did not forget this text, and he had in mind the notion to transpose chapter 6 into thesis
format with the intent of adding that thesis to DVI, to meet the need he called for in that
very text.9
Next we will turn to Lonergan’s question of the historical causality of Christ, and
to the essential elements in his answer to this question.

8.2

The Question of the Historical Causality of Christ

8.2.1

The Origin of Lonergan’s Question
Speculative theology, as with any inquiry, begins with a question. Lonergan’s

speculation on the historical causality of Christ is a response to a question arising from
historical consciousness. Historical consciousness is the advent of a more comprehensive
understanding of the human person. It is grounded in the realization that what makes a
human person who she or he is cannot simply be reduced to a constant human nature.
This is true to a degree. However, there is also a variable human historicity, what we
make of ourselves through the historical process. Human beings are products of history
and shapers of history. Our histories depend very greatly on the past, but we are free to
shape the future. For the most part, we shape the future through cooperation with others.
For Lonergan, following in the footsteps of Dawson, the concept of a variable
human history is bound up with the notion of culture. Very early in his career, Lonergan
9

Lonergan, De Verbo Incarnato, 416.
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held what he termed a “classicist” notion of culture. This was a notion of culture which
held a normative, idealistic, universalistic view of culture. It was a view of what culture
“ought” to be. It was a stable idea, grounded on the idea of a stable human essence,
informing a stable way of human life, thought to be normative for all peoples.10 Such a
notion of culture may have been thought to be normative, but it was certainly not
empirical. Empirical studies of concrete human living dismantled the older view.
Christopher Dawson was a pioneer in this effort,11 and Lonergan’s reading of
Dawson changed his notion of culture.12 He adopted Dawson’s anthropological notion of
culture, a notion of culture not as static but dynamic, not as universal but local, not as
abstract but concrete, not as constant but variable. It is not a perspective denying the
truth of universal human nature. It is, however, a perspective recognizing the particular
and concrete aspect of human living. That concrete aspect is one of development:
While classicist culture conceived itself normatively and abstractly, modern culture
conceives itself empirically and concretely. It is the culture that recognizes cultural
variation, difference, development, breakdown, that investigates each of the many
cultures of mankind, that studies their histories, that seeks to understand what the
classicist would tend to write off as strange or uncultivated or barbaric. Instead of
thinking of man in terms of a nature common to all men, whether awake or asleep,
geniuses or morons, saints or sinners, it attends to men in their concrete living.13
10

Lonergan, “Transition from a Classicist World-View,” 5-6; “Belief: Today’s Issue,” Second Collection,
92.
11
In Dawson’s The Dynamics of World History, he states: “... modern history is no longer satisfied with
rhetorical narrative or moral criticism. It seeks to understand the past rather as an organic process than as a
mosaic of isolated facts. It tends to pay less attention than in the past to the superficial activity of
politicians and diplomatists and more to the action of the permanent social and economic forces that
determine the life of peoples. Above all, it is coming to accept the new concept of Culture which has been
brought into currency by the anthropologists. It recognizes that the state is not, as the nineteenth-century
historians believed, the ultimate social unit and the final end of historical study. The cultural unity is both
wider and deeper than that of the state. It is not an intellectual abstraction or a by-product of the political
process. It is itself the fundamental social reality on which all the other social phenomena are dependent.”
See The Dynamics of World History, 19-20.
12
Lonergan read Dawson’s The Age of the Gods and credits that text for shifting his notion of culture away
from a classicist understanding: “In the summer of 1930 I was assigned to teach at Loyola College,
Montreal, and despite the variety of my duties was able to do some reading. Christopher Dawson’s The
Age of the Gods introduced me to the anthropological notion of culture and so began the correction of my
hitherto normative or classicist notion.” See Lonergan, “Insight Revisited,” Second Collection, 264.
13
Lonergan, “The Future of Christianity,” Second Collection, 161.
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Since concrete human living is characterized by variation and development, there
is in fact the notion of a person’s variable human historicity. Therefore, a modern,
anthropological notion of culture recognizes that culture does not automatically spring
from human nature as some normative, universal reality, as if human intentionality
played no role. The modern notion of culture grasped by historical consciousness
recognizes that cultures are products of intentional human activity, products of the
concrete meanings and values governing a particular way of life. This is why Lonergan
so often referred to the historical process as “man’s making of man.”
In brief, then, historical consciousness raised Lonergan’s awareness of the role of
culture in the human situation. His understanding of cultural development is at the heart
of his understanding of human development. This is a crucial point in understanding the
genesis of his interest in the historical causality of Christ. His interest in history is really
grounded in his insight into the influence of culture on human development, where that
influence can be for better or worse, for good or evil. This is why the cultural level is
most critical in his structure of the human good of order. This is why, in his thought,
cultural good is the best expression of human nature, and cultural evil is the worst. This
is why he judges that it is cultural evil that calls for a heaven-sent redeemer.
The juxtaposition between Lonergan’s awareness of the role of culture in human
development with what was already an interest in soteriology is the origin of Lonergan’s
question on the historical causality of Christ. The link is manifested in his early essays
on history. One also finds the link in his personal notes at the time he made his
breakthrough to functional specializations in theological method. In his breakthrough, he
identified two phases in theology. The first phase, mediating theology, mediates the past
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into the present. The second phase, mediated theology, is direct theological discourse
which takes its ground from the present with an eye toward the future. The functional
specialties of doctrines and systematics are part of the second phase. His handwritten
notes on his breakthrough to functional specializations reveal that (1) he conceived the
functional specialty of doctrines as a doctrine on history emphasizing redemption, and (2)
he conceived the functional specialty of systematics (designated “explanation” in his
notes) as a theological theory of history.14
Lonergan’s notes reflect his earlier insight, revealed in his student essays, on the
intimate link between history and redemption. Historical process, and therefore human
historicity, is not outside of the divine plan. History itself is constitutive of the actual
order of reality conceived by divine wisdom and chosen by divine goodness. Since there
are no divine afterthoughts, there must be an intelligible link between history and
redemption. The link between history and redemption grounds the heuristic notion
guiding Lonergan’s effort to explain the historical causality of Christ. He understands
history through the lens of redemption, and redemption through the lens of history.

8.2.2

The Nature of Lonergan’s Question
In Lonergan’s cognitional theory, he adopts from Aristotle the judgment that there

are two basic types of questions. The first is on the level of understanding. They are
questions for intelligence: What? Why? How? The second is on the level of judgment.
14

Doran, What is Systematic Theology, 152. On this handwritten page the four specialties of the first phase
of theological method are titled research, interpretation, history, and conversion. There is a second phase
also with four functional specialties, titled foundations, doctrine, explanation, and communication. In
Method in Theology, the specialty “conversion” will be named “dialectic,” and the specialty “explanation”
will be named “systematics.” This handwritten page is numbered A472 in file 7 of Batch V in the
Lonergan Archives, Lonergan Research Institute, Toronto. The page can be accessed at
www.bernardlonergan.com, file 47200D0E060 / A471 titled “Functional specialties: Breakthrough page.”
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They are questions for reflection: Is it so? Is it true? Transposed into theology, questions
for intelligence are related to systematics and questions for reflection related to doctrines.
Lonergan’s question is a question for intelligence, and theologically a question for
systematic theology. However, his basic question is not “what” redemption is. He does
explain this in the Supplement because he needs to explain this as a presupposition for a
separate question. His question is not primarily a question of what redemption is, but
how redemption is brought about, specifically through the historical causality of Christ.
Both the question of “what?” and the question of “how?” are questions for intelligence.
Where the former seeks the intelligibility of a thing in itself, the latter seeks the
intelligibility in another, meaning the intelligibility of how that thing is produced.
The question of “what?” was the basic question governing Lonergan’s final thesis
in DVI. There he speculated that the intrinsic intelligibility, or essence of redemption, is
the law of the cross.15 In his fourth and sixth chapters of the Supplement, he affirms the
law of the cross as the governing principle of the economy of salvation. In this respect,
his thought foreshadows DVI.
In the Supplement, however, his primary question is how redemption is realized in
history. So the question is more a focus on the extrinsic intelligibility of redemption
rather than its intrinsic intelligibility. Since a thing is understood through its causes,
extrinsic intelligibility is understood through extrinsic causes. Although redemption is a
supernatural reality, it is still a created reality. As with any created reality, it must have
an extrinsic cause. Only God is uncaused. Metaphysically, this means that the formal
cause or essence of any created reality cannot explain itself, in other words, cannot
explain why it is in act.
15

Lonergan, De Verbo Incarnato, 576-577.
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8.2.3

Lonergan’s Approach to the Answer
Lonergan’s approach to an answer is by way of analysis. There are two basic

elements. The first element resolves the work of Christ into specific categories
applicable to both objective and subjective redemption: satisfaction, meritorious
obedience, sacrifice, and intercession. Through these categories, Lonergan integrates
objective and subjective redemption while allowing for distinctions. Though Christ’s
work is mediated through his members, it is still the work of Christ. There is distinction
without separation.
The categories were established in his third chapter. In that chapter he also
discussed the category of the “price paid.” The reason Lonergan leaves this category
behind when he comes to his final chapter is because he is now integrating subjective
redemption into an understanding of the “whole work of Christ.” The giving of one’s
life, with respect to Christ’s members, is not a generalized condition applicable to each
and every member as a secondary cause, as a ministerial agent of Christ. On the other
hand, for Christ the giving of his life was a condition.
Consider Lonergan’s statement from article 17 (“The Payment of the Price”):
Redemption as means [ut medium] refers to that process by which this state [redemption
as end] arises or is brought about, not only by causality [causalitate] but also and
especially under that condition [conditione] most burdensome to Christ, namely, death on
the cross. The Word of God could have saved us without coming down from heaven; the
incarnate Word could have saved us without going through his passion and death; but in
actual fact it was through his passion and death that he did save us.16

In this passage, redemptio has a broader meaning than “ransom” or “payment of
the price.” Furthermore, the terms causalitate and conditione are found in the same
sentence and contrasted. Lonergan is using these terms in the technical sense to explain
16

Lonergan, DBM, 127 [Supplement, 52]. For the Latin text, see chapter 4, section 4.2.2.
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the dependence of Christ’s historical causality, understood as redemption as means, on a
particular condition. That condition was the giving of his life. Hypothetically, God
could have saved us in any number of ways, or not at all. However, scripture is clear that
God directly willed a condition for Christ to be the cause of our salvation. That condition
was the burdensome condition of giving his life. God directly willed this condition not in
the sense that God directly willed the evil perpetuated by those who crucified Christ.
God never directly wills evil. God willed this condition in the sense that God directly
willed Christ’s obedience and love in accepting his suffering and death. For Lonergan,
this payment of the price or ransom is a condition applicable to Christ’s causality, but not
applicable as a condition for the instrumental (secondary) causality exercised by Christ’s
members who mediate Christ’s ongoing work in history. Christ died once and for all for
the salvation of all. This is why, in his final chapter, the category of “payment of the
price” is not included with satisfaction, merit, sacrifice, and intercession.
The second element resolves the work of Christ into its causes, its forms of
agency, to understand how Christ propagates and perfects the Body of Christ in history
through the categories of satisfaction, merit, sacrifice, and intercession. Propagation
refers to the work of Christ in history to apply to his members the fruit of his objective
work such that what has been done in Christ is now done in and for the whole body.
Perfection refers to the work of Christ in history to produce similar operations in the
members, that is, operations of satisfaction, merit, sacrifice, and intercession modeled on
Christ. By producing similar operations in the members, Christ mediates his ongoing
work in history through his members, with the intent to prepare them for the future life in
heaven and to produce in them good works to improve the human situation.
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Lonergan’s approach also reveals an intentional concern to counter a theological
reductionism which would reduce our theoretical understanding of the work of Christ to
a specific category, say satisfaction, based on a theological method which deduces the
entire work of Christ from necessary reasons. In his fifth chapter on Christ’s satisfaction,
at the end of article 26 (“Division of the Question”), he noted that every theory gives rise
to further questions. He stated that Anselm’s theory is no exception. He raised a number
of questions in that chapter, the last being the following: “...must the whole work of
Christ be deduced from Anselm’s necessary reason, or is there some other way to come
to a theological understanding of this matter?”17 In that chapter, he never answered the
question.
He does answer the question, but it is found in his final chapter. There he states
that he does not follow those theologians preoccupied with deducing necessary
conclusions from a hypothesis of condign satisfaction or any other hypothesis, but rather
he subscribes to the method of Aquinas who looked to the concrete work of Christ and
put down as many reasons for it as he could, whether reasons of necessity or of
appropriateness, exemplified in a series of articles and in one outstanding article.18
This comment raises two points relevant to our interpretation of his theological
approach. First, Lonergan is interested in understanding the concrete work of Christ. He
is not interested in abstract theories of the work of the Lord deduced from hypothetical
necessities. Just as in Insight he used an empirical approach to developing his
cognitional theory, in the Supplement he uses an empirical approach to derive an
imperfect and analogical understanding of Christ’s historical causality. Relevant
17

Lonergan, DBM, *184 [Supplement, 76]. For the Latin text, see chapter 6, section B.1.
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doctrines are presumed based on the authoritative teaching of the Church. However, to
understand the meaning of those doctrines, he attends to the data of history, to human
development, to concrete human living. As he noted at the beginning of the Supplement,
only by attending to what is actual and concrete can one arrive at knowledge of created
good.19 Created good is an effect, whether in the order of creation or in the order of
redemption. You cannot understand a cause without understanding the effect. Any
historical effect produced by Christ is a created good. But all good is being, and being is
concrete. Therefore, if one intends to know the historical causality of Christ, albeit
imperfectly and analogically, one needs to attend to what is actual and concrete.
Second, Lonergan’s reference to a hypothesis of condign satisfaction is not a
reference to the doctrine of Christ’s satisfaction, but to the presupposition that the only
solution to sin must necessarily be condign satisfaction. Based on necessary deductions
from this necessary presupposition, one could deduce that the whole work of Christ is a
work of satisfaction, and not much, if anything, else. When referring to the work of the
Christ, Lonergan always includes Christ’s satisfaction in the wider context which also
includes Christ’s merit, sacrifice, and intercession.20 This applies both to objective and
subjective redemption. This is fitting simply from a doctrinal perspective. Christ’s work
on our behalf is not to be understood as excluding work on our part. Christ made
19

Lonergan, DBM, 5 [Supplement, 3].
In Lonergan’s final chapter he refers to Christ’s satisfaction on eleven different occasions, and in all but
one instance he always includes Christ’s merit, sacrifice, and intercession: DBM, *259 (2x), *260, *261,
*262, *266, *267 (3x), *272, *294 [Supplement, 110 (3x), 111 (2x), 113 (4x), 116, 125]. The one
exception is the very last sentence of the Supplement, where Lonergan states that it is appropriate that an
intermediary friend (the God-man) should make superabundant satisfaction for sin. There may be one of
two reasons he does not include merit, sacrifice, or intercession. First, since the Supplement is an
unfinished work, this last sentence may not have been intended to say all there is on the matter. More
likely, the reason is that the context of the statement involves an argument on why grace is superabundant.
All of Christ’s works are superabundant. I believe Lonergan’s point, as I stated in my interpretation of that
chapter, is that Christ’s superabundant satisfaction for sin is superabundant not because it was a
supererogatory deed, but because it was performed by a divine person.
20
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satisfaction for the body, but penitents ought to make satisfaction for themselves (DB
904, 905, 922, 924; DS 1689, 1692, 1712, 1714; ND 1630, 1633, 1652, 1654). Christ
merited for us, but we also should merit (DB 809, 843; DS 1545, 1583; ND 1946, 1983).
Christ offered sacrifice once and for all, but Christ’s members are to participate in the
sacrifice of the Mass, a sacrifice which is truly expiatory (DB 940, 950; DS 1743, 1753;
ND 1548, 1557). Christ lives forever interceding on our behalf, but we also ought to
pray.21
However, from a systematic perspective, Lonergan’s method to understand what
“the whole work of Christ” really means is to proceed from concrete knowledge of the
human situation. For Lonergan, redemption is God’s solution to the problem of evil. The
problem of evil is not with God. The problem of evil is with human beings. So the
solution must address the human situation. This is why Christ works not for himself, but
for us. The only exception is the work of Christ understood under the aspect of merit.
However, even here Christ merits not primarily for himself, but for us.22 The point is that
Lonergan does not try to understand the doctrine of redemption, and therefore the
historical causality of Christ, by deducing necessary reasons from a necessary hypothesis,
whether a hypothesis of condign satisfaction or any other hypothesis. He attends to the
concrete world of human affairs because this is where the effect is located. You cannot
understand a cause if you do not understand the effect. So although Lonergan certainly
affirms that Christ offered satisfaction to God the Father on our behalf, the effect is not
had in God. The effect is in history.

21
22
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As such, there is indeed some other way to come to a theological understanding of
what “the whole work of Christ” could possibly mean. For Lonergan, that other way is to
establish the historical effects produced by Christ and then proceed to understand how the
work of Christ is causally related to the production of these effects. This is why he stated
that the work of Christ explained in his third chapter is better described as a principle,
rather than a means. That objective work of Christ is indeed a means. However, it is not
the whole means. There is more to the notion of redemption as means. A principle is
what is first in some order. Thus to understand “the whole work of Christ” one must also
understand Christ’s ongoing work in history proceeding from the principle. I believe this
is why the first article in Lonergan’s final chapter is titled De Opere Christi. I find it
hard to believe the title is not revealing of an intent to answer the question raised in the
previous chapter.

8.2.4

Essential Elements in Lonergan’s Answer

My purpose here is to summarize what I interpret to be five essential elements in
Lonergan’s understanding of the historical causality of Christ.
First, Lonergan understands every aspect of the historical causality of Christ as
unfolding from the divine plan conceived by divine wisdom and chosen by divine
goodness. This divine plan is divine providence. This plan unfolds according to divine
governance. Therefore, the historical causality of Christ can be understood as divine
governance to redeem the historical order according to the plan of divine providence.
As such, although the historical causality of Christ is a dynamic process playing
out in the dynamism of history, it is nevertheless grounded in something eternal and
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immutable: divine wisdom and goodness. Lonergan’s appeal to divine wisdom and
goodness, and his faith in the divine plan, is a thread weaved throughout the Supplement.
This thread ties each chapter to the other, each part to the whole.23
Second, Lonergan’s consistent appeal to, and faith in, divine wisdom is a rejection
of divine voluntarism. The divine will always chooses from that which divine wisdom
infallibly knows. The implication in Lonergan’s speculative theology is significant.
Since the divine will always chooses from what divine wisdom infallibly knows, then the
actual world order, down to the smallest detail, is intelligible.24 And since it is
intelligible, then redemption in history will be in harmonious continuation with the basic
principles of the actual order of reality. This judgment is based on the principle that there
are no divine afterthoughts. This was the fundamental theological principle guiding
Lonergan’s heuristic structure of the solution to the problem of evil, presented in chapter
20 of Insight. In the Supplement, the principle now functions not for the purpose of
anticipating what the solution to the problem of evil might look like, but how that
solution can actually be understood in its historical dimension. The principle is operative
throughout the text. In fact, it is the fundamental theological principle in the entire text.
It is the ground of the two other major theological principles operative in the Supplement:

23
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327
the principle of cause and the principle of continuity. It is the principle of principles.
The principle provides Lonergan with a critical guidepost to pursue an imperfect and
analogical understanding of the historical causality of Christ.
Third, although Lonergan takes an analytical approach that resolves the work of
Christ into its causes, each cause, in one way or another, is constitutive of God’s entry
into “man’s making of man” as mediated by Christ. This phrase acknowledges God as
the salvific agent. The phrase also acknowledges the role of human freedom and the
social nature of human causality. There is such a thing as a constant human nature. But
there is a variable human historicity in which human beings make of themselves who
they are. As Lonergan explained in his second chapter, who we make of ourselves is
played out in the historical order. This historical order is fundamentally a social reality.
Each of us will ultimately be judged on what we make of ourselves qua individuals. But
the process itself is a social dynamic because history is a social dynamic. Therefore, if
God is to enter into this process to help us make of ourselves what God intends, then it is
fitting for God to enter into this social dynamic, into “man’s making of man.”
God’s entry into “man’s making of man” is entry of a redemptive vector into
human history. This redemptive vector establishes, propagates and perfects human
cooperation with God to transform evil into good.25 Recall from Lonergan’s first chapter
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There is an implication here for developing Lonergan’s thought in the area of pneumatology. The end of
the two divine missions is the same. Therefore the secondary end is the same. A theology seeking to
understand the intelligibility of the mission of the Spirit would not be restricted to understanding the
formality of that mission, where for Lonergan that formality is (1) what constitutes a divine mission; and
(2) a contingent external term, so that there is a correspondence of truth to the judgment that a divine
person is truly sent. What constitutes a divine mission is a divine relation of origin. So what constitutes
the mission of the Spirit is the sending of the Spirit by the Father and the Son. The contingent external
term of the mission of the Spirit is habitual (sanctifying) grace. But in The Triune God: Systematics,
Lonergan acknowledges that to understand a mission one should also seek to understand the consequences,
the created effects if you will, consequent on that term. The two missions are for the sake of initiating and
strengthening new personal relationships between God and human beings. The Son initiates these
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that the general structure of history is a threefold approximation of progress, decline, and
restoration. Redemption is restoration through supernatural assistance. The redemptive
vector reverses historical decline and restores the line of progress, the line of human
development such that over time there is improvement in the total human good of order.
At the heart of this redemptive vector is Christ’s mediation of God’s meanings
and values into human history, specifically into human culture. It is cultural evil that
calls for a heaven-sent redeemer. Cultural evil is the most hideous, and human power in
and of itself is impotent to heal it. So it is principally cultural evil that needs to be
transformed into good. For Lonergan, the historical causality of Christ transforms
cultural evil by mediating God’s meanings and values into history. Through this
transformation, evils at the social and particular levels of the human good are also
transformed.
Furthermore, though Christ is the mediator of God’s meanings and values into
history, Christ himself uses ministerial historical agents to carry out his work. The Body
of Christ is the medium by which Christ continues to act in history. As Lonergan stated
years earlier, the ascent of the soul towards God is not a private affair. There is human
solidarity in sin which deforms knowledge and perverts the will, but there is also a divine

relationships (which Lonergan understands as reconciliation), and through the Spirit’s self-donation the
new personal relationships are (1) strengthened and (2) provided a foundation for cooperation with God. I
suggest here that the notion of cooperation with Christ (with God if you will) for the purpose of returning
good to evil done is a basis to develop Lonergan’s thought in the direction of pneumatology. In my
opinion, this would suggests that the first effect of the gift of the Spirit would be the healing of dramatic
and/or individual bias that judges good to be evil, and judges evil to be good. As Lonergan stated in
Insight, “...how is a mind to become conscious of its own bias when that bias originates from a communal
flight from understanding and is supported by the whole texture of a civilization?” This effect is foremost a
healing effect, a revelation to a person of his or her own bias such that evil can be seen for what it is.
Alternately I would describe this effect as a healing of the pure desire to know, a rehabilitation of the
natural orientation to ask questions, a healing from the flight from understanding such that one can allow
the entry of otherwise unwanted insights. See The Triune God: Systematics, 491; Insight, 8.
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solidarity in grace which is the mystical body of Christ.26 Lonergan understands this
body through the analogy of a human good of order, but a supernatural one. His
emphasis on the social dimension of grace is very prominent in his understanding of the
historical causality of Christ. As a Catholic theologian, he identifies sanctifying grace as
the contingent, external term corresponding to the truth of the judgment that the Spirit is
truly sent. At the same time, he does not think of the Body of Christ as simply an
aggregate of individuals who have sanctifying grace. A new reality is present. A “higher
synthesis” if you will emerging from the fertility of a concrete plurality of many persons
linked together, under Christ, such that it can truly be said that the members are members
of one another, joined to each other through a union.27 Lonergan understands this union
through the analogy of friendship, a friendship initiated by the communication of divine
friendship itself.
It is still Christ who is working in history, but now he is working through others,
through the social and historical agency of the members cooperating with Christ. Human
cooperation with Christ, as with any form of human causality, is fundamentally a social
dynamic. Human cooperation depends on common meanings and common values, on
common understandings and common agreements. An actual cause is not typically found
in the isolated individual, but in several working together with mutual understanding and
agreement on where they are going. The effectiveness by which the Body of Christ
mediates Christ’s work in history ultimately hinges on the degree to which the members
recognize and embrace the common meanings and values of the Head.

26

Lonergan, “Finality, Love, Marriage,” 27.
Years earlier Lonergan described the mystical body as a “concrete plurality” of many persons linked
together. He was using the notion of vertical finality to explain the nature of the mystical body, since
vertical finality operates through the “fertility of a concrete plurality.” See “Finality, Love, Marriage,” 21.
27
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Fourth, there is one meaning and value of singular importance. It is the law of the
cross. Since human cooperation is done in and through others, the law of the cross is
meant to become a shared meaning and value of those who follow Christ, with the further
intention of spreading to the wider culture. It is through returning good to evil that the
members of Christ’s body transform cultural evil into good, thus improving the total
human good of order. The law of the cross is a meaning because it is intelligible and
judged as such by members of the Body of Christ. This insight and judgment is only
possible through the assistance of the Spirit. Through this judgment, evil is seen for what
it is: the absurd, the unintelligible, that which is meaningless. The law of the cross is a
value because God has created a world in which God has judged it good to return good to
evil, and thus worthy to be chosen as a response to evil. When those who follow Christ
perform operations according to this law they performatively treat evil for what it is.
They refuse to treat evil as good, refuse to treat the false as true, refuse to treat the
unintelligible as intelligible, refuse to treat the meaningless as meaningful.
To live the law of the cross requires that the members of Christ’s body not shrink
from legitimate suffering. Legitimate suffering is redemptive suffering. For Lonergan,
we incline toward sin because we either knowingly shrink from suffering, or we
unknowingly shrink from suffering. We unknowingly shrink from suffering when,
finding no intelligibility in an unintelligible (evil) situation, our intellect substitutes one
unintelligible situation for another.28 Either way, in shrinking from redemptive suffering,
we performatively deny that the absurd is absurd and therefore to be endured.
Christ’s communication of grace makes it possible that we can operate according
to this law. Lonergan attends to this communication of grace, understood according to
28

Lonergan, DBM, 60 [Supplement, 25].
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extrinsic efficient causality. Christ, as historical cause, is the efficient cause, that by
which his members can return good to evil. But Christ, as historical cause, is also the
exemplar cause. He is the model according to which his members ought to return good to
evil done in accordance with the divine plan conceived by divine wisdom and chosen by
divine goodness. It is the model according to which Christ’s members are to love others,
even their enemies. As such, the law of the cross is the very model according to which
those who authentically desire to follow Christ are to love God.
According to the divine plan, it is fitting that this law be communicated to human
beings. Even though the communication of grace is required for us to be capable of
choosing and living the law of the cross, it is fitting that we know this law in the first
place. Absolutely speaking, “thematic” knowledge of the law is not necessary. There are
certainly those who, enabled by grace, act according to this law even though they could
not articulate this law in any systematic sense as we are doing here. However, since
redemption as means is in harmonious continuation with the actual order of reality, it is
fitting that Christ’s ministerial agents understand this law and recognize it as a value.
Theologically, this means is that in addition to the grace of God’s selfcommunication, there is fittingly the grace of God’s revelation. This revelation is
communication of what Lonergan later called the cognitive, constitutive, and effective
meaning of Christ’s message. “It is cognitive inasmuch as the message tells what is to be
believed. It is constitutive inasmuch as the revelation crystallizes the hidden inner gift of
love into overt Christian fellowship. It is effective inasmuch as it directs Christian
service to human society to bring about the kingdom of God.”29
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Fifth, since in scholastic metaphysics the exemplar cause is the extrinsic formal
cause,30 Lonergan implicitly associates the law of the cross as the extrinsic formal cause
of the redemptive vector in history. If we generalize this notion with the assumption that
the redemptive vector is operative in all places, then the law of the cross is the extrinsic
formal cause of history itself. In fact, in 1962 Lonergan explicitly stated that in his mind
the fundamental aspect of the intelligibility of history was the transformation of evil into
good according to this law.31
Lonergan is explicit that Christ is the exemplar cause when we imitate him.
However, Christ also operates according to an exemplar, a formam intentionalem. That
exemplar has been conceived by divine wisdom and chosen by divine goodness from all
eternity as the form of God’s solution to the problem of evil. That form, or exemplar, is
the law of the cross. It is the intrinsic principle of the economy of salvation. However,
since the economy of salvation is a created reality, albeit supernatural, it must have an
extrinsic formal cause. Since Lonergan’s focus on the historical causality of Christ is a
focus on extrinsic causality, it is appropriate that we identify what this extrinsic formal
cause really is. Lonergan does so, but he does so implicitly and he uses the language of
exemplar causality, not extrinsic formal causality. The law of the cross is the extrinsic
formal cause conceived by divine wisdom and chosen by divine goodness. Christ, as
man, mediates this law into history according to the divine plan. He does so by
inaugurating, propagating, and perfecting the Body of Christ. In fact, the Body of Christ
itself is produced by Christ according to this same law.

30
31

John F. McCormick, S.J., Scholastic Metaphysics (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1940), 165.
Lonergan, Early Works on Theological Method I, 259.
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For Lonergan, the law of the cross is the fundamental aspect, the fundamental
form or exemplar of the redemptive vector in history. In another text he identifies the
law of the cross as the “strictly theological complement” of his dynamic structure of
history.32 To the degree that this law is operative in history, it is then the fundamental
aspect of the intelligibility of history itself, the law by which God overcomes evil in
human history to redeem human history. Implicit then in Lonergan’s understanding of
the historical causality of Christ is Christ’s knowledge of, choosing of, revelation of, and
introduction of this law into human history. With a view towards the secondary end in
which all earthly things will be gathered and reconciled in Christ, the law of the cross is
the extrinsic formal cause of history itself, the model according to which Christ gathers
earthly realities to himself.
As we just noted, Lonergan had at one time explicitly equated the law of the cross
to the “strictly theological complement” of his dynamic structure of history. He made
this statement in the context of providing a response to a request. The request was to
provide a theological perspective on how a community of love adapts itself and directs
itself to effective mission and witness.33 I will end on this theme, because I believe that
Lonergan’s other motive for writing the Supplement, aside from the juxtaposition of his
interest in redemption with his own historical consciousness, was a desire to understand
the historical causality of Christ with the hope that a community of love could adapt and
direct itself more effectively in mission and witness.

32

“I have been asked for a ‘theological perspective on how a community of love adapts and directs itself
for effective mission and witness.’ Presumably the reason for the request lies in points I have made
elsewhere. There is in my book Insight a general analysis of the dynamic structure of human history, and
in my mimeographed text De Verbo Incarnato a thesis on the lex crucis that provides its strictly theological
complement.” Lonergan, “Transition from a Classicist World-View,” 7.
33
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8.3

The Practical Orientation of the Supplement

It remains a fact that within and outside of the Lonergan community, Bernard
Lonergan is best known for his cognitional theory and his theological method, due to the
publications of Insight and Method, respectively. However, the posthumous discovery of
his student writings of the 1930s34 led the editors of the CWL to “revise considerably”
their view of the course of his life and career.35 The contents of these student writings
revealed his interests in the economic, political, sociological, cultural, historical, and
religious fields rather than the gnoseological and metaphysical.36 The editors of the CWL
sum up his interests at this time as follows:
The restoration of all things in Christ (Ephesians 1:10) was closer to a motto for him than
‘thoroughly understand what it is to understand.’ The human good proved to be more of
a magnet than was cognitional theory. It was in the social order that the restoration
would take place and the human good realized, so there was a crying need for a summa
sociologica.37

As the editors note, the examination of Lonergan’s student writings provide, in
hindsight, the discovery that these interests run like a thread through the period from the
1930s to the 1980s.38 These interests reveal a desire to work on the field of theory for the
ultimate benefit of guiding praxis. Frederick Crowe suggested that Lonergan had
experienced a strong influence directing him to the world and its needs, and so to the
influence Christ had for the world’s healing.39
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The contents of his unpublished student writings were contained in a manila folder, which Lonergan
numbered 713 in the organization of his papers, and simply labeled “History.”
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vol. 2 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), vii.
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In fact, according to Robert Doran, perhaps the one thing that characterized
Lonergan’s mode of thinking and the cognitive authenticity that he encouraged in others
was his approach to practicality.40 For Doran, the main source of data for this facet of
Lonergan’s thinking is chapter 7 of Insight. In the year before he passed away, Lonergan
mentioned in conversation that the chapters on common sense (6-7) and on judgment (910) were the first chapters of Insight that he wrote, that they contained what he most
wanted to say, and that it was in order to substantiate his point that he wrote the first five
chapters of Insight.41 Chapter 7 treats progress and decline in history. There Lonergan
states that the principle of progress is liberty, and the principle of decline is individual,
group, and general bias. Collectively these biases set up the reign of sin, the social surd.
The practical upshot of chapter 7 was already indicated in the Preface to Insight.
There Lonergan asks the following question: “What practical good can come of this
book?”42 His answer boils down to this: insight into insight brings to light the
cumulative process of progress, and insight into oversight reveals the cumulative process
of decline.43 For Lonergan, “to be practical is to do the intelligent thing, and to be
unpractical is to keep blundering about. It follows that insight into both insight and
oversight is the very key to practicality.”44
For Lonergan, oversight is rooted in the fundamental problem which he calls the
“flight from understanding.”45 He stated that no problem is at once more delicate and
more profound, more practical and perhaps more pressing than the flight from
40

See Robert M. Doran, “Lonergan, An Appreciation,” The Desires of the Human Heart: An Introduction
to the Theology of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Vernon Gregson (New York: Paulist Press, 1988), 7.
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understanding. The reason has to do with the nature of the problem. “How is a mind to
become conscious of its own bias when that bias originates from a communal flight from
understanding and is supported by the whole texture of a civilization?”46 The reason the
problem is more profound than any other is because the root of the problem is a failure of
human intelligence itself. As such, human intelligence is incapable of contributing to the
healing of its own perversion, and does not even recognize the perversion for what it is.
The absurd is thought to be intelligible, the false thought to be true, and evil thought to be
good.
Thus what Lonergan most wanted to say “included preeminently a position on the
role of human intelligence in history and society, and on the relation of intelligence to
social and cultural progress and decline, especially in the view of the distinct dangers
confronting human society today.”47 In Insight he states that there is needed an
intelligent critique of the role of human intelligence in history before there can be any
intelligent direction of history.48 This approach to practicality in Insight is a long-range
approach. It is an approach which Lonergan described as “a withdrawal from practicality
to save practicality.”49 As with Insight, the practical upshot of the Supplement is the
intelligent direction of history. The Supplement is a systematic work through and
through. But it also has a practical purpose, and that practicality is a long-range approach
to praxis. Like Insight, it is a long-range approach because it tries to get at the root of the
problem. It is a practical approach because it assumes a broader understanding of what
praxis is in the first place. Situations are constituted by meaning, and a change in
46
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constitutive meaning is in the long run the most effective form of praxis.50 Situations
also reflect the values of a culture. Systematic theology is praxis to the degree it
promotes the changing of the meanings and values of a culture such that the human
situation more closely approximates the reign of God.51 I hold these viewpoints as my
own, but more importantly I interpret that Lonergan held them as constitutive of his longrange approach to praxis.
I believe this long-range approach to practicality was Lonergan’s other motive for
writing the Supplement. He intended to promote understanding of the historical causality
of Christ for the purpose of informing a practical theology of cooperation with Christ.
Evidence for the motive is clear from his own words. In the opening paragraphs he
explicitly states that the aim is a fruitful understanding to address our contemporary
problems. He states that it is hardly surprising that we here on earth have little inkling
about how heavenly things might be gathered in Christ. Then he adds that it would be a
more serious matter if we were to neglect the question of how earthly realities are to be
brought together since it is our duty to work with Christ who gathers these earthly
realities. As Frederick Crowe has noted, these opening paragraphs of the Supplement
establish the practical orientation of the whole work.52 The practical implication is that
the better we understand how Christ works in history for the world’s healing, the better
we can cooperate with Christ in the world’s healing. The better we understand Christ’s
means of directing history, the better we can cooperate with Christ to direct history.
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I end with what I argue is for Lonergan at the very heart of our cooperation with
Christ. Christ’s acceptance of the cross shows us how to love God, how to do God’s will.
Such love for God is possible because God has first loved us through the love of God
poured in our hearts through the Holy Spirit given us (Rom 5:5). Lonergan was very
fond of quoting Romans 5:5 in the latter part of his career, and he interpreted the passage
as referring to God’s love for us, not our love for God.53 Christians, in response to this
gift, are called to imitate Christ, to return good to evil done. Human development is had
by returning good to evil done such that evil is transformed into good according to the
wisdom, will, and power of God. Therefore, God’s entry into human history, through the
historical causality of Christ, is the objective entry of God’s meaning and value into
human history that is the law of the cross. For Lonergan, the implication is that there is a
very practical aspect to loving God. The litmus test for authentically loving God is to
return good to evil according to God’s will. For Lonergan, Romans 5:5 is perhaps the
singular passage best reflecting the judgment that God’s initiating love has entered
human history to redeem history. I suggest that Romans 8:28 is perhaps the singular
passage best reflecting his judgment on the practical meaning of the drama which unfolds
from God’s initiating love, mediated through the historical causality of Christ: all things
work for good for those who love God.
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